‘Coloured Revolution’ as a Political Phenomenon

Abstract

Different forms of political change from putsch to revolution are described and ‘coloured revolutions’ are analysed as revolutionary coups d'etat. Conditions promoting and retarding the success of such movements are discussed and cases of ‘decremental relative deprivation’ are discovered which predisposed the public to insurgency. Conditions for success involved a united and organized opposition with an alternative ideology and political policy. Counter-elites when in power neither carry out revolutions nor promote democratic development. An unintended consequence of democracy promotion is that autocratic regimes learn to counteract it and in so doing weaken genuine civil society associations.

Following the transformation of the European state socialist countries in the period after 1989, the East European countries formed several distinct blocs: the new members of the European Union, those that aspired to membership (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) and a group of only partially reformed countries (Serbia, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). In several of these countries ‘coloured’ revolutions have occurred: Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). These public protests have adopted a colour (orange for Ukraine, rose for Georgia) as a symbol to identify their supporters and the character of the movement, although Serbia is referred to as a ‘bulldozer’ revolution. In 2005, in other countries with a similar economic and political trajectory (Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) comparable events were initiated although they were thwarted before they occurred or were successfully suppressed. Such phenomena, moreover, are not restricted to the former state socialist societies, Lebanon had its ‘cedar’ revolution in 2005 and George W. Bush referred to the ‘purple’ revolution in Iraq as the coming of democracy after the 2005 elections.

These processes have been linked to the earlier wave of ‘transitions from autocratic rule’.1 Portugal's ‘Revolution of the Carnations’ of April 1974 is seen as the beginning of this movement, which ‘crested’ with the collapse of communist regimes in 1989.2 However, the Portuguese ‘revolution’ was more like a military coup in which, to express solidarity with the people, soldiers carried carnations in the muzzles of their rifles and tank guns. This coup-like character continued, I shall argue, in the later coloured revolutions.

The activities given the popular appellation of ‘coloured revolutions’ all had in common a proposed socio-political transformation intended to introduce ‘democracy from below’. Although differing in content, they shared a common strategy: mass protests occurred within the constitutional framework to widen forms of public participation in the regimes: they were legitimated as a movement for ‘greater democracy’: they were all targeted on removing the incumbent political leaderships; electoral procedures, allegedly fraudulent, were a regular focus for the insurgents; the public gatherings were constituted from a mass base of young people, particularly students. In comparison with traditional political demonstrations, a novel feature was the orchestration of events through the use of modern media technology – mobile phones, the internet and assistance from local and foreign media. The demonstrations, in support of a supposedly democratic champion, once under way were accompanied to a greater or lesser degree by mass cultural events: rock and pop music, which helped mobilize, create solidarity, and entertain mass audiences.

The promotion and organization of these popular manifestations required considerable resources – propaganda, musicians, entertainers – and even the organizers and participants received payment and subsistence during the events. While these protests were legitimated in democratic terms, whether they achieved ‘democratization’ is another matter. It is also debatable whether this type of political event constituted a ‘people's revolution’ or a form of coup d'état.

The International Perspective

It is clear that these public events were cumulative and sequential in the sense that the earlier successful protest activity (particularly in Serbia and Ukraine) acted as positive models for subsequent demonstrations.3 However, they each had their own peculiarities dependent on local circumstances, the configuration of elites, and the predispositions of people to mobilization. Such conditions provided the opportunity for public demonstration, the lack of such opportunity, or the suppression of it.

Analysis of the coloured revolutions requires an international perspective. Proponents of democracy promotion have widely utilized the work of, and protest techniques defined by, Gene Sharp's From Dictatorship to Democracy.4 All had moral and financial support from external sources, particularly Western foundations supporting democratic institutions and processes. A form of ‘soft’ political power was utilized by the West to undermine established governments. Such policy is derived from the ideas of writers such as Joseph Nye, who have advocated a shift from the use of military force and coercion to the promotion of internal change through manipulation of the norms and values of citizens.5 Through the use of multiple channels of communication, the projection of the domestic achievements and international performance of the West is likely, claims Nye, to be to the advantage of the USA and Europe. ‘Attraction’ can refer to political values (democracy, freedom, justice), cultural artefacts (pop music, art) and consumption articles (McDonald's food, mobile phones). Promotion of internal change through manipulation of the norms and values of citizens is a major strategy.

The countries that are likely to gain from soft power are those closest to global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance. These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States and Europe.6

Foreign policy, derived from this standpoint, involves support of civil-society associations to pursue, by peaceful and legitimate means, regime change in authoritarian states. This position has been adopted by successive American administrations. George W. Bush, in his inaugural address in 2005, made clear that ‘it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture’.7 Policies of ‘democratization’ abroad are an important part of the neo-conservative value of creating an international order of values associated with American (and its allies') ways of doing things. Support of coloured revolutions that contest allegedly fraudulent elections in authoritarian states are forms of ‘soft power’. Unlike the 1974 ‘Revolution of Carnations’ in Portugal, which had a leftist orientation advocating not only democratic reforms but also the nationalization of property, the political complexion of the ‘coloured’ revolutions has been right-wing. The insurgents have emphasized freedom, rights to private property, market mechanisms and opposition to state regulation. Moreover, in appropriate cases, they have advocated support for joining Western alliances such as NATO and the European Union (EU).

Most Western interpretations of the ‘coloured revolutions’, academic and journalistic alike, have emphasized their positive intentions and consequences and legitimated them as part of the ‘Third Wave’ of democratization identified by Samuel P. Huntington.8 They ‘remov[ed] authoritarian leaders from political power … What we have witnessed in the postcommunist world, therefore, is an unexpectedly successful diffusion of electoral revolutions … where illiberal leaders were replaced by their liberal counterparts’.9 Such writers project ‘the electoral model of regime change’.10 ‘[E]lections are the indicator of democracy – a form of government that has become a global norm’.11 Such writing borders on the political authorization of an electoral process that is a tool in neo-conservative politics. By limiting the definition of ‘democracy’ to a narrowly conceived political mechanism,12 the concept is emptied of any policy outcomes on, and continuous deliberation of, public issues.13

Critics argue that what appear to be popular revolutions are disguised coups d'état. Opposition forces – counter-elites – who are unable to mobilize effectively against incumbent governments, organize revolutionary events to galvanize support and legitimate a transfer of power through popular elections. Natal'ya Narochnitskaya14 argues that the ‘voice of the people’ is an illegitimate use of modern media technology (television, radio and the press) to create public opinion to force political change. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with powerful sponsors, become political bodies working through networks and the media – rather than being rooted in civil society and acting on behalf of citizens. Sponsors,15 directly or indirectly financed by outside governments, become involved in insurgent activity, defining democracy in terms of their own conceptions and magnifying election frauds to promote and legitimate a coup d'état to their political advantage.

The accusation of ‘fraud’ is sometimes made before the election results are counted and follows a campaign of discrediting the incumbent power-holders. Exit polls are an instrument of politics, and once election fraud is declared it is amplified by the media. The initial claim of ‘election fraud’ in Ukraine, for example, was based on exit polls in October 2004 and again in the following month showing the challenger, Yushchenko, as victor. These claims set the political scene – the ‘taken for granted’ political assumptions – that election fraud had taken place. In the case of the failed ‘revolution’ led by former President Levon Ter-Petrossian in Armenia in February 2008, despite statements by international observers that the elections were close to European standards and that few irregularities took place, opposition media reports asserted that the election was accompanied by ‘brawling, threats and manipulation’.16 Like the other phenomena discussed here, the Armenian disturbances had the character of an attempted coup d'état by a former politician supported by crowds estimated at between 10,000 and 50,000 in number.

What is portrayed in the media as ‘people's power’ is in reality an elite-manipulated demonstration. While the masses may be captivated by euphoric revolutionary ideology, they are in political terms instruments of indigenous counter-elites, often encouraged by foreigners with their own agendas. If successful, rather than such revolutions leading to significant socio-political change, a circulation of elites follows the ousting of former rulers or their co-option into a new elite structure. The coloured revolution phenomenon is a new type of political movement that needs to be fitted into a paradigm of political change. In this essay, I first consider different forms of political change. Second, I conceptualize the coloured revolutions as novel types of revolutionary activity: a combination of public protest and coup d'état – a revolutionary coup. Third, I consider the conditioning factors leading to the rise of the phenomenon of the coloured revolution. Finally, I consider the extent to which ‘coloured revolutions’ might be a success or a failure.

Types of Political Change

In analysing political change, one may distinguish between a putsch, a coup d'état and a revolution. The criteria used to define these types of political change are:

• type of organization of political activity;

• level of public participation;

• intentions of the insurgents and counter political elitism; and

• the consequences.

The definition of various types of political change in terms of organization, level of public participation and intentions of insurgents and counter-elites is summarized in Table 1. A putsch may be defined as a sudden illegitimate overthrow of a ruling elite by another competing elite (for example, the installation of a military regime in place of a political one); the level of public participation is low, the objectives of the insurgents are to replace the existing elite with a new one. A coup d'état is an illegitimate replacement or renewal of one governing set of personnel by another (e.g. the substitution of a ruling faction of a political party by another from that party or another party). For both of these political processes relatively little public participation is needed, either in the overthrow or in the defence of the incumbents; and they have by intention no significant social or economic effects.

TABLE 1
TYPES OF POLITICAL CHANGE: PUTSCH, COUP D'ÉTAT, POLITICAL/SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Type of Political Change	Type of Organization	Level of Public Participation	Intentions of Insurgents or Counter-elites	Consequences, if successful
Putsch	Counter-elite led	Low	Elite replacement	New elite
Coup d'état	Elite or counter-elite led	Low	Governing elite renewal	New personnel in ruling elite
‘Classical’ Political/ Social Revolution	Counter-elite led	Very high: mass push from below	Redress public grievances through fundamental replacement of political class and socio-economic system	New political class, reconstituted institutions, including property relations

A revolution is a more complex process. Charles Tilly defines a ‘revolution’ as ‘a forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the state's jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc’.17 This definition is similar to that of Goodwin,18 who defines a revolution as any and all instances in which a state or government is overthrown by a popular movement in an extra-constitutional or violent manner. However, these approaches ignore the type of social movement, the level of popular participation and the policy intentions of the insurgents. There are different kinds of ‘revolution’.19 A maximalist definition of a social or political revolution requires not only mass participation but also an ideology on which is predicated a fundamental replacement of the political class and socio-economic system. Moreover, major changes take place in the social and economic system consequent on the political transformation of the ruling elites by a new political class taking power. Theda Skocpol is the best-known articulator of this position: she emphasizes the transformation of a society's state and class structures.20

After the event, we know that the coloured revolutions were more than palace putsches but they were not revolutions in the classic sense, and for several reasons. First, the thrust for radical change did not come from below, but from elites or counter-elites in the existing political classes. ‘Top–down’ social transformations do not qualify to be termed ‘revolutions’21 as by definition the contenders for power cannot be part of the state administration. Second, the outcomes involved changes in personnel of the state and led to shifts in foreign policy and international alignments, but they did not cause a system change: ownership of property remained the same.

Coloured revolutions do not fall into the models described above. Leadership by counter-elites with the objective of replacing the dominant elite is characteristic of a putsch and a coup d'état. Unlike those two processes, coloured revolutions have the distinguishing characteristic of a high level of public participation. They do not fall into the category of classic revolutions because they have no political theory of major social change. The political objective is replacement of an elite rather than the substitution of a new ruling class for the existing one and the transformation of property relations. With the possible exception of Serbia, the coloured revolution insurgents sought a change of leadership that would fulfil the promises of the transformation from communism to capitalism and democracy. The existing post-communist elites had not delivered what they had promised. Major differences from a normal coup d'état are to be found in the role of leadership, the high level of public participation, and finance from external sources. Unlike classic revolution, these phenomena lack a revolutionary class pushing from below for socio-political change.

Coloured revolutions may fit into yet another type of political category: that of a ‘revolutionary coup d’état'. The coloured revolutions did not entail any system changes of regime type (despite such demands by many of the supporters), but were intended to install new political incumbents. Mass involvement takes place which makes the movement more than a ‘coup d’état'. We may distinguish between such a coup and a social or political revolution. Whereas in a revolutionary coup d'état public participation is of a passive ‘audience’ type, in a political revolution, the public (in the form of autonomous civil-society associations) has a positive input to political activity, requiring significant social change. Finally, the outcomes are crucial. If the intentions of the insurgents are not subsequently realized in structural transformation, a political revolution cannot be said to have occurred. In this way, we may distinguish a social or political revolution from a coup d'état that is a consequence of public protest.

Revolutionary Coup d'état

A revolutionary coup d'état is a change of the political leadership instigated by internal or external counter-elites through the agency of mass popular support. Such an event has high elite (or counter-elite) participation, and high public (mass) involvement but of an ‘audience’ type. The intentions of the insurgents are to redress public grievances, to promote the objectives of transformation, and to do this through elite renewal, not through the reconstitution of the social economic order. Real economic and social grievances about falling living standards, health care, distribution of wealth and land, and unemployment may underpin the protests for the mass participants.22 This type of activity is illustrated in Table 2.

TABLE 2
REVOLUTIONARY COUP D'ÉTAT

Type of Political Change	Type of Organization	Level of Public Participation	Intentions of Insurgents/Counter-elites	Consequences, if successful
Revolutionary coup d'état	Elite or counter-elite led	High: audience participation	Redress public grievances. For elites, renewal of governing elite; for mass participants, changes of leaders and priorities	New personnel in ruling elite

Evidence for the successful ‘revolutions’ to be considered as coups is found in the background of the leaders who came to power after the events. In Serbia, the opponents of Milošević were leading politicians. Vojislav Koštunica, for example, who stood as the candidate opposing Milošević, had been the founder of the anti-communist and pro-Western Democratic Party. Another prominent member of the opposition was Tomislav Nikolić who had been a deputy prime minister in the coalition government of Yugoslavia in 1999–2000. In Georgia, those who came to power as a consequence of the disturbances were Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burjanadze and Mikheil Saakashvili: all had held posts in parliament and Saakashvili had been a minister (of justice) under Shevardnadze. In Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko had been head of the national bank as well as prime minister under Kuchma; he was joined by Yulia Tymoshenko, herself a leading economic ‘oligarch’. In Kyrgyzstan a former prime minister with roots in the Soviet period, Kurmanbek Bakiev, and Roza Otunbaeva, previously foreign minister, played leading parts in the movement to bring down the government of Askar Akaev. Much of the positive evaluation of the ‘people's revolutions’ ignores the literature on elite competition and the clan-like nature of politics in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan23 and Ukraine.

Viewing the coloured revolutions as a revolutionary coup, we may fit into place the domestic elite-led as well as the foreign character of these events. It gives a place for organizations such as the OSCE,24 USAID and foreign sponsored NGOs to set the agenda, and thus act for the West as agents of soft politics – ‘democracy promotion’. The OSCE and related organizations such as ODIHR25 have given priority to democracy promotion which it defines in terms of electoral rights and government corruption. These bodies have said very little about social security or rights to work or welfare, and made no criticisms of economic fraud, which occurred on a massive scale in the process of privatization.

The coloured revolutions were sequential in character, and the ‘success’ of one precipitated action for others to follow.26 However, the structural and psychological predispositions of the population are also important determinants. The mobilization of mass support against the regime is shaped by underlying social and economic inadequacies, or unfulfilled expectations on which the counter-elites capitalized. Differences in these structural and psychological attributes help explain the success and failure of the coloured revolutionary coups.

Outcomes of ‘Revolution’

The problem for analysis, however, is how much of an example the early upsurges were for those that followed: how is the ‘example’ of others copied, modified or ignored in host countries? We need also to analyse the extent to which, and why, people may be predisposed or prone to follow the example. One might re-group the various political phenomena by different criteria to explain why some have succeeded and others have failed.

Table 3 distinguishes between the different outcomes of ‘coloured’ revolution activity. It distinguishes between changes in political elite composition and consequent political and economic developments, and it differentiates the countries by the extent of mass participation. ‘Mass participation’ should not be conflated into ‘people's democracy promotion’: such participation might be motivated by other grievances – of a regional, ethnic, class or generational kind – or it may be emotional or mercenary.27

TABLE 3
OUTCOMES OF COLOURED REVOLUTIONS

Change of Ruling Elite	Level of Public Participation in Mass Activity		Subsequent Political System Change
	Low	High
Nil	Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan	China	Nil
Some and continuity		Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan	Low
High		Serbia, Georgia	High

To fit countries into these various boxes requires a considerable research exercise. Five countries (Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan) experienced failed popular protests against the regime. In 1989, China had a relatively high-level protest (in the sense that the centre of the capital was paralysed by demonstrators), but there was no significant change of regime. In Ukraine, the demonstrators succeeded in changing a major actor in the political elite, through the election of President Viktor Yushchenko, but subsequent political change was minimal. In Kyrgyzstan, the Akaev clan was ousted as a consequence of a protest movement originating in the south of the country and other clans came to power. In that country, the Tulip revolution was driven by ‘independent business interests, informal networks and patronage ties [that] remained strong after [the exit of President Akaev]’.28 The aftermath of the revolution did not reverse the previous patterns of corruption: ‘the March events appear … mostly to have worsened Kyrgyzstan's political instability, with rising numbers of assassinations and unruly crowd actions’.29 Akaev's successor, Bakiev, recognized a ‘dubiously elected’ parliament (the election results of which had been invalidated by the supreme court), and the new regime acted as ‘a means to protect its members’ private interests’.30 As Scott Radnitz puts it, there was not a regime change, but ‘a transfer of power’.31 Even in terms of electoral procedures, the 2007 election was faulted – the governing party received 71 of the 90 seats after receiving only 49 per cent of the vote, and the main opposition party received no seats at all. These results were derived from an electoral system that required a qualifying threshold for seats of 5 per cent and another 0.5 per cent in each of the regional voting constituencies: such a system clearly discriminated against regionally based parties. The OSCE preliminary report tamely described the election as ‘a missed opportunity’ and the electoral system as ‘unusual’.32

The opposition in Serbia and Georgia was successful in effecting a major change of government personnel. In Serbia, a significant Westward shift of orientation in foreign affairs occurred. In Georgia under Saakashvili, a more neo-liberal course was followed concurrently with the strengthening of the state. While President Mikheil Saakashvili came to power as a lauded democratic reformer, he was soon castigated by the opposition for persecuting opponents and curbing media freedom.33 Following the unsuccessful offensive against the separatist South Ossetia in 2008, opposition leaders organized demonstrations of some 20,000 calling for ‘presidential and parliamentary elections, election legislative reforms, media freedom and the freeing of political prisoners’.34 The opposition, led by the United National Movement, has alleged political killings, on top of the taking of political prisoners by the Sakaashvili regime.35

Clearly, regime change following the coloured revolutions has not unequivocally led to greater democratization, even in terms of a narrowly defined ‘electoral politics’.

Conditioning Factors for Success and Failure

The political and sociological puzzle is to explain why, if the objectives of the insurgents were similar (namely, democracy promotion), the outcomes were different. Three major conditioning factors are singled out that help to explain the success or failure of democracy promotion, as proposed by coloured revolution activity: (i) elites and a population predisposed to radical change; (ii) ideological mobilization and policy promotion; and (iii) practical political alternatives to the status quo. If we examine these three factors in relation to the post-socialist countries, we are able to understand why coloured revolutions occurred and were either successful or unsuccessful.

Public Predispositions

Predisposition for change is to a considerable extent a consequence of the effects of transformation. It is assumed that where transformation policies have led to unemployment, poverty and a decline in living standards, then there is a predisposition by the population for change. Of the countries under discussion, Belarus and China have had least disruption to economic life and have retained many of the economic and political structures of state socialism. Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Serbia all initially suffered substantial declines in GNP and a large proportion of the population lived in poverty.

Figure 1 shows that between 2000 and 2005 GDP had increased in most of the former state socialist countries; only Uzbekistan had suffered a decline. However, these figures ignore the distribution of wealth and income which, under state socialism, was relatively egalitarian and comparable to European welfare states.

FIGURE 1 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER PERSON 2000, 2005

As shown in Figure 1A, several of these countries (China, Turkmenia, Georgia and RF) currently have levels of inequality at similar (or higher in the case of China) levels to the USA and very much higher than welfare states such as Denmark.

FIGURE 1A LEVELS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION: GINI INDEXES 2001–3

Figure 2 shows that life expectancy declined considerably even during these four years: only China, Belarus and Kazakhstan had an increase in life expectancy.

FIGURE 2 LIFE EXPECTANCY 2000, 2005

Figure 3 shows the relationship between GDP and national wellbeing, measured in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI). The index subtracts the rank of human development from the rank of GDP: hence a low rank in GDP (say, 100) minus a high rank in HDI (say 25) gives an index of 75. The higher the index, the better the use made of GDP to promote human development. We note that with the exception of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, all the post-socialist countries had a relatively high index. Moreover, with the notable exceptions of Uzbekistan and Belarus, both of which have retained a considerable role for state redistribution, all suffered considerable reductions between 2000 and 2005.

FIGURE 3 GDP PER CAPITA (PPP US$) RANK MINUS HDI RANK, 2000, 2005

These data indicate that general social conditions were worsening in all the countries with the exception of Belarus and to some degree China – although income differentials in China rose at an alarmingly high rate. Russia is a particularly striking case: its income has risen, but it has experienced a fall in life expectancy and its GDP–HDI index is negative. These figures would lead one to suppose that there has been a rise in the condition of ‘decremental relative deprivation’ as defined by Ted Robert Gurr.36 People's expectations remain constant (or may even rise, in anticipation of gains to be made from the end of communism) but, despite a general rise in GDP between 2000 and 2005, the capabilities to meet them have fallen. In Gurr's terms, welfare (that is, economic), political and inter-personal value opportunities have declined, and constituted conditions predisposing people to political protest. There has been a weakening in the levels of loyalty and trust in government and a critical fall in support for the regime. (This is evidenced in public opinion poll data, not included in this study.) Not all the states we have examined here have experienced insurgency; in those that have, the experience has varied in intensity. Relative deprivation, however intense, may predispose to insurgency, but is not sufficient to cause it. For Lenin a spark (in Russian, iskra) was necessary, and the activists behind the coloured revolutions provided this spark to ignite supposed election fraud. The strategy of the coloured revolutions is Leninist in conception. As one youth organizer has put it, the resistance movement has three components: unity of opposition, discipline and a good strategic plan.37 Both organization and people predisposed to participate in civil strife are necessary for protests to succeed.

How then did levels of inequality, indicated by the gini indexes, correlate with the extent of public protest? This relationship is depicted in Figure 4, in which inequality is shown by the top line. The measurement of public protest is taken from numbers participating in protest as measured by OSCE38 (to which I have added China). Although such data may have many inaccuracies, they probably capture the relativity of popular protest between different countries. The trend line is plotted against the rising curve of inequality.

FIGURE 4 GINI INDEX AND POPULAR PROTEST

Data show the ranking of demonstrations, 1 (Ukraine) being the highest number of demonstrators and Mongolia the lowest. Correlation between inequality and numbers of demonstrators are –0.09 (Pearson) and +0.02 (Spearman), indicating no significant correlation at all. The results are strongly influenced by two extreme cases. China has the highest level of inequality (46.9) and witnessed the second highest level of demonstrations. At the other extreme comes Ukraine which has the highest number of demonstrations, but the lowest level of inequality (29.1). If we excluded Ukraine, the correlation rises to –0.29, indicating a much stronger relationship between inequality and protest. If we remove both these extremes (China and Ukraine) we have a more robust (negative) correlation: Pearson –0.41 (p = 0.21, n = 10) and Spearman –0.30 (p = 0.40, n = 10).39 Thus, our results are positive, showing a distinct relationship between the levels of public demonstration and inequality – the higher the inequality (1 being low), the larger the public demonstration (1 being high). Clearly, high levels of inequality associated with poverty at one end of the scale and wealth at the other, concurrent with a fall in living standards, predispose people to insurgency.

The data may need further interpretation. Possibly estimates of pro-Orange public protest in Ukraine are too high. The ‘demonstrators’ include those who favoured the Orange activists and those who opposed them. It is also possible that Orange activity politicized the population to a higher extent than would otherwise have occurred – a demonstration effect.40

Ideological Mobilization and Policy Promotion

The protagonists of coloured revolutions not only de-legitimated the existing regimes – usually through electoral irregularities – but provided an alternative set of values – an ideological rationalization of radical change. ‘Democracy promotion’ means, as Andrew Wilson approvingly points out, ‘The West promoting its own values [and] … help[ing] other countries [to] live up to these values’.41 This involves influencing elections and backing those parties approved by the West's leaders. What is ignored in much of the ‘diffusion of democracy’ literature is the power of Western governments and international organizations to influence political outcomes in host states.42

Consider, for example, Serbia. While Valerie J. Bunce and Susan L. Wolchik point out that international diffusion does not occur ‘when a powerful international actor orchestrates changes in weaker states’,43 they see change in Serbia as a case of collaboration between local and international actors.44 However, the US and EU pursued an aggressive policy of system change. As Christopher Lamont points out, both the USA and the EU coordinated their efforts to

push Milošević ‘out of power, out of Serbia and in[to] the custody of the war crimes tribunal’. Madeleine Albright and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer formulated a strategy that combined economic sanctions with engagement with opponents to Slobodan Milošević in the SRF itself. The United States not only invested heavily in funding opposition groups, but also opened a proxy office in the US embassy in Budapest to coordinate efforts to bring about regime change in Belgrade.45

Moreover, the policy advocated by the EU presidency made clear that

elective sanctions aimed at the regime will remain a necessary element of EU policy as long as President Milošević stays in power. The European Council appeals to the Serbian people to take their future into their own hands and to reclaim their place in the family of democratic nations. The EU for its part will not only continue to support the democratic opposition, but will also develop a comprehensive dialogue with civil society.46

System change was promoted, with financial support, by such organizations as the German Marshall Fund, the Project on Transitional Democracies, the Westminster Foundation and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

Money follows interests, and interests and ideology follow money. The lack of foreign support for resistance and democracy promotion may occur in countries where the US and its allies have economic interests (particularly stakes in energy companies). Opposition to governments supporting the terms of foreign extraction of energy supplies does not receive the same level of foreign support. As Ostrowski has pointed out, in Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev at the time of the coloured revolutions was ‘seen as the best guarantor of Western investments and interests. Thus from the Western – and most importantly the US – perspective political change at the apex of power in Kazakhstan was undesirable’.47 Testimony to this effect is also available from Azerbaijan. In the documentary film ‘The Democratic Revolutionary Handbook’,48 the youth movement Magam was turned down for financial support by Western foundations, including the Programme on Transitional Democracy, whose director, Bruce Jackson, explained that ‘Washington was not completely sure that it was the opposition’. An alternative explanation advanced by Magam was that the President Aliev had negotiated oil deals with the multinationals, which needed political stability: ‘if a change in power took place, all contracts would be worthless’. The upshot of demonstrations in Azerbaijan in 2005 (and also in Kazakhstan) was a complete rout of the democratic opposition.

For mobilization of the population in support of democracy promotion to take place, there must be a counter-elite available and willing to accept financial and moral support from both internal and Western sources. By the same logic, those in the host countries who lose as a consequence of Western policy will oppose the imposition of alien values. They will assert their own values and seek their own champions, including those located outside the country. The political and economic processes of the West, and particularly the image of the USA, are not universally acclaimed, making questionable the assumptions of ‘soft politics’ theorists, such as Nye, that ‘the West’ is likely to win a soft politics war. American hegemony, which threatens some countries, is seen in a negative light by the elites and public opinion in Russia, Belarus and China.

The reaction of authoritarian regimes in those three countries in pre-empting dissident movements has been widely covered in the press in the West. Measures taken against potential organizers of ‘coloured revolution’ include the banning of exit polls and the repression of opposition parties and leaders. In Russia, under Putin and Medvedev, it has become increasingly difficult for anti-statist (and pro-Western) counter-elites to organize and articulate an alternative ideology. None the less, however reprehensible repression may be, it alone cannot explain social stability. Repression can only be carried out in the context of the predisposition of elites and publics either to support collective anti-regime activity or to oppose it.49 As Elena Korosteleva, with respect to Belarus, puts it: ‘The specificity of Lukashenko's regime lies with the electorate: it is the contentment of many Belarusians and their identification with the president that defines the regime's most enduring feature – its genuine legitimacy’. Citing Max Weber, she points out that ‘rule is legitimate when its subjects believe it to be so’.50

Public opinion polls in Ukraine also show a very high rating for Lukashenko and Putin as leaders – consistently higher than even the champion of the Orange revolution, Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko's standing after his election was 5.6 compared with President Kuchma's 2.7 in 2005 (based on the average of respondents' answers on a ten-point scale51). In 2006, however, Yushchenko's score had plummeted to 3.8, whereas Putin in both 2005 and 2006 was higher (6.0 and 6.3 respectively) – even after the conflict over the price of energy between the two countries. Yet more remarkable is the popularity of the Belarusian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, who had higher standing in Ukrainian public opinion in 2005 (5.8) and 2006 (6.3) than Yushchenko even in 2005. A statist national welfare regime has considerable public appeal in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.

Political Alternatives

Elite consensus and division are important components of a revolutionary situation. In Ukraine and Serbia there were divisions, whereas in Georgia there was a fairly united elite who regarded Western support as a condition for economic and political security. Moreover, joining the West, through membership of the European Union, was a positive attraction for Serbia, especially given the economic consequences of the sanctions imposed by the EU. Alternative political strategies that might be followed by post-communist countries involve possible membership of NATO, the EU, or both. Joining these institutions provides a positive end-game for democracy promotion – an option not open to countries such as Russia and Belarus. In Serbia, the elite was (and is) divided between, on one side, those favouring the market and stronger links with the European Union and, on the other, the traditional leftist leaders supporting state redistribution and a nationalist ideology. Kyrgyzstan has no real options to join either the EU or NATO; ‘democracy promotion’ occludes a form of clan or interest politics, with a distinctive regional character.52

Ukraine is a more complicated case. Juxtaposed between Russia and the European Union, there is a choice – even if the pro-Western elite magnifies and distorts the political possibility of EU membership. The interests of different economic elites with bases in different parts of the country overlap with forms of ethnic identity: Western Ukrainians are oriented to the West, and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east look to Russia.53 The country has a major ethnic and political division aligned along an east–west axis. Moreover, youth leadership in Ukraine was radicalized against the regime, and Western-sponsored civil society organizations have been used positively in support of the ‘Orange’ tendency. The youth movement PORA (It's time), for example, supported by the Westminster Foundation, brought in Serbian agitators to train 200 activists to organize the events that have later become known as the Orange revolution.54

In Russia, Belarus and China, organized opposition to the incumbent regime is severely restricted, whereas in Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia there were particularly strong pro-Western groups that were able to coordinate opposition interests, and whole strata in the population were predisposed to these values. Conditions enabling mass demonstrations to take place were present in Ukraine. It is widely believed that demonstrations are not possible in Russia, although this is a questionable assumption. Massive demonstrations have been held in Russia in support of pensioners' rights, in opposition to the monetarization of social service benefits and proposed reductions in the size of the Russian army, as have smaller political rallies in support of candidates opposing the present regime. The latter may not have been effective, but they were held.55 But coloured revolution activity would certainly be broken up by the authorities, and they would have the authority, in terms of public sentiment, to do so. The political elite under Putin and Medvedev has greater unity and would be able to suppress such demonstrations.

Although the effects of transformation have led to relative deprivation in Russia, the regime under Putin has enjoyed widespread popular support. The ‘demonstration effect’ of the coloured revolutions does not work. The lack of success in Russia is connected with the legitimacy of the political elite and the formation of an elite consensus.

Table 4 shows the combinations of predispositions, affinity to the West and possibilities for political and social mobilization.

TABLE 4
CONDITIONING FACTORS PROMOTING/RETARDING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Elite Affinity to EU	Predisposition for Change –Consequent on Effects of Transformation			Popular Affinity to NATO ‘The West’
	Strong	Strong	Weak
Negative or N/A	KYRGYZSTAN	RUSSIA	BELARUS	Negative
Divided	UKRAINE, SERBIA			Divided
Positive	GEORGIA			Positive
	High	Low	Low
	Mobilization of Public for Democracy Promotion

Countries in which elites (or counter-elites) have a strong affinity to the EU or to NATO are clearly targets for successful democracy promotion as a form of soft power. Even where the predisposition for change may be strong, as in Russia, a counter-elite has no alternative policy objective in the form of a closer relationship with the leading institutions of the West – the EU and NATO. The failure of the market to enhance living standards, and the illegitimacy of the privatization process, have weakened the standing of neo-liberal capitalism. In Georgia, however, predispositions as well as mobilization of the public are strong, and the economic and political elites can advocate a viable alternative – membership of NATO and the EU. Belarus has weak predispositions and public mobilization for democracy promotion, and no policy option of membership of either NATO or the EU. The initial success of coloured revolution is where these four factors have a positive effect: strong public dispositions for change and high public mobilization, together with an alternative political policy – usually in terms of membership of NATO and or the EU; or more generally, a Western type of modernization based on the market and private property.

Conclusion: Future Scenarios

What is common to all the Central and East European countries outside the European Union is disappointment with the consequences of the transformation. The ‘coloured’ revolution is one way to correct the transformation outcome: opposition to the corrupt incumbent elites concurrent with a renewed effort towards modernization along Western lines – greater pluralism, strengthening of the market and a Western political alignment. For regimes such as Belarus, Uzbekistan and Russia, there is a move back towards a statist framework involving limitations on pluralism and greater statist redistribution.

Many accounts provide a rather simplistic version of events promoting democratic change, in terms of electoral revolutions. They envisage a push from below from liberals seeking to introduce democracy, civil rights and well-being against an ‘illiberal’ autocratic regime riddled with corruption. The push is relatively autonomous, although stimulated by the pull of the movers of the coloured revolutions – Western-sponsored civil society organizations.

The reality is that the thrust for change comes from counter-elites, either from within the ruling political class, or from outside, who seek to replace (or join) the existing elite. Legitimacy is achieved through democracy promotion. Where internal regime change is precluded by the institutional structure, counter-elites sponsor and utilize a mass movement, and they legitimate protest as democracy promotion. Regime weakness is greatest at times of elections which then become a focus for political change. Allegedly fraudulent election results are the trigger for protest. Success leads to the fall of the incumbent elite and its replacement with another. The consequences, however, are far from ‘revolutionary’: existing institutions retain their structures, although the personnel may change. The ‘democratic revolution’ often fails to democratize the electoral structure, and may even lead to new forms of electoral discrimination (as in the case of Kyrgyzstan). The new elites act in a similar way to their predecessors, albeit sometimes (as in Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia) with a more pronounced Westward-leaning policy orientation. Successful ‘coloured’ revolutions involving elite replacement and policy change can occur not only when the population is predisposed to, and mobilized for, change but also when there are alternative policy options on offer – particularly a move to join the economic and security organizations provided by the West. The revolutionary coups d'état that I have described involve the rise of different elite groups, clans or families, which seek to redistribute the assets of the previous regime. ‘Electoral revolutions’ are one of the means used to install them in power. Western interests are involved in these processes – in support of groups, in Margaret Thatcher's terms,56 ‘with whom we can do business’, or from a geo-strategic point of view, to change allegiances in favour of the West.

There are two unintended consequences to the efforts of democracy promotion. First, incumbent governments learn from their opponents' methods and their use of media technology; they also learn from their opponents' mistakes. In strengthening their own hold over their populations they too create their own youth and student organizations, and they define the ‘hostile others’ in terms of rapacious Western interests and aggressive US-led military offences. A consequence of the coloured revolution movements has been the closure of genuine benevolent and positive non-confrontational forms of civil society development: the curtailment of open press and television, and of genuine religious associations.57 Incumbent governments concoct their own counter-ideologies: they condemn the global hegemony of the West and advocate their own forms of sovereignty, democracy and civil society.

Second, internal resistance to Western ‘democracy promotion’ increases. Citizens of many states (among those discussed in this study, Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Serbia) do not share many of the assumptions of Western democracy. It is widely believed in the countries concerned that the opposition's allegations of vote rigging are fabrications.58 Hence, the promotion of ‘electoral democracy’ is undermined as a political strategy. Public opinion polls in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have shown an affinity with a different type of national welfare democracy – a political system that ensures stability in the form of the provision of work, health, educational services and welfare for the unwaged. Where conditions were not appropriate, attempts to instigate ‘coloured’ revolutions have been counter-productive and have strengthened incumbent states.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David Lane

David Lane is a Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. His previous posts include Professor of Sociology at the University of Birmingham, and Reader in Sociology at the University of Essex. He has written extensively on the USSR and state socialism, Marxism and socialism, class and stratification; his more recent writings have focused on transformation of state socialism, globalization and civil society, and the enlargement of the European Union. Research in this article was supported by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust.

Notes

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, ‘What Democracy is … and is Not’, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp.49–62 (p.49).

Ibid.

Mark Beissinger, for example, considers them to be ‘modular political phenomena’ in that action was based on the ‘emulation of the prior successful example of others’: Mark R. Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No.2 (2007), pp.259–76 (p.259).

Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy (Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 2003).

Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

Joseph Nye, ‘Why Military Power Is No Longer Enough’, The Guardian, 31 March 2002, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/31/1>, accessed 19 Feb. 2009.

George W. Bush, ‘Inauguration Speech 2005’, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>, cited in Aidan Hehir, ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.1, No.3 (2007), pp.307–32.

Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, No.3 (2006), pp.283–304 (p.284).

Ibid., p.288.

Ibid., p.295.

See the discussion in M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.18.

John Dunn, ‘Capitalist Democracy: Elective Affinity or Beguiling Illusion?’ Daedalus, Vol.136, No.3 (2007), pp.5–13 (p.10).

Natalya Narochnitskaya (ed.), Oranzhevye seti: ot Belgrada do Bishkeka [Orange Networks: From Belgrade to Bishkek] (St. Petersburg: Aleteyya, 2008).

Active in Ukraine, for example, were Soros's Renaissance Foundation, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Freedom House, the Carnegie Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, the German Marshall Fund, the National Center on Nonviolent Conflict, the Project on Transnational Democracies, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

Ascot Manutscharjan, ‘State of Emergency in Armenia’, available at <http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_14423-544-2-30.pdf>, accessed 11 Nov. 2008. Other commentators have asserted that the opposition led by Levon Ter-Petrossian claimed victory even before the election took place: Vicken Cheterian, ‘From Reform and Transition to “Coloured Revolutions”’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2-3 (2009), pp. 136–60 (p.146).

Charles Tilly, European Revolutions 1492–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.234.

Goodwin defines a revolution as any and all instances in which a state or government is overthrown by a popular movement in an extra-constitutional or violent manner: Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, ‘A Theory of Revolution’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.11, No.3 (1967), pp.264–80, for example, define four different types of ‘revolution’: mass revolution, revolutionary coup, reform coup, palace revolution (p. 265).

Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.4.

Tilly, European Revolutions, p.9.

Radnitz points to the uneven distribution of land in Kyrgyzstan as a cause of discontent and protest: Scott Radnitz, ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.17, No.2 (2006), pp.132–46 (pp.142-3); see also, on unemployment in Ukraine, David Lane, ‘The Orange Revolution: “People's Revolution” or Revolutionary Coup?’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.10, No.4 (2008), pp.525–49.

Radnitz contends (in line with the reasoning of this essay) that local elites, losing candidates, their acquaintances, neighbors and extended families were the driving forces in the Kyrgyz revolution: see Radnitz, ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’, p.137.

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

ODIHR: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, based in Warsaw.

Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example’, p.260.

See Lane, ‘The Orange Revolution’, for an account taken from focus groups of the motives of participants in Ukraine.

Radnitz, ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’, p.132.

Ibid., p.133.

Ibid., p.140.

Ibid., p.133.

Based on report by election observers, Clive Payne, ‘A Visit to Kyrgyzstan’, Nuffield Newsletter, Nuffield College (Oxford), 2008, No.4.

Laurence Broers, ‘After the “Revolution”: Civil Society and the Challenges of Consolidating Democracy in Georgia’, Central Asian Survey, Vol.24, No.3 (2005), pp.333–50 (p.334).

Opposition leader Eka Beselia, quoted in Morning Star (London), 8 Nov. 2008.

Eka Beselia, ‘Accidental Murders, Coincidence or Not?’, interview, available at <http://www.humanrights.ge/rss/index.php?a=more&r=analytical&id=2444&lang=en>, accessed 19 Feb. 2009.

Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), Ch.1.

This strategy was used in the Serbian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Azerbaijan protests and illustrated in a documentary film by Tania Rakhmanova, ‘The Democratic Revolutionary Handbook’, France, 2006.

Data cited in Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example’, p.264.

My thanks here to David Stuckler for comments and suggestions on my earlier draft.

See estimates of the support for the Oranges in Lane, ‘The Orange Revolution’.

Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2005), p.187.

Other writers have emphasized the role of international links, even considering the international element to be a fourth element in transformation: see M.A. Orenstein, S. Bloom and N. Lindstrom (eds.), Transnational Actors in Central and East European Transitions (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).

Bunce and Wolchik, ‘International Diffusion’, p.266.

Ibid., p.291.

Christopher Lamont, ‘Contested Sovereignty: The International Politics of Regime Change in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2-3 (2009), pp.181–98, p.190.

Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23–24 March 2000, cited in Lamont, ‘Contested Sovereignty’, which is also the source of the other quotations.

Wojciech Ostrowski, ‘The Legacy of the “Coloured Revolution”: The Case of Kazakhstan’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2-3 (2009), pp.347–68.

See note 37.

See, for example, Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example’, pp.268–70, who calls the process ‘elite learning’ to limit the spread of insurgency; the crucial question is why some elites should ‘learn’ and seek to restrict ‘revolutionary success’, whereas others may copy the process. On Belarus, see Vitali Silitski, ‘Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No.4 (2005), pp.83–97; on China see Jeanne Wilson, ‘Coloured Revolutions: The View From Moscow and Beijing’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2-3 (2009), pp.369–95.

Elena Korosteleva, ‘Was There a Quiet Revolution? Belarus After the 2006 Presidential Election’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.25, Nos.2-3 (2009), pp.324–46; the quotation from Max Weber is cited from Ian Clark, ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’, Review of International Studies, Vol.29, special issue (Dec. 2003), pp.79–95 (p.79).

‘How would you evaluate L. Kuchma's actions as president? 1 as lowest grade and 10 the maximum’; source: N. Panina, Ukrains'ke suspil'stvo: sotsiologichni monitoring 1992–2006 [Ukrainian Society: Sociological Monitoring 1992–2006] (Kyiv: Institut sotsiologii NAN Ukraini, 2006); data for some of the tables are available only in the edition for 2005.

On the clan-like nature of political power see Kathleen Collins, ‘Clans, Pacts and Politics in Central Asia’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, No.3 (2002), pp.137–52.

See Lane, ‘The Orange Revolution’.

Ukrainian PORA leader speaking on the documentary, ‘The Democratic Revolutionary Handbook’ (see note 37).

See for example, the website of A-INFOSNEWSSERVICE, available at <http://ainfos.ca>. It carried accounts of demonstrations in Murmansk in 2005 attended by 2000 participants and organized by the Party of Pensioners and the Communist Party, and also anarchists: <http://www.ainfos.ca/index24/index24-05/index.html>, accessed 19 Feb. 2009.

Margaret Thatcher famously described Mikhail Gorbachev, a few months before his accession to power in March 1985, as a man with whom she felt she could do business.

This is detailed for Russia and China in Wilson, ‘Coloured Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing’.

IISEPS poll, available at <http://www.nisepi.by/pres1.html>, cited in Vitali Silitski, ‘Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No.4 (2005), pp.83–90 (p.90).