The Changing Role of the State and State Bureaucracy in the Context of Public Administration Reforms: Russian and Foreign Experience

Abstract

The challenge of implementing administrative reform (AR) in the Russian Federation corresponds to international ideas and practice of improving public administration that were conceptually based on the theory of New Public Management (NPM), which supposes the delegation of some state functions to commercial structures and civil society institutes. However, the results of the efforts to implement AR in Russia are not yet satisfactory. An important cause of failure was the fact that the application of the AR model to Russian conditions had not been conceptually worked out to a sufficient degree and, in particular, the question of the role and functions of contemporary government had not been thought through. In essence, the attempt was made to apply a number of sound and rational principles in the absence of many key preconditions that evoke a need for this model.

The author thanks Dr Anton Oleinik for helpful comments on an early draft of this essay.

Notes

1. Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1989).

2. The concept of ‘clan’ is the most widely used in the literature on contemporary Russian elites. From a formal point of view this concept is not quite precise, since both relative and ethnic ties are not obligatory features of Russian elites. However, Russian clans have the same typical features, including secrecy, especially a particular corporate orientation, that constitute the core of clan relationships: see O. Gaman-Golutvina, Politicheskie elity Rossii. Vekhi istoricheskoi evolyutsii (Russia's political elites: landmarks of historical evolution) (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), p.335.

3. T. Graham, ‘New Russian Regime’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 Nov. 1995.

4. It is necessary to clarify the content of the terms ‘civil service’ and ‘state bureaucracy’. The content of the terms both coincides and differs. As a rule the latter is broader than the former. By ‘state bureaucracy’ we mean those who realize ‘a type of work consisting in the practical realization of state functions by the workers of the state apparatus, who occupy posts in state bodies and receive compensation from the state for their work’: see A. Obolonskii (ed.), Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba (state service) (Moscow: Delo, 2000), p.10. The term ‘civil servant’ defines those members of the state bureaucracy who obtain a special rank (or status). In this context we mean the corps of the people who are professionally involved in the state management process, both those who make key decisions and those engaged in realizing them.

5. In this case the concept ‘state’ is used neither as a synonym for the totality of political institutions nor to refer to a machinery of repression, but as an instrument for achieving the common good.

6. Robert J. Brym and Vladimir Gimpelson, ‘The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s’, Slavic Review, Vol.63, No.1 (2004), pp.90–112 (p.112).

7. Ibid.

8. Note that the Russian word effektivnyi can be translated as both ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’; in the present instance, the term ‘effective’ is more appropriate.

9. Barry Bozemann and Jeffrey D. Straussman, Public Management Strategies: Guidelines for Managerial Effectiveness (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1991); H. George Frederickson, ‘Comparing the Reinventing Government with the New Public Administration’, Public Administration Review, Vol.56, No.3 (1996), pp.263–70; H. George Frederickson, ‘The Repositioning of American Public Administration’, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol.32, No.4 (1999), pp.701–11; Christopher Hood, Beyond the Public Bureaucracy State? Public Administration in the 1990s, inaugural lecture (London: Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1990); Christopher Hood and Michael Jackson, Administrative Argument (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Managing Across Levels of Government (Paris: OECD, 1997); David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (New York: Plume, 1992); B. Guy Peters, ‘Models of Governance for the 1990s’, in Donald F. Kettl and H. Brinton Milward (eds.), The State of Public Management (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp.15–44; B. Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie, ‘Managing Incoherence: The Coordination and Empowerment Conundrum’, Public Administration Review, Vol.56, No.3 (1996), pp.281–90; and others.

10. For example, European countries deploy several models of civil service and several models of modernizing civil service, which they use for optimizing their administrative systems. For further discussion, see M.K. Meiniger, ‘Sravnitel'nyi analiz reform gossluzhby v stranakh ES’ (Comparative analysis of state service reforms in EU countries), in Reformy gosupravleniya (Reforms of government) (Moscow: RAGS, 1999), p.47.

11. Nick Manning and Neil Parison, International Public Administration Reform: Implications for the Russian Federation (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), Ch.6.

12. Ibid., Ch.7.6.

13. Frederickson, ‘The Repositioning of American Public Administration’; Bozeman and Straussman, Public Management Strategies; Lawrence R. Jones and Fred Thomson (eds.), Public Management: Institutional Renewal for Twenty-First Century (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999); and others.

14. Ya. Kuzminov, ‘Tupiki i perspektivy administrativnoi reformy’ (Dead-ends and perspective of administrative reform), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 April 2006.

15. In this context it is worth mentioning the discussions on the issue that took place at the workshop ‘Administrative reforms in post-Soviet countries’ in St. John's in August 2006. Richard Rose considers that NPM may be assessed as an example of bureaucratization of ideology. It is possible to add that the opposite is also true: NPM in its Russian version may be assessed also as an example of ideological interpretation of institutional transfers, which in a broader context is one of the priority objects of our interest. The opinion of Anton Oleinik that NPM is a case of conservative modernization – an attempt to increase the efficiency of the state without changing the model of power relationships – is ambiguous. The validity of this assessment depends on the starting point of the evaluation. In comparison with Yeltsin's time, the AR model of power relationship in the spirit of NPM is really conservative modernization. Meanwhile, in comparison with the traditional (pre-Yeltsin) Russian model of power relationships, AR in accordance with NPM orientations is obviously non-conservative modernization, since it means a rejection of the former power model: NPM principles require changing the model of power relationships. As for the related question concerning the opportunity of administrative reform without changing the underpinning model of power relationships (Oleinik), it is possible to note that the answer depends on the scale of the planned reforms and their expected results. If you plan only cosmetic measures that are called to correct some aspects of the managerial system, you can do that without deep tectonic changes of the key elements of the whole management system. In the opposite case this is impossible.

16. Brym and Gimpelson, ‘The Size, Composition, and Dynamics’, p.112.

17. Trud i zanyatost' v Rossii: Statisticheskii sbornik (Labour and employment in Russia: a statistical collection) (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1996), p.2; Vladimir Gimpelson and Daniel Treisman, ‘Fiscal Games and Public Employment: A Theory with Evidence from Russia’, World Politics, Vol.54, No.2 (2002), pp.145–83.

18. Brym and Gimpelson, ‘The Size, Composition, and Dynamics’, p.96.

19. Ibid., p.99. OECD: Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development.

20. Ibid., p.101.

21. Manning and Parison, International Public Administration Reform, Ch.8.5.2.

22. It should be said in passing that this resembles the situation that existed in the Russian Empire: a satisfactory level of wages for civil servants was attained only in the second half of the nineteenth century, despite all the efforts undertaken to this end during the sixteenth–nineteenth centuries. For further discussion, see Oksana Gaman-Golutvina, Byurokratiya Rossiiskoi imperii: vekhi evolyutsii (The bureaucracy of the Russian Empire: landmarks of evolution) (Moscow: RAGS, 1997).

23. Concerning the last two points I have to agree with Anton Oleinik's position expressed at the workshop in St. John's: comparing two major directions of AR – commercialization and the transfer of responsibilities to civil society – the willingness to move in the former direction is stronger than in the latter one.

24. Brym and Gimpelson, ‘The Size, Composition, and Dynamics’, p.100.

25. < http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/gcr_2006/chapter_1_1.pdf > ; see also: V. Inozemtsev, ‘Prizrak konkurentosposobnosti’ (The spectre of competitiveness), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 April 2007.

26. Politicheskaya sistema SShA: aktual'nye izmereniya (Political system of the USA: current soundings) (Moscow: Nauka, 2000), pp.133–4.

27. S. Rogov, ‘Funktsii sovremennogo gosudarstva: vyzovy dlya Rossii’ (Functions of contemporary government: challenges for Russia), Part I, Svobodnaya mysl', No.7 (2005), pp.50–63 (p.53). This article is written on the basis of a large-scale comparative project conducted by research associates of the Institute of the US and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

28. Ibid., p.54.

29. Janet Hook, ‘President Putting “Big” Back in Government’, Los Angeles Times, 8 Feb. 2005, p.A1.

30. Rogov, ‘Funktsii sovremennogo gosudarstva’, pp.56–7, 58–9, 61–82.

31. Ibid., p.61.

32. Ibid., Part II, p.82.

33. Ibid., pp.82–3.

34. Ibid., pp.92–3.

35. Rossiya i strany mira, 2002. Statisticheskii sbornik (Russia and the countries of the world 2002: a statistical collection) (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 2002), pp.78, 334.

36. Ibid., pp.78, 334.

37. Federal'nyi zakon ‘O federal'nom budzhete na 2007 god’ (Federal law ‘On the federal budget for 2007'), Attachment 10, at < http://www1.minfin.ru>, accessed 27 July 2007; see also S. Glaz'yev, ‘Nastional'nye proekty: illyuzii i real'nost’ (National projects: illusions and reality), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 Feb. 2007.

38. Ibid.

39. V. Komarovskii and Ye. Morozova, ‘Administrativnaya reforma v vospriyatii grazhdan’ (Administrative reform in citizens' perception), Vlast', No.6 (2006), p.35.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Oxana Gaman-Golutvina

Oxana Gaman-Golutvina is professor at the Moscow Institute for Foreign Relations (MGIMO) and the Higher School of Economics, and specializes in political science theory, and studies of contemporary Russian politics, Russian political elites and bureaucracy, and Russian political culture. This study is written in the framework of the Russian Foundation for Humanities project No.06-03-00563a.