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Abstract
At the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 1999 air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna republika Jugoslavije: SRJ) the United States publicly committed itself to a policy of regime change towards the Belgrade government presided over by Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević. In addition, the May 1999 indictment of Milošević by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for crimes against humanity marked an unprecedented act of judicial intervention that challenged hitherto dominant conceptions of the norm of Westphalian sovereignty. Those acts – state promotion of regime change and the indictment of a sitting head of state by an international criminal tribunal – both require an examination of the role of external agency in either bringing about or acting as a catalyst for regime change. The Milošević regime attempted to use the Westphalian notion of sovereignty to fend off external pressure; events leading to the regime change of October 2000 suggest that this defence was inadequate, as Western powers legitimized their intervention through appeals to humanitarian norms and by direct appeals to citizens of the SRJ.
Notes
Roger Cohen, ‘Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?’, New York Times Magazine, 26 Nov. 2000.
See the Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic et al., 24 May 1999, available at <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e.htm>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Stephen Krasner defines Westphalian sovereignty as follows:
an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. Rulers may be constrained, sometimes severely, by the external environment, but they are still free to choose the institutions and policies they regard as optimal. Westphalian sovereignty is violated when external actors influence or determine domestic authority structures.
See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.20.
I would like to thank Professor David Lane for drawing attention to this point.
Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy, p.20. Of course, Krasner argues that in practice Westphalian sovereignty has been frequently violated and has generally not acted to constrain powerful states.
The Bush Administration requested US$1.5 billion for ‘democracy promotion’ for fiscal year 2008: Susan B. Esptein, Nina M. Serafino and Francis T. Miko, ‘Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 26 Dec. 2007).
Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2004), p.2.
Michael McFaul, ‘Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution’, International Security, Vol.32, No.2 (2007), pp.45–83 (p.46). Carothers points to continuity between the administrations of George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush regarding the rhetoric of democracy promotion: Carothers, Critical Mission, p.7.
See, for example, Mattias Brucker ‘Trans-national Actors in Democratizing States: The Case of German Political Foundation in Ukraine’, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.23, No.2 (2007), pp.296–319; Luke March and Graeme P. Herd, ‘Moldova Between Europe and Russia: Inoculating Against the Colored Contagion?’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.22, No.4 (2006), pp.349–79; McFaul ‘Ukraine Imports Democracy’.
See, for example, Brucker, ‘Trans-national Actors’.
Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.17, No.4 (2006), pp.5–18.
Carothers, Critical Mission, pp.53–61. McFaul also emphasizes semi-authoritarianism as an antecedent condition necessary for post-communist electoral revolutions: Michael McFaul, ‘Transitions from Postcommunism’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No.3 (2005), pp.5–19 (p.7).
March and Herd, ‘Moldova Between Europe and Russia’, p.351.
Ibid.
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.1–38.
Brucker, ‘Trans-national Actors’, p.315.
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Risse and Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms’, pp.1–38.
It is of interest to note that when Li Peng, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress, visited Belgrade in June 2000, China's People's Daily quoted Li as stating that the 1999 NATO air campaign against the SRJ was a ‘violation of the intent of the United Nations Charter and universally recognized norms governing international relations’: see ‘Li Peng Delivers Speech in Belgrade’, People's Daily, 13 June 2000, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200006/13/eng20000613_42856.html>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Ljubivoje Aćimović, ‘Pitanje kontinuiteta međunarodne ličnosti Jugoslavije i njenog članstava u Ujedinjenim Nacijama’ [The Question of Continuity of the International Personality of Yugoslavia and Its Membership in the United Nations], Međunarodni Problemi, Vol.XLVI, No.3 (1994), pp.413–24.
The SFRJ was one of the founding members of the non-aligned bloc of countries as Belgrade hosted the first Non-Aligned Movement summit in 1961. Moreover, Petković noted that Belgrade enjoyed strong support among Non-Aligned Movement member states at a ministerial summit held in 1991; however, owing to a diplomatic focus on European mediation in the Yugoslav conflict, Belgrade failed to ask the movement for support. Once the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina erupted, divisions emerged within the Non-Aligned Movement as predominately Muslim states advocated a harsher line against Belgrade. At the movement's Jakarta summit (September 1992), Belgrade was described to have been in the ‘doghouse.’ None the less, at Jakarta, the Non-Aligned Movement did not debate the Yugoslav crisis, fearing such a debate would divide the Movement between Muslim and non-Muslim states: Ranko Petković ‘The Non-Aligned in Jakarta’, Review of International Affairs, Vol.XLIII, No.1007–1008 (1992), pp.7–8 and 29.
Michael Libal, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991–1992 (London: Praeger, 1997), pp.138–9. The arbitration commission headed by Robert Badinter was established by the European Community in August 1991 to identify solutions to the legal issues arising from the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
Aćimović, ‘Pitanje kontinuiteta’, p.415.
Libal, Limits of Persuasion, p.139.
Milenko Kreća, ‘A Few Remarks about the Continuity of the FR Yugoslavia and its Membership in the United Nations’, Međunarodni Problemi, Vol.XLVI, No.3 (1994), pp.399–412.
Beverly Crawford, ‘German Foreign Policy and European Political Cooperation: The Diplomatic Recognition of Croatia in 1991’, German Politics and Society, Vol.13, No.2 (1995), pp.1–34.
Mate Granić, Vanjski poslovi: Iza kulisa politike (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2005), pp.11–46 and 153. Michael Libal, former head of the southeast Europe department in the German foreign ministry, recalled that during 1991, when Croatian armed forces were suffering losses at the hands of the Yugoslav national army, Zagreb pressed for the internationalization of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia while the focus of Belgrade was to characterize the conflict as an internal matter: Libal, Limits of Persuasion, p.38.
Dušan Lazić, ‘Yugoslav Foreign Policy – the Need for Fundamental Change’ (Belgrade: Center for Strategic Studies, 7 Feb. 1999) full text available at <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2890/lazic.html>, accessed 31 March, 2007.
Programme of the Socialist Party of Serbia, 1992; available at <http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/2kprogosn.pdf>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Ibid.
Slobodan Milošević, ‘Closing Statement to the First Congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia’, 18 July 1990; full text available on the Socialist Party of Serbia's party website, available at <http://www.sps.org.yu/uploads/1sm.pdf>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
One example of this: prior to the 24 September 2000 elections Milošević was quoted as stating, ‘People will be able to differentiate between their own and foreign interests, between real heroes and foreign informers’: Vesna Perić Zimonjić ‘Milošević Tells Serbs to Vote Against the “Traitors”’, The Independent, 13 Sept. 2000, available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/milosevic-tells-serbs-to-vote-against-the-traitors-699627.html>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics and Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.37.
Vid Vukasović, ‘Sukobi u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i međunarodno krivično i humanitarno pravo’ [Conflict in the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal and Humanitarian Law], Međunarodni Problemi, Vol.XLVI, No.1 (1994), pp.9–22 (p.12).
Dragan Bujosević and Ivan Radovanović, The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution (New York, Palgrave–Macmillan, 2003), p.171.
The Croatian foreign minister, Mate Granić, explained how images of Serb-run concentration camps emerging from Bosnia had a transformative effect on the perception of Belgrade in the international community: Granić, Vanjski poslovi.
Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf, Peace with Justice? War Crimes and Accountability in the Former Yugslavia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p.227.
Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.232.
David Owen, ‘The Future of the Balkans: An Interview with David Owen’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.2 (1993), pp.1–9 (p.9); emphasis added.
For Croatia see The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-01-50-I, 8 October 2001, and for Bosnia-Herzegovina see The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-01-51-I, 22 November 2001; indictments are available at <http://www.icty.org/case/slobodan_milosevic/4>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Andrej Nosov of the Belgrade-based Youth Initiative for Human Rights compares the EU's embrace of Koštunica in 2006 as a ‘pro-European’ reformer to that of the EU's embrace of Milošević in 1996 as a regional ‘peacemaker’ (interview with author, January 2007).
OECD Economic Surveys: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Economic Assessment, Volume 2002, Supplement No.3 (Paris: OECD, January 2003), p.23.
At the time Dini stressed that he spoke on behalf of only the Italian government and not the United States or the European Union: ‘Serbia: Italian Foreign Minister Says Both Sides Resist Compromise’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 Dec. 1996, available at <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1082886.html>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s (London: Hurst, 1999), p.301. OSCE is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
Chip Gagnon, ‘International Non-Governmental Organizations and “Democracy Assistance” in Serbia’, Carnegie Project on ‘Evaluation NGO Strategies for Democratization and Conflict Prevention in the Formerly Communist States’, unpublished paper, December 1998; available at <http://www.ithaca.edu/gagnon/articles/carnegie/serbia.htm>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Williams and Scharf, Peace with Justice?, pp.196–201.
Ibid., p.202.
Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević, rev. edn. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), pp.314–15.
A full text of the Rambouillet agreement is available on the United States Department of State website, available at <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html>, last accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Madeleine K. Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax, 2003), p.502; Williams and Scharf, Peace with Justice?, p.207.
Instead, Williams and Scharf argue that the ICTY's indictment provided a ‘legitimate basis’ for policymakers to call for regime change: Williams and Scharf, Peace with Justice?, p.207.
Ibid., pp.194–5. In fact, given the presence of senior Serbian officials such as Milan Milutinović, who was later indicted by the ICTY, indictments against Milošević regime officials would probably have precluded SRJ participation in the Rambouillet conference. Interestingly, Williams and Scharf note that, despite a desire on the part of an unnamed US government official to have Milošević attend Rambouillet, Milošević feared the existence of a sealed ICTY arrest warrant and therefore chose not to attend so as not to risk arrest.
Nina Bang-Jensen, Testimony before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 4 June 2003, official transcript of briefing on Democracy, Human Rights and Justice in Serbia Today (Washington, DC: CSCE, 2003), available at <http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewWitness&ContentRecord_id=371&ContentType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=B&CFID=3412141&CFTOKEN=38485869>, accessed 14 Feb. 2008.
Slobodan Milošević was not charged with genocide in Bosnia for a further two years.
While Bass suggests that Arbour gave the impression that the US opposed her indictment of Milošević, Williams and Scharf claim that Arbour was reluctant to indict Milošević and did so only after a meeting with a US State Department official who asked for Milošević to be indicted: Williams and Scharf, Peace with Justice?, pp.206–7, and Bass, Stay the Hand, p.313.
National Public Radio (NPR), ‘Serbia Must Hand over Milošević to Remain in Community of Nations says Albright’, 28 May 1999, available at <http://www.npr.org/about/press/990528.albright.html>, accessed 26 March 2007.
Albright, Madam Secretary, p.500.
NPR, ‘Serbia Must Hand over Milošević’.
Albright, Madam Secretary, p.500.
Jane Perlez, ‘U.S. Anti-Milosevic Plan Faces Major Test at the Polls’, New York Times, 23 Sept. 2000.
Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23–4 March 2000, available at <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, 24–5 March 1999, available at <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFB2.html>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3–4 June 1999. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, established in 1999, is a broadly-based international political initiative, embracing countries of former Yugoslavia, European, North American and other donor countries, plus a variety of international organizations, intended to enhance co-operation among the countries of the area; available at <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFB2.html>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Steven Erlanger, ‘Serb Opposition Leaders Boycott European Union Session’, New York Times, 12 Oct. 1999.
Nina Wichmann, ‘External Intervention and the Development of NGO's in Serbia and Croatia: The Case of the European Union’, paper presented at the 7th Annual Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop, 4 Feb. 2005, available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW7/Wichmann%20_Paper_.pdf>, accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
Curt Tarnoff, ‘The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: U.S. Economic Assistance’, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, 16 Aug. 2001, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/RS20737.pdf>, accessed 14 Feb. 2009.
National Endowment for Democracy 2000 Annual Report (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy, Jan. 2001).
Florian Bieber, ‘The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol.17, No.1 (2003), pp.73–90 (p.86); Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom, p.430.
Bujosević and Radovanović, The Fall of Milosevic.
Bieber, ‘The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society’, pp.73–90.
In the case of the European Union, five days before the elections of 24 September EU foreign ministers urged SRJ voters to vote against Milošević in order to bring about the lifting of EU sanctions against the SRJ: ‘EU Offers Carrot to Yugoslavian Voters’, CNN, 19 Sept.2000, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/09/18/yugo.sanctions/index.html>, accessed 28 Feb. 2009.
Bujosević and Radovanović, The Fall of Milosevic, pp.6–8.
For reports of reactions within the security services to reports that Koštunica won the 24 September elections outright see Bujosević and Radovanović, The Fall of Milosevic.
McFaul, ‘Transitions from Postcommunism’, p.10; McFaul also notes that parallel vote counts were held in Georgia and Ukraine.
‘Opposition Celebrates as Pressure Mounts on Milošević‘, CNN, 25 Sept. 2000, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/09/25/yugoslavia.elex.03/index.html>, accessed 11 Sept. 2008.
Moreover, in 2000 Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini warned of ‘devastating consequences’ if Milošević attempted to ‘steal’ the 24 September elections: ibid.