Shi‘a, Tribalism and the Iraqi state: the ethno-religious dimension

ABSTRACT

This essay delves into the intricate interplay between Shi‘a Islam, tribalism, and the Iraqi regime during the 1990s, with a specific focus on the influential figure of Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr. Al-Ṣadr epitomized a compelling case of second-tier scholars who successfully engaged segments of society overlooked by the clerical leadership, recognizing the multifaceted composition of Shi‘a society, with its urban poor, tribal roots, and growing intelligentsia. His Fiqh al-ʿAshāʾir, harmonized Islamic principles with tribal customs, facilitating dialogue with this traditional element, deeply entrenched within Iraqi society. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr believed that the tribes and their leadership, with their growing alienation from the state, were ready to return to Islam, seeking spiritual comfort and a sense of belonging. While tribalism as a sub-national construct has the potential to undermine the unity of a nation or a larger supra-national entity, in Iraq, tribalism also encompassed a shared Arab ethnic identity, offering a prospect for bridging divides between the Sunni and Shi‘i population. Nevertheless, for Saddam Hussein, tribalism was a tool instrumental in consolidating his power. Consequently, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s endeavour to influence tribal behaviour and inculcate an ethno-religious notion of tribalism presented a direct challenge to Saddam’s autocratic rule and his manipulation of state ideology.

Introduction

Iraqi politics since the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s tightly-controlled state, saw the re-emergence of sectarianism, following the empowerment of the Shi‘i numerical majority and the marginalization of the Arab-Sunni elite.¹ This period also witnessed the resurgence of the tribal element and its impact on inter-communal relations. Tribal leadership and tribal values within the Sunni, Shi‘i and Kurdish community resurfaced in the new political landscape of post-2003 Iraq. A case in point is the rise of the Sunni Ṣaḥwa [Awakening] movement, an alliance of tribes from Ramadi who were former members of the Sunni insurgency and began cooperating with US-led forces. Tribalism continued to play a part in forging political alliances in Iraq and in governing society, particularly in rural areas and among the urban lower-class, exemplifying the continued significance of this primordial phenomenon also in the contemporary Middle East.²

During the colonial era, the perception of tribe and the phenomenon of tribalism carried a pejorative undertone, characterized by a perception of primitiveness and backwardness inherent in agrarian lifestyles, juxtaposed against the Western narrative of progressive urbanization. Within this binary portrayal, scholars of the Middle East frequently depicted tribes in the region as discrete and isolated social entities, distinct from and sometimes in opposition to settled communities, urban development, and a central authority. Samira Haj argues against this essentialist portrayal of tribes in the Middle East, and particularly in the case of Ottoman Iraq. Within this region, tribes interacted throughout history with other social and economic groups as they went through a continuous process of formation and transformation over centuries. Devoid of an ideological underpinning, this paper will explore the notions of tribe as a semi-organized socio-political framework; and tribalism as the condition of existing within a tribe with some form of loyalty to one’s tribe. Within this broad-ranging perspective on tribalism, tribal membership will be viewed as loosely connected to factors such as group cohesion, shared ancestry, and adherence to specific rituals and values. Additionally, tribalism encompasses a network that is linked to a particular territory, despite the possibility of members residing outside the immediate tribal boundaries. Furthermore, tribal networks and elements of tribal culture may be absorbed into the structures of the state to bolster the authority of the ruling elite. Conversely, tribes may also function as non-state actors, providing social and even judicial functions to the populace, particularly within contexts of frail or ineffectual governance structures.³ For Shi‘is in Iraq, tribal membership connected this former political minority with their fellow Sunni Iraqis, and their Arab heritage. Tribalism was a mark of identity for large groups in Iraq, over centuries. Within the central and southern regions of Iraq, the Arab populace associated their tribal membership with the Arab ideal of manhood (muruwwa), characterized by attributes like bravery, courage, and honour. Shi‘is of Iraq shared this ethnic identity and value system with their fellow-Sunnis.⁴ Moreover, the area of Iraq held paramount significance for Shi‘ism from its earliest days, owing to the presence of the Shi‘i holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in its southern precincts. These cities house the resting places of two venerated leaders of Shi‘a Islam: Imam ‘Ali in Najaf and Imam Husayn in Karbala. Consequently, the local Shi‘i population constituted an integral and deeply ingrained element of society within this region, over centuries.

The establishment of Iraq as a nation-state in 1920, and the subsequent process of modernization, did not erase a narrow tribal identification. Tribalism, characterized by its traditional leadership and deeply ingrained customs, continued to exert influence, and even gained prominence during the rule of Saddam Hussein. Notably, Saddam ascended to power within the framework of the Ba‘th pan-Arab ideology, a modern political movement that originated in Syria and was closely aligned with a secular-socialist perspective.⁵ Operating as a sub-state actor, tribal membership posed a challenge to the pan-Arab ideology that aimed to unite Arab nations under a supra-national entity. Despite this ideological divergence, Saddam’s tightly controlled state strategically leveraged tribal networks from its inception. It notably focused on the Sunni Triangle Sheikhs to secure their unwavering allegiance to the regime. This deliberate incorporation of Sunni-Arab clans into the state machinery and security apparatus served to reinforce the regime’s grip and counterbalance the absence of substantial popular legitimacy. During the 1990s, as the state was hit-hard by international sanctions in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990) and the Shi‘i-Kurdish uprising (1991), the tribes and their leadership entered the vacuum created by a weak state expanding their reach in society, within a growing process of retribalization.⁶

This paper will focus on the relationship between Shi‘a, tribalism, and the regime during the 1990s. It will assess this unique dynamism focusing on Fiqh al-ʿAshāʾir [Jurisprudence of the Tribes], a treatise written by Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr (1943–1999), an important leader of the Shi‘i community in Iraq who challenged the clerical establishment. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was a member of the prominent Shi‘i clerical family of al-Ṣadr, with its multiple branches in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. His Fiqh al-ʿAshāʾir (1997) assessed the compatibility between tribal customary law and Islamic jurisprudence. What is the significance of this debate on tribal law in the context of the Shi‘i community in Iraq, its leadership, social makeup, religious outlook,; and its broader relationship with the regime? Very little has been written on the Shiʿi community during the 1990s, a period of political and socio-economic upheavals in Iraq and the last decade of Saddam’s one-man rule.⁷ In this article, I build upon previous scholarship, analysing Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s thought in its broader socio-political context.

Until the late eighteenth century, Shi‘i presence in Iraq was mainly confined to the Holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. However, a substantial shift in demographics transpired due to a massive conversion of Sunni tribal population in southern Iraq from this period and into the nineteenth century. This transformation stemmed from pivotal occurrences during this era. Notably, assaults by Wahhabi forces on Najaf and Karbala prompted the Shi‘i clergy in these holy centres to fortify their standing by orchestrating a widespread conversion campaign among the Sunni tribal communities. The tribes themselves were ready to accept a new religious leadership due to Ottoman policy of tribal settlement during this period, which weakened the power of the Shaykhs and undermined tribal order. The resettled tribes were increasingly drawn to Najaf and Karbala owing to the burgeoning importance of these cities as thriving desert market-towns and pivotal grain hubs in the region. This accelerated conversion of the tribes notably augmented the Shi‘i population to southern areas beyond Najaf and Karbala. Yet, the conversion also split confederations and tribes between those who remained Sunni and those who embraced Shi‘a Islam. Consequently, tribal membership at times cut across the Sunni-Shi‘i divide and this feature remained also in contemporary Iraq. For example, parts of the Muntafiq confederation became Shi‘i, while another section remained Sunni. In the area of Kazimayn, the Fadagha tribe was split between Sunnis and Shi‘is. Within the Shamar there was also a mixed membership. Another example is the Bani Tamim which became almost entirely Shi‘i, while some sections remained Sunni. Moreover, the tribes who converted to with Shi‘a Islam identified with this creed predominantly through the cult of Shi‘i saints without an in-depth understanding of its legal dimension. This nominal level of conversion resulted in the retention of tribal codes, with Shi‘i law predominantly observed in matters such as marriage and divorce. Meanwhile, the perpetuation of tribal ethos, encompassing courage, honour, generosity and Arab masculinity; as well as customs related to blood money and tribal methods of conflict resolution, fostered a shared heritage among both Sunni and Shi‘i populations in Iraq well into the twentieth century.⁸

In the transition to the twentieth century, the struggle against foreign invasion united diverse members of society, Sunni and Shi‘i, who joined forces in the 1920 revolt against British occupation.⁹ The 1920 revolt became known as the establishing myth of Iraqi nationalism, capturing a significant place in the Iraqi historical memory. Nevertheless, defining the political framework and determining the question of nationalism, became complex issues in a state that from its outset was cut across ethnic [Arab/Kurdish] and religious lines [Sunni/Shi‘i], with further multiple divisions along social classes and a tribal membership. In the following years, the dynamics of minority-majority relations further compounded the intricacies of statecraft in Iraq and the endeavour to promulgate a cohesive national identity. Notably, the Shi‘i populace, constituting a numerical majority, assumed a marginalized socio-political status, owing to the British administration’s alignment with the Sunni elite of the Ottoman era, in their effort to rule Iraq and establish their interests in the region.¹⁰ In their endeavour to exert control over Iraq and suppress resistance, the British sought to coopt the tribes and weaken the traditional power of the Shi‘i clerics. Ten of leading Shi‘i clerics (mujtahids) who were involved in anti-British activities during the 1920s, were deported to Iran. Moreover, the colonial authorities established the Directorate of Tribal Affairs (1923), that extended tax exemptions to tribal Shaykhs and accorded them representation in the nascent parliamentary framework. In the following years, many Shiʿis began migrating to the capital of Baghdad with the growth of the new urban centres, enrolling their sons in the educational system established under the British mandate. Modernization and social change also led to the rapid decline in the numbers of students in the learning centres in Najaf and Karbala. This shift was accompanied by a growing challenge to the authority of the senior clerics, the mujtahids, and their historical control over religious knowledge.¹¹ The emergence of a nascent Shi‘i elite, due to the growth of state-education and exposure to new ideas, also contributed to greater social and political contacts between Sunnis and Shi‘is, in the mandate era and in its aftermath. However, while the currents of social transformation and a shared Arab identity served to attenuate sectarian divisions and underpin a nascent national consciousness, the intricate fabric of Iraqi society remained characterized by profound fissures along religious, tribal, and socioeconomic fault lines, manifesting dynamic and overlapping identities.¹² Furthermore, the ethnic question not only signalled out the Kurds, but remained a contested question also between Sunnis and Shi‘is of Iraq due to the political direction of Arabism, its secular nature and the question of group membership.¹³

Shi‘is of Iraq began to get organized politically, following the 1958 Revolution led by General ‘Abd al-Karīm Qāsim, that ended the thirty-seven-year Hashemite monarchy and established the Republic of Iraq.¹⁴ The growing authoritarian nature of the state, in the post-1958 era, further contributed to communal separatism. The Shi‘i Daʿwa movement [The Islamic Call], which was the first Shi‘i political movement in Iraq, did not pay much attention to the Shaykhs and to tribal customs. The main threat was the Communist movement and its appeal to Shi‘i youth and to members of the new Shi‘i intelligentsia, due to a growing process of secularization.¹⁵ Ayatollah Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, the main ideologist of the Da‘wa movement sought to appeal to the educated Shiʿis through his unique model of Islamic economics. In the early 1960s when Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr began enrolling in the Islamic seminar, his famous cousin Bāqir al-Ṣadr wrote his famous treatise Iqtiṣādunā (Our Economy), which laid out his unique model of Islamic economics with its multiple forms of ownership. Bāqir al-Ṣadr presented Islamic economics as a middle path between Capitalism and Marxism.¹⁶ This was an attempt to reach out to the secularized Shi‘i youth and particularly to the more educated segment with its growing attraction to the Iraqi Communist party, established in 1930s.¹⁷ In both his Iqtiṣādunā (Our Economy), published in 1961 and his Falsafātunā (Our Philosophy), published three years earlier, Bāqir al-Ṣadr demonstrated his acquaintance with Western philosophy and social thought, in his elitist appeal to the Shi‘i intelligentsia. In contrast his cousin, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr, would later focus his mobilization efforts predominantly on the Shi‘i underclass in their continuous struggle for economic survival.

In February 1999, Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was assassinated near the holy Shiʿi city of Najaf in Iraq, together with his two sons, Muṣṭafa and Muʾammal.¹⁸ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr came to be known as al-Shāhid al-Thānī (the second martyr), linking his death to the assassination of his famous cousin, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, and to a long chain of Shiʿi martyrs.¹⁹ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was killed several years after he began building a popular mass movement with the initial approval of Saddam Hussein. During the 1990s, the Shiʿi community was weak and fractured. Two decades earlier, the regime had crushed the Shiʿi Daʿwa movement, killing its main ideologist, Bāqir al-Ṣadr, and his sister known as Bint al-Huda (1980), in what seemed like the final chapter of Shiʿi activism in Iraq.²⁰ The Shiʿi-Kurdish uprising of 1991 and Saddam Hussein’s punitive measures, led to a sense of fear and passivity within the Shiʿi community. In the late 1990s, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr dramatically changed the orientation of the community by reinstituting the Friday prayer and preaching against those whom he deemed ‘the silent clerics’ (al-ʿulāmāʾ al-sākitīn).

This quietest tendency became a prominent feature of Shi‘a Islam over centuries. After the disappearance of the revered leadership of the Imams [known as the Occultation of the Twelfth Shiʿi Imam (329/940)], Shiʿis embraced an apolitical tendency. They ceased to actively establish the rule of the Prophet Muḥammad’s cousin and son-in-law, Imam ʿAli, and his descendants. In the absence of the Imams, regarded as the true heirs to the Prophet’s authority, the Shiʿis refrained from political involvement, living in secluded communities. Shiʿis also began to abstain from performing some religious duties, including the Friday Prayer (al-jumʿa). Throughout Muslim history, this important Qur’anic based communal prayer, established the power and legitimacy of the Caliphs. In the early days of Islam, the Prophet Muḥammad led the Friday Prayer and in the following periods, it was conducted by the Caliph, in his position as head of state. Shiʿis on the other hand, considered the al-jumʿa among the duties of the venerated Imams and the rule of the Caliphs illegitimate. Following the disappearance of the last Imam, Shi‘is refrained from activating this important congressional prayer which became a symbol of power for the Sunni Caliphs.²¹

Consequently, Shiʿi communities living within the Ottoman Empire, including the Iraq area, did not practice the Friday Prayer until the twentieth century. Nevertheless, in Iran, already under the Safavids (1501–1722), the Friday Prayer was used as a tool to enhance the power of the new dynasty in its effort to convert Iran to Shiʿi Islam.²² Under the Safavids who embraced Shi‘a Islam as state religion, there was a growing interdependence between the clerics and state. Nevertheless, until the twentieth century, Shiʿi minority communities living outside Iran, served predominantly as jurists and communal leaders. They supported a quietist tendency—in both the political and religious domains—in fear of the Sunni majority and in the absence of the Imams. ²³ The clerics of the Shi‘i centres of Najaf and Karbala [in Iraq of today] focused on their traditional role as jurists and maintained a quietist position over centuries, in the religious and political domain. This orientation began to change in the twentieth century, and Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was an important representative of this new tendency.

New ideas and the growing challenge of imperialism led Shi‘i clerics from Iraq to engage in the political domain. The Shi‘i clerical leadership played a dominant role in the 1920 revolt, which would become a founding myth of Iraqi nationalism. Under Mandate rule, the Shi‘i reformist cleric Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’ (1877–1954) was noteworthy in his political discussions on Arabism and Palestine.²⁴ The rise of the Da‘wa (1958) as the first Shi‘i political party in Iraq, reflected a further step in the politicization of the community. Its main ideologist, Bāqir al-Ṣadr and his Islamic economics incorporated the notion of an Islamic polity combining multiple forms of ownership, to create an ideal Islamic society.²⁵ Yet, alongside the growth in its power, the Da‘wa was faced with opposition from senior Shi‘i clerics who opposed this new competition to traditional authority in its apolitical tendency. Quietism regained its dominance during the 1980s, following Saddam Hussein’s punitive actions against the Da‘wa party.²⁶ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr would re-enact the Da‘wa’s activist tendency even under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, by bringing the masses to the Friday Prayer.

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr targeted two different audiences: the tribal community and the more educated Shiʿis through a debate on contemporary issues. He appealed to the Shi‘i intelligentsia through ruling on contemporary issues. His Fiqh al-Mawḍūʿāt al-Ḥadītha [Jurisprudence of New Topics] discussed contemporary issues ranging from genetic engineering and artificial insemination to contraception, civil law, and economic policy. Fiqh al-faḍāʾ [Jurisprudence of Space] provided judicial advice on questions of practice related to space exploration.²⁷ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr did not claim more religious knowledge than the existing clerical leadership. The novelty was in his appeal to diverse social classes and particularly to the impoverished masses, addressing their needs through new topics that were not tackled by the established clerics.

The figure of Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was born in Najaf in 1943 and began studying in the Najaf Seminary (the ḥawza) in 1954.²⁸ He studied under his famous cousin, Ayatollah Bāqir al-Ṣadr, and under the Grand Ayatollah Muḥsin Ṭabāṭabā’ī al-Ḥakīm (1889–1970), the leading marjaʿ [source of emulation] of the community during this period. Sadiq al-Sadr rejected the orientation of his other teacher, Ayatollah Abū al-Qāsem al-Khōʾī (1899–1992), leader of the ḥawza since 1970, who reflected a more quietist traditional Shi‘a approach. Nevertheless, al-Khōʾī would also diverge from this passive and apolitical position during the events of 1991, as will be explained below. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr may have also been exposed to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s activist model, during Khomeini’s years of exile in Iraq.²⁹ During the 1970’s, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was arrested twice due to his contacts with the Da‘wa movement.³⁰ In 1991, Shiʿis and Kurds gained confidence and revolted against the regime, following Saddam Hussein’s failed invasion of Kuwait. The uprising was spontaneous, disorganized, and easily crushed by Saddam Hussein’s forces. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was apparently forced to renounce the uprising and declare his support for the regime.³¹

Following the death of al-Khōʾī (1992), he was succeeded by ‘Abd al-A‘la al-Sabziwārī (d. 1993). However, ʿAli al-Sistānī gradually emerged as the most senior cleric in Iraq. Sistānī, a disciple of al-Khōʾī, continued to uphold, to some extent, the conventional quietist tradition of clerical authority within Shi‘a Islam until the removal of Saddam and the Ba‘th regime in 2003. It was subsequent to this transformative event that Sistani manifested a discernible shift in his hitherto apolitical stance. Following the collapse of Saddam’s regime and the burgeoning empowerment of Shi‘i communities in Iraq, he actively advocated for enhanced representation, particularly in the aftermath of the US-led invasion. Additionally, he began offering guidance to various political players who acknowledged Sistānī’s authoritative religious standing.³²

A decade earlier in 1991, a year before the transition to Sistānī’s leadership, al-Khōʾī issued a statement endorsing the Shi‘i uprising against the regime. Al-Khōʾī pronounced the fighters as ‘a good example of high Islamic values’ but also called to preserve people’s property, money, and honour, and to protect public property and institutions.³³ Throughout the twentieth century, Iraqi clerics engaged in debates on political issues, beginning with Shi‘i reformists like Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, and further continuing with Bāqir al-Ṣadr, who played a more active political role, as the main ideologist of the Da‘wa movement. Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, Bāqir al-Ṣadr and al-Khōʾī represented varying degrees of clerical involvement in politics, in a departure from the traditional quietist stance of Shi‘a Islam, in both its religious and political dimensions. Nevertheless, both al-Khōʾī and Sistānī refrained from endorsing Khomeini’s innovative doctrine of vilāyat-e faqīh [The Rule of the Supreme Cleric]. They intervened in specific moments deemed significant for their community but maintained that the primary role of clerics is to offer guidance to their followers rather than actively lead or participate in the political sphere.

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr presented a further step in this gradual and nuanced shift from a passive to a more active perception of clerical authority. He did not only provide religious justification for the reinstitution of the Friday Prayer but brought the masses to his mosque in Kufa. Nevertheless, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr lacked recognition within the ḥawza due to his age. Furthermore, he had not published a major treatise on practical law (risāla ʿamaliyya), a crucial step in establishing the credentials of clerical authority.³⁴ Yet, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr dared to challenge the religious establishment of Najaf by assembling the faithful, amidst ongoing religious debates over the permissibility of this prayer. Furthermore, this bold act unfolded within a broader context wherein Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s authority within clerical circles was not fully recognized.

Two decades prior, Ayatollah Muḥammad al-Ḥusayni al-Shīrāzī (1928–2001), from the prestigious Shīrāzī family of Karbala, embodied a comparable populist agenda, while also contesting the ascendency of Najaf. In his actions, Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī sought to overcome marginalization of Karbala as a Shi‘i learning centre, a process that began in the late nineteenth century and gathered pace following the creation of Iraq.³⁵ This endeavour was notably marked by his pursuit of the Marja‘iyya. Asserting his claim to overarching religious authority at a relatively young age, al-Shirazi displayed a resolute stance vis-à-vis the ḥawza of Najaf, particularly challenging the acknowledged status of al-Khōʾī. Al-Shīrāzī also clashed with the Da‘wa movement, rejecting the notion of a political party as incompatible with Islam.³⁶ Shifting away from the Da‘wa more elitist outlook, al-Shīrāzī directed his revivalist mission towards the masses, voicing support for popular Shi‘i practice of the taṭbīr [a form of self-flagellation], which had previously drawn stern criticism from Muḥsin al-Amīn, a leading Shi‘i reformist from Lebanon, who advocated for the purification of commemorative practices for Imam Husayn during the ‘Ashura.³⁷ Exiled by the Ba‘ath regime in 1970, al-Shīrāzī sought sanctuary in Kuwait, where he commenced the establishment of numerous religious institutions catering to various segments of society, including children, youth, the less privileged, and the educated.³⁸

In 1994, Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī published ‘al-Sabīl ilā Inhāḍ al-Muslimīn’ [The Path Towards the Reemergence of the Muslims], in which he advocated for the establishment of a singular Islamic government encompassing the entire Muslim world. This proposed government would mirror the inclusive governance model of the Prophet’s era, founded upon Islamic principles of shūra [consultative assembly] and istishāra [consultation], thus aligning with divine satisfaction. Within this framework, the populace across all Muslim regions globally would elect their marja‘, who in turn would participate in selecting representatives for the supreme leadership body. Furthermore, this envisioned Islamic government would possess a cohesive organizational structure with unified objectives, including the promotion of consultation, the cultivation of Islamic consciousness, and the demonstration of respect for the public. Rejecting the Da‘wa’s concept of a political party, this universal Islamic government presented a political model akin to the vision of the Islamic revolution, while also emphasizing its representative and popular elements.³⁹ Both Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr and Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī reflected a novel position among clerical circles in their expansive perspective on clerical authority and its communal role. They diverged from the centralized and elitist outlook of the ḥawza. Nevertheless, each pursued these objectives through distinct means.

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr sought to establish his popular powerbase by reviving the Friday communal prayer and speaking directly to the tribes through his Fiqh al-ʿAshāʾir. Already in the 1930s, Shiʿi peasants and tribe-members began migrating to the cities of Baghdad and Basra, seeking a better life and new opportunities. Sixty years later when Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr published Fiqh al-ʿAshāʾir, these impoverished migrants still maintained ties to former tribes and remained committed to popular Shiʿi rituals. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr appealed to the marginalized Shi‘i population but also to growing numbers of educated Shiʿis who originated in the poor suburbs of Baghdad. He sought to galvanize support to his revivalist mission among this demographic segment, through his newly activated Friday prayer and through his treatises Fiqh al-Mawḍūʿāt al-Ḥadītha and Fiqh al-faḍāʾ.⁴⁰ This emerging intelligentsia benefitted from economic mobility in the 1970s yet suffered under an oppressive regime and were also hit hard by the international sanctions. Unskilled Shiʿi workers sank deeper into poverty following UN pressure on Iraq.⁴¹ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr sought to provide spiritual comfort and a sense of belonging for this alienated society in its multiple social components.

In late 1997, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr conducted his first Friday sermon in his mosque in Kufa. Muḥammad Mahdī al-Khālīṣī (1890–1963) was the first Shiʿi cleric outside Iran who had approved the re-establishment of the Friday Prayer even in the absence of the Imam. He represented a group of reform-minded clerics from Iraq and Lebanon who reassessed traditional modes of Shiʿi thought in the transition to the modern era.⁴² Al-Khalisi’s most innovative ruling was to re-establish the Friday Prayer. He disregarded Shiʿi reservations over conducting the Friday Prayer in the absence of the revered Imams and was highly critical of Shiʿi jurists who abstained from this Qurʾanic duty.⁴³ Many Shiʿi clerics rejected al-Khalisi’s position due to the prevalence of the quietist tendency. Al-Khālīṣī was perceived as an outcast and his years in exile in Iran, contributed to his weak standing in the local Iraqi community.⁴⁴

Following Qassem’s revolution (1958) and his leftist and Pan-Arab orientation, Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm the Grand marjaʿ, issued a fatwa prohibiting convening the Friday Prayer under a secularist regime. As a result, the Friday Prayer was not practiced throughout Iraq during this period. Only a small group known as the ‘al-Khālīṣī movement’ in Kazimiya, continued to follow the ruling of their mentor on the permissibility of this prayer, as described above.⁴⁵ Al-Khālīṣī had already paved the way for reinstating the Friday Prayer in the early twentieth century. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr invigorated this marginal Shiʿi position, in the socio-political context of the 1990s.

Yet, already a decade earlier, Ayatollah Khomeini played an important part in the revival of the Friday prayer under revolutionary Iran. Khomeini lifted the restrictions imposed on the Friday Prayer during the former Pahlavi dynasty, which closely monitored and controlled the services. The first Friday Prayer after the revolution was held in Tehran in July 1979, following Khomeini’s orders and this institution began spreading across the country. Khomeini established the Central Committee for Friday Prayer leaders to outline the policies related to Friday prayers and ensure their alignment with the revolutionary ideals. Over the ensuing years, the Friday Prayer leaders emerged as influential figures in the regime’s mobilization efforts, with their sermons broadcasted on television and radio in major urban centres across Iran.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Khomeini issued a fatwa permitting Shi‘a Muslims to perform in prayers led by a Sunni Imam, in a effort at fostering greater Muslim unity, transcending sectarian divisions.⁴⁷ Consistent with his activist and pan-Islamic vision, Khomeini refrained from offering religious justification for reinstating the Friday prayer during the ghayba. While upholding the details of Shi‘i law in other areas, Khomeini regarded the obligation of the Friday prayer as devoid of any sectarian meaning. Subsequently, in 1992, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor as the Supreme Leader of Iran, formalized and institutionalized the weekly congregations by establishing the Council for Outlining the Policies of Friday Prayer Leaders (Shūrāy-e Siyāsat Goẕārī-ye A’imeh Jom‘eh), supplanting the earlier committee established by Khomeini.⁴⁸

In his decision to reinstate the Friday prayer, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr may have drawn inspiration from Shi‘i activism, as exemplified by the Iranian revolutionary model. Additionally, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr obtained official authorization from Saddam Hussein to congregate the believers, following further conciliatory gestures by the regime, permitting him to disseminate his treatises. Rumors began spreading suggesting that Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was collaborating with the regime. The intensification of international sanctions and internal challenges amplified Saddam’s endeavours to exert control over the ḥawza. Consequently, this approval may have reflected the regime’s effort to coopt the mujtahids. Another perspective posits that Saddam Hussein aimed to undermine Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s popular appeal by endorsing his leadership.⁴⁹ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr understood that the only way to advance his agenda was through relations with Saddam’s dictatorship. This convergence of interests paved the way for an official approval granted to Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr to reactivate the Friday Prayer.⁵⁰

Providing religious legitimacy to convene the Friday congressional prayer, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr declared:

I say that the Prophet, peace be upon him, prayed the al-jumʿa [Friday Prayer] and amīr al-muʾminīn [The Commander of the Faithful, Imam ‘Ali] prayed al-jumʿa and Imam Hassan prayed al-jumʿa and Imam Husyan prayed al-jumʿa. Many Muslims in their diverse maddhabs [schools of thought] including the Shiʿis prayed al-jumʿa; and I don’t think that since the beginning of Islam until today al-jumʿa was abandoned for one week …⁵¹ Are we better than God’s Messenger? Are we better than amīr al-muʾminīn? Didn’t the Prophet deliver the khuṭba [the religious sermon during the Friday Prayer]? Didn’t he pray al-jumʿa?⁵²

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr pronounced the Friday Prayer as an unconditional obligation:

With the blessing of Allah, The One and only Who has No Partners, nothing bad could happen, God the Glorious; and why is there objections to congregate for the Friday prayer? Not only did no misfortune occur but many blessings have occurred, light [is prevalent] and [it also led to] commanding right and forbidding wrong (al-amr bi’l maʿrūf wa’l nahī ʿan al-munkar) …⁵³

… We are not alone in praying al-jumʿa not in Najaf and not outside of Najaf, not in Iraq and not outside Iraq, not within the maddhab and not outside the maddhab. The Friday Prayer is present and thank God it is present in abundance …⁵⁴

He expressed strong belief in activating the Friday Prayer due to its clear Islamic basis and current significance, reaching out to the Shi‘i masses but also to the more educated Shi‘is.⁵⁵

Jurisprudence of the Tribes

In 1991, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr visited prominent tribes in southern Iraq.⁵⁶ He met the tribal heads to discuss ’al-sanīna al-ʿashāʾiriyya’ [the accepted rules and clauses agreed upon by tribal leaders to govern the affairs of the tribe].⁵⁷ His visit to the tribes, resulted in the signing of an agreement to maintain conformity between tribal conduct and the laws of the Shari‘a.⁵⁸ These are several of the main clauses of this treaty:

• One should implement what Allah and his Messenger are content with; and should not deviate in actions and conduct from the sacred Shari‘a.

• One should not accept any person into his tribe who is an apostate or a polytheist.

• One should approach the fuqahā’ over any issue in question.

• Ṣulḥ between disputing parties is the aim of all of us. However, it should not prohibit the permitted or permit the prohibited (lā yuḥarrimu ḥalālan wa-lā yuḥallilū ḥarāman).

• diya [compensation paid by one who has committed homicide or has wounded another] is limited to lawful inheritance and no one from the tribe can participate in it.

• There is no diya for the thief, the adulterer, or the fornicator if he killed in the course of committing a crime.

• The diya of a woman is half the diya of a man.

Already in its early days, Islam incorporated pre-Islamic customs into its legal framework, in areas such as personal law, property, trade and other domains. The expansion of Muslim lands to multiple cultures, provided space for pragmatic considerations, including tribal conduct. Within Sunni law, customs were incorporated into multiple dimensions of jurisprudence due to the flexibility of Islamic law. ʿUrf refers to common practice, including social norms and local customs, ‘what is known’ but also ‘what is good’ and even commendable, maʿrūf.⁵⁹

Shiʿi scholars did not consider custom as an independent source of law. Yet, they incorporated common practices within uṣūl al-fiqh [the principles and methodologies of Islamic law], due to the concept of al-sīra al-ʿuqalāʾiyya [the conduct of reasonable people, linked to the significance of rationalism in Shi‘i Islam].⁶⁰ Religious precepts may be drawn from both pure and practical reason, combined with the other Shiʿi sources of Islamic law. Shi‘i scholars applied flexible and pragmatic approaches including reliance on ‘urf, particularly in the sphere of social relations (mu’āmalāt). Shiʿi law provided space for ʿurf since it was linked to other legal principles such ʿaql [reason] and maṣlaḥa [public interest]. Yet, there were accepted and non-accepted customs, ʿurf ṣaḥīḥ [sound customs] and ʿurf fāsid [invalid customs].⁶¹ Both Sunni and Shiʿi law incorporated customs through a process of Islamizing local practices. This process reached its height in the transition to the modern era. Beginning with the early Muslim reformists of the late nineteenth century, the call for renewal provided further impetus for incorporating local practices through a new emphasis on legal reasoning [ijtihād].

The Salafi movement called to return to a pristine Islam according to the model of ‘the exalted forefathers’ (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ). Its more militant branch focused on strict devotion to the Shari‘a. The believers should purify Islam from local customs that contradict a literalist adherence to the scripture.⁶² Nevertheless, tribal conduct did not become a major issue for the moderate, pragmatic, and radical currents of the Salafi movement of political Islam since there were more pressing issues to deal with.⁶³ Relations with the emerging secular nation-states and the struggle against foreign involvement, in its political and cultural manifestations, were more critical for these Islamist movements than dealing with tribal practices, as a conservative social construction that did not overtly undermine religious values.

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was among the first scholars, Sunni and Shiʿi, who devoted a treatise to Jurisprudence of the Tribes. Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir reflected Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr belief that this important segment of Shi‘i society was open to amend its ways due to growing alienation from the regime. Following the uprising of 1991 and the subsequent international sanctions, Saddam Hussein felt he could no longer count on the Iraqi population or on the Arab world and could only depend on the core tribal unit.⁶⁴ Many Shiʿi tribes participated in the 1991 uprising, yet there were some tribe members who supported the regime. Their loyalty to Saddam Hussein was due to fear of the oppressive state. Yet, there were also pragmatic considerations, particularly among Shiʿis living in proximity to the capital of Baghdad, where the central government held tight control.⁶⁵ Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir aimed to bring the tribes back to Islam and to sever connections between the Shaykhs and Saddam Hussein. Mobilization of the tribes intended to enhance Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s popular base in competition with the traditional mujtahids. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr directed the treatise towards Shiʿi tribal population and the tribal leaders but also perhaps towards ‘the deprived’ of al-Thawra City in Baghdad, who maintained social contacts with their original tribes. The Shiʿi urban poor still upheld tribal customs, as a mark of identity of a disaffected city population.

In 1997, six years after signing the agreement with the tribes mentioned above, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr published Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir. It was printed in further editions following his death. The treatise is written in the traditional form of questions and answers. It is divided into five main parts: ‘al-sanīna al-ʿashāʾiriyya’, ‘al-ḥudūd wa’l diyāt fī’l ‘urf al-‘asha’irī’ [limits/punishment and blood money in tribal customs], ‘al-zawāj wa’l ṭalāq fi’l ‘urf al-‘asha’irī’ [marriage and divorce in tribal customs], ‘masa’il mutafariqa fi’l aḥkām al-‘asha’iriyya’ [diverse issues in tribal customs] and ‘’ādāt ba‘ḍ al-‘asha’ir al-khaṣṣa’ [the particular practices of some tribes]. There is no concrete evidence to determine the impact of this treatise on the Shi‘i community in Iraq. Nevertheless, Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir’ was published in several editions following Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s death, denoting some level of communal acceptance of this treatise. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the composition of the book occurred six years after the signing of an agreement with tribal factions aimed at ensuring concordance between tribal customary practices and Islamic jurisprudence, as previously highlighted. This temporal alignment suggests a willingness on the part of tribal leaders to support Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s religious mission, in his effort to influence tribal conduct through his ‘Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir’.

Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir opens with an introduction written by one of the students in the ḥawza in Najaf, Ramadan 5, 1417/14 January 1997, beginning with the following quote from the Qur’an, Surat al-Ḥujurāt (13):

O Mankind! We created you from a male and a female and made you into peoples and tribes so that you may know one another. Surely the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous among you. Allah is truly All-Knowing, All-Aware.

So, the guidance in dividing mankind to diverse nations and to multiple tribes in their features, languages and practices is that they get to know one another so that every person gets to know his own characteristics and unique qualities and to know their genealogy; but not to brag about it or to favour one race against another or one family against one another as was the case among some of the Jahili zealots [reference to ‘The Era of Ignorance’, a highly negative depiction of the pre-Islamic period in its culture and state of affairs]. The basis of the divides [between people] is to get closer to Allah the Almighty…

This student introduced Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s book by providing religious justification for the existence of tribes, thus creating bridges towards the tribal population. Emphasising that the Qur’an endorsed tribalism, and God himself created the tribes, he also cautioned against condescension and bigotry as a reflection of pre-Islamic Jahili norms. Nevertheless, he did not reject ‘the leadership of the elders’ entirely but called to ensure its commitment to the path of Islam:

… And all this is to warn against what happened to the past to nations who obeyed their elders, and they [these elders] misled them in the path … Therefore, every person who hands over the leadership to someone, obeys and follows him, must observe that the leaders obey God the Almighty … However, what is strange is that after all this we see that many tribes are totally undermining this in their practices. We also see that they have the power to implement [their ways] more that the power of the Shari‘a…

Following this warning, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr mentioned the subsequent request by the tribal leaders:

Your excellency the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr

(May your shadow remain upon the Muslims)

We ask your excellency ‘Sayyiduna’ that you provide the answer to these questions in the language of customs (lughat al-‘urf) and not in the language of the faqīh (Islamic jurist) due to the difficulty in understanding the judicial expressions.

May Allah reward you with the best of rewards for the doers of good.

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr presented his treatise as response to a bottom-up appeal to return to Islam. This was not a dominating imposition of a mujtahid but an accessible interaction with tribal concerns. Responding to a general query over the conformity between tribal conduct and the laws of the Shari‘a, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr said:

Any stipulation that violates the Islamic law—ordering that what is permitted is prohibited and what is prohibited is permitted—is invalid. These should be replaced by clauses that Allah and his Messenger are content with. And if they contradict the Shari‘a, it is a duty to oppose them… How can Allah and the Messenger be content with disobedience over the tenets of religion? One should determine that the lawful teaching (al-ta‘līm al-shar‘iyya) should go back to the “fiqh” [religious law] and to the fuqahā’. [the religious scholars; the jurists]

On this question of authority, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was further asked:

What are the boundaries in which the head of the tribe (‘ashira) or federation of tribes (qabīla) can operate within them, in relation to the rights of the individuals, financial and others … and is it lawful to relinquish some or all of these rights, due to zealous notions and their impact on the head of the tribe, such as honour and other elements?

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr laid down the rule of obeying the Shari‘a ‘on what is permitted and prohibited’. The ultimate holders of authority are the clerics and not the tribal heads. He further cautioned:

The heads of the tribe do not hold ‘wilāya sharʿiyya’ [authorised power or guardianship], neither general (‘amma) nor specific (khaṣṣa), as this authorisation only be obtained by “al-ḥākim al-sharʿī” [the holder of authority]. Alongside, “al-ḥākim al-sharʿī” members of a tribe could nominate a leader who is well-versed in the rules of his conduct, and obtain authorisation for his conduct from “al-ḥākim al-shar”ī’, if he rules according to the teaching of Islam and the fatwas of the clerics”.⁶⁶

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr sought to limit the power of the shaykhs. They cannot issue legal opinions or act as authorized judges since they do not hold any level of religious authority (wilāya). He was protecting the rights of the individual and going against arbitrary actions undertaken by heads of tribes. Wilāya resides first and foremost with the Imams in their comprehensive notion of authority known as wilāya khaṣṣa [special/specific notion of authority/deputyship].⁶⁷ Relying on the notion of wilāya sharʿiyya, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was arguing that the shaykhs are neither Imams nor jurists and they must subordinate their actions to the true holders of authority. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr did not call to terminate their leadership, but to nominate al-ḥākim al-shar‘ī who will advise the shaykhs over the compatibility between tribal conduct and the laws of Islam.

The discussion shifted to specific details of tribal conduct, beginning with the significant notion of blood money, known in its tribal usage as faṣel and in its Qurʾanic terminology as diya, paid by the perpetrator’s tribe or family to the victim’s close members, to avoid retribution. Faṣel/diya provides space for inter-tribal resolution, while maintaining the significance of honour. The provisions of diya are applicable for any incident that results in bodily harm—intentional or unintentional.⁶⁸ Ṣulḥ [a centuries-old Arab-Islamic peacemaking process] is a comparable concept that existed in the pre-Islamic era and was embraced by the Prophet Muḥammad himself. It continued to play an important part in resolving tribal feuds throughout Muslim history.⁶⁹

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr discussed the tribal custom of doubling the faṣel/diya blood money, in cases in which the act or crime does not enable ṣulḥ. He emphasized that doubling the diya is prohibited by the Shari‘a, without explaining why one cannot double the diya if this act will lead to a tribal settlement, even though the concept of diya, is based on forgiveness and reconciliation, as encouraged by Islamic teaching.⁷⁰ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s underlying message was that one should abide unequivocally by the Shari‘a. Yet, we can learn from Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s response that on a fundamental level, the tribal faṣel and the Islamic diya are based on similar concepts.

Is it permitted to hand over a woman to the guardian of the slain person as diya, known as faṣel according to the tribal customs?⁷¹ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr replied:

It is prohibited to agree to this, in any situation. And if she has agreed [in a contract] and got married, if she is underage, it is important to receive the approval of her father. However, if she is a non-virgin, it is important to gain her consent. And if there is no consent, the contract is void and the sexual connection prohibited, unless one of the two individuals are in a significant state of hardship.⁷²

Islamic law prohibits women to act as diya. Yet, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr offered exceptions, in cases in which there is a contract, with the woman’s approval. His position stemmed from the sanctity of contract (‘aqd) in Islamic law. One is bound by its conditions (shurūṭ) if there is a mutual offer and acceptance, and the contract is not invalid or irregular. Yet, a contract concluded by a minor without the guardian’s consent is non-effective. Consequently, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr provided here approval to the prohibited custom of women acting as diya due to the sanctity of contract, while also legitimizing tribal customs through contractual consent.⁷³

Is it permitted to receive payment in cases in which women are the faṣel and after long negotiations it is replaced by financial compensation? One can intend that the money serves as diya and this is lawful, if according to the tribal custom women act as compensation.⁷⁴ Another tribal custom is that the head of the tribe safeguards part of the diya which is put aside as inheritance and divides the accumulated sum to members of the tribes in accordance with their rights. If it received the consent of the inheritors who are of adult age, it is acceptable. However, if some do not approve or are of young age, it is permissible only for the approved part, and only if the approval is by choice and not by compulsion.⁷⁵

Can one divide the diya between the victims and his relatives and the members of the tribe; the members of the tribe and the Shaykh himself hold a third and the remainder goes to the victim? All this is prohibited without the consent of the victim or the inheritors. If the money is in the protection of those who hold it, it is forbidden, and must be returned to the inheritors or the victim.⁷⁶ Is there a legal obstacle to a situation in which members of a tribe together guarantee a payment? Also here Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr asserted that this is permitted according to the Shari‘a, if it is agreed upon by members of the tribe.⁷⁷

Most tribe members take upon themselves different agreements to adhere to the rules of the tribes, such as the custom that all members of the tribe jointly pay the faṣel. There is no proof that the necessity of loyalty is lawful by the Shari‘a, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr asserted, although it is desirable to help others. If it is impossible or disputed by the owner, one should not undertake this by compulsion. Agreement is preferable, as social solidarity and assistance are at times a necessity.⁷⁸ Similar to above cases, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr demonstrated here his undisputable compliance with the Shari‘a. Yet, he also provided examples on the conformity between the Shari‘a and tribal law, over diverse aspects of diya/faṣel compensation money. Moreover, he acknowledged that mutual responsibility is beneficial for society. Therefore, tribal norms that advance this notion are preferable and even necessary. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr stressed the significance of social responsibility, without justifying this realization through Islamic notions of public interest, welfare or general good (maṣlaḥa).⁷⁹ Yet, alongside the resemblance between faṣel and diya, the Shari‘a alone provides justice for the individual, while the tribal system subordinates its members to the power of the group.

Another important topic is the question of marriage. In tribal customs, paternal approval is a prerequisite for marriage. However, what happens when the father wasn’t consulted? Is the contract still valid? As with the tribal custom, the father must provide active consent to the nuptials. If the father does not have prior knowledge before the marriage contract (‘aqd), he can offer his consent in retrospect, after the ‘aqd and before the zafāf (wedding ceremony).⁸⁰ What is the Islamic position when the marriage engagement is rejected without tribal or Shari‘a justification; For example, when the groom is from a different tribe than the bride? The groom may run away [with his bride] after he fails to receive approval by the tribe; yet he does manage to obtain a Shari‘a contract. However, tribal customs do not acknowledge this authorization and the result is violence and victims. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr stressed that the process is null if the engagement did not receive the father’s consent. What happens when the bride is not a virgin or in cases in which her father is absent or dead? In this case, the contract is sound if the bride provided her consent.⁸¹ The custom of marrying women within one’s tribe and one’s social stratum is oppressive and repressive (ẓulm wa kabt) and therefore forbidden. One should apply the guardianship of the father to establish a lawful marriage.⁸² Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr spoke for individual justice, in this case even towards women. He resorted to the protection of the Shari‘a, but also called to reject evil-doing, in the name of a more universal appeal for justice.

The last part of Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir is dedicated to miscellaneous issues including tribal customs during funeral services: is it lawful to follow funeral processions with shouting and announcements, as practiced by Iraqi tribes? There is no problem with this practice if the processions do not violate the Shari‘a, such as telling lies in praise of the deceased. Another example is firing live gunshots during the processions which can cause injuries and even death and therefore forbidden. However, if the organizers guarantee the safety of the public, there is no problem with this act.⁸³ Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was applying here the classical five rules of Islamic law (al-aḥkām al khamsa), providing space for tribal customs which cannot be determined as prohibited (ḥarām). He demonstrated continuity in Shi‘i traditional practice of ijtihād, in cases when there are no clear-cut textual pronouncements.⁸⁴

In concluding words, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr emphasized his overall message to the tribal leadership:

I advise you all to implement the true laws of the Shari‘a, in their minor or major details. And to obey God in all situations. Avoid the pitfalls of sin and the grievances of worship that will not provide good in this world and the next. The best way to achieve this is by reaching an understanding to remove tribal customs that are incompatible with the Shari‘a and to submit to the laws of the Shari‘a, since it is the decisive rule in every situation … God should save us and all believing men and women from mistakes and blunders.⁸⁵

Conclusion

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr sought to rebuild the Shiʿi community in Iraq, following prolonged clashes with the Saddam’s regime. The aim was to unify a shattered community by providing it with a sense of purpose, through activating the Friday Prayer and tailoring the Daʿwa [Islamic call] to diverse social classes. Sadiq al-Sadr reflected a new clerical realization over the complex make-up of Shiʿi society with its urban poor, its tribal roots, and its growing intelligentsia. Similar to Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr epitomized a noteworthy example of second-tier scholars vying for authority amidst the dominance of highly erudite scholars. These scholars endeavoured to assert their influence through unconventional avenues, notably charisma and populism, demonstrating their adeptness in addressing contemporary legal issues affecting the community. These issues encompassed various domains, including Islam and tribal law, the need for Islamic institutions catering to diverse social strata, and the intersection of Islamic law with modern development. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr challenged the existing clerical leadership with its elitist notion of authority, through piety, morality, religious activism, and an appeal to the ‘brotherhood of believers’. He empowered a shattered community through a unique style of leadership that combined activism with scholarship, populism with social inclusivity, independence with realism and local Shi‘i concerns with a pan-Islamic worldview.

Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir was the first Shi‘i treatise dedicated to the tribes and their customary laws. Other modernist trends, both Sunni and Shi‘i, overlooked the tribes, focusing their attention predominantly on the new educated elite and on the challenge of secularism. However, in the 1990s, when Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr wrote Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir, this primordial social structure remained a significant component of Muslim society in Arab Middle East including Iraq, where it became a source of power for a regime fighting for its survival. Similar to other revivalist movements, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr stressed commitment to the Shari‘a as an all-Islamic message. Also in his discussion on tribal conduct, the overall agenda was pan-Islamic with very few references to a specific Shi‘i angle. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr continued this cross-sectarian tendency initiated by early Shi‘i reformists and carried on by Bāqir al-Ṣadr’s Islamic economics. He remained committed to this notion even after Saddam Hussein crushed the Da‘wa movement and suppressed the Shi‘i uprising of 1991. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr understood that unifying the community behind a universal call for Islam, requires reaching out to the masses, through a dialogue with its archaic and divisive element, and with its entrenched social and cultural roots in Shi‘i society. In his understanding, the tribes themselves were ready for this return to Islam as indicated by the agreement signed in 1991 to maintain conformity between ‘the law of the tribes’ and the Shari‘a. The aim was also to enhance his own position in competition with the more established voices of the Shi‘i Islamic seminary through his activist mission and popular appeal.

The Shari‘a alone provides justice for the individual, while the tribal system subordinates its members to the power of the group and to the arbitrary actions of the Shaykhs. Yet, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr also offered examples that demonstrate conformity between the Shari‘a and tribal customs, over diverse aspects of blood money and over questions of marriage. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr provided space for tribal customs which cannot be determined as prohibited (ḥarām), demonstrating continuity in Shi‘i traditional practice of ijtihād, in cases when there are no clear-cut textual pronouncements. He demonstrated a realist position in accepting the place of the Shaykhs within a tribal-oriented society, while calling to subordinate their leadership to the authority of the mujtahids. Furthermore, he acknowledged that values of justice and mutual responsibility are beneficial for society. Therefore, tribal norms that advance these notions do not need Islamic justifications. Consequently, while expressing criticism towards tribal conduct, his Jurisprudence of the Tribes intended to mend fences with the Shaykhs through mutual engagement and an understanding of tribal customs. It would also provide spiritual comfort and a sense of belonging for this alienated society who suffered under international sanctions. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr did not explicitly speak the language of politics yet his effort to connect with diverse Shiʿi classes to enhance their religious commitment held political ramifications, as it echoed the original Daʿwa’s message. Furthermore, reactivating the Friday prayer with its significant element of preaching, provided a further basis for the politicization of the community. The Daʿwa was crushed but Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr revived its call, planting the seeds of political activism within a fractured and demoralized community.

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s discourse on tribalism epitomizes the enduring significance of this social construct within Iraq, as a shared Arab heritage that transcends sectarian identities. Al-Ṣadr’s comprehension of the profound historical roots of this traditional phenomenon prompted him to forge connections with Shi‘a tribal leaders, acknowledging their deep-seated norms. While tribalism, as a sub-national construct, holds the potential to erode the unity of a nation or a broader supra-national entity, in Iraq, tribalism also encapsulates a collective Arab ethnic identity. This identity offers a potential avenue for bridging divides between the Sunni and Shi‘a populations. Nevertheless, in the context of Saddam Hussein’s rule, tribalism was harnessed as a tool to strengthen his grip on power. As a result, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr’s attempts to influence tribal norms and promote an ethno-religious tribal ethos directly challenged Saddam’s authoritarian regime and its manipulation of state ideology. Their contrasting visions underscore the intricate relationship between this primordial aspect of society and the complex power dynamics of the modern state.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ The historical rift between Sunnis and Shi’is began in the early days of Islam over the question of succession to the Prophet Muhammad, incorporating questions of leadership, authority, religion-state relations, and theology. See for example, Maria Massi Dakake, The Charismatic Community: Shi’ite Identity in Early Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007); Wilferd Madelong, The Succession to Muḥammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

² Amatzia Baram, ‘Tribes’ Centrality in Iraq’s Intercommunal Rapprochement’ in Overcoming Intractable Conflicts: New Approaches to Constructive Transformations, ed. Miriam F. Elman, Catherine Gerard, Galia Golan and Louis Kriesberg (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 243–262; Haider Ala Hamoudi, Wasfi H. Al-Sharaa and Aqeel al-Dahhan, ‘The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq’, in Negotiating State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism, ed. Michael A. Helfand (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 215–260. See also, Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.) Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Yoav Alon, ‘Tribalism in the Middle East: A Useful Prism for Understanding the Region’ in Roundtable: Tribes and Tribalism in the Modern Middle East, International Journal of Middle East Studies 53 (2021), 477–481; Peter Wein, ‘Tribes and Tribalism in the Modern Middle East: An Introduction’, in Roundtable: Tribes and Tribalism in the Modern Middle East, International Journal of Middle East Studies 53 (2021), 471–472.

³ See, Andre Gingrich, ‘Tribe’, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), ed. James D. Wright (Oxford: Elsevier, January 1, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097,086-8.12159-2. See also, Samira Haj, ‘The Problems of Tribalism: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Iraqi History’, Social History 16, no. 1 (1991): 45–58. Faleh A. Jabar, ‘Shaykhs and Ideologues: Detribalization and Retribalization in Iraq, 1968–1998’, Middle East Report, no. 215 (2000): 28–48, https://doi.org/10.2307/1520152.

⁴ On the history of tribalism in Iraq and its Shi‘i component see, Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25–43. See also, Yitzhak Nakash, ‘The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes to Shiism’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 26:3 (Auf., 1994), 443–463.

⁵ See for example, Malik Mufti. Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

⁶ Faleh A. Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968–1998’ in Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, ed. Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod (London: Saqi, 2003), 69–109; Amatzia Baram, ‘Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 1991–1996’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 (1997), 1–31; Jabar, Shaykhs and Ideologues; Charlotte Hille, ‘Clans and Democratization: Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq’, in Clans and Democratization: Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq (Brill, 2021), https://brill.com/display/title/56053.

⁷ See, Harith Hasan, ‘The Roots of the Sadrist Movement: Muhammad al-Sadr, Religious Authority, and Sociopolitical Practice’, Middle East Journal 75, no. 3 (2021), 365–385; Yamao Dai, ‘An Islamist Social Movement under the Authoritarian Regime in Iraq during 1990s: A Study on the Shi’ite Leadership of Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr and its Socio-Political Base’, AJAMES 25, no. 1 (2009), 1–29; Amatzia Baram, ‘Sadr the Father, Sadr the Son, the “Revolution in Shi’ism”, and the Struggle for Power in the Hawzah of Najaf’ in Iraq between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present, ed. R. Seidel, et al. (Palgrave Macmillan 20,022), 143–157; ʿĀdel Raʾūf, Muḥammad Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr Marjaʿiyyat al-Maydān: Mashrūʿihu al-Taghyīrī wa-Waqāʿi al-Ightiyāl (al-Markaz al-‘Irāqī li-l-I’lām wa-l-Dirāsāt, 2nd. Ed. 2005).

⁸ See, Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25–48. See also, ‘The Shaikhs, Aghas, and Peasants’ in Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Baʻthists, and Free Officers (Princeton University Press, c1978), 63–152, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb00859.0001.001.

⁹ Sami Zubaida, ‘The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 2 (May 2002): 205–15.

¹⁰ See, Zubaida. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804304., 30–74. Reidar Visser, ‘Proto-Political Conceptions of “Iraq” in Late Ottoman Times: International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 3, no. 2 (June 2009): 143–54, https://doi.org/10.1386/ijcis.3.2.143/1.

¹¹ Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, 75–105. Tripp, A History of Iraq.

¹² See, Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq : Antagonistic Visions of Unity (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹³ See, Elisheva Machlis, “A Shi‘a Debate on Arabism: The Emergence of a Multiple Communal Membership”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 95–114, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2013.790288. On the question of national identity see also, Tripp, A History of Iraq.

¹⁴ See, Oles M. Smolansky, ‘Qasim and the Iraqi Communist Party a Study in Arab Politics (Part One: 1958–1959)’, Il Politico, 32:2 (GIUGNO 1967), 292–307.

¹⁵ Rodney Wilson, The Contribution of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought, Journal of Islamic Studies 9 , no. 1 (1998), 46–59. Hanna Batatu, ‘Iraq’s Underground Shī’a Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects’, Middle East Journal 35, no. 4 (1981), 578–594; Silvia Naef, ‘Shiʿi-Shuyuʿi or: How to Become a Communist in a Holy City’, in The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious, Culture & Political History, ed. Werner Ende and Rainer Brunner (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

¹⁶ See Ranj Alaaldin, “The Islamic Da‘wa Party and the Mobilization of Iraq’s Shi‘i Community, 1958–1965”. Middle East Journal 71, no. 1 (Winter 2017), 45–65; Rodger Shanahan, “The Islamic Da‘wa Pary: Past Developments and Future Prospects”, MERIA 8:2 (June 2004), 16–25.

¹⁷ See, Rodney Wilson, The Contribution of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought, Journal of Islamic Studies 9, no. 1 (1998), 46–59.

¹⁸ Samual Helfont, Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018),149–154.

¹⁹ In the Shi‘i memory, al-Shāhid al-Thānī is associated with Zayn al-Dīn ibn ‘Alī al-’Āmilī (1506–1559), a prominent Twelver jurist from Jabal ‘Āmil who was killed by the Ottoman authorities.

²⁰ Beyond his significant contribution to the Da‘wa party, the assassination of Bāqir al-Ṣadr by the regime, may have been related to his prominent religious status within the Shi‘i community. See, Talib Aziz, ‘Baqir Al-Sadr’s Quest for the Marjaʿiya’, in The Most Learned of the Shiʿa: The Institution of the Marjaʿ Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge (Oxford University Press, 2001), 140-148, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195137996.003.0009.

²¹ Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism (Yale University Press, 1987); Marion Holmes Katz, Prayer in Islamic Thought and Practice (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 128–176.

²² Devin J. Stewart, ‘Polemics and Patronage in Safavid Iran: The Debate on Friday Prayer during the Reign of Shah Tahmasb’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 72, no. 3 (2009), 425–457; Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 7–30

²³ Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam; Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, The Just Ruler (al-Sultān al-‘Ādil) in Shi’ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamate Jurisprudence (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 29–57.

²⁴ Machlis, A Shi’a Debate on Arabism.

²⁵ Alaaldin, The Islamic Da’wa Party; Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi‘as (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 73–99.

²⁶ Faleh A. Jaber, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi, 2003), 78–109.

²⁷ Muḥammad al-Ṣadr, Fiqh al-Mawḍūʿāt al-Ḥadītha (Beirut: Dār wa-Maktaba al-Baṣāʾir, 1431/2010); Muḥammad al-Ṣadr, Fiqh al-Faḍā’ (Beirut: Dār wa-Maktaba al-Baṣā’ir, 1998); Mukhtār al-Asadī, al-Ṣadr al-Thānī: al-Shāhid wa’l Shahīd: al-ẓāhira wa-rudūd al-fi‘l (mu’ssasat al-i‘rāf, 1999), 27–37.

²⁸ Alaaldin, THe Islamic Da’wa Party; Shanahan, The Islamic Da’wa Party.

²⁹ Elvire Corboz, ‘Khomeini in Najaf: The Religious and Political Leadership of an Exiled Ayatollah’, Die Welt des Islams (2015, online edition).

³⁰ See, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr: لقاء الحنانة كامل, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRVarymsN6s.

³¹ Faleh Abd al-Jabbar, ‘Why the Uprisings Failed’, Middle East Report 176 (1992), 2–14.

³² See, Liora Lukitz, ‘The Shi’is in Post-Saddam Iraq: A Common Political Front, but Different Tactics?’, in Brighton, Portland, Toronto Post-Saddam Iraq: New Realities, Old Identities, Changing Patterns, ed. Amnon Cohen and Noga Efrati (Brighton, Portland, Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), 53–103. Isaac Hasson, ‘Grand Ayatollah ’Ali al-Sistani: Ideology, Activities, Proselytizing, Polemics’, in Brighton, Portland, Toronto Post-Saddam Iraq: New Realities, Old Identities, Changing Patterns, ed. Amnon Cohen and Noga Efrati (Brighton, Portland, Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2011).

³³ See, ‘المرجعية الدينية ودورها في الانتفاضة الشعبانية’, https://c-karbala.com/ar/karbala-people/7200. (accessed March 25, 2024), See also, تأليف الدكتور and محمد جواد جاسم الج ازئري, السيد أبو القاسم الخوئي رؤاه ومواقفه السياسية (النجف االشرف, 1437), 30–39. https://www.alkhoei.net/01-AllFiles/Texes/pdf/bohoth-elmie-0022.pdf.

³⁴ Harith Hasan, ‘The Roots of the Sadrist Movement: Muhammad al-Sadr, Religious Authority, and Sociopolitical Practice’, The Middle East Journal 73, no. 3 (Autumn, 2021), 365–385; Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, (Routledge, 2017 edition), 340–349.

³⁵ On the gradual decline of Karbala see, Meir Litvak, Shi’i Scholars of Ninetheenth Century Iraq: The Ulama of Najaf and Karbala, Cambridge Middle East Studies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq.

³⁶ For Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī’s biography and the significance of the Shīrāzīyūn see, جماعة من العلماء, أضواء على حياة الإمام الشيرازي (مؤسسة الوفاء, 1414), https://www.noor-book.com/en/tag/أضواء-على-حياة-الإمام-الشيرازي. See also, Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (Hurst Publishers, 2011), 88–96.

³⁷ See, محمد القاسم الحسيني, ثورة التنزيه رسالة التنزيه تليها مواقف منها وآراء في السيد محسن الامين (دار الجديد, 1996), https://www.noor-book.com/book/review/565796. See also, Elisheva Machlis, ‘The Cross-Sectarian Call for Islam: A Sample of Shi’a Reformist Thought’, Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 2 (March 1, 2009): 195–219. Werner Ende, “The Flagellations of Muḥarram and the Shi‘ite ‘Ulamā’ 1”, in The Development of Islamic Ritual (Routledge, 2006).

³⁸ Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī established numerous religious institutions in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and other locations in the Shi‘i world. See, جماعة من العلماء, أضواء على حياة الإمام الشيرازي, 25–51, 61–68, 71–83. Transnational Shia Politics, 120–126.

³⁹ السيد محمد الحسيني الشيرازي, السبيل إلى إنهاض المسلمين (مؤسسة الفكر الاسلامي, 1414), 11–79, https://ar.pdf.lib.eshia.ir/96252/1/1. See also, السيد محمد الحسيني الشيرازي, ممارسة التغيير لإنقاذ المسلمين (مؤسسة الفكر الاسلامي للثقافة والاعلام, 1999), 277–298. https://alfeker.net/library.php?id = 3150.

⁴⁰ Elisheva Machlis, Shi’i Sectarianism in the Middle East: Modernisation and the Quest for Islamic Universalism (I.B. Tauris, 2014), 25–36.

⁴¹ Hasan, The Roots of the Sadrist Movement; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 356–360.

⁴² Machlis, Shi’i Sectarianism, 1–15. Mina Yazdani, ‘KĀLEṢIZĀDA, MOḤAMMAD B. MOḤAMMAD-MAHDI’, in Encyclopædia Iranica, October 7, 2015, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/khalesizada.

⁴³ Muḥammad Mahdī al-Khāliṣī, al-Jum‘a: kitab fiqhī istiflālī fī wujūb ṣalwat al-jum‘a (Baghdad: Maṭba‘at al-Ma’ārif, 1949?).

⁴⁴ Dai, An Islamist Social Movement, footnote 15.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ See, Heidar G. Azodanloo, ‘Formalization of Friday Sermons and Consolidation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 1, no. 1 (September 1, 1992): 12–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/10669929208720023. Moatasem Sediq Abdullah and Mohammed Alsayed Alsayyad, ‘Friday Prayers in Iran Religionizing Politics and Politicizing Religion | International Institute for Iranian Studies’ (International Institute for Iranian Studies [Rasanah], March 11, 2020), https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/centre-for-researches-and-studies/friday-prayers-in-iran-religionizing-politics-and-politicizing-religion/. See also, Mehdi Khalaji, ‘Iran’s Regime of Religion’, Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011): 131–47.

⁴⁷ On Khomeini outreach efforts see, Emmanuel Sivan, ‘Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 21, no. 1 (1989): 1–30.

⁴⁸ ‘شورای سیاستگذاری ائمه جمعه، شورای بولتنها’, https://iranwire.com/fa/features/27248/ (accessed May 31, 2023).

⁴⁹ Helfont, Compulsion in Religion, 145–158.

⁵⁰ Abbas Kadhim, ‘The Hawza under Siege: A Study in the Ba’th Party Archive’, Boston University: Institute for Iraqi Studies Occasion.al Paper 1 (2013), 16–52.

⁵¹ Minbar al-Ṣadr, 28.

⁵² Ibid. 35.

⁵³ Minbar al-Ṣadr, 17.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 133.

⁵⁵ ʿAbd al-Nabī Jāsem Butūr al-Ḥalafī, Qiyām Ṣalāt al-Jumʿa fī ‘Irāq fī ʿAhd al-Marjaʿ al-Dīnī Muḥammad Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr 1997–1999 m. (Beirut: Dār al-Qāriʾ, 2018), 134–143.

⁵⁶ Hosham Dawood, ‘The “State-ization” of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of Iraq’, in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod (eds.), Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: Saqi, 2003), 110–135.

⁵⁷ Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir, 19.

⁵⁸ Raʾūf, Muḥammad Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr Marjaʿiyyat al-Maydān, 336–338.

⁵⁹ John Hursh, ‘The Role of Culture in the Creation of Islamic Law’, Indiana Law Journal 84, no. 1401 (2009), 1401–1423; Ayman Shabana, Custom in Islamic law and Legal Theory: The Development of the Concepts of ‘Urf and ‘Ādah in the Islamic Legal Tradition (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2010), 1–11, 32–58, 71–91, 147–171.

⁶⁰ See for example, ‘السيرة العقلائية ـ السيرة المتشرعية - مدرسة الفقاهة’, https://www.eshia.ir/feqh/archive/text/javaheri/osool/32/330215/ (accessed April 1, 2024).

⁶¹ Hossein Modarressi, ‘Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shî’î Jurisprudence: A Preliminary Survey’, Studia Islamica 59 (1984), 141–158; Liyakat Takim, “Custom as a Legal Principle of Legislation for Shi’i Law, Studies in Religion 47, no. 4 (2018), 481–499: Sumeyra Yakar, “The Diachronic Analysis of Interactive Relations between ‘Urf and Sīra ‘Uqalāiyya in the Ja’far School of Law’, 7AÜİFD 7, no. 2 (2020/2), 719–744; Robert Gleave, “Imami Shi‘i Legal Theory: From its Origins to the Early Twentieth Century”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, ed. Anver M Emon and Rumee Ahmed (Oxford University Press, 2015), 207–230.

⁶² See, Frank Griffel, ‘What Do We Mean By “Salafī”? Connecting Muḥammad ʿAbduh with Egypt’s Nūr Party in Islam’s Contemporary Intellectual History’, Die Welt Des Islams 55, no. 2 (September 1, 2015): 186–220, https://doi.org/10.1163/15700607–00552p02. Henri Lauzière, ‘Rejoinder: What We Mean Versus What They Meant by “Salafi”: A Reply to Frank Griffel’, Die Welt Des Islams 56, no. 1 (April 19, 2016): 89–96, https://doi.org/10.1163/15700607–00561p06.

⁶³ See for example the following rulings by the prominent Saudi cleric Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-Munajjid (b. 1961): ‘Tribal Laws and the Call to Revive Them—Islam Question & Answer’, 2024, https://islamqa.info/en/answers/21029/tribal-laws-and-the-call-to-revive-them (accessed March 28). ‘Ruling on Referring to Tribal Customs for Judgement—Islam Question & Answer’, 2024, https://islamqa.info/en/answers/84073/ruling-on-referring-to-tribal-customs-for-judgement (accessed March 28).

⁶⁴ Dawood, The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of Iraq, 110–135.

⁶⁵ Adeed Dawisha, ‘“Identity” and Political Survival in Saddam’s Iraq’, Middle East Journal 53:4 (1999), 553–567; Jabar, Shaykhs and Ideologues; See also, Amatzia Baram, ‘The Iraqi Tribes and the Post-Saddam System’ (Brookings, July 8, 2003), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iraqi-tribes-and-the-post-saddam-system/.

⁶⁶ Fiqh al-ʿashāʾir, 23–24.

⁶⁷ Mawil Y. Izzi Dien and and P.E. Walker, ‘Wilāya’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, https://doi.org/10.1163/1573–3912_islam_COM_1349 (accessed April 1, 2024). Hamid Mavani, ‘Ayatullah Khomeini’s Concept of Governance (wilayat al-faqih) and the Classical Shi‘i Doctrine of Imamate’, Middle Eastern Studies 47:, no. 5 (Sep. 2011), 807–24; Liyakat Takim, ‘From Partial to Complete: Juristic Authority in Twelver Shi‘ism’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 4 (Summer 2020), 6–27.

⁶⁸ Absar Aftab, ‘Restorative Justice in Islam with Special Reference to the Concept of Diya’, Journal of Victimology and Victim Justice 3, no. 1 (2020), 38–56.

⁶⁹ Aseel al-Ramahi, ‘Sulh: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration’, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 12 (2008), 1–23. See also, Katherine Blue Carroll, ‘Tribal Law and Reconciliation in the New Iraq’, Middle East Journal 65, no. 1 (2011), 11–29.

⁷⁰ al-Ṣadr, Fiqh al-‘Ashā’ir, 26–27.

⁷¹ Ibid., 27.

⁷² Ibid., 27–28.

⁷³ Chafik Chehata, ‘ʿAkd’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, https://doi.org/10.1163/1573–3912_islam_SIM_0460 (accessed March 28, 2024).

⁷⁴ al-Ṣadr, Fiqh al-‘Ashā’ir, 30.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 37–38.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 42.

⁷⁷ Ibid. 46.

⁷⁸ Ibid. 47.

⁷⁹ M. Khadduri, ‘Maṣlaḥa’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, https://doi.org/10.1163/1573–3912_islam_SIM_5019. (accessed March 28, 2024).

⁸⁰ al-Ṣadr, Fiqh al-‘Ashā’ir, 29–30.

⁸¹ Ibid. 73–74.

⁸² Ibid. 99–100.

⁸³ Ibid. 85.

⁸⁴ Hamid Mavani, “Structural Ijtihad: A Radical Paradigm Shift in Twelver Shi‘i Legal Theory” in Islamic Law and Ethics, ed. David R. Vishanoff (London & Washington: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2020), 52–75. Anver M Emon, ‘Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law’, Journal of Law & Religion 20, no. 2 (2004), 351–95.

⁸⁵ al-Ṣadr, Fiqh al-‘Ashā’ir, 101–102.