Italian foreign and security policy in a state of reliability crisis?

Abstract

This article focuses on Italian foreign and security policy (IFSP). It looks at three examples of the country's policy-making which reveal its poor results as a security provider, namely: Italy's tardy reaction to the violence in Libya in 2011, its prompt reaction to the Lebanon crisis in 2006, and its efforts to be included in the diplomatic directorate, the P5+1, approaching relations with Iran in 2009. The article considers whether government action has bolstered the reliability of IFSP and also discusses the country's FSP in terms of its basic differences from that of its partners in the European Union, France, Britain and Germany, envisaging how Italy could react to build more credibility. Italy's policy is observed through a three-pronged analytical framework enriched by concepts of the logic of expected consequences. The article concludes that IFSP is predictable, but it must still reveal that it is reliable, and explains why this is the case.

Keywords:

• Italy's foreign and security policy
• European Union
• crisis management
• logic of expected consequences

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to the anonymous peer-reviewers for their constructive comments and to the people who commented on an earlier, shorter draft, when it was presented at the 2011 PSA Annual Conference in London, and in particular to Paul Furlong, James Newell and Maurizio Carbone.

Notes

1. France, Britain and the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – Russia, China and the US – plus Germany.

2. Rome's contribution was controversial: the French military forces were commanded by the operative centre in Lyon, and the British by the headquarters in Northwood. Italy felt it played no influential role and argued for the use of Napoli Capodichino airport (Marizza, 2011).

3. Italy provided the EU Operation Commander (Rear Admiral Gaudiosi) and the Operational Headquarters in Rome. Council of the European Union (8589/11).

4. As the diplomat explained, ‘there was a lot of pressure by the French and others to demonstrate that the EU is a military player’.

5. D'Alema to the New York Times.

6. The peacekeeping force, in the end, had the UN mark, UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). Italy seized command over the mission only later, in February 2007.

7. The country's provision of combat aircraft consisted of four aircraft of the Eurofighter or F16 type for defence tasks, four Tornado ECRs that were capable of launching missiles to destroy Libyan radar and suppress Libyan defence, and four AV-8B Plus set on the warship Garibaldi for air defence and recognition.