Federalism and Inter-governmental Relations in Russia

Abstract

Since the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation in 2000, the principles and practices of federalism have come under attack and we have witnessed a recentralisation of power in the Kremlin. Over the period 2003–6 a number of major laws were adopted that seriously weakened the powers and competencies of federal subjects. Moreover, any hopes that the centralizing initiatives of the Putin administration would be reversed by President Medvedev have been dashed. Inter-governmental relations in Russia are once again conducted in accord with Soviet style principles of hierarchy and control. Russia is a ‘quasi-unitary’ state masquerading as a federation.

Introduction

Article 1 of the December 1993 Constitution declares that the Russian Federation is ‘a democratic federative rule-of-law state with a republican form of government’.1 However, as discussed below, there are serious doubts over the validity of Russia's federal system. Since, the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as president in 2000, we have witnessed a series of radical reforms of the federal system that have transformed Russia into a ‘quasi-unitary’ state. Moreover, any hopes that the inauguration of President Dmitrii Medvedev in 2008 would bring about a reversal of Putin's centralizing policies, and a reinvigoration of the principles of federalism, have so far failed to materialize.

This study examines federalism and inter-governmental relations in the Russian Federation. After outlining the key features of federalism and inter-governmental relations, I examine: (1) the rights of the regions to exercise their prerogatives of legislative initiative in the upper chamber of the Russian parliament (the Federation Council) and in other newly created bodies such as the State Council and the Council of Legislators; (2) the representation of the regions in the State Duma and the Federation Council, and the ability of the upper chamber to act as an independent forum for the articulation and promotion of regional interests; (3) the centralization of powers and competencies under Putin and Medvedev and the creation of a ‘quasi-unitary state’.

The Key Features of Federalism and Inter-governmental Relations

According to Elazar, ‘If a political system has two arenas, planes, spheres, tiers, or levels of government, each endowed with independent legitimacy and a constitutionally guaranteed place in the overall system and possessing its own set of institutions, powers and responsibilities, it is deemed to be federal’.2 For Watts, federations have the following key characteristics:

two or more orders of government each acting directly on their citizens; a formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources to the different orders of government; a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable by either order of government and requiring a measure of consent from each order; an umpire, usually in the form of courts, to adjudicate disputes between governments; processes and institutions to facilitate inter-governmental collaboration for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap; and provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually including some form of federal second legislative chamber.3

A number of scholars have stressed the territorial aspect of federations. Thus, for Gibson, ‘Federalism is a system with a built-in presumption that powers will be divided between a central government and subnational governments, and that political representation will balance representation of territories against representation of people’.4 Similarly, as King stresses, the distinctive feature of federations

is not the fact that the ‘people’ are viewed as sovereign, but that the expression of this sovereignty is tied to the existence and entrenchment of regional, territorial entities. In federations, ‘the people’ are taken as a single entity, in one sense, but as a plurality of entities in another. The people are represented as a whole (the nation) and as parts (the distinct regions comprising the nation).5

Inter-governmental Relations

As Söderlund notes, ‘Continuous processes of political bargaining constitute an essential and central feature of federal systems’. Moreover, ‘Inconsistencies in the allocation of powers between the different levels of government affect the need for inter-governmental collaboration.’6 For Rodin, ‘The federal institutional construction, which rests on a constitutionally guaranteed vertical division of power, creates a multitude of relations, such as “federal–regional”, “federal–local”, “regional–local”, “interregional”, and “inter-local relations”’.7

Moreover, as Cameron observes, inter-governmental relations vary widely from one federation to another, ‘The number and relative size of the units in a federation, the degree of asymmetry among them … whether the government is organized according to parliamentary or presidential/congressional principles – these are all considerations of the utmost importance in determining the nature of inter-governmental structures’.8 Where there exist a high number of constituent units, sub-national governments tend to be less powerful and joint co-operative efforts will be much more difficult to achieve. By contrast, when there are only a few regional units, they are usually more powerful, and in some extreme cases this can lead to the disintegration of the federation, as occurred in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.9

The Russian Federation

The Russian Federation, which has a population of 142 million, is one of the largest and most ethnically diverse multi-national federations in the world. There are 182 different officially recognized nationalities residing in an area of 170 million square kilometres. Inter-governmental relations in Russia are highly complex and have to be conducted ‘across four sub-national layers’.10 First, there are the 83 federal subjects:11 21 republics, 46 oblasts (provinces), 9 krais (territories), 4 autonomous okrugs (areas), 1 autonomous oblast', and 2 federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg). At the second level there are seven Federal Okrugs. These ‘super-districts’ are a new administrative layer created by Putin in 2000 to act as a check on the power of the regional governors; each comprises a dozen or so federal subjects.12 The federal subjects, in turn, are subdivided into 521 ‘city okrugs’ and 1,790 ‘municipal raions (districts)’, which make up the third layer. Finally, the raions are subdivided into 1,733 city settlements and 19,858 rural settlements.13

The Russian Federation is also highly asymmetrical. The federal subjects vary widely in the size of their territories and populations, their socio-economic status, and their ethnic makeup. Thus, for example, the territory of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is 388 times greater in size than that of the Republic of North Ossetia. The population of Moscow in 2006 (10,407,000) was 578 times greater than that of the sparsely populated Evenk Autonomous Okrug (18,000).14 In six subjects of the federation the population does not exceed 75,000, but the geographical size of each is comparable to that of Germany.15

There are also vast differences in the socio-economic status of the federal subjects. For example, per capita income in the oil-rich Yamala-Nenets Autonomous Okrug in 2003 was 178 times that of the Republic of Ingushetia. Moreover, economic asymmetry has been growing in Russia. If in 2000 the volume of per capita industrial production in the regions varied by a factor of 64, by 2005 this had risen to a factor of 281. Variations in the per capita income of richest and poorest regions grew from a factor of 50 to 194, and the volume of per capita investment from 30 to 44. Variations in regional levels of unemployment rose from a factor of 48 to a factor of 78.16

Constitutional Asymmetry

The Russian Federation is also constitutionally asymmetrical. While Article 5.4 of the Russian Constitution declares that all subjects of the federation are equal, in fact the 21 ethnic republics were granted far greater powers than the territorially defined regions. Moreover, over the period 1994–98 the asymmetrical nature of the federation was increased by Yeltsin's promotion of bilateral treaties between the centre and individual subjects. Article 78 of the Russian Constitution allows the centre to transfer ‘the implementation of some of its powers’ to the federal subjects and vice versa, and this article was used by the Yeltsin regime to promote the development of ‘contract federalism’. Over the period 1994–98, 46 bilateral treaties were signed between the federal government and subjects of the federation, which gave the local signatories a whole host of political and economic privileges.17 Moreover, a majority of these treaties violated the Russian Constitution and federal laws. Such factors have made inter-governmental relations in the Russian Federation much more complex and difficult to manage than in other smaller and more homogeneous federations.

The Distribution of Powers in Russia

The Russian Constitution of December 1993 granted the federal government sweeping powers over all the major aspects of the economy and polity. The distribution of powers is set out in Articles 71–73. As can be seen in the appendix, Article 71 granted the federal government 18 exclusive powers over a broad range of national policies (including the national economy, the federal budget, federal taxes and duties; foreign and defence affairs), and Article 72 lists 14 powers that were to be shared between the federal authorities and the federal subjects. No exclusive powers were delegated to the federal subjects; instead, the subjects were granted only ‘residual powers’ (Article 73), that is, powers over those relatively few policy areas not already provided for in Articles 71 and 72.

The supremacy of the Federal Constitution over the constitutions and laws of the federal subjects is proclaimed in a number of articles. Thus, Article 4.1 declares that ‘the sovereignty of the Russian Federation extends to the whole of its territory’. Article 4.3 declares that ‘The Russian Federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of its territory’. According to Article 15.1 ‘the Constitution of the Russian Federation has supreme legal force and is direct-acting and applies throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. Laws and other legal enactments adopted in the Russian Federation must not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation’.

Analysis of Articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution shows that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to create a balanced and equitable division of competencies between the federal centre and federal subjects in such a large and ethnically diverse country as Russia. The thorny question of who should be in charge of the implementation of the long list of rather vaguely worded ‘concurrent powers’ outlined in Article 72 has created tensions and conflict between the centre and the regions. This has not been helped by the fact that a number of the powers listed in these articles are contradictory. Thus, for example, the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms and the protection of the rights of national minorities are both placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian Federation (Article 71c) and the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its constituent units (Article 72f).

The Bilateral Treaties

As noted above, over the period 1994–98 Yeltsin signed a number of bilateral treaties with the federal subjects. The vast majority of these treaties (42 of the 46) contained provisions that violated the Russian Constitution. Thus, for example, special agreements attached to Tatarstan's treaty led to infringements of 12 of the 18 sub-clauses of Article 71 of the Russian Constitution.

The treaties also widened the number of areas which come under the joint jurisdiction of the federal government and the federal subjects as stipulated in Article 72, while in other cases powers that were exclusively reserved for the Russian Federation Government (Article 71) were transferred to the sole jurisdiction of the federal subjects. Finally, in a number of the treaties, areas that in the Constitution were identified as spheres of joint jurisdiction (Article 72) were transferred to the exclusive authority of the federal subjects.

In response to the massive loss of power at the centre, Yeltsin in March 1996 adopted a presidential decree (No. 370) and the Russian parliament adopted legislation in June 1999, both of which stressed that all bilateral treaties had to conform to the Russian Constitution.

Institutional Factors

As Söderlund notes, ‘Different forms of government, in general, generate different patterns of inter-governmental relations.’18 For example, in presidential systems, such as Russia, where power is dispersed among a large number of actors, inter-governmental relations are ‘fragmented and difficult to coordinate’.19 This is ‘due to the occurrence of both horizontal and diagonal relationships between the executive and legislative branches at both the federal and sub-national levels’.20

Another important factor shaping inter-governmental relations is the structure of the party system. As Cameron notes, ‘A federation with an integrated national/regional party system is endowed with an integrative capacity missing in a federation differently constituted; relations among governments may take on the appearance at times of relations among fellow politicians within the same political formation.’21 Where parties are weak and fragmented this will tend to intensify centrifugal forces and make it difficult to bind the units of the federation together. This was the case in Russia during the Yeltsin era (1991–99). Similarly, if parties are over-centralized in their structures and operation and do not reflect the interests of the constituent units, this also can lead to tensions and conflict between the centre and the federal subject, particularly in multi-national federations. Such a situation has now emerged in Russia, where regional parties are prohibited and all the regional assemblies are dominated by the Kremlin's ‘party of power’, United Russia.

It should also be stressed that behind the formal veneer of constitutionalism and the rule of law, an important aspect of inter-governmental relations in Russia is the myriad of informal relations that operate between the political and economic elites at the centre and in the regions. Informal political and clientelistic relations often dominate legal and constitutional relations. Top officials in the regions often prefer to bargain directly with federal officials on a one-to-one basis rather than act in concert with other regions through their formal representation in the Federation Council and the Council of Legislators (see below).

Putin's Radical Reforms

By the end of the Yeltsin era, constitutional federalism had been replaced by a highly politicized form of ‘negotiated federalism’. The number of normative legal acts adopted by the regions and republics exceeded 300,000, and of these, approximately a quarter infringed federal laws. Moreover, 19 of the 21 republican constitutions were in breach of the Federal Constitution.22

On coming to power in 2000 President Putin quickly adopted a number of radical federal reforms whose primary aim was to reassert the powers of the Kremlin over the regions. In the summer of 2001 the president launched a major campaign to bring regional legislation into line with the federal Constitution, and he created a special commission headed by Dmitrii Kozak, the deputy head of his presidential administration, to oversee its operation. As a result of the work of this commission, all the bilateral treaties have now been rescinded, and regional legislation is gradually being brought back into line with the Constitution.23 Putin also instigated a major reform of the Federation Council, which has severely compromised its political independence (see below). Moreover, in 2004, the upper chamber approved a new law that gives the president the right to appoint regional governors, subject to the approval of the regional parliaments.

The Representation of the Federal Subjects in Federal Policy-making

As noted above, one of the key structural prerequisites of federal states is the institutional representation of regions in policy-making at the federal level. As King notes,

A federation may be viewed as a sovereign state marked by the fact (a) that its representation is preponderantly territorial; (b) that this territorial representation is characteristically secured on at least two sub-national levels (local and regional government); (c) that the regional units are incorporated electorally, perhaps otherwise, into the decision procedure of the national centre; and (d) that the incorporation of the regions into the decision procedure of the centre can only be altered by extraordinary constitutional measures, not for example by resort to a simple majority vote of the national legislature, or by autonomous decision of the national executive.24

Thus, a key prerequisite of a federation is the creation of bicameral national parliaments with an upper chamber especially designed to accommodate regional interests. There are considerable variations in the powers of upper chambers, the methods by which their member are elected, their relations with other federal and regional bodies, and the equality of representation within them. As Cameron comments,

the form of appointment effectively defines the manner in which regional interests will receive expression at the centre; by direct election, as in Australia, Switzerland and the United States; by indirect election from the regional legislatures, as in Austria and – to a degree – in India; by direct nomination of delegates by the regional governments, as in Germany; or by some mixture of the above, as in Belgium, Malaysia and Spain.25

However, Stepan also alerts us to the fact that ‘the greater the competence of the territorial house, the more the demos – which is represented on a one person–one vote basis in the lower house – is constrained’.26 Likewise, for Gibson,

Federalism poses potential limits to the one person, one vote principle by combining two norms of political representation in its institutions: representation by population, where the unit of representation is the individual citizen, and representation by territory, where the unity of representation is the subnational territorial entity (e.g., each state receives a fixed standard of representation regardless of its population).27

Thus, for example, as Stepan observes, in Brazil each state gets the same number of senators regardless of the size of its population, which means that ‘One vote cast for a senator in Roraima has 144 times as much weight as that of a senator in São Paulo’.28 Likewise, in Russia all 83 federal subjects have equal representation in the Federation Council even though there are massive variations in the size of their populations. Thus, for example, Moscow city and the Nenetskii Autonomous Okrug both have two ‘senators’ even though Moscow's population is 248 times larger than that of Nenets.

The Federation Council

From a comparative perspective, the Russian Federation Council is a relatively weak federal institution that has been dominated for much of its existence by the lower house and the presidency. It is the lower house, the State Duma, that is the law-making chamber; the upper chamber has the more limited power to approve or reject the legislation of the lower house; moreover, a veto by the Federation Council can be overturned by a two-thirds majority in the Duma. The president also has the power to veto the legislation of the Council, and likewise this veto can only be overturned by a vote of two-thirds of its members. According to the Russian Constitution, the Federation Council consists of ‘two representatives from each component of the Russian Federation; one each from the representative and executive bodies of state power’ (Article 95). However, the Constitution did not stipulate the precise method by which members were to be chosen. In 1993 the first Council was elected by means of national elections. The method of choosing members was changed by Yeltsin in 1995 and by Putin in 2000, and more recently Medvedev has adopted yet further changes that are due to come into force in 2011.

From 1996 until 2000 the heads of the legislative and executive branches of government in each region were granted ex officio membership of the Council. Thus, during this period, the Council was indirectly elected, and its composition was decided by whoever held the post of chair of a regional assembly or head of a regional administration. Members of the Council could retain their seats as long as they held their regional posts. Initially, Yeltsin was able to exert a powerful influence over the work of the Council as he had the power to appoint the regional governors directly. However, in the mid-1990s he was forced to relinquish his powers of appointment of the regional governors, which seriously weakened his ability to control the upper chamber.

The authority of the Federation Council, during this period, was weakened by the fact that most of its members were too preoccupied with their duties in the regions to attend its sessions. Indeed, often it was difficult to achieve a quorum and the Council even had to resort to postal voting. Moreover, according to Article 105 of the Russian Constitution, legislation adopted by the State Duma, was ‘deemed to have been approved by the Federation Council’ if it was examined by the upper chamber within 14 days. Up until 2002 the Council met for only a few days each month, hardly sufficient time to carry out its legislative duties. Thus, many laws of the Duma were adopted without the proper scrutiny of the Council.

Another sign of the weakness of the Federation Council was its failure to use its right of legislative initiative. Thus, ‘only about 7 percent of draft laws prepared by the upper chamber and its members in 1994–98 passed all stages of the legislative process and were adopted as federal laws’.29 None the less, the Council acted as a forum for the airing of regional interests in the centre, and regional elites were able to defend their rights and privileges via the Council. The Council also successfully thwarted the adoption of a key law that would have tightened up centre–periphery relations and reduced the powers of the regions vis-à-vis the centre.

Putin and Medvedev's Reforms of the Federation Council

In August 2000 Putin rescinded the ex officio rights of the governors and the chairs of regional assemblies to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament.30 These were to be replaced (from January 2002) by full time ‘delegates’, chosen by the regional assemblies and chief executives. For Thomas Remington, ‘There is every indication that the presidential administration was active in coordinating this process … 75–80 per cent of the appointments were either recommended by or cleared with the presidential administration.’31

In many cases, regions ‘chose’ Moscow insiders or high-ranking entrepreneurs from the capital as their new senators. As Remington notes, over 45 per cent of the 165 members (for whom there was information on residency) were ‘Moscow-based’ in 2003.32 In addition, Turovsky noted that by 2006 elites from the two ‘capital cities’, Moscow and St. Petersburg, dominated the leadership of the Federation Council.33

My study of the membership of the Federation Council (as of 31 December 2009) shows that, at the time of their appointment, more than half (55.5 per cent) of the members did not reside or work in the regions that nominated them.34 In 30 regions both representatives (one from the executive branch and one from the legislative branch) were ‘outsiders’. Moreover, in only 17 of the 83 federal subjects did both members reside in the regions where they were selected. Of the five members of the top leadership of the Federation Council two have close connections with the regions they represent: Sergei Mironov, chairman of the Federation Council, made his career in St. Petersburg, and deputy chairman Mikhail Nikolaev has a long record of employment in the Republic of Sakha. The other three – first deputy chairman Aleksandr Torshin and deputy chairmen Yurii Vorob'ev and Svetlana Orlova – are ‘outsiders’, with no connections to the regions they represent.

One of the supposed advantages of the new system was that it removed members of the executive branch from the upper chamber. So long as the governors were ex officio members, this violated the principle of the separation of powers. However, a study of the current membership shows that there are a large number of Council members who made their careers in the executive branch. Alongside many former regional governors there are also a number of former high-ranking officials from the Russian government and presidential administration. Now that all the governors have been appointed by the president, and United Russia dominates all the regional assemblies, it is doubtful that the regions will be granted an independent voice in the selection of their senators. What we appear to be witnessing is a ‘de-regionalization’ of the upper chamber, which is gradually turning into a club for former members of the national executive and influential entrepreneurs. Such developments have seriously undermined one of King's key prerequisites for a federation, namely ‘the legislative entrenchment’ of federal subjects in central decision-making.35 Regions may have representatives but there are now questions about which they really represent, the centre or the region.

As a result of these reforms, we now have a much more compliant and passive upper chamber which acts more as a champion of the federation in the regions than as a representative of the regions at the centre. Thus, for example, over the period 1996–99 approximately 23 per cent of the legislation that was sent to it by the State Duma was rejected by the Federation Council,36 whereas under the Putin presidency, the upper chamber was turned into a ‘a kind of legislative conveyor belt. All bills, even bills that directly infringe [sic] upon regional interests, are quickly considered and approved’.37 For example, in the summer of 2002 deputies even supported changes to the law on the police, which revoked the governors' powers of appointment of top regional law-enforcement officials. As noted above, in 2004 the Council ratified Putin's legislation abolishing the direct election of governors. As discussed below, over the period 2003–6 the Council also ratified a series of laws that have substantially weakened the powers of the federal subjects.

The Right of Legislative Initiative

In conformity with Article 104, the right of legislative initiative is granted to the Federation Council acting as a corporate entity and to each individual member of the Council. However, in practice, these rights have rarely been put into practice. As Leksin notes, ‘Each year the State Duma adopts, the Federation Council approves, and the President of the Russian Federation signs over 200 federal acts, of which only a few are the result of legislative initiatives of the Federation Council.’38 Thus, for example, over the period 2000–2 the Russian Federation president signed over 500 federal acts, only three of which were initiated under the auspices of the Federation Council, and 13 by individual members of the upper chamber, and, according to Leksin, the work of the Council in initiating legislation was no more successful in the period 2003–6.39

The fierce competition for scarce budget funds has also made it impossible for members of the upper chamber to act as a collective body, and to provide a united front in the annual budget negotiations. The centre has been able to use a policy of divide and rule. Informal ‘back-room agreements’ between individual regions and the centre, rather than collective bargaining, has now become the norm when drawing up the federal budget. Moreover, as Remington has clearly demonstrated, the ability of the chamber to act in concert was for a time seriously compromised by the fact that party factions were not permitted to function in the upper chamber.40

In yet another twist in policy, Medvedev in his first presidential address to the Federal Assembly in November 2008 called for further changes to the method of forming the Federation Council. According to the president, the Council should henceforth comprise only ‘people elected to the representative assemblies and deputies from the local self-government bodies of the region in question’. Paul Goode comments: ‘Whilst this has the advantage of creating the upper chamber from members of the legislative branch of power (regional or local legislatures) – it would appear that the real aim of the policy is to further weaken the power of regional governors.’41 These proposals were adopted by the State Duma in 2009 and they are due to come into force in 2011.

The State Council and the Council of Legislators

In order to compensate regional governors and the chairs of regional assemblies for the loss of their ex officio membership of the Federation Council, two new advisory bodies were set up by Putin: the State Council and the Council of Legislators.

The State Council, created by a presidential decree on 1 September 2000, meets every three months and is chaired by the president; all the regional governors are members of the Council. There is also an inner presidium comprising seven governors (one from each of the federal districts), membership of which rotates each six months. Members of the presidium meet with the president once every month. The State Council has no formal law-making powers and is primarily an advisory body for the president. According to Turovsky, ‘As far as the actual authority of the State Council is concerned, it is capped by its low status. The Council's attempts to launch various initiatives have traditionally been neglected by the government, which does not take recommendations of this consultative body on board’.42 However, membership of the council does give regional governors direct access to the president and other top members of the federal government. In February 2007 Putin widened the membership of the council to include a number of former governors who supported the government. At best, the council has served as a direct channel for the governors to the president and has afforded them some limited input into policy-making. Moreover, now that the governors are appointed by the president, the role of the State Council in representing the interests of the regions has been severely curtailed. The State Council does, however, play an important role in ameliorating disputes that arise between federal and regional executives.

The Council of Legislators

In a similar vein the Council of Legislators, which is meant to provide a forum where the chairs of regional assemblies can participate in federal policy-making, is in reality nothing more than a ‘talking-shop’. This council has no formal law-making or decision-making powers.

The structure of the Council of Legislators includes the chairman of the Federation Council (who also chairs this council), the first deputy chairman of the State Duma (who is the vice-chairman of the council), one of the deputy chairs of the Federation Council, and all the chairs of the legislative assemblies of the federal subjects. The Council of Legislators meets not less than once every three months. There is also a permanently operating working body, the Presidium of the Council of Legislators, which meets in session at least once a month. The presidium is headed by the chairman of the Federation Council, and the deputy chairman (the first deputy chairman of the State Duma), and the secretary (one of the deputy chairmen of the Federation Council). The membership of the presidium also includes one member of the Council of Legislators from each of the seven federal districts, who is elected by the head of the legislative body in each of those districts. Rotation of membership of the presidium takes place once a year. The council also has eight standing commissions,43 each overseen by the head of a regional assembly.

A study of the work of the Council of Legislators shows that it is primarily a tool of the federal centre, a body that assists the centre in monitoring federal legislation in the regions, rather than a body that represents and promotes the adoption of regional legislation in the centre. Sessions of the council are often held in the Kremlin and attended by the president. A great deal of the council's work is devoted to coordinating the activities of the regions in implementing the president's policies rather than initiating legislation. A 2008 report of the upper chamber gave this negative appraisal of the work of the council:

it has not yet managed to solve the problem of giving a systemic character to the legislative process, both at the federal and regional levels, or to assume the role of a body that collects legislative initiatives from regions for their subsequent consolidation in the form of specific legislative initiatives initiated by the Council of Federation. The commissions of the Council of Legislators have failed to turn into methodological centres, capable of developing recommendations for determining the main directions of federal legislation, and the legislation of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.44

Regional Input into Policy-making and Legislative Initiatives

Regional authorities have been granted special powers over the adoption of draft federal laws in those areas that come under their joint jurisdiction. According to legislation first adopted in June 1999,45 all such draft laws must be considered by the legislative and executive bodies in the regions before they can be adopted into law. Federal subjects have 30 days to consider the draft laws, and if a third of them give a negative response a conciliation commission must be created to work out a compromise.46 However, many regional officials lack the necessary legal expertise to carry out such work, and the time period of 30 days is often too short. Thus, for example, the first deputy minister of justice of the Republic of Tatarstan noted that, over the period 2001–2, the State Duma sent over one thousand draft federal laws to the republic and it was simply impossible for officials there to respond to all these laws in the time available.47 Moreover, often there are contradictions between the responses sent to the Duma from the executive and legislative branches in the regions, and it is the opinions of the regional executive that take priority.

Legislative Initiative

According to Article 104 of the Russian Constitution, the right of legislative initiative is vested in ‘legislative (representative) bodies of components of the Russian Federation’. However, the success rate of the legislative initiatives of the regions has been very low. Thus, for example, over the period 1995–2005 just 3 per cent (110) of the 3,305 legislative proposals submitted to the Duma from the regions were enacted as laws.48 Moreover, a study of 444 regional laws considered by the State Duma in 2006 shows that only 32 were adopted as federal laws.49 These 32 laws made up just 11.55 per cent of the total number of laws adopted in 2006.50 As Leksin observes, these figures are very different from the success rate of presidential and governmental initiatives. For example, of the 27 legislative proposals sent to the Duma by the Russian president in 2006, 26 were adopted, and likewise 100 of the 106 draft laws submitted by the Russian Government were adopted by the State Duma.51 These problems were acknowledged by President Medvedev in his address to the Federal Assembly in 2008:

Legal authorities in the regions of the Russian Federation have submitted many initiatives to the State Duma but very few of them are adopted as laws. This is due to insufficient elaboration of these initiatives and the large number of alternative bills in the Duma. In general there is little awareness in the regions of the legislative process at the federal level. I think that the Federation Council could play a much larger role than it does now, as coordinator of the legislative activity on the part of the regional representative bodies.52

Representation of the Regions in the State Duma

In 2007 the method of electing members of the State Duma was changed from a mixed to a fully fledged party list system of proportional representation. As a result of this change to the electoral system, which abolished the single-seat constituencies, 11 federal subjects now have no representation in the State Duma.53 Moreover, the Duma is now dominated by Muscovites, who make up 40.7 per cent of its members. Moreover, just under a quarter (104) of the deputies are ‘outsiders’ (so-called ‘Vikings’, with no residency ties to the regions where they were elected).54

The Centralization of Competencies and Executive Powers

In 2001 the Kozak Commission was charged with the daunting task of clarifying the powers of federal, regional and local governments. According to the Federal Register, the legislative base of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation consists of more than 235,000 normative legal acts.55 However, ‘clarification’ soon turned into the ‘centralization’ of competencies. As a result of the recommendations of the Kozak Commission a number of major laws were adopted over the period 2003–6 which have severely weakened the powers and competencies of federal subjects, and transformed Russia's federal system into a ‘quasi-unitary state’.

Two key laws were adopted in 2003: (1) Federal Law 184, 4 July 2003, ‘On the General Principles of Organizing Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation’, which was a new version of the law of October 1999,56 and (2) Federal Law 131, ‘On the General Principles of Organizing Local-Self Government in the Russian Federation’.57 As Leksin observes, the adoption of these two laws required the ‘revision of the basic provisions of 155 previously adopted federal laws, changes to the budget and tax codes, and termination of 42 federal laws’.58 Moreover, the provisions of several thousand regional laws also had to be amended. By 1 January 2008, 7,291 legal and normative acts had been adopted by the regions in order to implement Law 131.59

According to Gligich-Zolatoreva, Federal Law 184 was adopted without taking into consideration the views of the federal subjects, or respecting federal principles. Moreover, that law has now been amended so many times that many of its original provisions have been changed out of all recognition: ‘many of its key articles remain highly ambiguous or even contradictory, and the law still contains numerous provisions which violate the Russian Constitution’.60

Two major laws reforming the federal system were adopted in 2004:

(1) Federal Law 122, 22 August, ‘Amending Russia's Federal Legislation Pursuant to the Amended Federal Laws, “On The General Principles of the Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies in the Subjects of the Russian Federation” and “The General Principles of Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation”’.61 The provisions of this massive law, which runs into more than 700 pages, called for amendments to 264 federal laws and decrees. Moreover, in the first six months after its adoption the law was amended a further 11 times.62 The draft law was pushed through the legislative process very quickly – the whole process took less than three months – providing the regions with very little opportunity to exercise their legal rights to scrutinize such legislation, and give their official responses.63

As Leksin notes, Law 122 ‘provides: (1) an exhaustive (closed) list of 41 joint powers of the Federal Government and subjects of the Russian Federation, and also an exhaustive (closed) list of questions of local significance of municipalities (for settlements, municipal areas and city districts)’.64 In addition, a number of powers were transferred de facto from the joint jurisdiction of the federal government and the regions to the sole jurisdiction of the centre.65 For example, the law required amendments to the federal law ‘On Minerals’ that significantly reduced the powers of the federal subjects in the field of mineral extraction. Similar amendments have also had to be made to the federal water and timber codes.

On 14 July 2004 the Association of Regions of the Far East and Zabaikal (the region beyond Lake Baikal) sent a letter to President Putin, the Federation Council and the State Duma, which stated that the centralization of powers provided for in Law 122 had transformed Russia into a ‘unitary state’. The letter was signed by nine heads of regions and speakers of regional parliaments.66

(2) Federal Law 159, 3 December 2004, ‘About Modification in the Federal Law, Concerning the General Principles of the Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of the Government of Subjects of the Russian Federation’.67 The adoption of Law 159 permits federal subjects to take independent control over a number of those powers which they exercise jointly with the Federal government and which they can fund from their own budgets. However, at the same time, other joint powers funded from the Federal Budget were to be taken under federal control.68 According to Gligich-Zolatoreva, with the adoption of this law, ‘we witnessed the transfer of the Russian Federation on to a unitary track’.69 It was as part of this legislation that the election of regional governors was abolished and replaced by presidential appointment (subject to the approval of regional assemblies).

Finally, there were two important laws adopted in 2005 and 2006.

(1) Federal Law 199, 31 December 2005, ‘About Modification in Individual Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with Improving the Delimitation of Powers’.70 This law was adopted in response to Putin's call, at a meeting of the State Council in July 2005, for 114 additional competencies to be delegated to the jurisdiction of the federal subjects. Many commentators hailed this move as an indication that Putin was reversing his centralizing policies in favour of a new programme of devolution. However, this should be viewed as a ‘de-concentration’ of duties, rather than a ‘devolution’ of powers, for, as Clark notes, ‘Decentralization occurs when local governments have both resources and the authority to use these resources. Deconcentration indicates that resources are devolved to the localities from the centre but their use is still under central direction’.71

(2) Federal Law 258, 29 December 2006, ‘About Modification of Individual Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with Improving the Delimitation of Powers’.72 Nicknamed ‘the second Law number 199’, after that adopted in 2003, the implementation of this law required amendments to 26 federal laws, and five laws were made redundant.73 These changes in turn led to amendments to 300 other normative acts including federal laws 122 and 199, both of which had been adopted to modify earlier federal laws!74

Law 258 strengthens the powers of the territorial branches of federal executive bodies in the regions over those areas that come under federal or joint jurisdiction. In particular, the law states that the heads of territorial executives are to be granted the right to determine the specific structures of regional executives and to nominate the heads of the departments of regional administrations. This provision violates Article 11.2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation which states that ‘State power in the components of the Russian Federation is exercised by the bodies of state power formed by them’. With the implementation of this law, heads of the departments of regional executives now operate under a system of ‘dual subordination’, whereby they are directly accountable to the regional governors and the heads of the territorial branches of federal ministries.75 In federations, in contrast to unitary states, specific areas of regional policy-making are constitutionally guaranteed. However, Putin's reforms have led to the reinstitution of Soviet-style principles of hierarchy and centralized administrative control from Moscow. Thus, for example, as a result of the centralizing policies implemented over the period 2003–6, the regions retained about 70 powers, while 700 new powers were transferred to the jurisdiction of the centre!76 There has also been a massive increase in the size of the federal bureaucracy and the number of federal officials working in the regions. As Kozak observed in October 2007,

Over the period 2003–4 we acted mechanistically. All that was not transferred to the competence of the federal subjects was transferred to the Federal level and this has necessitated the creation of a huge army of territorial branches of the Federal Executive. Today in the regions there is a ratio of one to three as regards the number of federal and regional officials in a given territory.77

According to Slider, over the period 2001–6 the number of federal executive officials in the regions grew from 348,300 to 616,100. In comparison, the number of regional executive branch officials increased at a much smaller rate, from 169,900 to 200,000.78

Fiscal Centralization

Fiscal federalism has now been replaced by fiscal centralism. Thus, for example in 1996 regional tax revenues constituted 57.95 per cent of the total revenues in the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation, but by 2005 this proportion had fallen to just 31.57 per cent.79 Moreover, the Federal government has also been given new rights of federal intervention. For example, regions with budget deficits exceeding 30 per cent of their income are subject to direct administrative control by the federal government.

Conclusion

The centralization of inter-governmental relations and the emasculation of the upper chamber have turned Russia into a quasi-unitary state which pays only lip service to the principles and practices of federalism. Heads of departments of regional administrations are now subordinate both to the regional governors and to the heads of the territorial branches of federal ministries. The governors, in turn, are appointed by the president, subject to the approval of the regional assemblies, which are controlled by United Russia (the ‘official’ party). According to a report of the Federation Council published in 2008, ‘federal relations between the Russian Federation and its constituent entities are being replaced by administrative relations between federal and regional bodies of state power. Federal units are turning into administrative–territorial ones, which threatens to reform a federal state into an administrative and unitary one’.80

For Elazar, ‘The elements of a federal process include a sense of partnership among the parties to the federal compact, manifested through negotiated cooperation on issues and programmes and based on a commitment to open bargaining between all parties to an issue in such a way as to strive for consensus or, failing that, an accommodation that protects the fundamental integrity of all the partners’.81 However, in the Russian Federation, changes to the method of appointing members of the upper chamber have turned the Federation Council into a compliant and passive body which is no longer able to act as an independent forum for the articulation of regional interests. Likewise, the State Council and the Council of Legislators have not provided the regions with anything more than a consultative voice in federal policy-making.

In conclusion, Russia is now a Federation in name only. Federal principles of non-centralization and regional autonomy are rapidly being replaced by centralized commands from above, and subordination and subservience from below.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Cameron Ross

Cameron Ross is Reader in Politics, School of Humanities, University of Dundee, Scotland.

Notes

See the translation of the Russian Constitution in Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 4th edn. (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.478–513.

Danial J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL and London: University of Alabama Press), 1987, p.21.

Ronald L. Watts, ‘Multinational Federations in Comparative Perspective’, in Michael Burgess and John Pinder, Multinational Federations (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.225–47 (p.226).

Edward Gibson, ‘Federalism and Democracy: Theoretical Connections and Cautionary Insights’, in Edward Gibson (ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp.1–28 (p.7).

Preston King, ‘Federation and Representation’, in M. Burgess and A.-G. Gagnon (eds.), Comparative Federalism and Federation (New York, London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp.94–102 (p.94).

Peter Söderlund, The Dynamics of Federalism in Russia: A Study of Formal and Informal Power Resources of the Regional Chief Executives in Russian Centre–Region Relations (Åbo, Finland: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2006), p.14.

Johnny Rodin, Rethinking Russian Federalism: The Politics of Inter-governmental Relations and Federal Reforms at the Turn of the Millennium, Södertörn Political Studies (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 2006), p.18.

David Cameron, ‘Structures of Inter-governmental Relations’, background paper, Forum of Federations, Conference on Federalism, Mont-Tremblant, October 1999, p.2, at <http://26772.vws.magma.ca/en/libdocs/IntConfFedBk99/ICFE9911-int-Cameron-bg.htm>, accessed 24 Oct. 2009.

Rodin, Rethinking Russian Federalism, p.46.

Migara O. de Silva, Galina Kurlyandskaya, Elena Andreeva and Natalia Golovanova, Inter-governmental Reforms in the Russian Federation: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009), p.20.

According to the Russian Constitution of December 1993, the Russian Federation comprised 89 federal subjects; over the period 2005–8 a process of regional mergers took place, hence the number of federal subjects has been reduced to 83.

On 19 December 2009 the Southern Federal District was divided into two parts and a new 8th Federal District, ‘The North Caucasus’, was created: see the article by Petrov, below.

Doklad Soveta Federatsii Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2008 goda, O Sostoyanii Zakonodatel'stva v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Monitoring Pravovogo Obespecheniya Osnovnykh Napravlenii Vnutrennei i Vneshnei Politiki [Report of the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2008, On the state of legislation in the Russian Federation: Monitoring of legal provision of the basic directions of domestic and foreign policy] (Moscow: Federation Council, 2009), p.330.

The Evenk Autonomous Okrug was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007.

De Silva et al., Inter-governmental Reforms in the Russian Federation, p.21.

S.D. Valentei, ‘Soderzhanie Rossiiskogo Federalizma’ [The content of Russian federalism], in S.D. Valentei (ed.), Rossiiskii federalizm: Ekonomiko-pravovye problemy [Russian federalism: economic–legal problems] (St. Petersburg: Aleteya, 2008), pp.57–82 (p.69).

For further details on the bilateral treaties, see Cameron Ross, Federalism and Democracy in Russia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Söderlund, The Dynamics of Federalism in Russia, p.15.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.16.

Cameron, ‘Structures of Inter-governmental Relations’, p.3.

M.I. Vil'chek, ‘O klyuchevykh problemakh stanovleniya instituta polnomochnykh predstavitelei Prezidenta RF’ [Key problems of establishing an institution of plenipotentiary representatives of the President of the RF], in Polpredy Prezidenta: Problemy stanovleniya novogo instituta [Plenipotentiary Representatives of the President: Problems of establishing a new institution], Nauchnye Doklady, Moscow State University, 2001, No.3 (Jan.), p.20.

Just one new treaty has been signed since 1998 – the treaty with Tatarstan, which was ratified in 2007.

King, ‘Federation and Representation’, p.94.

Cameron, ‘Structures of Inter-governmental Relations’, p.4.

Alfred Stepan, ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.10, No.4 (1999), pp.19–34 (p.27).

Gibson, ‘Federalism and Democracy’, p.15.

Alfred Stepan, ‘Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy’, in Gibson (ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, pp.29–84 (p.55).

Oksana Oracheva, ‘Democracy and Federalism in Post-Communist Russia’, paper presented at the conference, The Fall of Communism in Europe: Ten Years On, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 14–17 May 2001, p.7.

See the Federal Law 113, 5 August 2000, ‘O Poryadke formirovaniya Soveta Federatsii Federal'novo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [On the order of forming a Federal Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation], adopted by the State Duma 19 July 2000 and ratified by the Federation Council 26 July 2000, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 5 Aug. 2000.

Thomas F. Remington, ‘Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federation Council since 2000’, Europe–Asia Studies, Vol.55, No.5 (2003), pp.667–91 (p.674).

Ibid., p.675.

Rostislav Turovsky, ‘The Mechanism of Representation of Regional Interests at the Federal Level in Russia: Problems and Solutions’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.8, No.1, April (2007), pp.73–97 (p.77).

The study included 164 of the 168 members of the council. There were four vacant posts. I would like to thank Dr Rostislav Turovsky of the School of Higher Economics, Moscow, for providing me with detailed biographies of the members of the Federation Council. Short biographies can also be found on the website of the Federation Council: see <http://www.council.gov.ru>, accessed 5 Jan. 2010.

King, ‘Federation and Representation’, p.93.

Remington, ‘Majorities without Mandates’, p.670.

Julie A. Corwin, ‘Federation Council: House of Lords or House of Valets? ’, RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, Vol.4, No.31 (16 August 2004), p.1.

V.N. Leksin, Federativnaya Rossiya i ėė Regional'naya Politika (Moscow: INFRA, 2008), p.165.

Ibid., p.166.

See Remington, ‘Majorities without Mandates’.

Paul J. Goode, ‘Medvedev's State of the Nation: Letter to Barack or Putin?’, Johnson's Russia List, 6 Nov. 2008.

Turovsky, ‘The Mechanism of Representation of Regional Interests’, p.79.

(1) On coordination of legislative activities; (2) On delineation of powers between federal bodies of state power, bodies of state power in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and bodies of local self-government; (3) On inter-budgetary relations and tax laws; (4) On legislative support of development of agriculture and land relationships; (5) On regional policies and ethnic affairs; (6) On legislative support for economic and industrial policies; (7) On legislative support for social policies; (8) On monitoring legislation and legal enforcement. Each commission is overseen by the head of a regional assembly.

S.M. Mironov and G.E. Burbulis (eds.), Report of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, On the State of Legislation in the Russian Federation in 2006 (Moscow: Federation Council, 2008), p.136.

Federal Law 119, 24 June 1999, ‘O Poryadke razgranicheniya predmetov vedeniya i polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov RF’ [On the procedure for delimiting the objects of control and power between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the subjects of the RF', Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Collected statutes of the Russian Federation], No.26 (1999).

Leksin, Federativnaya Rossiya, p.159

Ibid., p.156.

Ibid.

Mironov and Burbulis, Report of the Federation Council, p.136.

Ibid., pp.142–3

Leksin, Federativnaya Rossiya, p.158.

Dmitry Medvedev, Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 5 Nov. 2008, pp.14–15, at <http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/1968> , accessed 1 Oct. 2009.

Vladimir Kozlov, ‘Problemy predstvitel'stva regionov v novoi Gosudarstvennoi Dume’ [Problems of representation of the regions in the new State Duma], Zhurnal o vyborakh [Election journal], No.6, (2007), available at <http://www.vibory.ru/discussion/kozlov-r.htm>, accessed 23 Oct. 2009.

Ibid.

Mironov and Burbulis, Report of the Federation Council, p.126.

‘Ob Obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel'nykh (predstavitel'nykh) i ispolnitel'nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’.

‘Ob Obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’.

Vladimir Leksin, ‘Federal Statehood in Russia: Legislation and Conflict Resolution’, in Peter H. Solomon (ed.), Recrafting Federalism in Russia and Canada: Power, Budgets, and Indigenous Governance (Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2005), pp.33–60 (p.39).

Doklad Soveta Federatsii Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2008 goda, p.330.

M.V. Gligich-Zolatoreva, ‘Pravovye osnovy rossiiskogo federalizma’ [Legal bases of Russian federalism], in Valentei (ed.), Rossiiskii federalizm, pp.235–82 (p.236).

‘O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v svyazi s prinyatiem federal'nogo zakona, O vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Federal'nyi Zakon “Ob obshchikh printispakh organizatsii zakonodatel'nykh (predstavitel'nykh) i ispolnitel'nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. i Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii.”’

Gligich-Zolaroreva, p.239.

‘Comment on the Federal Law of 22 August 2004, No. 122’, NGO Newsletter, Legislative Process in the State Duma: Human Rights Analysis, Issue 76, 8 Oct. 2004, p.1.

Leksin, Federativnaya Rossiya, p.178.

Ibid., p.177.

Vitalii Ivanov, Putinskii federalizm: Tsentralizatorskie reformy v Rossii v 2000–2008 godakh [Putin federalism: Centralizing reforms in Russia 2000–2008] (Moscow: Territoriya Budushchego, 2008), pp.182–3.

‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal'nyi Zakon, Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel'nykh (predstavitel'nykh) i ispolnitel'nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’.

Gligich-Zolatoreva, ‘Pravovye osnovy rossiiskogo federalizma’, p.239.

Ibid.

‘O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v svyazi s sovershenstvovaniem razgracheniya polnomochii’ [On introducing amendments to particular legislative acts of the Russian Federation in connection with improving the division of powers], Rossiiskaya gazeta, 31 Dec. 2005, in Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No.1 (Part 1), 1 Jan. 2007; see Gligich-Zolatoreva, ‘Pravovye osnovy rossiiskogo federalizma’, p.241.

Daniel R. Kempton and Terry D. Clark, Unity or Separation: Centre–Periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 2002), pp.221–2; see Cameron Ross, Local Politics and Democratisation in Russia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Cameron Ross and Adrian Campbell (eds.), Federalism and Local Politics in Russia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

‘O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v svyazi s sovershenstvovaniem razgracheniya polnomochii’ (note 70).

Doklad Soveta Federatsii Federal'novo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2008 goda, p.398.

Gligich-Zolatoreva, ‘Pravovye osnovy rossiiskogo federalizma’, p.241.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.259.

E.V. Pershin and M.V. Gligich-Zolatoreva, ‘Aktual'nye voprosy razgracheniya kompetentsii mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i sub”ektami Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Current questions of the division of competences between the Russian Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation], Analiticheskii vestnik, Federation Council, No.27 (344), Dec.2007, p.7, n.1.

Darrell Slider, ‘Russian Federalism: Can It Be Rebuilt from the Ruins?’, Russian Analytical Digest, 2008, No.43, p.3.

L.N. Lykova, ‘Tendentsii i perespektivy reformirovaniya otechestvennoi modeli byudzhetnogo federalizma’ [Trends and prospects in reform of the fatherland's model of budget federalism', in Valentei, Rossiiskii federalizm, pp.105–37 (p.108).

Mironov and Burbulis, Report of the Federation Council, p.112.

Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 67.

Appendix

Articles 71–72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation

Table

Article 71

The following fall within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation:

adoption and amendment of the constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, and the monitoring of compliance with them; the federative system and territory of the Russian Federation; the regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; citizenship of the Russian Federation; the regulation and protection of the rights of national minorities; the establishment of a system of federal bodies of legislative, executive and judicial power, the procedure for their organization and activity; the formation of federal bodies of state power; federal state property and the management thereof; the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programmes in the sphere of the state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation; the establishment of the legal foundations of the single market; financial, currency, credit and customs regulation, monetary emission and the foundations of pricing policy; federal economic services, including federal banks; the federal budget; federal taxes and duties; federal regional development funds; federal power systems, nuclear power generation, fissile materials; federal transport, railways, information and communications; activity in space; the Russian Federation's foreign policy and international relations and the Russian Federation's international treaties; issues of war and peace; the Russian Federation's foreign economic relations; defence and security; defence production; the determination of the procedure for the sale and purchase of weapons, ammunition, military hardware and other military property; the production of toxic substances, narcotic substances and the procedures for their use; the determination of the status and protection of the state border, territorial seas, airspace, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation; the judicial system; the procurator's office; legislation in the field of criminal, criminal-procedure and criminal-executive law; amnesty and the granting of pardons; legislation in the field of civil law, the law of civil procedure and the law of arbitration procedure; the legal regulation of intellectual property; federal law relating to the conflict of laws; the meteorological service, standards and standard weights and measurements, the metric system and measurement of time; geodesy and cartography; geographic names; official statistical records and accounting; state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation; the federal civil service.

Article 72

The following fall within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the components of the Russian Federation:

the guaranteeing that the constitutions and laws of republics, and the charters, laws and other normative legal acts of krais, oblasts, cities of federal significance, the autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs accord with the constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws; the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; the protection of the rights of national minorities; the guaranteeing of legality, law and order and public safety; the arrangements relating to border zones; issues relating to the ownership, use and disposal of land, mineral resources, water and other natural resources; the delimitation of state property; the use of the natural environment; environmental protection and the guaranteeing of ecological safety; natural sites under special protection; the protection of historical and cultural monuments; general issues of nurture, education and science, culture, physical fitness and sport; the coordination of questions of public health; the protection of the family, mothers, fathers and children; social protection, including social security; the implementation of measures for combating catastrophes, natural disasters and epidemics and the elimination of their consequences; the establishment of general principles of taxation and levying of duties in the Russian Federation; administrative, administrative-procedural, labour, family, housing, land, water, and forestry legislation, and legislation on mineral resources and on environmental protection; personnel of judicial and law-enforcement bodies; attorneys and notaries; protection of the primordial habitat and traditional way of life of numerically small ethnic communities; the establishment of the general principles for the organization of a system of bodies of state power and local self-government; the coordination of the international and foreign economic relations of components of the Russian Federation and the fulfilment of the Russian Federation's international treaties.

Source: Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 4th edn. (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.492–3.