“Intentionality” in radical flank effects: reflections on Al-Nusra Front’s discourse of moderation between 2012–2017

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I examine the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs) reflecting on the case of al-Nusra Front and specifically its oscillation between ‘moderation’ and ‘radicalism’ in the period between its official establishment in early 2012 and the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in January 2017. The main contribution in this paper originates from revisiting Haines’ premise that RFEs happen ‘unintendedly’. Reflecting on the discourse and behaviour of al-Nusra, I propose that RFEs can be managed purposefully by collective actors in ways that serve their strategic goals. In this sense, claims to moderation may serve as a strategic tool in the hands of collective actors, including militant Islamist organizations. In this regard, the research reveals that al-Nusra’s oscillation between moderation and radicalism was by and large purposeful, or at least carefully managed by the organization’s ideologues and strategists.

Introduction

In this paper, I examine the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs), reflecting on the case of al-Nusra Front and specifically its oscillation between ‘moderation’ and ‘radicalism’ in the period between its official establishment in early 2012 and the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in January 2017. The main contribution in this paper originates from revisiting Haines’ premise that RFEs happen ‘unintendedly’. Reflecting on the discourse and behaviour of al-Nusra, I propose that RFEs can be managed purposefully by collective actors in ways that serve their strategic goals. In this sense, claims to moderation may serve as a strategic tool in the hands of collective actors, including militant Islamist organizations. The research shows that al-Nusra’s oscillation between moderation and radicalism was by and large purposeful, or at least carefully managed by the organization’s ideologues and strategists. Given the presence of fierce competition over legitimacy and resources alongside the raging conflict in Syria as well as the constantly lurking danger of being targeted by international and regional coalitions against terrorist groups, al-Nusra sought to manage the issue of ‘moderation’ to increase its power and influence and to ensure its survival in the long run. The research demonstrates the agency of militant Islamist actors through revealing how al-Nusra managed its ‘moderation’ variably in its relations with ISIS and the Free Syrian Army (FSA). While the initial swift expansion of ISIS in Syria pushed al-Nusra to utilize an exceedingly extremist discourse and start seriously planning to establish an Islamic emirate in northern Syria, it shifted its strategy towards distancing itself from ISIS discursively and organizationally when ISIS became under the strikes of the Global Coalition in September 2014. At the same time, al-Nusra attempted to appear more committed and less compromising than other competing Islamist groups and factions of the FSA. Moreover, al-Nusra’s leadership frequently redefined their notion of ‘moderation’ to restructure its internal organization and expel disobedient members or potentially rebellious subdivisions.

The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section examines al-Nusra’s responses to the rise of ISIS in a highly competitive ‘jihad market’. The second section focuses on the relations between al-Nusra and FSA factions and analyses the changes to these relations over the period between 2012 and 2017. In the third section, I explore the different currents within al-Nusra and their competition over power and legitimacy and analyse the impact of that competition on the overall behaviour and strategic choices of al-Nusra.

What are radical flank effects?

Haines was the first (1984) to highlight and theorize Radical Flank Effects (RFEs),¹ which he defines as ‘interactive processes involving radical and moderate factions of social movements’.² Haines focuses specifically on uncovering ‘the impacts of radical group actions upon the reputations and effectiveness of more moderate collective actors’. He points out that such impacts may take negative or positive forms.³ Negative effects occur when the actions, or mere existence, of ‘extremists’ hinders the ability of more moderate factions to pursue their strategic plans and achieve their objectives. Conversely, RFEs may lead to positive outcomes for the more moderate actors by rendering them more acceptable or negotiable, for example. Haines rightly notes that positive RFEs have garnered the greatest interest from scholars of social movements.⁴

Importantly, Haines postulates that ‘positive RFEs are almost always unintended results of movement fractionalization’ and that normally moderate and radical factions do not collaborate intentionally to bring about positive effects because that is an extremely risky strategy that could backfire if uncovered.⁵ This is also believed to be the case because such a scenario requires radical actors to sacrifice all their own ambitions to advance those of other actors.

Haines’ insights regarding positive and negative RFEs have been incorporated into the agenda of social movement research. However, his initial theory has been criticized by other scholars on the basis that the positive–negative dichotomy ignores other possible effects. Gupta, in this regard, adds four possible RFEs⁶ radicals benefit at the expense of moderates; moderates benefit at the expense of radicals; both radicals and moderates benefit; or both radicals and moderates lose.⁷ Table 1 illustrates Gupta’s four possible RFEs:

Table 1. Radical flank effects.

In addition to his significant additions to Haines’ analytical approach, Gupta raises the possibility that, in order to circumvent becoming irrelevant, moderate factions may be compelled to alter their strategies and discourses to bring them closer to those of the radicals.⁸ This is especially important when the radical flank rises quickly, makes significant advances, and/or manages to capture the attention of the media and the public. As a result, the effectiveness and empowerment of the radical factions may prompt their comparatively moderate counterparts to respond and modify their strategies by repositioning themselves organizationally and ideologically to become either closer to or further apart from the radicals based on contextual considerations and cost-benefit calculations, thereby demonstrating agency within militant Islamism.

If we are to determine possible effects, it is crucial to begin by defining ‘moderation’ and ‘radicalism’. First of all, moderation is a relative concept. It always depends on the context and the angle from which one is perceiving behaviours, attitudes, and statements. Moderate actors are deemed ‘moderate’ in comparison with others who are more radical. In our case, both al-Nusra and ISIS are considered radical organizations that do not abide by national and international laws and use violence for ideological reasons; they are thus commonly designated ‘terrorist groups’, following Security Council resolution 1566 (2004). However, observing the situation in Syria since 2011 shows that the two militant Islamist organizations have embarked on two different courses of action despite their shared ideological and organizational source.

While ISIS emphasized its terrorist character and demonstrably remained committed to its extremely violent and chauvinistic approach since its inception, al-Nusra seemed to care more about its reputation and public image, refrained from directing or commissioning external operations, and displayed more pragmatic behaviour. Taking these differences into consideration, it is plausible to say that al-Nusra was less radical than ISIS. Yet, al-Nusra was more radical and extremist than most other opposition factions fighting the Syrian regime. Al-Nusra frequently showed hegemonic tendencies in its relations with FSA factions, was intolerant, and committed serious violations of international humanitarian law in the areas under its control.⁹

In the Syrian context, ‘moderation’ is a factor that played a vital role in determining the trajectory of al-Nusra’s activism and its strategic choices. In the case of al-Nusra, the RFEs vary across time and place. They also differ from one standpoint to another because al-Nusra was concurrently a part of a transnational Salafi-Jihadist movement and a leading player within the anti-Assad opposition, and by itself was a distinct organizational framework that contained competing currents that varied in their extremism and intransigence. The RFEs are found in all three spheres, with each effect having its unique considerations and circumstances. Another point worth adding here is that the RFEs did not happen spontaneously or unintendedly but rather were managed and manipulated to serve certain strategic interests. In this respect, al-Nusra’s ideational framing was strategically employed in the ‘management of moderation’.

The disputes and confrontations between al-Nusra and ISIS are usually explained as a result of differing theological and doctrinal standpoints or conflicting geostrategic ambitions. That is true to a great extent, but there is more to add. At the macro level, both Salafi-Jihadist players constituted two flanks in one movement despite their differences and occasional clashes. The rise of ISIS as the more radical flank in an amorphous Salafi-Jihadist movement in some ways benefited al-Nusra, which responded by pragmatically and purposefully trying to appear the less radical and more flexible of the two. This was meant to serve al-Nusra’s survival and advance its activities in Syria. On one hand, the discourse of moderation was used by al-Nusra’s ideologues and strategists to engender local support given the expansion and terrorizing practices of ISIS. Additionally, it aimed to evade being designated a ‘terrorist’ group and to challenge the designation when it happened. Moreover, presenting itself as moderate allowed al-Nusra to attract more recruits based on claims of authenticity, moderation, and centrism in between the more radical ISIS and the more compromising FSA factions. Claims to moderation also enabled the leadership of al-Nusra to get rid of disobedient members, accusing them of being kharijites (deviants) and ghulat (extremists).

To simplify, the following is a hypothetical moderation-radicalism spectrum to help visualize the position of al-Nusra between the more radical ISIS and the more moderate factions of the FSA.

It should be emphasized here that the above depiction is by no means final or fixed. Rather, I propose that al-Nusra deliberately kept moving between the two hypothetical poles in order to maximize its effectiveness and influence, as the following sections will further elucidate.

Islamist moderation in theoretical context

In exploring the dynamics of moderation within Islamist movements, it is imperative to contextualize the choice of the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFE). Traditional approaches, such as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and the theory of Post-Islamism, have predominantly focused on analysing Islamist parties and movements through lenses such as ideological evolution or strategic adaptation, often attributing moderation or radicalism solely to the openness of the political system and choices made by the state. RFE, on the other hand, offers a novel perspective that is particularly pertinent to intra-Islamist dynamics.

For example, Jerome Drevon’s assertion that political inclusion and the opening of political opportunities encourage Islamists to participate and accept democratic means to power, while maintaining their ideological precepts, is one such ‘statist’ approach.¹⁰ According to Drevon, the experiences of the Islamic Group and the Jihad Group in post-Mubarak Egypt reveal that the presence of democratic institutions may lead Islamists to pragmatically engage with democratic processes without necessarily altering their underlying ideological principles.¹¹

In the same vein, Ashour postulates that introducing more inclusion and political openness will lead radicals to interact with ‘non-like-minded’ individuals and groups, and it is through such interactions that radicals learn to cooperate and shift towards moderation.¹² However, this perspective, while widely debated within academic circles, can be viewed as overly simplistic and reflective of an old paradigm that sees Islamist actions as primarily reactive to the nature of the political system. In this regard, Schwedler (2011) convincingly argues that political learning is not necessarily guaranteed to produce more moderation because Islamist activists may also learn from radicals.¹³ Generally speaking, attributing Islamist moderation or radicalism to the presence or absence of democratic institutions fails to account for the dynamics within Islamist movements, including intra-group competition, strategic calculations, and ideological evolution. Furthermore, such statist frameworks risk underestimating the agency and autonomy of Islamist actors, portraying them as passive recipients of state policies rather than active agents shaping their own trajectories.¹⁴ While political inclusion and democratic processes may indeed influence Islamist activism, a comprehensive understanding of Islamist moderation necessitates considering the multifaceted motivations and dynamics at play within the world of Islamism.

As part of the broader discourse on Islamist moderation, the theory of Post-Islamism, notably exemplified by the work of Asef Bayat (2007), has heavily influenced writings in the field of Islamism, especially pre-2011. Post-Islamism posits a transition within Islamist movements towards a more pluralistic and democratic framework, departing from previous emphases on the establishment of the Islamic state.¹⁵ However, the unfolding events of the Arab Spring and the subsequent resurgence of extremely violent Islamist factions and discourses have underscored the explanatory weaknesses inherent in the Post-Islamism theory. The resurgence of radical Islamist organizations, exemplified by the activities of groups such as al-Nusra Front in Syria post-2011, alongside the continuous evolution of ideological views and propaganda messaging within Islamist factions, has highlighted the inadequacies of classical approaches. These developments have illuminated the pressing need for alternative theoretical frameworks. In response, the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFE) emerges as a valuable tool that adds to our understanding of the strategic manoeuvres and tactical calculations underlying groups’ oscillation between moderation and radicalism.

One of the key rationales for employing RFE in this study is its focus on the interplay between different factions within Islamist movements. Unlike some classical approaches that may view shifts towards moderation as enduring strategic decisions, RFE highlights the tactical nature of such manoeuvres. It underscores the strategic calculus behind presenting a moderate façade, illustrating how Islamist factions leverage and sometimes exploit each other to gain legitimacy and acceptance, even if such shifts are temporary. Moreover, RFE’s applicability is underscored by its relevance to radical and terrorist groups within the Islamist spectrum. Traditional approaches often centre on Islamist parties, occasionally extending to movements espousing extremist ideologies. However, these frameworks may overlook the distinct characteristics of radical groups whose identities are fundamentally shaped by violence, excommunication, and the targeting of civilians. With that in mind, I propose that transcending scholarly barriers and employing RFE can help address some of the shortcomings of conventional paradigms. This approach may aid in understanding moderation dynamics by illuminating the interactions among radical elements within the broader Islamist landscape.

Al-Nusra’s behavioural patterns and shifts

Between 2011 and 2017 there were several developments and incidents that affected the way researchers and analysts perceived al-Nusra Front. While al-Nusra’s clear doctrinal leaning towards Salafi-Jihadism was always evident, its organizational affiliation changed over time. To clarify, in al-Nusra’s early statements and media releases there was no mention of any direct affiliation with al-Qaeda or any other Islamist organization. Only when the threat of ISIS became imminent in April 2013 did Abu Mohamad al-Jolani declare his group’s allegiance to al-Qaeda Central (AQC).¹⁶ Al-Nusra then remained an official branch of al-Qaeda until July 2016, when al-Jolani appeared in a video revealing his face for the first time and declared that his group had decided to change its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for Liberation of the Levant) (JFS) which would have no links with foreign parties.¹⁷ A few months after splitting from al-Qaeda, al-Nusra started to shift its strategy towards attempting to secure local acceptance and regional and international recognition of its de facto role in its areas of control, most of which were in the Idlib province. Henceforth, JFS, formerly al-Nusra, began to assert its local Syrian character while embarking on an aggressive and hegemonic approach in its relations with smaller opposition groups. Importantly, JFS led the formation of a new Islamist coalition under the name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in January 2017 responding to the initiation of political negotiations between the Syrian government and several opposition groups including representatives of militant Islamist factions.

In spite of al-Nusra’s attempts to distance itself from al-Qaeda’s global jihadist approach and appear organically entrenched in the Syrian context, only a small number of experts of Islamist activism believed that al-Nusra was going through a pivotal ideological adjustment. However, the group’s tactical moves led some analysts, such as Colin Clarke,¹⁸ to describe al-Nusra as ‘the moderate face of al-Qaeda’. Moreover, other counter-terrorism scholars began to openly call for a policy shift towards ‘accepting al-Qaeda’ and its less dangerous offshoots in order to halt the rapidly expanding ISIS.¹⁹ Such voices were lent credence by al-Nusra’s avoidance of operations against Western targets and the group’s apparent concern for its public image. Al-Nusra’s ostensible willingness to respond to international and local pressures was indeed unprecedented considering the experience of Salafi-Jihadist activism since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent emergence of al-Qaeda in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that al-Nusra’s strategic goals seem to have remained firmly anchored in Salafi-Jihadism.

The group’s understanding of jihad as an armed conflict and as an obligation did not change. Since the beginning of al-Nusra’s operations in Syria in late 2011, its members showed hostility towards democracy and the modern institution of the nation-state, adopted divisive sectarian rhetoric, and their proclamation of war against unbelief and apostasy had constantly been their declared drive.

Al-Nusra’s strategic management of the “moderation” discourse

Al-Nusra frequently utilized the pretence of moderation to maximize its benefits during the conflict in Syria. Qualitatively, however, it employed ‘moderation’ variably in relation to different competitors and challengers. Examining the variability in the use of the discourse of moderation offers insight into the Islamists’ strategic management of discourse.

Studying the qualitative changes of the discourse of al-Nusra reveals that in the beginning it used the claim to moderation to become more acceptable locally and persuade more Syrians to join its ranks. Al-Nusra kept its relations with The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qaeda Central (AQC) undeclared for more than a year after its official formation in early 2012. Its designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the American Foreign Office in December 2012 pushed it to present itself as a ‘moderate’ and ‘authentic’ organization that was being treated unfairly. For al-Nusra, the possibility of being targeted militarily by American or international forces following the designation was a lurking existential threat given the newness and immaturity of al-Nusra’s experience and the ongoing confrontation with the Syrian regime. Appearing moderate was meant to resonate with the local form of religiosity that is traditionally closer to Sufism and quietist Salafism than Salafi-Jihadism.

Al-Nusra purposefully attempted to appear as the moderate flank in a Salafi-Jihadist movement that also encompasses the more radical ISIS. The discourse of moderation was also used to challenge those who sympathize with ISIS, al-Nusra’s main Salafi-Jihadist competitor. This was important given the rapid expansion of ISIS and its extreme views and violent practices that engendered fear locally and internationally from 2013 onwards.

Later, when al-Nusra became engrossed in demonstrating its local Syrian character and its involvement in the Syrian opposition, it began to present itself as the moderate and most effective part of the opposition. The claim to moderation was now articulated in contrast to the perceived ‘too lenient’, ‘unauthentic’, and ‘less committed’ factions of the opposition, Islamists or otherwise. In its competition with factions of the opposition, al-Nusra presented itself as the opposition movement most capable of practising politics since it enjoys popular support and is powerful enough to represent the Syrian people and negotiate on their behalf without needing to make substantial concessions.

The leadership of al-Nusra instrumentalised the discourse of moderation to enforce internal discipline and rid the organization of any rebellious figures and units. This process led to the consolidation of al-Jolani’s power and provided him with the freedom to implement his strategic visions, most of which revolve around breaking with global Jihadism, embedding into the Syrian context, and maintaining his group’s de facto dominance in Idlib province.

Competitive “jihad market”: Al-Nusra’s discursive reactions to the rise of ISIS

The expansion of ISIS in Syria posed a grave threat to various rebel groups including al-Nusra. Operating under its newly coined slogan, ‘remaining and expanding’, ISIS sought to become the only dominant Salafi-Jihadist actor in Iraq and Syria. Citing the help and resources with which it had provided al-Nusra from its inception, it demanded full compliance and cooperation. ISIS leaders, especially the group’s spokesman al-ʿAdnani, struck an increasingly commanding tone in their messages to al-Nusra. Tensions escalated quickly into militant confrontations in the eastern part of Syria. ISIS achieved a relatively easy victory and consequently powerful military commanders and entire units of al-Nusra joined ISIS. Fearing ISIS, al-Jolani swore allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda Central (AQC), and al-Nusra began to assert its Salafi-Jihadist character, trying to appear firmly anti-democratic, anti-secular, and committed to the ideas of abolishing man-made laws, establishing an Islamic state, and applying the rules of sharia. Militarily, al-Nusra’s leadership turned towards solidifying its influence and presence in the countryside of Idlib and Aleppo, Damascus’ Ghouta, and Daraa.

Discursively, ideologues from the two jihadist groups engaged in heated competitions for authenticity on two fronts: firstly, regarding the group’s adherence to the principles of the founding fathers of contemporary Salafi-Jihadism such as Abdallah Azzam, Osama b. Laden and Abu Musʿab al-Suri; and secondly, concerning the group’s commitment to following the literal understanding of the Quran and the Hadith especially in regard to matters that have political and strategic relevance. These competitions manifested in virtual debates, exchanges of tweets, and written commentaries, among other forms.

While unable to outweigh ISIS militarily, al-Nusra managed to win the support of numerous jihadist ideologues inside and outside Syria. The support of these ideologues helped al-Nusra immensely and preserved its popularity in the jihadist circles through validating its doctrine and endorsing its strategic approach at a critical time. In a 2014 account of the three ‘camps’ of Syrian jihadism,²⁰ for example, the ideologue Tariq Abdelhaleem describes ISIS as so extremist that it is ‘more dangerous than al-Assad’s Nusayri regime’.²¹ At the same time, he dismisses those who aspired to find a middle way between ‘the infidel secular and democratic regimes and the jihadist movement’ as immature, having failed to realize that their ‘compromising approach’ will lead to another democratic state in Syria supported by the West and ruled by man-made laws.²²

The period between 2013 and 2015 was marked by jihadist infighting in addition to rising dogmatism and intransigence across all jihadist fronts. During this period, the rise of ISIS as a powerful and extremely radical flank in Salafi-Jihadism appeared to push al-Nusra closer to ISIS’ end of the spectrum, albeit only discursively. As a result, al-Nusra’s marajiʿ (leaders and referential figures) began to focus on demonstrating their dogmatic adherence to Salafi-Jihadism and their rejection of pragmatism and the recurring and expansive employment of the concept of maslaha (public interest). Veteran jihadists known to be close to al-Qaeda, such as Radwan Nammous (aka Abu Firas al-Suri), surrounded al-Jolani and became the main representatives of al-Nusra at this stage. Additionally, calls for the establishment of Islamic emirates near the Turkish borders started to emerge.²³

Later, when al-Nusra decided to break ties with al-Qaeda and shift towards attempting to embed in the Syrian opposition, several of the group’s ideologues were relegated to a less significant role. Most of them voluntarily distanced themselves from al-Nusra’s new policies. Others who were closer to the field were marginalized or forced to leave al-Nusra. Accusations of being ghulat (extremist) became more common. Accusations of being ISIS sympathizers were also used, as will be further elaborated in later sections.

ISIS posed a serious international threat as well. ISIS’ brutality and ruthless executions of foreign journalists and aid workers in addition to its responsibility for numerous local and external terrorist attacks triggered an international military response, which began in September 2014. As Coalition airstrikes and ground offensives by the predominantly Kurdish ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) gradually pushed ISIS back, there was less pressure on al-Nusra, allowing the latter to concentrate on projecting its power over other militant Islamist groups and FSA factions. As such, despite sporadic targeting by Russian and American airstrikes, al-Nusra benefited indirectly from the international military campaign against ISIS and became ready to shift its strategy towards asserting its local character and de facto dominance in northwest Syria. This strategic shift was accompanied by a finetuning of al-Nusra’s jihadist discourse which began to feature signs of willingness to engage pragmatically with the increasingly visible Turkish influence in the north and readiness to adhere to localized and temporary ceasefire initiatives.

Al-Nusra and IS: the rival brothers

The relationships between al-Qaeda Central (AQC) and The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) had never been stable. Strategic and theological disputes between the two parties arose frequently since the time of Zarqawi. However, despite their disagreements, al-Qaeda supported ISI and praised its activities in Iraq. This should be seen in the light of the fact that al-Qaeda was losing in Afghanistan and Pakistan.²⁴ The successes and popularity of ISI served to revive al-Qaeda and remind people of its presence and far-reaching influence.²⁵ ISI remained officially loyal to al-Qaeda until it expanded into Syria, became the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and clashed with al-Nusra Front. ISIS’ unanimous announcement of the Khilafah in mid-2014 and the momentous confrontation with al-Nusra and other factions in Syria marked a point of divergence within the world of Salafi-Jihadist activism and the beginning of a phase of jihadi hostilities, infightings and takfir.

Significantly, ISIS’ expansion and hegemonic tendencies brought al-Nusra closer to al-Qaeda Central (AQC) and fostered the consolidation of two separate trends in global Jihadism. On one hand, ISIS’ ‘achievements’ made it more intransigent and committed to its excessively violent and authoritative approach. The group’s rapid geographical expansion and ever-growing popularity that overshadowed all other Jihadist organizations in 2013 and 2014 made it confrontational and aggressive in its relationships with competing militant Islamist groups in the marketplace of jihadism. On the other hand, AQC and its affiliates chose to present themselves as more discursively ‘moderate’ and practically ‘flexible’ than their rival ISIS especially in terms of their relationships with other Islamist groups and schools of thought.

On the ground, being under constant pressure from ISIS, al-Nusra became officially al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria in April 2013. Shortly after that, al-Nusra embarked on a strategy to dissociate itself from ISIS, promote its own version of jihadist activism, and reposition itself on the map of the conflict in Syria.

The year 2013 witnessed a war of statements between ISIS and al-Qaeda as well as calls for reconciliation. However, all attempts to bring the rival brothers together failed. In January 2014, Jaysh al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Army), which included several Islamist factions such as Fastaqim Union, Nour al-Din al-Zenki Battalions and Ansar al-Khilafa Brigade, launched swift attacks on various ISIS posts in northern and north-western Syria.²⁶ Soon after, al-Nusra began attacking ISIS especially in the countryside of Idlib.²⁷ By engaging in a serious military confrontation with ISIS, al-Nusra sought to show commitment to its claims of religious authenticity, look like a moderate faction facing an extremist one, and get closer to factions of the opposition that were already engaged in widespread military confrontations with ISIS.

The orchestrated military operation of Jaysh al-Mujahideen and al-Nusra Front managed to push ISIS away from Aleppo towards the eastern countryside of the city and resulted in the death of ISIS’ top commander and mastermind Sameer Abd Muhammad Khleifawi, known as Hajji Bakr. However, large numbers of al-Nusra’s local and foreign fighters, including powerful allies such as Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili (known as Abu Omar al-Shishani and Omar the Chechen), joined ISIS.²⁸ Fearing more defections, al-Jolani warned against ‘drifting into a jahili conflict between muhajireen (migrants) and ansar (local supporters)’, and stated that ‘there is an essential need for the presence of migrant elements in the field of jihad in order to demonstrate the unity of Islam in such an historic conflict’.²⁹ Al-Jolani also directed members of al-Nusra, especially the Syrians, ‘to take responsibility for protecting those who have sought their assistance and defending them with blood and money’.³⁰ However, in the conflict between al-Nusra and ISIS, the latter seems to have managed to win the battle for foreign fighters, inadvertently fostering the ‘Syrianisation’ of al-Nusra Front.

ISIS accused al-Nusra of apostasy and in February 2014 began attacking the latter’s positions in Deir Ezzor and other parts in the east of Syria. By August 2014, ISIS defeated al-Nusra and other Islamist factions decisively in Deir Ezzor and captured the city of Raqqa. Meanwhile, entire units of al-Nusra pledged allegiance to ISIS and some al-Nusra leaders, such as Abu Malik al-Talli in al-Qalamoon, refused to fight ISIS revealing serious internal divisions within al-Nusra. Although Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, leader of al-Nusra in the eastern part of Syria, remained loyal to al-Jolani and decided to move with the remaining members of al-Nusra to the southern governorate of Daraa, he was soon replaced by a more hard-line jihadi, Jordanian Sami al-ʿUraydi. The growing influence of al-ʿUraydi and his countrymen Iyad al-Tubasi, Bilal Khreisat, Khalid al-Arouri, and Abu Anas al-Sahaba, all of whom are close to al-Zawahiri’s line of global jihad, reflected al-Nusra’s desire to assert its Salafi-Jihadist character and alignment with AQC in response to the ISIS grave threat.

Claiming “religious authenticity” in the face of ISIS

Mazhar al-Wais remained one of al-Nusra’s leading marajiʿ since an early stage. He is a Syrian Salafi-Jihadist Sheikh and known to belong to al-Jolani’s small circle of trusted figures. He has criticized ISIS sharply and written books and commentaries trying to invalidate its approach to religion, and defend the jihadist doctrine of al-Nusra and other al-Qaeda affiliates.

Al-Wais shares with Abu Musʿab al-Suri, who was described by Lia (2008) as the ‘architect of global jihad’,³¹ the notion that the interest of jihad justifies everything and must be the fundamental reason behind any strategic decision.³² In this sense, the interest of the ummah is partly dependent on the continuation of jihad; and the very pursuit of jihad is understood to be both a religious principle and a strategic necessity. Following that, ISIS was accused of giving primacy to the interest of the group over any other religious or political considerations.³³

Al-Wais argues that ISIS members are superficially firm and that they are strict only on matters pertaining to Muslims. For him, members of ISIS excommunicate entire Islamic formations and legal schools accusing them of ceasing the application of hudood (Islamic capital punishments), while they only apply the hudood that are useful to their propaganda.³⁴ Additionally, al-Wais highlights ISIS’ ‘disloyalty’ to the legacy of the architects of contemporary jihadism. He gives an example ISIS members’ refusal to support the popular revolutions of the Arab Spring which contradicts the approach of Osama b. Laden and his companion Ayman al-Zawahiri.³⁵

Moreover, he draws a historical analogy, comparing the doctrine of ISIS with that of the khawarij (Kharijites).³⁶ He explains that ‘like their ancestors, who had attractive slogans, the IS group deceives the public by their discourse, whereas the truth is that their actions have nothing to do with shari’a; they are pretentious, utilitarian, opportunistic, pleasure-loving and greedy’.³⁷ Al-Wais highlights another commonality between ISIS and the Kharijites which is the exaggeration in the application of the rule: ‘who does not excommunicate a kafir, or doubts that, is kafir’.³⁸ Al-Wais explains that such traditional rules have been used by ISIS to excommunicate those who disagree with their doctrine or practices. Following that, and in his defence of al-Nusra, he states that the closest people to truth in the time of disunity are those who face the Kharijites and endeavour to establish a ‘Sunni project that will return the glory of the ummah’.³⁹

Importantly, al-Wais criticizes ISIS’ notion of qatl al-maslaha ‘interest killing’ which refers to killing any person if that would benefit the group regardless of any religious or ethical considerations. He adds that practising ‘interest killing’ is another feature shared with the Kharijites.⁴⁰

ISIS’ Caliphate proclamation represented a major point of disagreement in the Salafi-Jihadist camp. Numerous Salafi-Jihadist marajiʿ around the world denied the legitimacy of the newly announced caliphate, which was used by al-Nusra in its counter propaganda campaigns. Sizeable portions of al-Nusra’s magazine, Al Risalah,⁴¹ are dedicated to renouncing the newly announced Caliphate and highlighting statements and opinions of ulama that disprove ISIS’ unilateral move. The jihadist magazine states that despite the ulama’s clear disproval of ISIS’ behaviours, ISIS continued slandering the respected ulama labelling them as ‘old, senile men’.⁴² Al Risalah mentions that some ISIS figures went as far as saying ‘we don’t need scholars, we have Qur’an and Sunnah’ which the magazine describes as an ‘ill-advised statement’.⁴³ The magazine’s main criticism is that ISIS considers the ulama ‘mere common men who are prone to make mistakes’; a criticism that reflects the turn towards re-establishing the authority of a class of epistemic leaders in al-Qaeda’s version of Salafi-Jihadism.⁴⁴

It is noteworthy that al-Nusra’s discourse of moderation drew on the experiences of other Islamist groups, militant and non-militant. Al-Nusra presented its adaptations and changing discourse and behaviour as a corrective movement within militant Islamism. It tried to maintain a Salafi-Jihadist discourse in tandem with its attempts to become more localized and closer to factions of the opposition.

For al-Nusra’s leading marjiʿ Abd al-Rahim Attoun,⁴⁵ numerous Islamist groups appeared during the last century driven by a shared desire to return the rule of Islam but employed different methods. He considers one of the most significant experiences to be that of the Muslim Brotherhood, who believe that, since Muslims are a majority in the region and will choose the rule of Islam at the ballot box if given the chance, participating in parliamentary life is a way of achieving Islamic government.⁴⁶ Attoun argues that ‘regardless of the fallacies in this heretical method (the parliament), the Muslim Brothers have never applied Islamic rules in any of their experiences with government’. He mentions the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as an example of the Brotherhood’s political behaviour. He criticizes the AKP because ‘it has not ruled by Islam’ despite its economic achievements.⁴⁷ Attoun adds that the AKP abides by the rules of the international community and is still determinedly seeking membership of the European Union, and that its army is still part of NATO.⁴⁸

On the other hand, Attoun adds that there are also the ‘extremists who follow the doctrine of Kharijites and wage jihad against the ummah instead of fighting tyrants’.⁴⁹ For him, this extremist school encompasses the Takfir and Hijrah group, the GIA in Algeria, and the Islamic State group, and, wittingly or unwittingly, these groups ‘serve the interest of the enemies of God since they distract the mujahideen and prevent them from achieving their goals’.⁵⁰

Attoun considers that neither ‘lenience and democracy’ nor ‘extremism and backstabbing the mujahideen’ will eliminate the currently prevalent state of jahiliyya. Therefore, he praises the activism of Salafi-Jihadists describing them as the most committed and the closest to the essence of Islam and placing them between the compromising Brotherhood and the extremist Kharijites. However, he holds that Salafi-Jihadists also have their own problems as well. He explains that most jihadist factions have been preoccupied with performing jihad but developed very little knowledge of political reasoning.⁵¹ For him, the mujahideen of al-Nusra stand out because they reflect on the experiences of other Islamist groups and are aware of the need to formulate a comprehensive and balanced strategy that includes jihadist activities, sophisticated political reasoning, and commitment to the core tenets of Islam.

Portraying al-Nusra as a committed Salafi-jihadist organization with a mature understanding of the socio-political situation in the Middle East was a cornerstone of the group’s propaganda. Such claims were used to persuade bystanders to participate and to attract members from other Islamist groups in a serious intra-Islamist competition over human resources and legitimacy.

Al-Nusra’s calculated moderation and conditional cooperation

Al-Nusra remained AQC’s official branch until July 2016 when it started operating as an independent militant group by the name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). The phase of JFS represents a purposeful strategic turn marked by what I term ‘calculated moderation’, that is the carefully managed transition from global Jihadism to local activism, and ‘conditional cooperation’ in reference to al-Nusra’s attempts to embed in the Syrian opposition but on its own terms.

Breaking ties with al-Qaeda

Al-Nusra’s decision to disband from al-Qaeda and rebrand itself in mid-2016 followed mounting local and international pressures to change its discourse and behaviour and rid itself of any extremist influences.

Locally, there had been important developments that drove al-Nusra to make behavioural changes. Firstly, al-Nusra’s relationships with locals in opposition-held areas had deteriorated in consequence to al-Nusra’s recurrent attempts to purge small factions of the FSA and harass and detain tens of civil society activists.⁵² From late 2014 onwards, al-Nusra started attacking externally backed factions, justifying its action in religious terms. Its maraji’ accused several FSA factions of receiving money and weaponry from the United States and Britain and thus breaching the Islamic principle of ‘loyalty and disavowal’. Following attacks on Haqq al-Muqatilah Front, the Hazm Movement and Unit 30, Attoun stated that ‘some leaders have been compromised and have begun to alter their agendas and transform into extensions of the American project’.⁵³ Al-Nusra appeared ready to distance itself from al-Qaeda’s global Jihadism and focus on arrogating to itself the role of a mover and shaker within the militant opposition in Syria.

Secondly, the Russian military intervention in September 2015 tipped the balance of power in favour of the regime and put an end to months full of strategic territorial advances by the rebels⁵⁴ in the countryside of Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, and Daraa. Backed by Russian air operations and numerous Shia militias on the ground, including Lebanese Hezbollah, the regime swiftly regained territory.

At the same time, the increasing power and influence of al-Nusra were putting the regional and international supporters of the Syrian opposition in a difficult and embarrassing position, and calls for the opposition to isolate it were on the rise. In December 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2254 initiating talks between the regime and opposition members and calling upon all parties to combat terrorism and repudiate extremists. Militarily, the strategy of the US-led international coalition to defeat ISIS formed in September 2014⁵⁵ involved stemming the flow of all foreign fighters into and out of Syria including those fighting with al-Nusra. As a result, al-Nusra suffered heavy losses as the Russian and American airstrikes continued to target its top-ranking fighters in addition to senior members of its allied groups.⁵⁶

These factors deprived al-Nusra of two sources of power and influence. On one hand, rising hostilities with factions of the opposition and local people weakened al-Nusra’s claim of being accepted and supported in the areas that had been captured from the Syrian regime. On the other hand, the Russian intervention and the increasing local ceasefires reduced its military effectiveness considerably. Under these circumstances, al-Nusra’s leadership decided to cut ties with al-Qaeda in July 2016 and turn towards solidifying its position in the armed opposition against the Syrian regime.

Blending into the Syrian opposition

A few months after splitting from al-Qaeda, al-Nusra started to shift its strategy towards attempting to secure local acceptance and regional and international recognition of its de facto role in its areas of control, most of which are in Idlib province. It appears that al-Nusra built its new strategy on claims of being able to contain other factions, capable of establishing governing bodies that provide services and mobilize people,⁵⁷ willing to acquiesce in more visible diplomatic and military roles by regional powers such as Turkey, and uninterested in launching international attacks.

Aiming to blend into the Syrian context, JFS, formerly al-Nusra, pursued a strategy of ‘calculated moderation’ which was translated practically through undertaking several steps. Firstly, JFS started to pay more attention to local politics and show a willingness to take part in coalitions and coordinate with other factions, on its own terms, however. JFS’ discourse at this stage indicates that al-Jolani’s leadership was preoccupied with trying to form a broad coalition or merger aiming to justify its strategic turn away from al-Qaeda and global Jihadism.

Secondly, JFS began to assert its local presence and dominance over all aspects of governance in Idlib. This included launching propaganda campaigns that focus on showing the group’s new outlook that revolves around ensuring accountability, fighting corruption, and providing public services.

Thirdly, JFS embarked on a process of rearranging its internal power distribution which began with arresting or expelling leaders who were known to be loyal to AQC and those who opposed or expressed dissatisfaction with the decision of disbanding from al-Qaeda. JFS also launched attacks against groups that were suspected of being sympathetic to or affiliated with IS. In addition to that, JFS became clearly interested in asserting its ‘Syrianness’ and embeddedness in the local context.⁵⁸

The discourse of al-Nusra has changed noticeably, reflecting the group’s new strategic repositioning. It signalled a departure from al-Qaeda’s old strategy of fighting the ‘far enemy’. This is the case in the writings of al-Nusra’s marjiʿ Attoun who reminded members of al-Nusra that the strategy of targeting the West is not eternal or untouchable; rather it was adopted in response to specific circumstances.⁵⁹ Defending al-Nusra’s turn towards focusing on the context in Syria and blending into the opposition, Attoun says: ‘Another September [attack] is not possible given the extraordinary security measures put in place currently and the fact that the raid of September 2001 has achieved its goals’.⁶⁰ Following that, Attoun states that the United States remains an enemy but ‘the most useful way to fight the U.S.A. today is through thwarting its plans by cutting off its hands and proxies’. This reasoning was used to justify al-Nusra’s military campaigns against several factions of the FSA who were in control of parts of Idlib and Aleppo provinces and were challenging al-Nusra’s military and administrative dominance.

From Jabhat Fateh al-Sham to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

Towards the end of 2016, al-Nusra worked on reaching a merger of all rebel groups under its umbrella, calling its attempt a ‘uniting of the ranks’.⁶¹ Al-Nusra’s efforts resulted in the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organisation for the Liberation of al-Sham) (HTS) in January 2017. However, in the way towards forming HTS, JFS sought to become the sole powerbroker in the armed opposition. Therefore, it used its military capabilities and exerted tremendous pressures on all the factions present in the northwest. In the few weeks prior to the formation of HTS, JFS eliminated several armed groups including Jaysh al-Mujahideen in spite of the objections expressed by Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham.⁶²

Threatened by JFS, other groups decided to come together and form smaller coalitions to survive which eventually resulted in the creation of two militant Islamist camps, the JFS-led HTS on one side and the powerful Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham and its allies on the other side.⁶³ It is worth noting that although Ahrar al-Sham was angered by JFS’ escalating aggression, it did not intervene militarily to protect the groups under attack, which was enough to allow the newly formed HTS to attain and maintain dominance over most of the ‘liberated’ areas and eventually drive other rebel groups, including Ahrar al-Sham itself,⁶⁴ out of their Idlib strongholds.

Initially, HTS included powerful Islamist groups such as al-Zinki Movement and Ansar al-Din Front, received the support of influential Islamist marajiʿ such as Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi, Abdullah al-Muhaysini, and Muslih al-Alyani, and attracted military commanders such as Hashim al-Sheikh (Abu Jabir) who left Ahrar al-Sham and was appointed the general commander of HTS.⁶⁵ Later, however, several groups defected from HTS including al-Zinki Movement⁶⁶ and Ansar al-Din, both of which soon realized that HTS was to be managed and led by al-Jolani and the rest of the leadership of JFS (formerly al-Nusra). Additionally, al-Muhaysini, al-Alyani, and other Islamic scholars left HTS at the beginning of September 2017 in consequence of leaked recordings containing conversations between military commanders close to al-Jolani wherein they harshly criticize the mashayekh (religious figures) in HTS and disparage them as being ‘mere apologists’.⁶⁷ It soon became clear that HTS was another attempt to modify and rebrand al-Nusra and strengthen al-Jolani’s control, after the short-lived experiment of JFS.

The JFS-led merger was a strategic move aimed at countering intensified international diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict and reach a political settlement in Syria. Such initiatives were mainly organized by Russia after it provided vital assistance to the Syrian regime enabling the latter to decisively defeat the armed opposition in Aleppo and regain most parts of the strategic city in December 2016.⁶⁸ Specifically, as Russia, Iran, and Turkey arranged and oversaw indirect talks between representatives of the Syrian government and representatives from several armed opposition factions in January 2017 in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, JFS lobbied factions that opposed negotiating with the regime and count on winning militarily. On the ground, soon after its formation, the JFS-led HTS launched a broad attack against factions that agreed to attend the peace talks in Astana.

Through that, JFS wanted to prove to regional and international players that opposition parties and armed factions that agreed to engage in political negotiations with the government do not represent the will of the people living in ‘liberated’ areas and that they do not have influence in the field. Discursively, JFS dedicated much of its propaganda at this stage to challenge the legitimacy and utility of the ongoing negotiations.⁶⁹

In May 2017, the Astana peace talks produced a plan to implement four ‘de-escalation zones’ in Eastern Ghouta, Daraa, Homs, and Idlib; with each zone being surrounded with monitoring posts.⁷⁰ The plan did not prevent the Syrian regime from escalating its offensives in the ensuing months allowing it to retake all de-escalation zones apart from the north-western province of Idlib. This made Idlib the last stronghold of the opposition, with a very high demographic density, since it had become the destination for several mass internal displacements and evacuations.⁷¹ HTS gradually consolidated its control over the area by eliminating or integrating other groups⁷² and through expanding the work and authorities of its newly founded ‘modernised’ administrative bodies such as the civilian-led ‘Salvation Government’ that, in November 2017, replaced al-Nusra’s ‘Civil Administration for Services’.⁷³

Competing flanks inside al-Nusra

As discussed above, acting as the official branch of al-Qaeda in Syria started to impede al-Nusra’s attempts to blend into the Syrian opposition and engender local popular support. The bad reputation of al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization made international and regional backers of the opposition reluctant to increase their financial and military support. Moreover, influential Islamist marajiʿ such as Abu Basir al-Tartusi issued fatwas against joining al-Nusra because the presence of al-Qaeda began to tarnish the reputation of the rebels and delay their victory.⁷⁴ Under these pressures, al-Jolani’s leadership decided to cut ties with al-Qaeda in July 2016, a decision that has proven to be a bone of contention between different currents within al-Nusra.

Fearing internal divisions, leaders of al-Nusra presented their decision to lay members as a step coordinated with AQC and accepted by influential jihadi figures around the world.⁷⁵ In reality, the decision was taken without AQC approval. Consequently, serious internal divisions became apparent, especially when the AQC leadership, represented by its overall leader al-Zawahiri, publicly censured al-Nusra’s decision to break from al-Qaeda and change its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.⁷⁶ Al-Zawahiri issued several letters wherein he seemed furious with the leadership of al-Nusra accusing the latter of acting autonomously and breaking its oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda.

Al-Nusra’s leadership responded to al-Zawahiri’s rebuke by citing maslaha and public good and blaming AQC for its slow and unresponsive bureaucracy and lack of knowledge of the context in Syria. Regarding maslaha, al-Nusra framed the HTS project as the crystallization of a common idea developed and endorsed by most of the factions in Jaysh al-Fatah.

Al-Jolani’s leadership directed much of its criticism to a group of leaders within al-Nusra who had direct links with the leadership of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most of the al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadists inside al-Nusra belonged to a Jordanian current that included Iyad al-Tubasi (aka Abu Julaybib) who was a top military commander in HTS, Sami al-ʿUraydi who was the chief of religious affairs in al-Nusra Front, and Abu al-Qassam al-Urduni, among others.⁷⁷

Attoun raises another point and blames AQC for turning its back on the newly formed HTS and getting fixated on its organizational affiliation.⁷⁸ At this stage, al-Nusra’s propaganda focused on demonstrating the need to prioritize a united Islamist front in Syria over any other doctrinal or organizational considerations—signifying the incorporation of pragmatism into the group’s official discourse.

As such, the transition to HTS came to mark a complete departure from al-Qaeda and its line of global jihad. At the same time, the HTS merger marked a turn towards more politics and less ideology, discursively and practically. From 2017 onwards, al-Jolani and his affiliated cadre have demonstrated willingness to accept the presence of Turkish troops near their areas of influence and even cooperated with Turkey through the diplomatic activities of their affiliated Salvation Government.⁷⁹ Since al-Nusra’s marajiʿ have different positions on Erdogan’s government and its policies and interventions in north Syria, HTS’ gradual rapprochement with Turkey triggered further withdrawals of support.

Dissatisfied with the localization of its jihadist activism and the decision to disengage from al-Qaeda, numerous jihadists distanced themselves from HTS and founded or joined other jihadist groups. Significantly, a group of jihadists deserted HTS and in the second half of 2017 established a new al-Qaeda-affiliated group that was officially declared in early 2018 by the name Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion) (HaD) and led by Abu Humam al-Shami. Other jihadists joined already established groups such as Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Tawhid. However, these seemingly competing jihadist actors have in fact served HTS’ strategies by sustaining its claims of being moderate and centrist, especially with the declining influence and presence of ISIS as the most hard-line jihadist organization.

When its dispute with AQC went public and with the solidification of its control over most of the Idlib province including a monopoly over the strategic border crossing of Bab al-Hawa with Turkey,⁸⁰ HTS moved to reorganize its internal leadership structure, using its pretence of moderation to rid itself of any disobedient or dissenting figures. On one hand, HTS launched offensives against groups that it accused of being ghulat (extremists) or affiliates of IS. For instance, in February 2017 the newly formed HTS launched a military operation in southern Idlib to uproot its previously close ally Liwa’ al-Aqsa (formerly Jund al-Aqsa) justifying the move as a war on extremism and takfir.⁸¹ On the other hand, in conformity with its new strategy of asserting its ‘Syrianness’, HTC led frequent campaigns to rid itself of numerous non-Syrian figures (muhajiroun). For example, in November 2017 HTS arrested leading figures of the Jordanian jihadist current that was in favour of remaining officially affiliated with AQC.⁸² In effect, the absence of these figures meant that al-Jolani has gained more power, maintained his control of HTS, and become freer to implement his own visions supported by a small group of loyal marajiʿ and strategists.

Conclusion

This paper has elucidated al-Nusra Front’s purposeful and adaptable utilization of the discourse of moderation and illustrated how such strategic employment of discourse aimed to maximize the group’s advantages across various episodes of the Syrian conflict between 2012 and 2017. Al-Nusra’s discourse of moderation accompanied its recurrent behavioural shifts that were prompted by three key factors: the rise of ISIS as a strong Salafi-Jihadist challenger, the overall downturn of the militant opposition, and managing the relationship with al-Qaeda and its local affiliates and sympathizers.

Studying the discourse and conduct of al-Nusra Front against the backdrop of the rise of the more radical and excessively violent ISIS group demonstrates the utility of Haines’ theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs). It also corroborates the idea that the emergence of a radical flank does not necessarily lead to a positive impact on the more moderate flank. However, the findings challenge Haines’ premise that RDFs, whether positive or negative, happen unintendedly.

Since 2013, al-Nusra capitalized on the rise and expansion of ISIS to present itself as the moderate flank in Salafi-Jihadism, portraying itself as adaptable, less violent, and more politically and strategically adept. The claim to moderation at that stage was employed to evade the consequences of being designated a ‘terrorist group’, including the risk of international targeting and the inability to integrate into the opposition and encourage locals to join and support al-Nusra’s activities.

Furthermore, al-Nusra used the claim to moderation differently in relation to factions of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In mid-2016, al-Nusra underwent a strategic shift when its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, announced breaking from al-Qaeda and cutting ties with all foreign parties. This decision signified a turn towards asserting al-Nusra’s ‘Syrian character’. Therefore, the Salafi-Jihadist group began to employ a discourse emphasizing ‘organicity’ and representation of local will. Aiming to expand, attract more members, and become a de facto dominant player in the northwest, al-Nusra resorted to challenging the effectiveness and cultural authenticity of the FSA by portraying the latter’s components as timid, dependent on external aid, and acting in compliance with foreign agendas. In this respect, al-Nusra’s moderation discourse was constructed around claims of commitment, effectiveness, autonomy, and cultural resonance.

The research shows that al-Nusra used its internal radical flanks to appear centrist, pragmatic, negotiable, and separate from globally oriented jihadism. Recurrent internal campaigns against extremism and intransigence took place since disengaging from al-Qaeda and the subsequent formation of HTS. It appears that these campaigns happened to serve the interest of a specific group within al-Nusra. Al-Nusra’s central leadership—al-Jolani and a select group of close associates—launched military operations and propaganda campaigns to rid their organization of any ‘extremist’ elements. This, in effect, resulted in the arrest, expulsion, or assassination of numerous members and leaders who in reality were potential challengers of al-Jolani’s authority and strategic plans. Consequently, the pretence of moderation served as a tool in the hands of al-Nusra’s leadership, enabling al-Jolani to tighten his grip on power and gain more freedom to implement his strategic plans most of which revolve around breaking from global Jihadism and embedding into the Syrian context, on one hand, and maintaining his group’s de facto dominance in the Idlib province, militarily and administratively, on the other hand.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Herbert H. Haines, ‘Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970’, Social Problems 32, no. 1 (1984): 31–43.

² Herbert H. Haines, Radical flank effects. In: David A. Snow et al., The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Devashree Gupta, ‘Radical flank effects: The effect of radical-moderate splits in regional nationalist movements’, (Working paper, presented at the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 14–16, 2002).

⁷ Gupta’s remarks are further discussed in: Rune Ellefsen, ‘Deepening the Explanation of Radical Flank Effects: Tracing Contingent Outcomes of Destructive Capacity’ Qual Sociol 41, 111–33.

⁸ Gupta, ‘Radical flank effects’.

⁹ Syrian Network for Human Rights. the most notable HTS violations since the establishment of Jabhat al Nusra to date, Report, (31 January 2021): 69. https://shorturl.at/xzAMZ (accessed December 12, 2023).

¹⁰ Jerome Drevon, ‘Democracy and Islamist Violence: Lessons from Post-Mubarak Egypt’, Digest of Middle East Studies 23, no.1, (2014): 1–14.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of JihadistsTransforming Armed Islamist Movements (New York: Routledge, 2011).

¹³ Jillian Schwedler, Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, World Politics 63, no. 2 (2011): 347–376.

¹⁴ Azzam Al Kassir, Arab Jihadism: Nikāya and Tamkīn between ISIL and al-Qaeda by Hassan Abu Haniyeh, Al-Muntaqa: New Perspectives on Arab Studies 4, no. 1 (September/October 2021): 117–123.

¹⁵ Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

¹⁶ The Conflict in Syria: al-Nusra Front Pledges Allegiance to Zawahiri, Leader of Al-Qaeda (in Arabic), B.B.C. Arabic, April 10, 2013. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/04/130410_nusra_qaeda (accessed January 18, 2020).

¹⁷ Erika Solomon, ‘Al-Nusra’s break from al-Qaeda seen as a strategic move’, Financial Times, July 30, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/4eda41ba-5665-11e6-9f70-badea1b336d4#comments-anchor (accessed June 12, 2021).

¹⁸ Colin P. Clarke, ‘The Moderate Face of Al Qaeda’, Foreign Affairs, October 24, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-10-24/moderate-face-al-qaeda (accessed May 19, 2019).

¹⁹ See for example: Barak Mendelsohn, ‘Accepting Al Qaeda: The Enemy of the United States’ Enemy’, Foreign Affairs, March 09, 2015, https://fam.ag/2PmsSCV (accessed June 10, 2017).

²⁰ Tariq Abdelhaleem, ‘The Syrian Jihad at a Crossroads’ (in Arabic), Tariq Abdelhaleem’s Website, May 29, 2014, http://www.tariqabdelhaleem.net (accessed August 02, 2019).

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Thomas Joscelyn, ‘Leaked audio features Al Nusrah Front emir discussing creation of an Islamic emirate’, FDD’s Long War Journal, July 12, 2014, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/leaked_audio_of_al.php (accessed May 20, 2020).

²⁴ Wesley Morgan, ‘Whatever Happened to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan?’, Politico, August 15, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/15/al-qaeda-afghanistan-terrorism-777511 (accessed April 12, 2020).

²⁵ Zarqawi’s ‘Testimony to Prevent Bloodshed Among the Mujahedeen in the Levant’ Al-Sahab Media Production, May 2014, cited in: Yasir Abbas, Another ‘State’ of Hate: Al-Nusra’s Quest to Establish an Islamic Emirate in the Levant, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, (April 29, 2016). https://shorturl.at/pvEQX (accessed January 12, 2024).

²⁶ Aron Lund, The Mujahideen Army of Aleppo, Diwan-Carnegie Middle East Center (April 08, 2014). https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55275?lang=en (accessed September 02, 2023).

²⁷ Syria Countrywide Conflict Report 4, The Carter Center, (September 11, 2014). https://shorturl.at/dpyT9 (accessed April 22, 2024).

²⁸ Bill Roggio, Senior Islamic State military commander, ’emir of suicide bombers’ among Treasury’s terrorism designations, Long War Journal (September 24, 2014). https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/senior_islamic_state.php (accessed April 28, 2024).

²⁹ Voice message by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani entitled Allah Allah fi Sahat al-Sham (Fear Allah in the Avenue of Sham) (in Arabic), al-Manarah al-Bayda’, January 07, 2014.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, (London: Hurst, 2008).

³² Mazhar Al-Wais, ‘Distinctive Signs for Exposing the Religion of Deviants’ (in Arabic: al-ʿalamat al-fariqah fi kashf din al-mariqah), 2015. www.Jihadology.net

³³ Ibid, p. 189.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 190.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 191.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 200–9.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 209.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 246.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 81.

⁴¹ The first issue of Al-Risalah was released online in July 2015. The magazine was originally in English and was produced by the Al-Risalah Production Center, which was affiliated with al-Nusra and dedicated to producing written and visual materials in defence of the group’s actions and doctrine.

⁴² Al Risalah Magazine, Issue 1, mid-2016, p. 23.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Abd al-Rahim Attoun (aka Abu Abdullah al-Shami) is a well-known Islamist scholar, who was a member of al-Nusra’s Shoura Council. Between 2012 and 2018, he frequently appeared in numerous video recordings and issued statements and fatwas on various religious and strategic matters. Significantly, he represented al-Nusra in al-mubahala, which is a doctrinal and strategic dialogue held over Skype with Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani, ISIS’ spokesman.

⁴⁶ Abd al-Rahim Attoun, ‘In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad’ (in Arabic: fi zilal dawhat al-jihad), 2016,169. www.Jihadology.net

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 169.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 172.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid, p.171.

⁵² Yasir Abbas, ‘How Al Qaeda is Winning in Syria’, War on the Rocks, May 10, 2016, https://bit.ly/31gEIUD (accessed June 10, 2020).

⁵³ Attoun, ‘In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad’, p.195.

⁵⁴ For more on Jaysh al-Fatah see: Mohammed Alaa Ghanem, ‘Syria: An Opportunity in Idlib’, Atlantic Council, April 03, 2015. https://bit.ly/3gqaTr1 (accessed June 12, 2020); and, Ben Hubbard, ‘A Look at the Army of Conquest, a Prominent Rebel Alliance in Syria’, The New York Times, October 01, 2015, https://nyti.ms/2Xn2tco (accessed July 22, 2020).

⁵⁵ Tom Cohen, ‘’Obama Outlines ISIS Strategy: Airstrikes in Syria, More U.S. Force’s, CNN, September 11, 2014, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/isis-obama-speech/index.html (accessed September 15, 2020).

⁵⁶ Karen DeYoung; Liz Sly; Missy Ryan, ‘U.S. Airstrikes Target al-Qaeda Faction in Syria’, The Washington Post,November 06, 2014, https://wapo.st/39YR9Is (accessed July 14, 2020). For more information on the US targeting of al-Nusra see, for example: ‘US Targeted “Legacy” al Qaeda Leader Abu Firas al-Suri in Syria Airstrike’, DW,April 04, 2016, https://bit.ly/2EKnozx (accessed June 16, 2020); and: Adam Entous, ‘Obama Directs Pentagon to Target al-Qaeda Affiliate in Syria’, The Washington Post, November 10, 2016, https://wapo.st/2EQNAIR (accessed October 12, 2020).

⁵⁷ Abbas, ‘How Al Qaeda is Winning in Syria’.

⁵⁸ Charles Lister, The Syria Effect: Al-Qaeda Fractures, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, (December 2019). https://shorturl.at/bgrt3 (accesses October 23, 2023).

⁵⁹ Attoun, ‘In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad’, p.177.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p.178.

⁶¹ Charles Lister, ‘Al Qaeda Is Starting to Swallow the Syrian Opposition’, Foreign Policy, March 15, 2017, https://bit.ly/3gr3ZSo (accessed May 20, 2020).

⁶² ‘Fatah al-Sham’ Eliminates Jaysh al-Mujahideen and Takes Over Arms Depots (in Arabic), Sham Network, January 25, 2017, https://bit.ly/2TNgA8G (accessed May 14, 2019).

⁶³ For more details about the circumstances surrounding the formation of HTS refer to: Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, ‘Idlib and Its Environs: Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes 75, February 2020, https://bit.ly/35WwP93 (accessed December 11, 2020).

⁶⁴ Khalid Al-Khatib, ‘The War of the Bab al-Hawa Crossing is Over. Will Ahrar al-Sham Disintegrate?’ (in Arabic), al-Modon Online, July 27, 2017, https://bit.ly/2K5rpBv (accessed June 10, 2020).

⁶⁵ ‘Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: Its Formation, Leadership, and Joining Factions’ (in Arabic), Sham Network, January 28, 2017, https://bit.ly/38GPFEn (accessed October 12, 2020).

⁶⁶ ‘Al-Zinki’ Announces Its Disbanding from ‘Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’ (in Arabic), Enab Baladi, July 20, 2017. https://enabbaladi.net/archives/162465 (accessed October 06, 2020).

⁶⁷ ‘Defections Return HTS to Its Initial Core’ (in Arabic), Enab Baladi, September 14, 2017. https://enabbaladi.net/archives/172765 (accessed September 30, 2020).

⁶⁸ Jonathan Landay; Arshad Mohammed, ‘Aleppo’s Fall Would Be Win for Russia, Defeat for U.S. in Mideast’, Reuters, December 05, 2016, https://reut.rs/2XCXMLv (accessed October 02, 2020).

⁶⁹ See for example: Attoun, ‘In the Shade of the Big Tree of Jihad’, p.196.

⁷⁰ ‘Syria: The Astana Peace Process’, France 24, September 05, 2018, https://bit.ly/33Cydhu (accessed July 15, 2019).

⁷¹ Tom Rollins, ‘Syrian evacuations break the will to resist’, The New Humanitarian, September 20, 2016, https://bit.ly/2C5UpVW (accessed July 18, 2019).

⁷² Fabrice Balanche, ‘Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War a Geopolitical Study’, The Washington Institute, February 05, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sectarianism-syrias-civil-war-geopolitical-study (accessed April 04, 2019).

⁷³ Mona Alami, ‘HTS Continues to Evolve’, Atlantic Council, December 01, 2017. https://bit.ly/3fOtxHR (accessed February 14, 2018).

⁷⁴ Abd al-Rahim Attoun, ‘A Dialogue with Shaykh Abu Basir al-Tartusi’ (in Arabic), October 01, 2015, www.Justpaste.it (accessed January 20, 2020).

⁷⁵ Ahmed Abazid, ‘Jolani’s Final Plan: War in Search of Politics’ (in Arabic), Ala Basirah, February 09, 2017, https://alabasirah.com/node/523 (accessed March 22, 2020).

⁷⁶ ‘Al-Zawahiri Attacks al-Jolani: We Have not Approved the Breaking of Ties’ (in Arabic), al-Modon Online, November 29, 2017. https://bit.ly/354MaVU (accessed January 04, 2020).

⁷⁷ Abd al-Rahim Attoun, ‘Testimony on the Breaking of Ties of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda’ (in Arabic), 2017, www.Justpaste.it (accessed February 21, 2020).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Alami, ‘HTS Continues to Evolve’.

⁸⁰ Al-Khatib, ‘The War of the Bab al-Hawa Crossing is Over’.

⁸¹ Aqil Hessein, ‘Tahrir al-Sham Declares War on “Liwa” al-Aqsa’’ (in Arabic), al-Modon Online, February 14, 2017, https://bit.ly/3iAjVlW (accessed May 12, 2022).

⁸² ‘Tahrir al-Sham Explains the Circumstances of Arresting “Abu Julaybib” and “al-ʿUraydi” (in Arabic), Enab Baladi, November 28, 2017. https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/187330 (accessed June 12, 2021).