Abstract
The recognition of Turkey as a candidate country for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 has provided a new basis for Turkey–EU relations after long years of association. Post-Helsinki dynamics have strengthened the position of pro-EU circles in Turkey. However, continuing debates between pro-EU and Eurosceptic circles still constitute an important domestic factor shaping the dynamics of Turkey's candidacy process. The interaction between these circles is characterized by cleavages on political and economic aspects such as compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria and the obligations of the customs union between Turkey and the EU. In fact, such debates are influenced particularly by the EU's stance over Turkey's membership. Positive signals from the EU help to strengthen the position of pro-EU circles. On the other hand, ambiguous signals and controversial declarations from Europe tend to have a negative impact on the credibility of the EU's conditionality, amplify the arguments of Eurosceptics, and thereby undermine Turkish public opinion's support for EU membership.
Enlargement has long been one of the important activities of the European Union. Turkey, whose relations with the Union have developed quite differently from the others, became part of the EU's enlargement process in December 1999, when the EU recognized Turkey as a candidate country for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit. Candidacy has brought Turkey directly under the aegis of the EU's membership conditionality. Thus, a major transformation has started in Turkey. Many vital reforms have been undertaken in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, the domestic dynamics of Turkish candidacy have also served as relevant factors.
The case of Turkish accession is quite distinct from previous enlargements of the EU in several respects. Therefore, the case for and against membership has long been debated in both Turkish and European circles. The distinctive features of the Turkish case have led to particularly far-reaching debates in Turkey itself shaping the axis of pro-EU and Eurosceptic circles as well as the position of Turkish public opinion. Hence, Turkish perceptions of the EU generally swing between pro-EU and Eurosceptic views.
Turkish Path to Candidacy for EU Membership
Turkey was one of the first countries to develop an association relationship with the newly established European Community (EC) in 1963. Thus, when the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) started their formal relationship with the Community, Turkey and the EC had already had an association of almost three decades. Ironically, perhaps, Turkey is still a candidate country with an uncertain accession date while the ten CEECs have already become EU members.
The conclusion of an Association Agreement between Turkey and the EC was indeed a natural consequence of the Turks’ long-held desire to integrate with Europe. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, almost all Turkish governments have claimed a European orientation. One of the main aims of modernization in Turkey has been to be recognized as a European state. This aim has been strongly held especially by the Turkish intelligentsia and bureaucracy.Footnote1
The agreement envisaged the possibility of eventual Turkish membership of the EC as well as the gradual completion of a customs union (CU) between Turkey and the EC. However, the severe economic difficulties and political instability faced by Turkey prevented the expected evolution of integration in the 1970s and 1980s. Owing to economic problems, Turkey suspended its association obligations in the late 1970s. Political relations between the parties were also frozen after the 1980 military coup in Turkey.Footnote2
After returning to parliamentary democracy and initiating a series of reforms to liberalize its economy, Turkey officially applied for full EC membership on 14 April 1987. It was believed that Turkish economic liberalization would facilitate accession. However, although confirming Turkey's eligibility, the European Commission expressed a negative opinion in 1989 on Turkey's accession.
Subsequently, the parties intensified their efforts for the conclusion of a customs union. Accordingly, a CU that envisaged the free circulation of industrial products between Turkey and the EU entered into force on 1 January 1996. In this way, Turkey has achieved the strongest possible economic integration with the EU short of full membership. The CU has never been viewed as an end in itself by Turkey. It was rather regarded as a ‘final post to cross the road to full membership of the EU’.Footnote3 According to the Turks, their country was ahead of all other potential applicant countries.Footnote4 But it was soon understood at the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 that this was not really the case.
In Luxembourg the EU excluded Turkey from the list of candidate countries for membership. Turkey condemned the decision for being ‘unjust and discriminatory’ and reacted with a ‘deep and genuine anger’.Footnote5 The Turkish prime minister of the period, M. Yılmaz, expressed the general disappointment by stating that ‘Turkey was the only country that had signed a CU agreement with the EU and at the same time had been kept outside the Union's membership plans’.Footnote6 The Turkish government argued that Turkey had not been subject to the ‘same well-intentioned approach and objective criteria’ of the EU as the other applicant countries and suspended political dialogue with the EU. There were even some calls for the revision of the CU, although many thought that such an attempt would be impractical for Turkey.Footnote7
The stalemate in Turkish–EU relations continued until Turkey was recognized as a candidate country for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. This recognition has in a way provided a new basis for the resumption of relations. In the words of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, ‘The damage caused in Luxembourg was repaired in Helsinki’.Footnote8
‘Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States ... Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms’.Footnote9 These statements of the Helsinki Summit have been the centrepiece of Turkey–EU relations since 1999. The decision was welcomed with great enthusiasm in Turkey. Turkish rulers characterized candidacy as a ‘landmark event’.Footnote10 Turkish newspapers described it as a historical turning point and proof that the doors of Europe had been opened to Turkey irreversibly.Footnote11
The Domestic Dynamics of Turkish Candidacy
Candidate status does not provide any rights of membership. Therefore, Turkish candidature should not have involved any special costs to the EU. Even so, the candidacy decision has added the expected dynamism to Turkish–EU relations. Post-Helsinki dynamics have strengthened the position of pro-EU circles in Turkey. A strengthening civil society and public involvement in EU-related issues increased the pressure on policy makers. Important segments within the Turkish state bureaucracy, such as the ministry of foreign affairs, the secretariat for EU affairs and the state planning organization, have adopted liberal approaches to EU-related reforms.Footnote12
Non-governmental organizations in particular have served as an important source of pressure for reforms. The Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) are some of the active organizations in this regard. For instance, before the Copenhagen Summit, IKV headed a broad-based movement of 175 civil society organizations called ‘Movement for Europe 2002’ to provide collective support for Turkey's EU accession and reforms. The digital clock located opposite the Turkish parliament counted the days, hours and minutes revealing the time left to undertake reforms before the summit. This was a simple but effective means of imposing pressure on public officials. These organizations also played a crucial role in the mobilization of public support for reforms through widespread media campaigns.Footnote13
However, it would not be true to say that Turkey–EU relations have always worked smoothly. For instance, the decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey was taken in a very tense atmosphere on 3 October 2005 by the council of ministers in Luxembourg. The insistence of Austria to add an option of privileged partnership for Turkey instead of full membership in the Negotiation Framework Document, and Turkey's resistance to Austria's proposal, created a crisis in Turkey–EU relations. A consensus was reached between the parties late in the evening after a full day of intense negotiations. In the final document the absorption capacity of the EU was mentioned along with the Copenhagen criteria, while the privileged partnership option was left out.Footnote14
These kinds of tensions strengthen the suspicions of Eurosceptics in Turkey. According to Eurosceptics, the EU does not really intend to accept Turkey as a member country. From their point of view, the main aim of the continuing accession process is to keep Turkey in the EU's sphere of influence without offering a clear timetable for membership.Footnote15 A survey carried out among the representatives of various elites in the Ankara area (journalists, academics, businessmen and government officials in the foreign ministry) illustrated that Turkish elites viewed socio-economic problems, demographic issues including the size of Turkey's population and concerns within the EU about the issues of free movement of workers, political problems, human rights violations, religious, cultural and identity problems as the main problems regarding Turkey's EU membership. Thus, they were not hopeful about Turkey's prospects of joining the EU in the near future.Footnote16
There are also others who take a cautious approach towards Turkey–EU relations such as the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD). MUSIAD expresses its position ‘beyond the dilemma of being totally against or totally for the EU membership’ depending on the costs and benefits of EU membership for Turkey. Although MUSIAD favours a closer relationship between Turkey and the EU in general, it advocates a balanced and cautious integration with the EU. It claims that having drawn lessons from the previous experiences it should be kept in mind that the EU does not always keep its promises to Turkey. Furthermore, it argues that Turkey's destiny is not bound to EU membership alone but Turkey should also take its domestic dynamics into account.Footnote17
The opposition of some European circles to the possibility of Turkey's EU membership on the grounds of its lack of ‘Europeanness’ increases the hesitancy of Eurosceptics and cautious groups in Turkey. This hesitancy is also reflected in the ambiguous and biased attitudes of Turkish public opinion on most issues regarding the EU. On the one hand, the surveys indicate that a kind of EU fatigue has developed. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in spring 2006, the proportion of those stating that membership would be a ‘good thing’ has continued its decline in Turkey compared with the 2004 and 2005 results. In spring 2006, 44 per cent (55 per cent in autumn 2005) of the Turkish public indicated that EU membership would be a ‘good thing’ while 25 per cent (15 per cent in autumn 2005) indicated the opposite; in spring 2006, the undecided comprised a group of about 23 per cent. The belief that membership would be a ‘good thing’ was lower in Turkey than in Romania (62 per cent) or Bulgaria (53 per cent) and higher than in Croatia (34 per cent).Footnote18 Additionally, according to a survey conducted in Turkey by the private survey company A&G, the ratio of those stating that accession to the EU was a ‘must’ for Turkey declined from 68 per cent in 2004 to 57 per cent in 2005 and continued to decline to 32 per cent in 2006. On the other hand, the proportion of those opposing Turkey's accession to the EU increased from 9 per cent in 2004 to 10 per cent in 2005 and then leapt up to 26 per cent in 2006 (see ).Footnote19
Figure 1. EVALUATIONS OF EU MEMBERSHIP
On the other hand, feelings of being excluded by the EU are very widely held. According to a survey carried out under the title of ‘The Suspicion of Europe in Turkey’ at the end of 2003,Footnote20 34 per cent think that the EU has double standards in its treatment of Turkey and just under 50 per cent believe the EU is trying to distract Turkey and does not really intend to accept it as a member country. Nevertheless, a majority of Turks think that Turkey belongs to Europe geographically (some 60 per cent of respondents) and historically (about 50 per cent).Footnote21
Cleavages Regarding the Economic Aspects
An important distinctive aspect of the Turkish case of accession which pro-EU and Eurosceptic circles approach differently is the CU. Turkey was the first country to conclude a customs union with the EC without being a full member. Thus, Turkey is already practically part of the internal market for industrial goods and is scheduled to take over large parts of the acquis regardless of what happens on the accession front. In this sense it has achieved much greater integration than the CEECs had prior to their accession.Footnote22
The CU mainly involves the free circulation of industrial goods between Turkey and EU and excludes trade in agricultural goods. Its basic components are the removal of barriers in the trade of industrial goods, alignment of Turkish customs tariffs with the EU's common custom tariffs, harmonization of Turkey's commercial policy with the EU's common commercial policy, progressive adoption by Turkey of the EU's preferential trade agreements with third countries, and alignment of Turkish legislation with EU legislation in the areas of competition rules and protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights.
According to the Eurosceptics, the conclusion of a CU with the EU short of full membership creates an unbalanced relationship between Turkey and the EU. For example, the Ankara chamber of commerce sees it as a concession given to the EU for the sake of Turkey's possible EU membership, which means that Turkey has accepted the costs without receiving the benefit.Footnote23 Eurosceptics put their emphasis on crucial unilateral undertakings that Turkey has made under the provisions of the CU. Turkey has to align with the EU's common commercial policy and take on the EU's preferential trade agreements with third countries, although it is excluded from EU decision-making mechanisms. Outside those mechanisms, Turkey has no voice in the agreements that the EU concludes with third countries, so it is up to the EU to take Turkish interests into account during the negotiation process of the agreements.
In this context, Eurosceptics regard the CU as an artificial and one-sided system designed to incorporate Turkey within the EU without granting membership. They argue that the system created by the CU does not bring Turkey closer to equality in the EU but merely makes it dependent on the EU.Footnote24 Some even claim that the CU puts Turkey in a position similar to that between a colony and an imperial state, since the EU and Turkey do not have equal status under the CU.Footnote25 In other Eurosceptic circles the CU is viewed as a new form of deception, which indeed implies a return to the dependence caused by the capitulationsFootnote26 of the Ottoman eraFootnote27 as a consequence of the Copenhagen criteria of 1993.
On the other hand, pro-EU circles see the CU as an opportunity for Turkey to integrate with global markets and adapt to conditions of globalization. They highlight the CU issues that enable free movement of industrial goods, adoption of the EU's external trade tariffs, rules of competition, industrial and intellectual property rights, standards and certification as factors contributing to the competitiveness of Turkish industry. For instance, TUSIAD, which represents the owners of large companies, regards the CU as an asset creating more trade and paving the way for structural reforms. Moreover, it reiterates its support for further trade liberalization in services and public procurement harmonization with the EU.Footnote28 The IKV takes a similar stance, rejecting the argument that Turkey has simply lost out from its membership of the CU. Rather, the IKV asserts that it is not reasonable to evaluate the CU in a narrow perspective just considering its effects on trade between the parties concerned. The CU should be assessed in a broader context taking its positive impact on Turkey's competitiveness into account.Footnote29
The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) is also supportive of advanced economic integration between Turkey and the EU. The president of TOBB, M. Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, expressed his opinion on the subject by saying that ‘As far as the economic side goes, we are very pleased with what has been achieved in economic integration on both sides. Turkey worked for over a generation on the EU customs union. It was an ambitious target. We achieved it in 1996’.Footnote30 Nevertheless, it is also generally accepted in pro-EU circles that one of the most important disadvantages faced by Turkey under the CU is Turkey's exclusion from its decision-making processes. Actually, such a relationship seems hardly sustainable in the long term. Therefore, it is only by means of total integration that such a relationship could work properly in the future.
Another important aspect of the Turkish case is related to the EU's financial assistance. The association agreement between Turkey and the EU was based on mutual obligations: Turkey's obligation was to take concrete steps towards the CU while the EU's obligation, among others, was to provide financial aid to support Turkey's efforts.Footnote31 Within this context, the fact that Turkey received very little financial support either as a CU partner or as a candidate country compared to other candidates is the point that brings pro-EU and Eurosceptic circles together and reinforces Eurosceptic trends in Turkey (see and ).
Table 1 TURKEY–EU FINANCIAL CO-OPERATION
Table 2 EU FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN 2000–2006 (€ billion)
The EU allocated a fund of approximately €21.8 billion (1999 prices) to the Central and Eastern European Countries (ten new members including Bulgaria and Romania) under the SAPARD, ISPA and PHARE programmes for the period 2000–2006, while Turkey has been allocated €1.75 billion for the same period. In 2000, the amount of the grant per capita was €2.7 for Turkey, while that for Estonia was €46 and the per capita grant in the Czech Republic was €17; even the average financial assistance per capita was nine times more for Central and East European countries.Footnote32
Cleavages Regarding the Political Implications of Membership
Apart from economic and financial aspects, the political implications of Turkey–EU relations have often been subject to heated discussions between pro-EU and Eurosceptic circles in Turkey. Therefore, although fulfilment of the entire Copenhagen criteria is needed for EU accession, political criteria have generally been at the forefront of debates over the Turkish case.
Turkish Eurosceptics believe that compliance with the political criteria implies the danger of unilateral dependence and is contrary to Turkish national interests.Footnote33 They are not happy with the EU's increasing influence on Turkey's domestic politics as they think that this risks the loss of national autonomy and sovereignty. According to them, the current mechanism of political conditionality, which gradually weakens Turkey's ability to resist the EU's demands, might even lead to the disintegration of the country. Therefore, their approach to the reforms is sceptical, and they resort to a sort of bargaining with the EU over accession criteria.Footnote34
While pro-EU circles consider the EU as a civilization project and the Copenhagen criteria as a tool for the transformation of a modern Turkey, Eurosceptics relate the Copenhagen political criteria to the motives for the Tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman Empire. The term Tanzimat refers to a modernization process in the Ottoman era. The process started with the Imperial Decree of Gülhane which provided modern citizenship rights to Ottoman subjects – such as equality before the law irrespective of social status and religion, and the security of life, property and honour of all citizens – and aimed to create a state based on the rule of law. The decree was later supplemented by the Declaration of Reform Decree which in 1856 brought special new rights and privileges – such as the right to establish their educational institutions, freedom of prayer, and equal taxation – to Christian subjects. However, these modernization efforts were successful neither in preventing foreign countries from interfering in Turkey's internal affairs nor in preventing the collapse of the empire. This bitter historical memory has an impact on Eurosceptics’ perceptions of the political criteria and is still referred to as the ‘Tanzimat syndrome’ by some scholars.Footnote35
On the other hand, pro-EU circles are not only committed to EU membership as a general ideal, but also disposed to push for the reforms necessary to meet the political criteria. They regard Turkey's EU accession process as an opportunity for Turkish democratic consolidation. Therefore, they actively support the current reform process even though it implies a loss of autonomy over some policy areas. According to them, since European integration is based on a significant ‘pooling of sovereignty’, it is also natural that the EU's enlargement process should limit the sovereignty of candidates in some areas. Hence, it is not possible for the candidates to keep their domestic politics beyond the reach of the EU's influence.Footnote36
Besides, they do not think that the EU's political criteria imply disintegration or security risks for Turkey. For them, the most important risks stem from domestic instabilities. Thus, they view the EU accession process as a chance to resolve Turkey's own political problems. They believe that a Turkey which has overcome its major domestic problems will be more powerful and secure. Furthermore, once Turkey satisfies the Copenhagen criteria it will be harder for the EU to delay Turkey's accession. So, compliance with the political criteria should be perceived as a process accelerating Turkey's EU accession.Footnote37 Furthermore, it is imperative for the credible negotiation of Turkey's rights as a candidate country with the Union.Footnote38
In fact, the prioritization of human rights and democracy in Turkey–EU relations had started by the mid-1990s. This development was mainly due to important shifts in the international arena such as the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, and the membership applications of the CEECs which were influential in the construction of a European identity.Footnote39 As a result, the EU started to concentrate more and more on political and human rights issues in Turkey. The European Parliament has become especially critical of what it regards as Turkey's democratic deficiencies and human rights violations, thus creating public discontent. Nevertheless, the Turkish elite generally took the view that Turkey was a more democratic country than the CEECs and they did not consider the Copenhagen political criteria a serious threat to the prospect of EU membership until the Luxembourg summit of 1997. Thus, the Turkish government regarded the conclusions of that summit as the outcome of discriminatory and ‘concealed intentions’ towards Turkey.Footnote40
Until Turkey was recognized as a candidate country and offered an accession strategy, the Turkish political elite regarded the EU's demands concerning human rights – and particularly minority rights – as interference in Turkey's internal affairs.Footnote41 But the approval of Turkey's candidate status at the Helsinki summit in 1999 was seen as confirmation of Turkey's obligation to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria in order to be able to begin accession negotiations.Footnote42 Issues related to the political requirements of EU membership began to divide the political spectrum as the deadlines for the required reforms drew nearer. Thus, domestic debates on Turkey's EU membership have started to be politicized leading to confrontations between the political parties.
Whereas the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) became the main source of nationalist opposition, business circles, major non-governmental organizations and the mainstream right-wing parties – the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) – continued their support for political reforms. Although MHP did not totally reject EU membership, it found the EU's attitudes inconsistent and insincere. On the other hand, the military elite and left-wing nationalists also had some concerns. However, the Turkish military elite has always been careful to detach itself from an anti-EU label as on the whole it sees Turkey's political and economic destiny in Europe.Footnote43
The three-party coalition of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), the MHP and the ANAP that governed the country from 1999 to 2002 contained important cleavages regarding political reforms, such as abolition of the death penalty and the use of Kurdish in education and broadcasting. Only the ANAP took a clear pro-EU position among the coalition partners. But the ANAP did not have enough power to alter what had become a Eurosceptic configuration under the coalition government. These cleavages led to the disintegration of the coalition and a call for early elections.Footnote44 In what had become an election climate, the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved a package involving important political reforms such as the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, and legalization of broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish. This package, which was presented by the ANAP, was duly approved with the support of the DSP and opposition parties, despite the opposition of the MHP.Footnote45
The Justice and Development Party (AKP), a religious-rightist party, gained an overwhelming majority in the Turkish parliament in the early elections of November 2002 and established a new Turkish government. The AKP government adopted a clear pro-EU position different from earlier generations of religious-rightist parties, which generally expressed themselves in anti-EU rhetoric. For instance, in the 1970s the National Salvation Party described the EC as a Christian Club and suggested the establishment of an Islamic Common Market as an alternative. The religious rightist Welfare Party and Virtue Party adopted similar attitudes towards the EU: the Welfare Party was totally opposed to the Customs Union Decision. Therefore, the pro-EU attitude of the AKP implies a major transformation of the religious right in Turkey. The AKP government perceives EU integration as a process of democratization and the issues of religious rights and freedoms are seen within the context of this process.Footnote46 The AKP has defined itself as ‘conservative democrat’, which identity has enabled the party to declare its pro-EU position easily and without creating too much suspicion.Footnote47
On the other hand, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi, CHP), which was the only opposition party and which succeeded in getting into parliament in the 2002 elections, has had a rather lukewarm approach towards democratization reforms. The tendency of the party elites to establish causality between democracy and secularism was determinant in the CHP's position.Footnote48 The Republican elite has had concerns about the sincerity of the AKP regarding secularism as well as concerns about the EU with respect to national integrity and especially EU policies on minorities. Hence, they have been constructing a coalition with nationalists across the political spectrum, including elements of the left, with whom they share similar concerns.Footnote49
Turkish reformers have in a way benefited from a certain shift in favour of pro-EU circles after the Helsinki decision and especially after the AKP came to power. However, the current debates between these two circles still constitute an important domestic factor which may affect the future of Turkish political transformation. In fact, these debates are vastly influenced by the EU's stance over Turkey's membership. Positive signals from the EU help to strengthen the position of pro-EU circles. On the other hand, ambiguous signals and controversial declarations from Europe tend to have a negative impact on the credibility of political conditionality and thereby amplify the arguments of Eurosceptics.Footnote50
For example, following the decision to start accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 some signs of weakness emerged in the government's ‘decisive’ attitude towards the EU accession process. This was in some measure due to the unsolved problems regarding Cyprus, which led to disappointment within the government. Besides, the lack of encouraging feedback from the EU also played a role in the decelerating momentum in the reform process. The European Parliament Report on Turkey's progress towards accession prepared by Camiel Eurlings and adopted on 4 September 2006 ‘urged’ Turkey to reinvigorate the reform process and included controversial points such as opening Turkey's borders to Greek Cypriot vessels and aeroplanes and recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide as a precondition for accession. The negative tone of the report created unease in both pro-EU and Eurosceptic circles in Turkey. Reactions to the report came immediately from the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs. The report was criticized for being written under political influence and being incompatible with the honour and seriousness of the European Parliament in view of some of its remarks which were seen as being far from objective or even common sense. The original supporters of a pro-EU position such as the TUSIAD, TOBB and the IKV were also critical of the report.Footnote51
Turkey–EU relations were further strained by the EU's decision to suspend negotiations with Turkey for eight of the 35 chapters.Footnote52 This was because Turkey had refused to open its ports and airports to trade from Greek Cyprus. The EU demanded that Turkey should open its ports and airports as one of the requirements of the Ankara ProtocolFootnote53 relating to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. Turkey grounded its position regarding the Cyprus issue on its unfulfilled expectation of the ending of the isolation by the EU of the Turkish Cypriot community in the north of the island. Turkey's effort to break the Cyprus deadlock by offering to open up one port and one airport to trade from Greek Cyprus was perceived by the EU as a positive but insufficient step. Turkey's offer could prevent neither the partial suspension of negotiations nor the EU decision not to close any chapter provisionally until the Commission confirmed that Turkey had fully implemented its commitments with respect to the Ankara Protocol.Footnote54
The decision on partial suspension of accession negotiations has created deep frustration. Business circles and major non-governmental organizations known to be favourably disposed towards the EU voiced their resentment at the decision. TUSIAD's executive board chairman, Ömer Sabancı, described the decision as an unjust one that was not compatible with EU norms and called on the EU to be more rational and far-sighted in its negotiations with Turkey.Footnote55 The president of TOBB, Hisarcıklıoğlu, had a similar reaction, stressing that the Cyprus issue had become a test of goodwill for the EU.Footnote56 On the other hand, the IKV has drawn attention to the fact that the EU decision does not allow the provisional closure of other chapters until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fully implemented its commitments with respect to the Ankara Protocol. The decision has been criticized for creating uncertainty in the negotiation process.Footnote57
At the government level, the Turkish prime minister and general president of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, considered the EU's decision unfair.Footnote58 He indicated that a critical period had started in Turkey–EU relations, emphasizing that it would be a big mistake to drive Turkey away from the negotiation table.Footnote59 Foreign Minister of that time (currently the President of Turkey) Abdullah Gül argued that the decision was related to the inadequate vision of the EU for Turkey.Footnote60 The chief negotiator Ali Babacan stated that unilateral pressure on Turkey with respect to the Cyprus issue would not bring about a resolution.Footnote61 Nevertheless, the Turkish government underlined its commitment to continuing the reform process in Turkey.Footnote62 In fact, it should be taken into account that the positions of both sides are influenced to some extent by the election atmosphere both in Turkey and in Europe. The year 2007 has been marked by presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey and by presidential elections in France. Furthermore, European Parliament elections in 2009 will have implications for Turkey–EU relations.
Conclusion
Tensions in Turkey–EU relations tend to strengthen Eurosceptic feelings in Turkey. Controversies damage the credibility of the EU in Turkey and undermine the Turkish public's confidence in the EU and its institutions. Thus, relations between the two parties are becoming overshadowed by the problem of mistrust. In this context, the low level of trust of Turkish people in both the EU and EU institutions (about 35 per cent) is striking. The overall image of the EU is also on the slide. Only 43 per cent of the Turkish public found the image of the EU positive in the spring of 2006, compared with 60 per cent who found it positive in the autumn of 2005.Footnote63 Thus, it can be concluded that the inclination of the Turkish public and elites towards the EU is not unconditional, rather it depends on a number of factors. Tense or cordial relations between the EU and Turkey affect the position and credibility of pro-EU or Eurosceptic circles respectively. In turn, the interplay between these circles and the views of the Turkish public have considerable implications for the future of Turkey's political transformation.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sedef Eylemer
Sedef Eylemer is a Research Assistant at the Graduate Department of European Union Studies in the Institute of Social Sciences, Dokuz Eylül University, Turkey. She holds a BA degree in International Relations. She completed her Master's degree in European Union Studies, Dokuz Eylül University. Currently, she is a PhD candidate at the Graduate Department of European Union Studies at the same University in Turkey. Her research interests include external relations of the EU, European Neighbourhood Policy and EU–Turkey relations.İlkay Taş
İlkay Taş is a Research Assistant at the Graduate Department of European Union Studies in the Institute of Social Sciences, Dokuz Eylül University, Turkey. She holds a BA degree in Tourism Management. She completed her Master's degree in European Union Studies, Dokuz Eylül University. Currently, she is a PhD candidate at the Graduate Department of European Union Studies at the same University. Her research interests include EU–Turkey relations, EU enlargement and tourism policies of the EU.Notes
1. Meltem Müftüler-Bac, ‘The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (1998), pp.240–58 (p.243).
2. Onur Öymen, Turkish Challenge: Turkey, Europe and the World towards the 21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.219–20.
3. Ebru Loewendahl, Promises to Keep: The Reality of Turkey–EU Relations (Chorley: Action Centre for Europe, 1998), p.9.
4. Ziya Öniş, ‘Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey–EU Relations’ (2000), available at <http://home.ku.edu.tr/∼zonis/helsinki.PDF>, accessed 14 June 2007.
5. William Park, ‘Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki to Ankara?’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol.5, No.3 (2000), pp.31–53 (p.35).
6. Birol A. Yesilada, ‘The Worsening EU–Turkey Relations’, SAIS Review, Vol.19, No.1 (1999), pp.144–61 (pp.147–8).
7. William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000 (London: Cass, 2000), p.240.
8. Gamze Avcı, ‘Turkey's Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-scepticism?’, in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds.), Turkey and European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics (London: Cass, 2003), pp.149–70 (p.150).
9. ‘Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions’ (10–12 Dec. 1999), available at <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#enlargement>, accessed 14 June 2007.
10. Park, ‘Turkey's European Union Candidacy’, p.31.
11. Hürriyet Daily Newspaper, “Türkiye artık Avrupa'dadır” (12 Dec. 1999), available at <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1999/12/12/162979.asp>, accessed 10 March 2007.
12. E. Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, ‘Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State’ (2003), available at <http://home.ku.edu.tr/∼zonis/summer2003/kopen.PDF>, accessed 12 March 2007.
13. Ersel Aydinli and Ali Resul Usul, ‘Looking Towards Europe’, The World Today, Vol.58, No.10 (2002), pp.10–11 (p.11).
14. See Article 2 of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, Luxembourg (3 Oct. 2005), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_TR_framedoc_en.pdf>, accessed 10 March 2007.
15. Tarık Oğuzlu, ‘How to Interpret Turkey's Accession Process with the EU? A Clash of Discourses’, Perceptions, Vol.7, No.4 (Dec. 2002–Feb. 2003), available at <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume7/Dec2002-Feb2003/PerceptionVolumeVII3TarikOguzlu.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2007.
16. Lauren M. McLaren, ‘Turkey's Eventual Membership of the EU: Turkish Elite Perspectives on the Issue’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.38, No.1 (March 2000), pp.117–29 (pp.123–5).
17. Sabah Daily Newspaper, ‘MÜSİAD’ın AB Raporu’ (3 April 2005), available at <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/04/03/gnd99.html>, accessed 20 May 2007; and MÜSİAD Press Releases (6 Feb. 2005), available at <http://www.musiad.org.tr/gebze/bbdetay.asp?Bulten=101>, accessed 20 May 2007.
18. Eurobarometer, ‘Survey on Public Opinion in The European Union’, No.65, National Report Turkey (Spring 2006), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_tr_nat.pdf>, accessed 10 July 2007.
19. Milliyet Daily Newspaper, ‘Halk AB'ye Güvenmiyor’ (24 Oct. 2006), available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/10/24/siyaset/asiy.html>, accessed 26 July 2007.
20. The survey took place between 17 October and 10 November 2003 among adults older than 18 years; 68 per cent of the respondents were urban citizens whereas 32 per cent came from suburban areas; the total sample was 2,123 individuals. The survey was prepared by the Open Society Institute, Bosphorus University in Turkey, Scientific Research Project Commission and Bosphorus University European Workers’ Centre.
21. Ayten Görgün, ‘What Turks Think of Europe: Opinions on the European Union in Turkey’, in Richard T. Griffiths and Durmuş Özdemir (eds.), Turkey and the EU Enlargement (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp.29–45 (pp.37–8).
22. Kemal Derviş, Michael Emerson, Daniel Gros and Sinan Ülgen, The European Transformation of Modern Turkey (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004), p.66.
23. Ankara Ticaret Odası, Avrupa Birliği'nde Maskeli Balo Dayatmalar, Gerçekler, No.74 (Ankara: ATO Yayınları, 2004), p.36.
24. Erkan Erdogdu, ‘Turkey and Europe: Undivided but not United’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.6, No.2 (2002), pp.40–51 (p.44).
25. Erol Manisalı, İçyüzü ve Perde Arkasıyla Avrupa Çıkmazı Türkiye–Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri (Istanbul: Otopsi Yayınevi, 2001), p.112.
26. Capitulations in the general sense refer to commercial privileges given to foreigners by the Ottoman Empire. The roots of capitulations in the Ottoman Empire go back to the commercial agreement signed between the Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman the Magnificent, and the King of France, Francis, in 1536. According to that agreement, Ottoman and French merchants were bound only by their home laws in the conduct of commercial activities. Later on, particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these agreements were extended to other European countries. Capitulations were considered one of the major reasons for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and have left bitter memories in the Turkish collective consciousness. The Republic of Turkey officially terminated capitulation policies with the Lausanne Agreement, signed on 24 July 1923.
27. Sadi Somuncuoğlu, ‘Gümrükte Kuşatma’ (2002), available at <http://www.atonet.org.tr/turkce/yayinlar/kitaplar/gumrukte_kusatma.pdf>, p.85, accessed 12 April 2007.
28. TUSIAD, Duyuru No.122, available at <http://www.tusiad.org/internet.nsf/d00127d66ca9c239c225679f00276512/6afc122f370d178ec2256b72004fdfea/$FILE/duyuruno122.pdf>, accessed 14 April 2007.
29. İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (IKV), ‘Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye-AB İlişkileri Hakkında Doğru Bilinen Yanlışlar’, No.178 (2004), available at <http://www.ikv.org.tr/pdfs/e4cb46ef.pdf>, accessed 23 March 2007.
30. M. Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, ‘Turkey's EU Accession: An Exciting Opportunity for Friends of Europe’, Turkey's EU End-Game?, European Policy Summit, Brussels (17 June 2004), available at <http://www.friendsofeurope.org/pdfs/Turkey_eBook_1.pdf>, accessed 20 March 2007.
31. Canan Balkır, ‘Turkey and the European Community: Foreign Trade and Direct Foreign Investment in the 1980s’, in Canan Balkır and Allan M. Williams (eds.), Turkey and Europe (London: Pinter, 1993), pp.100–140 (p.129).
32. Metin Gençkol, ‘Avrupa Birliği Mali İşbirliği Politikaları ve Türkiye’, DPT Avrupa Birliği ile İlişkiler (Ankara: Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, Eylül 2003), available at <http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/genckolm/malipoli.pdf>, accessed 20 April 2007. SAPARD: Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development; ISPA: Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession; PHARE: Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Economic Reconstruction.
33. Manisalı, İçyüzü ve Perde Arkasıyla Avrupa Çıkmazı Türkiye–Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri pp.206–8.
34. Tarık Oğuzlu, ‘The Impact of Democratization in the Context of the EU Accession Process on Turkish Foreign Policy’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol.9, No.1 (2004), pp.94–113 (pp.104–5).
35. Hakan Yılmaz, ‘Betwixt and Between Europe and the Mediterranean: New Stakes and New Challenges’, paper presented at Seminar at IMEIS and Collingwood College University of Durham (1–4 July 2004), available at <http://periples.mmsh.univ-aix.fr/REMSH/seminaires/Durham/HakanYilmaz_DurhamConferencePap.pdf>, accessed 13 April 2007.
36. Ziya Öniş, ‘Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era’, Turkish Studies, Vol.4, No.1 ( 2003), pp.9–34 (p.11).
37. Oğuzlu, ‘How to Interpret…’.
38. Meltem Müftüler-Bac, ‘Enlarging the European Union: Where Does Turkey Stand?’ (2002), available at <http://www.tesev.org.tr/engnew/publication/monographs_Enlarging%20the%20European%20Union.php>, accessed 11 July 2007.
39. Wendy Asbeek Brusse and Richard T. Griffiths, ‘Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey–EU Relations in a Historical Perspective’, in Richard T. Griffiths and Durmuş Özdemir (eds.), Turkey and EU Enlargement Processes of Incorporation (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), pp.13–27 (p.24).
40. Serap Atan, ‘Europeanisaton of Turkish Peak Business Organizations and Turkey–EU Relations’, in Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds.), Turkey and European Integration Accession Prospects and Issues (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.100–122 (p.106).
41. Kıvanç Ulusoy, ‘What Went Wrong?: Reconsidering Turkey's European Vocation (1963–1987)’, paper at Colloque EMMA, Madrid (4–5 June 2004), available at <http://web.univ-pau.fr/RECHERCHE/GDRI-EMMA/activites/Coll2004/pdf%20EMMA%20Madrid%20r%E9vis%E9/42143.32%20Ulusoy.pdf>, p.16, accessed 1 Sept. 2007.
42. Atan, ‘Europeanisaton of Turkish Peak Business Organizations’, p.108.
43. Gamze Avcı, ‘Turkish Political Parties and the EU Discourse in the Post-Helsinki Period: A Case of Europeanization’, in Uğur and Canefe (eds.), Turkey and European Integration Accession Prospects and Issues, pp.194–214 (pp.197–8).
44. Atila Eralp, ‘The Process of Europeanization in Turkey’, available at <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/AUD/AUD2/Eralp%20paper.pdf#search=%22atila%20eralp%20the%20process%20of%20europeanization%20in%20turkey%22>, pp.4–5, accessed 5 May 2007.
45. Avcı, ‘Turkish Political Parties and the EU Discourse’, pp.202–3.
46. Eralp, ‘The Process of Europeanization in Turkey’, p.7.
47. Erhan Doğan, ‘The Historical and Discursive Roots of the Justice and Development Party's EU Stance’, Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No.3 (2005), pp.421–37 (p.429).
48. Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman, ‘Globalization, Social Democracy and the Third Way: Paradoxes of the Turkish Experience’, available at <http://home.ku.edu.tr/∼zonis/Keyman-Onis-Turkey%20and%20Third%20Way.pdf>, accessed 12 May 2007.
49. Doğan, ‘The Historical and Discursive Roots’, p.434.
50. Natalie Tocci, ‘Anchoring Turkey to Europe: The Foreign Policy Challenges Ahead’ (2003), available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?v21=107277&click53=107277&lng=en&v33=106395&id=22386>, accessed 20 July 2007.
51. See ‘Dışişleri Türkiye Raporu'ndan Rahatsız’ (5 Sept. 2006), available at <http://www.cnnturk.com/HABER/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&HID=1&haberID=226621>, accessed 4 April 2007; M. Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu, Speech at the Conference of European Technology Platforms (7 Sept. 2006), available at <http://www.tobb.org.tr/haber2.php?haberid=912&sy=1; and İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (IKV), available at <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=39722&l=1>, accessed 4 April 2007.
52. Chapter 1: free movement of goods, Chapter 3: right of establishment and freedom to provide services, Chapter 9: financial services, Chapter 11: agriculture and rural development, Chapter 13: fisheries, Chapter 14: transport policy, Chapter 29: customs union and Chapter 30: external relations.
53. The Ankara Protocol is the document that extends the customs union between Turkey and the EU to countries that joined the Union in 2004. Turkey signed the Protocol on 29 July 2005 and at the same time issued a declaration stating that signature of the Protocol did not mean its recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. On 21 September 2005 the EU adopted a counter-declaration indicating that Turkey's declaration was unilateral, did not form part of the Protocol and had no legal effect on Turkey's obligations under the Protocol.
54. Council of the European Union, press release on meeting dated 11 December 2006, available at <http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/conclusions/vko50/en_GB/1165914662658/_files/76409400367120534/default/92122.pdf>, accessed 12 May 2007.
55. ‘EU Must be Rational and Farsighted in Talks with Turkey, TUSIAD’, 30 Nov. 2006, available at <http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=153633>, accessed 10 April 2007.
56. ‘Hisarcıklıoğlu: Kıbrıs, AB müzakere sürecinde Türkiye'nin onurudur’ (9 Dec. 2006), available at <http://sanayi.tobb.org.tr/haber_goster.php?hid=1084&ser=3>, accessed 15 March 2007.
57. İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (IKV), Haftalık E-Bülten (24 Nov.–4 Dec. 2006).
58. ‘EU Unfair to Turkey, Says Erdogan’, EU Observer, 13 Dec. 2006, available at <http://euobserver.com/?aid=23086>, accessed 15 March 2007.
59. ‘Erdoğan: Biz değil, AB kaybeder’ (6 Dec. 2006), available at <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/393032.asp>, accessed 15 March 2007.
60. ‘Gül: AB'nin Vizyonu Noksan’, Dünya Daily Newspaper, 13 Dec. 2006, p.3.
61. ‘Babacan: Kıbrıs Konusunda Baskı Çözüm Getirmez’, available at <http://www.haberler.com/babacan-kibris-konusunda-baski-cozum-getirmez-haberi/>, accessed 12 April 2007.
62. ‘EU Unfair to Turkey, says Erdogan’, EU Observer, 13 Dec. 2006.
63. Eurobarometer, ‘Survey on Public Opinion in the European Union’, No.65, National Report Turkey (Spring 2006), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_tr_nat.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2007.