A Clash of Mindsets? An Insider's Account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Abstract

Previous analyses have provided extensive and in-depth insights into the external relations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, particularly the division of labour between them and the humanitarian assistance community.1 This article broadens and deepens this literature by focusing on the internal relations of PRTs, particularly the cooperation between military and civilian sections within them. It shows that the successes and failures of PRTs are not just on the part of individual advisers, officers or uncooperative partners, but can also be located in the organizational culture of a PRT as a whole. On the one hand, a PRT constitutes a forum in which diverging civilian expert, military and national interests may collide, producing a potential for a ‘clash of mindsets’. On the other, such a collision can lead to fruitful results and innovative policies in which different viewpoints complement each other.

Notes

1. See, for example, Charlotte Watkins, ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): An analysis of Their Contribution to Security in Afghanistan’, unpublished paper, Oxford: Oxford Brookes University, 2003.

2. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient’, unpublished paper, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005, pp.7–8.

3. On lessons learnt from the first PRTs set up by the US Forces, see, for example, Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘How to Nation-Build’, National Interest, Vol.80, 2005, pp.19–27.

4. Jakobsen (see n.2 above), p.12.

5. See Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Military–Civilian Humanitarianism: The “Age of Innocence” is Over’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.2, No.2, 1995, pp.157–74.

6. Weiss, Military–Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p.3.

7. Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Itacha, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002; Barnett, ‘Bureaucratizing the Duty to Aid: The United Nations and Rwandan Genocide’, in Anthony F. Lang (ed.), Just Intervention, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003, pp.174–91.

8. Ibid., pp.176–7.

9. For a detailed account of Jumbesh and other political parties in Northern Afghanistan, see, International Crisis Group, ‘Political Parties in Afghanistan’, Policy Briefing No.39, Kabul/Brussels, 2 June 2005, p.9. On the strongman behind Jumbesh, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, see The Economist, ‘Clearing out the Warlords’, Vol.369, No.8348, 11 Jan. 2003; Anthony Davis, ‘Makeover for a Warlord’, Time, Vol.159, No.22, 6 Mar. 2002; USA Today, ‘Civilians Suffer Just as Before’, 8 July 2002.

10. The Charter of the PRT Executive Steering Committee adopted on 2 December 2004 determines that, ‘PRTs facilitate the extension of the reach and influence of the Afghan Central Government. The overarching goal of the PRT program is to fulfil the conditions for transition from an environment where international military forces are necessary to an environment in which GOA [Government of Afghanistan] and provincial government institutions are soundly established, fully functioning with PRTs in turn becoming unnecessary.’

11. A memorandum of peace agreement between the supporters of Jumbesh and Azadi, facilitated by PRT Meymaneh and UNAMA, was signed on 7 December 2005. However, the first round of negotiations collapsed no later than the following week, as the fighting between the parties resumed.

12. The Memorandum of Peace Agreement included provisions regarding the collection of all light and heavy weapons and ammunition in the area, the return of displaced people, and the establishment of a police post in the neighbouring village of Kateh Qala. (Memorandum of Peace Agreement between Both Rivals of Ghondasang, Teraili, Belarsai and Shah-e-Mardan Villages on 16 of Qaws 1384/7 Dec. 2005) Only the latter requirement was eventually fulfilled, but this alone could not alter the course of events in Ghunda Sang. The most important point of the agreement regarding disarmament also proved ineffective, as only seven operational light weapons were collected on 10 December.

13. International Crisis Group, Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia Report No.101, 21 July 2005, p.20.

14. ‘Guidelines for the Implementation of DIAG Main Phase from the D&R Commission to Provincial Committees’, 20 Sept. 2005.

15. Robert Perito notes that, ‘the Steering Committee lacked authority to direct or even coordinate PRT operations, which were guided by donor country priorities. A subordinate, staff-level PRT Working Group provided for information exchange, but also lacked authority to provide guidance’. Robert M. Perito, ‘The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified, special report No.152’, United States Institute of Peace, Oct. 2005, p.2.

16. Quoted in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton: Harvester, 1982, p.187.

17. Personal communication with Phil Sparrow, 19 April 2006.

18. Norway has cooperated with the EU in the field of armaments and has participated in Operation EUFOR Althea, as well as the Nordic Brigade Group which will be operational in 2007.

19. Discussion and decision-making on conflict management in the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is typically based on military advice and recommendations concerning civilian crisis management.