Operation Concordia: developing a ‘European’ approach to crisis management?

Abstract

Launched in Macedonia in March 2003, Operation Concordia was the first EU military crisis management operation. In accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements concluded days before its launch, Operation Concordia was conducted using NATO assets. Although these assets were not strictly necessary for a limited operation such as Concordia, the prior conclusion of Berlin Plus was a political necessity for the EU–NATO relationships. Concordia also signified a deepening in the Union's relationship with the Balkans, where the EU is now the lead international organization, deploying a full range of civilian and military crisis management instruments in support of the Stabilization and Association Process.

Acknowledgement

Catriona Mace is currently employed at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The views expressed in this article are strictly personal. The author would like to acknowledge the financial support provided by the European Community's Human Potential Programme through the ESDP democracy project for the research and writing of this article.

Notes

For an analysis of Operation Artemis, see Ulriksen et al. in this volume.

SAP was launched in 1999 to provide a new framework for the EU's relations with the countries of the western Balkans. It encompasses Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. The SAP offers the countries of the western Balkans a ‘membership perspective’, which explicitly recognizes that the future of the region lies with the EU. See Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘Turbo-charged Negotiations: The EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.7, No.5, Dec. 2000, pp.767–86.

Kristina Balalovska, Alessandro Silj and Mario Zucconi, Minority Politics in Southeast Europe: Crisis in Macedonia, Rome: Ethnobarometer, Jan. 2002.

Abiodun Williams, Preventing War: The United Nations in Macedonia, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

Ulrich Schneckener, Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management: Test Case Macedonia, ECMI Working Paper No.14, Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, Jan. 2002, pp.27–30.

In 1989 Macedonia adopted a new constitution. Many ethnic Albanians viewed the wording of the new constitution as deliberately exclusionary. See ibid., p.27. On the dispute over Macedonia's name see International Crisis Group, Macedonia's name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It, Balkans Report No.122, Skopje/Brussels, 10 Dec. 2001.

The Macedonian economy suffered indirectly from the sanctions imposed on the former Yugoslavia during the Milosevic regime and from the economic blockade imposed on Macedonia by Greece between 1994 and 1995.

The dispute began in 1994 with the founding of a private Albanian-language university, which was declared illegal by the government. The dispute seemed to be resolved in 2000 with an agreement to establish a trilingual (Albanian, Macedonian and English) University of Southeast Europe in Tetovo under the auspices of the OSCE. However, the issue resurfaced in 2003 with a government proposal to legalize the original ‘illegal’ Albanian University in Tetovo.

For an explanation of NATO's role in resolving the Presevo Valley crisis see Mihai Carp, ‘Back From the Brink’, NATO Review, Vol.4, Winter 2002, pp.5–10

Suggestions that some of the gunmen originated not from Kosovo but from Macedonia have proved controversial within Macedonia. However, the idea that the UÇK comprised ethnic Albanians from both Kosovo and Macedonia is gaining ground. See Biljana Vankovska, Current Perspectives on Macedonia: The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Security, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Dec. 2002, accessed at www.boell.de/index.html? www.boell.de/en/05_world/1733.html.

John Peterson, The US and the EU in the Balkans: America fights the wars and Europe does the dishes?, San Domenico de Fiesole: EUI Working Paper RSC No.2001/49, Dec. 2001, p.12.

The CARDS programme (Community Action for Reconstruction and Development) was established in December 2000 to support the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process by providing funds for reconstruction and return, institution building, sustainable economic and social development, and regional cooperation.

The RRM had been established in February 2001 to enable the Commission to release Community funds quickly in emergency situations. See www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fyrom/index.htm.

See European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, Rapid Reaction Mechanism End of Programme Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, November 2003, accessed at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_realtions/cpcm/rrm/fyrom.pdf.

Planning for the second RRM financing decision did not begin until after the Ohrid Agreement was signed, and the decision to release the funds was not taken until 3 October 2001. European Commission (see n.14), p.2.

The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) was designed as the principal instrument of the SAP to structure a signatory state's progress toward EU membership. Whereas the SAP was designed to encourage regional cohesion, the SAA was designed to allow for differentiation between potential candidates. See Friis and Murphy (n.2 above), pp.767–86.

Schneckener (n.5 above), p.36.

Claire Piana, ‘The EU's Decision-Making Process in CFSP: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.7, No.2, 2002, pp.209–26.

International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Still Sliding, Skopje/Brussels: Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001.

The General Affairs and External Relations Council of 25 June made clear that the SAA was in doubt if the crisis were not resolved peacefully. 2362 Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, 10228/01 (Presse 250), Luxembourg, 25 June 2001.

International Crisis Group (n.19 above), p.4.

The Ohrid Agreement can be read in full at www.president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm

The establishment of a 20 per cent threshold as the trigger for the introduction of Albanian as an official language at municipality level added extra importance to the results of the population census, which the Ohrid Agreement set for October 2001. Due to the politically sensitive nature of the task, the census was postponed until November 2002 and publication of the results was delayed until 1 December 2003.

On 10 December 2002 the Council passed a Joint Action in which the mandate of the EUSR was amended to read: ‘The EUSR will ensure close co-ordination of the international community's efforts to help in the implementation and sustainability of the provisions of the Framework Agreement’. Council Joint Action (2002/963/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 334, 11/12/2002, pp.7–8

European Commission (n.14 above), p.5.

Although the EU has been involved in several rule-of-law projects, the OSCE has played the major role in police training, particularly of minority officers. To minimize duplication, the EC and the OSCE concluded a Memorandum of Understanding. The Commission seconded staff to the OSCE and the Director of the OSCE Police Unit was selected as the first EUPOL Commissioner in January 2003.

The management of some CARDS projects remains centralized at Commission Headquarters. See www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fyrom/index.htm.

European Commission (n.14 above), p.3.

International Crisis Group, Macedonia: No time for complacency, Skopje/Brussels: Europe Report No.149, Oct. 2003.

See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fyrom/index.htm.

See U.S. Aid Programs for FYR Macedonia, Fact Sheet, US State Department accessed at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/eur/balkans/aid0212.htm.

See www.dfid.gov.uk/sid2003.

Peterson (n.11 above), p.4.

Piana (n.18 above), pp.209–26.

Dana Allin, NATO's Balkans Interventions, Adelphi Paper, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002, p.80.

Tom Rhodes, ‘Bush to pull US troops out of Balkans’, The Sunday Times, 31 Dec. 2000.

Press Availability with NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, 27 Feb. 2001, accessed at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010305a.htm.

Secretary Rumsfeld, interview with The Washington Post, 17 May 2001.

Early US desire to pull out of the region was later tempered by the perception that the region could be an important front line in the War on Terror. International Crisis Group, Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo/Brussels: Balkans Report No.127, 25 March 2002, pp.22–3.

See article by Catriona Gourlay in this volume.

This advisory function continued after the handover from Allied Harmony to Concordia as NATO retained, by agreement with the Macedonian government, its advisors within the Macedonian Ministry of Defence.

Author's interview with Council Official, Brussels, Belgium, 14 Aug. 2003. See also International Crisis Group, Moving Macedonia Toward Self-sufficiency: A New Security Approach for NATO and the EU, Skopje/Brussels: Balkans Report No.135, 15 Nov. 2002, p.12–14.

Author's interview with member of the EU Military Staff, Norwich, UK, 15 Sept. 2003.

On 27 January the Council adopted a Joint Action establishing the basis for Operation Concordia. See Council Joint Action (2003/92/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities, L34, 11 Feb. 2003, pp.26–9.

Earlier on 14 March 2003 the EU and NATO had signed an Agreement on the Security of Information leading to Lord Robertson's announcement on 17 March that the Berlin Plus arrangements had been finalized.

Council Joint Action (n.44 above).

Catriona Gourlay, ‘EU Operations Update: Past, Present and Future’, European Security Review, No.19, Oct. 2003, accessed at www.isis-europe.org/isiseu/esreview/esreview.html.

Author's interview with member of EU Military Staff, Norwich, UK, 15 Sept. 2003.

Concordia had 22 light and eight heavy field liaison teams grouped under three Regional Headquarters (RHQs) at Skopje, Kumanovo and Tetovo. These regional headquarters report to the Force Headquarters (FHQ) in Skopje.

International Crisis Group (n.29 above), p.8.

A series of incidents in early September, including the kidnapping of a policeman, have been linked to the Albanian National Army, a guerrilla group previously active in Kosovo and southern Serbia. Macedonian security forces have been involved in a stand-off with gunmen in two northern villages where police have been searching for the self-proclaimed UÇK commander thought to be responsible for recent incidents.

Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Communities, L249, 1 Oct. 2003, p.66.

EUPOL faces considerable challenges. The proportion of victims of crime seeking police assistance remains very low at just 10.5 per cent. This reluctance to seek assistance can partly be explained by continued mistrust of the police, particularly amongst ethnic Albanians, 19.1 per cent of whom continue to view the police as a threat rather than a protector. See UNDP, Early Warning Report: FYR Macedonia, No.1, 2003, accessed at www.undp.org.mk/governance/mapping.htm.

Author's interview with member of the EU Military Staff , Sept. 2003.

These are: conflict prevention and crisis management, defence and security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, countering the threat of terrorism, border security and management, arms control and removal of small arms.

European Council Conclusions, (DOC/03/05) 12–13 Dec. 2003, p.16.

‘Déclaration commune des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement d'Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne’, Bruxelles, 29 April 2003, accessed at www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/discours_divers/2003/d060503/060503.htm.

The European Council also endorsed a Declaration on Transatlantic Relations, in which the Council affirmed that the EU–NATO relationship is an important expression of the transatlantic partnership.

The US and the UK have always insisted that the Berlin Plus arrangements give NATO the ‘right of first refusal’ over prospective crisis management operations. However, France has refrained from explicitly acknowledging such a right, preferring to talk instead of the ‘primacy’ of NATO. Practice to date appears to confirm NATO's right to be consulted on EU plans for autonomous operations, although some commentators have suggested that NATO did not receive as much advanced notice of Operation Artemis as it would have liked.

In light of the improving security situation in the country, at their meeting in Brussels on 1 and 2 December, NATO Ministers of Defence decided to reduce the force from approximately 11,900 to a deterrent force of around 7,000. NATO will also examine options for a possible termination of the mission and handover to the EU by the end of 2004. See ‘SFOR plans future force structure’, NATO Update, 12 Dec. 2003 at www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/12-december/e1217b.htm.

‘These proposals … make clear that there will be no duplication of NATO's standing operational planning capabilities.’ Press Statement from NATO Secretary-General, Press Release (2003) 154, 11 Dec. 2003, accessed at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-154e.htm.

Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington, DC, 12 Dec. 2003, accessed at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/27170.htm.

European Commission COM(2003) 526 final, The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism, Brussels, 10 Sept. 2003.