Learning from the west: policy transfer and political parties

Abstract

Policy transfer or policy learning between political parties has become more likely in the context of recent European integration. Parties are now keener to learn from their sister parties in other European countries. The need for new policy programmes was particularly acute for the communist successor parties (CSPs) of Eastern and Central Europe, which had to adapt their policies to new political and socio-economic structures. The subsequent transition period saw a number of CSPs attempt to ‘learn from the West’, often from the social-democratic parties (SDPs) of Western Europe. Policy was transferred between SDPs and CSPs in two main ways: ‘inspiration’ or ‘ideational transfer’; and active engagement through ‘transfer networks’. Nevertheless, SDPs are only one (external) factor in CSP policy making, and local opportunity structures ultimately determine whether a policy is adopted and/or adapted.

Notes

1. See, for example, R. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning across Times and Space (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, ‘Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature’, Political Studies, Vol.44, No.2 (1996), pp.343–57; C. Bennett, ‘Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross-National Adoption of Policy Instruments for Bureaucratic Accountability’, Governance, Vol.10, No.3 (1997), pp.213–3l; D. Stone, ‘Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines’, Politics, Vol.19, No.1 (1999), pp.51–9; M. Evans and J. Davies, ‘Understanding Policy Transfer: A Multi-Level, Multi-Disciplinary Perspective’, Public Administration, Vol.77, No.2 (1999), pp.361–85; E. Page, ‘Future Governance and the Literature on Policy Transfer and Lesson Drawing’, prepared for the ESRC Future Governance Workshop on Policy Transfer, available at <http://www.hull.ac.uk/futgov>, accessed 1 Nov. 2004; K. Mossberger and H. Wolman, ‘Policy Transfer as a Form of Prospective Policy Evaluation’, Future Governance Paper 2, available at <http://www.hull.ac.uk/futgov> accessed 1 Nov. 2004; W. Jacoby, ‘Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and Western Models’, Governance, Vol.14, No.2 (2001), pp.169–200; H. Wolman and E. Page, ‘Policy Diffusion Among Local Governments: An Information-Theory Approach’, Governance, Vol.15, No.4 (2002), pp.477–501; S. Padgett, ‘Between Synthesis and Emulation: EU Policy Transfer in the Power Sector’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.10, No.2 (2003), pp.227–45.

2. See Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy.

3. See G. Pridham, ‘Uneasy Democratizations: Pariah Regimes, Political Conditionality and Reborn Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe’, Democratization, Vol.8, No.4 (2001), pp.65–94; M. Zaborowski, ‘Westernizing the East: External Influences in the Post-Communist Transformation of Eastern and Central Europe’, in the present collection, pp.20–36.

4. See R. Gillespie and W.E. Paterson (eds.), Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1993).

5. This approach is used here and – in greater depth – elsewhere in this collection to evaluate SDPs as a model for the CSPs of Eastern and Central Europe since 1990; see in particular the articles by J. Sloam, ‘West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer’; P. Buras, ‘Polish Social Democracy, Policy Transfer and Programmatic Change’; and V. Handl and V. Leška, ‘Between Emulation and Adjustment: External Influences on Programmatic Change in the Slovak SDL’, in the present collection, respectively pp.71–87, 88–108 and 109–126.

6. Stone, ‘Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy’, p.51 (original emphasis).

7. For analysis of external influences, see Zaborowski, ‘Westernizing the East’. For more on the policy transfer continuum, see D. Dolowitz, and D. Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy Making’, Governance, Vol.13, No.1 (2001), pp.5–24.

8. Mossberger and Wolman, ‘Policy Transfer as a Form of Prospective Policy Evaluation’, pp.2–4.

9. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy.

10. R. Eyestone, ‘Confusion, Diffusion, and Innovation’, American Political Science Review, Vol.71, No.2 (1977), p.441.

11. C. Bennett, ‘How States Utilise Foreign Evidence’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol.11, No.1 (1991), pp.31–54; Mossberger and Wolman, ‘Policy Transfer as a Form of Prospective Policy Evaluation’.

12. Wolman and Page, ‘Policy Diffusion Among Local Governments’, p.480.

13. See Sloam, ‘West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer’.

14. See Zaborowski, ‘Westernizing the East’.

15. For an explanation of institutional isomorphism, see P. Dimaggio and W. Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American Sociological Review, Vol.48, No.1 (1983), pp.147–60; C.M. Radaelli ‘Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy’, Governance, Vol.13, No.1 (2000), pp.25–43.

16. J. Walker, ‘Innovation in State Politics’, in H. Jacobs and K. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971), pp.377–8.

17. W. Jacoby, ‘Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and Western European Models’, Governance, Vol.14, No.2 (2001), pp.169–200, at p.171. The possibility of institutional isomorphism is borne in mind in the country case studies later in this collection. That offer a broader analysis of the external influences on CSPs than this essay on party-to-party transfer. Where ‘influence’ is clearly identifiable but ‘policy transfer’ is not, ‘policy learning’ is generally referred to.

18. See R. Ladrech, ‘Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis’, Keele European Parties Research Unit Working Paper, No.7, Keele University, 2003. The idea of ‘Europeanization’ refers more correctly to ‘EU-ization’ – the process of adaptation to increasing European integration. See also S. Bulmer, D. Dolowitz, P. Humphreys and S. Padgett, ‘Electricity and Communications: Fit for the European Union?’, in K. Dyson and K. Goetz (eds.), Germany in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.251–69.

19. See Ladrech, ‘Europeanization and Political Parties’; Bulmer et al., ‘Electricity and Communications’.

20. I. Bache and A. Marshall, ‘Europeanization and Domestic Change: A Governance Approach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain’, available at <http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudies/FileStore/EuropeanizationFiles/Filetoupload,5456,en.pdf>.

21. I. Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum, Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

22. See W.E. Paterson, ‘Political Parties and the Making of Foreign Policy’, Review of International Studies, Vol.7, No.1 (1981), pp.227–35; J. Sloam, The European Policy of the German Social Democrats: Interpreting a Changing World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004).

23. J. Bara and I. Budge, ‘Party Policy and Ideology: Still New Labour?’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.54, No.4 (2001), p.591.

24. The SPD's Agenda 2010 proposed a wide range of significant reforms for the German welfare state, labour market and tax system, and was launched by the party leadership in 2003 (shortly after the 2002 federal elections), but bore little relation to the treatment of these policy areas in the election campaign and manifesto.

25. M. Dauderstädt, A. Gerrits and G.G. Markus, How Social Democrats, After the Collapse of Communism, Face the Task of Constructing Capitalism (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1999), pp.60–61.

26. See K. Lawson and P. Merkl (eds.), When Parties Fail (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); R. Inglehart, Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).

27. The gauche plurielle was a leftist alliance including the Greens, Communists and other smaller groups.

28. A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

29. G. Sani and G. Sartori, ‘Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies’, in H. Daalder and P. Mair (eds.), Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change (London: Sage, 1983), pp.307–40.

30. François Hollande, cited in Le Monde, 6 Aug. 2002, available at <http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_breve/1,13-0,37-768020,0.html>.

31. See Labour Party, 2001, Ambitions for Britain, at <http://www.labour.org.uk/manifesto> Parti Socialiste, 2002, Choisissons le progres–en avant le gauche, at <http://www.psinfo.net>; SPD, 2002, Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt – Wir in Deutschland, SPD-Vorstand, at <http://www.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1019292/Regierungsprogramm%20der%20SPD.rtf>.

32. Panebianco, Political Parties.

33. See C. Hay, ‘Structure and Agency’, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), Theories and Methods in Political Science (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp.189–206.

34. The Labour Party nevertheless left its major increases in public spending until its second term (beginning in 2001), after the public debt had been reduced from 60.8 per cent to 50.4 per cent of GDP: OECD, 2004, Economic Outlook No.75, Annexes, at <http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,2340,en_2649_33733_2483901_1_1_1_1,00.html>accessed 1 July 2004.

35. The Labour Party nevertheless left its major increases in public spending until its second term (beginning in 2001), after the public debt had been reduced from 60.8 per cent to 50.4 per cent of GDP: OECD, 2004, Economic Outlook No.75, Annexes, at <http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,2340,en_2649_33733_2483901_1_1_1_1,00.html>accessed 1 July 2004.

36. W.E. Paterson and A.H. Thomas, The Future of Social Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p.16.

37. Labour Party, Ambitions for Britain; SPD, Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt; PS, Choisissons le progress.

38. See Sloam, ‘West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer’.

39. See Budge et al., Mapping Policy Preferences.

40. The choice of documents may be open to the charge of selectivity when compared with the consistent use of election manifestos across time. Yet, as programmes have a different value in different parties and reflect alternative configurations of opinion within the party structure (explored in a contextual analysis), a more open approach to what constitutes a programme is required.

41. T. Diez, Die EU Lesen: Diskursive Knotenpunkte in der britischen Europadebatte (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1999), p.610.

42. A. Hoffman and V. Knowles, ‘Germany and the Reshaping of Europe: Identifying Interests – The Role of Discourse Analysis’, ESRC–IGS Discussion Paper Series, 99/9, University of Birmingham, 1999, pp.33–4.

43. Budge et al., Mapping Policy Preferences.

44. W. Grant, ‘Elite Interviewing: A Practical Guide’, Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper, 2000/11, University of Birmingham, 2000.

45. Although interviewees may not acknowledge the broader framework for policy making (as they may be ‘locked into path dependency’ – that is, have only one policy alternative – from their own perspectives), attempts should be made to bring the various layers of policy context (actors and structures) into the discussions.

46. Dolowitz and Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad’; Bennett, ‘Understanding Ripple Effects’; Evans and Davies, ‘Understanding Policy Transfer’; Jacoby, ‘Tutors and Pupils’.

47. See Sloam, ‘West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer’.

48. For similar arguments, see Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy; and Padgett, ‘Between Synthesis and Emulation’.

49. Dolowitz and Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad’, claim that such ‘interdependence’ leads to indirect coercive transfer.

50. S. Eyre and M. Lodge, ‘National Tunes and a European Melody? Competition Law Reform in the UK and Germany’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.7, No.1 (2000), pp.63–79, at p.64.

51. See Sloam, ‘West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer’.

52. See Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy. Communist ‘retreatist’ parties have been drawn towards the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) for similar reasons: see D. Hough and V. Handl, ‘The (Post-) Communist Left and the European Union: The Czech KSČM and the German PDS’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.37, No.3 (2004), pp. 333–6. See also Buras, ‘Polish Social Democracy, Policy Transfer and Programmatic Change’; Handl and Leška, ‘Between Emulation and Adjustment’; V. Handl, ‘Choosing Between China and Europe? Virtual Inspiration and Policy Transfer in the Programmatic Development of the Czech Communist Party’; and D. Hough, ‘The Programmatic Development of the Eastern German PDS: Learning What from Whom and Under What Conditions?’, in the present collection, respectively pp.127–145 and 146–164.

53. See Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy, p.5.

54. Dimaggio and Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited’, pp.150–52.

55. See Sloam, ‘West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer’.

56. Wolman and Page, ‘Policy Diffusion Among Local Governments’.

57. Evans and Davies, ‘Understanding Policy Transfer’, pp.374–6. The networks described in this volume are far from rigid, which makes sense of a focus on interactions between key actors (the ‘hubs’ of these networks) as reference points for the research.

58. P. Sabatier and H. Jenkins-Smith (eds.), Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), pp.16–20.

59. P. Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), p.3.

60. Interviews in 2003 with a number of officials and politicians from the three social-democratic parties and the Party of European Socialists confirmed the informal and ad hoc nature of these networks.

61. Haas, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, p.4; Virginia Gray claims that interaction increases the likelihood of the diffusion of policies: see V. Gray, ‘Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study’, American Political Science Review, Vol.67, No.4 (1973), pp.1174–85.

62. J. Walker, ‘The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States’, American Political Science Review, Vol.63, No.3 (1969), pp.880–99. Interaction in these networks is similar to the concept of ‘normative isomorphism’, where trans-organizational networks provide arenas through which ‘new models diffuse rapidly’: see Dimaggio and Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited’, pp.150–52.

63. See Handl and Leška, ‘Between Emulation and Adjustment’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

James Sloam

honorary Research Fellow in the Institute of German Studies, University of Birmingham