Peacekeeping and Counter-insurgency – Two of a Kind?

Abstract

This article demonstrates that there are more similarities between peacekeeping and counter-insurgency than often recognized. In today's ‘war among the people’, the counter-insurgent cannot succeed with offensive military capabilities alone and must seek to apply also non-kinetic and defensive methods; whereas the peacekeeper often is forced to apply ‘robust’ and kinetic means to implement a mandate. As a result, the two concepts seem to be converging and share some commonalities. The article compares the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations ‘capstone doctrine’ and the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual to argue that the two doctrines share similarities in six areas: (1) a focus on civilian solutions; (2) a need for protection of civilians; (3) international coherence; (4) host-nation ownership; (5) use of intelligence in support of operations; (6) limitations on the use of force. The article suggests areas where the two doctrines could mesh with each other.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author thanks the editors and the anonymous peer reviewers for comments and suggestions, as well as colleagues at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), in particular Cedric de Coning, Benjamin de Carvalho and Ståle Ulriksen.

Notes

‘DPKO Factsheet’, accessed at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf, 10 October 2009. However, several non-Western countries have been engaged in COIN-like operations in their own countries. Pakistan in the Swat and Waziristan regions represents an interesting case because it is also the major troop-contributing country to the UN.

Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, New York: Knopf, 2007.

See Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (eds), International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, Washington: National Academy Press, 2000, pp.178–224.

See e.g. Denis M. Tull, ‘Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.2, 2009, pp.224–5.

In the US context, COIN is a part of ‘irregular warfare’, but for sake of simplicity, I focus only on COIN here.

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Smith (see n.2 above).

John Kiszely, Post-modern Challenges for Modern Warriors, Shrivenham, UK: UK Defence Academy, 2007, p.7.

Nathaniel C. Fick and John A. Nagl, ‘Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition’, Foreign Policy, 25 March 2009 (at: www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587). See also David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; ISAF HQ, ‘Tactical Directive 6 July 2009’ (at: www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/07/pr090706-tactical-directive.html), 17 July 2009.

FM 3-24 (see n.6 above) p.2.

Obviously there are many other instances of insurgency and counter-insurgency. The early writers drew on their experience as imperial rulers fighting liberation movements. In modern-day war theatres like Iraq and Afghanistan, intervention has had a different origin. However, there is nothing in the US COIN doctrine that presupposes an occupation; on the contrary, the focus is on assisting and strengthening a host nation. Nevertheless, it might be a more political or bilateral engagement than a UN peacekeeping operation.

FM 3-24 (see n.6 above), p.2.

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice, New York: Praeger, 1964.

Fick and Nagel (see n.9 above).

Ståle Ulriksen, Power to Protect? The Evolution of Military Structures and Doctrine in Relation to the Responsibility to Prevent and Protect, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008, p.29.

FM 3-24 (see n.6 above), p.54.

David W. Barno, ‘Fighting “the Other War”. Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005’, Military Review, Sept.–Oct. 2007, pp.32–44.

The degree of ‘success’ in the early years of the Afghanistan operation is contested. See Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, New York: Viking, 2008.

David H. Petraeus, ‘Learning from Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq’, Military Review, Jan.–Feb. 2006, pp.2–12.

See COMISAF's Initial Assessment (at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html), 30 Nov. 2009.

FM 3-24 (see n.6 above), p.199.

‘Iraq's Army Grows in Numbers and Readiness’, Christian Science Monitor, 15 Sept. 2008 (at: www.csmonitor.com/2008/0915/p06s01-wome.html), 24 March 2009.

Petraeus (see n.19 above), pp.3–5.

‘U.S. Plans Vastly Expanded Afghan Security Force’, International Herald Tribune, 18 March 2009 (at: www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/us/politics/19military.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=19%20march%202009%20afghanistan&st=cse).

FM 3-24 (see n.6 above), pp.79–80.

Ibid., p.83.

Ibid., pp.48ff.

Ibid., p.45.

Ibid., p.365. The sharp increase in the use of air strikes by ISAF and the increase in civilian deaths are by many observers considered to be one of the main reasons for the strengthening of the Taliban in Afghanistan. See Adam Roberts, ‘Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan’, Survival, Vol.51, No.1, 2009, pp.29–60.

UN DPKO, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’, New York, 2008 [also reproduced in International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.5, 2008].

Ibid., pp.17–18.

Ibid., p.19.

Ibid., p.22.

Ibid., p.23.

Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, London: Routledge, 2009. Note also the critique of the liberal peacebuilding and its merger with state-building, for example, Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009; David Chandler, Empire in Denial: the Politics of State-Building, London, Pluto Press, 2006.

‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, UN doc., S/RES/1738, 2006.

UN, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, UN doc., A/55/305 – S/2000/809, 2000.

UN DPKO (see n.30 above), p.24.

Cf. Cedric de Coning, The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2008; Karsten Friis and Pia Jarmyr (eds), Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Opportunities in Complex Crisis Management, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008.

Originally labelled ‘integrated missions’. Kofi A. Annan, ‘Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions from the Secretary-General’, 2006. See also International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, 2008.

Annan (see n.40 above), p.2.

This is particularly evident in missions where there are no or few UN troops. The appropriate role of the UN in, e.g. Afghanistan, is continuously debated, and also in Kosovo, where coordination between the UN, NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and EU has been ad hoc and not anchored at the strategic (HQ) level.

UN DPKO (see n.30 above), p.39.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), cited in Simon Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.1, No.1, 2007, p.7.

Cf. Timothy Donais, Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, Geneva: DCAF/LIT Verlag, 2008; Annika Hansen and Sharon Wiharta, The Transition to a Just Order – Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict – A Practitioners' Guide, Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2007; Chesterman (see n.44 above).

Frank van Kappen, ‘Strategic Intelligence and the United Nations’, in Ben De Jong, Wies Platje and Robert David Steele (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future, Oakton, VA: Open Source Solutions International Press, 2003, p.3.

National contingents did, however, sometimes have their own ‘military information’ units with intelligence-like capacities. The UN operation in Congo in the 1960s was also an exception. See Walter A Dorn and David J.H. Bell, ‘Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo, 1960–64’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.2, No.1, 1995, pp.11–33.

Ben de Jong et al. (see n.46 above).

UN DPKO, ‘Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres’, DPKO Policy Directive POL/2006/3000/4, New York, 2006, p.2.

Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Developing Intelligence Capabilities in Support of UN Peace Operations. An Institutional Approach, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2009.

UN DPKO (see n.30 above), p.34.

Ibid., p.35.

Tull (see n.4 above); Stian Kjeksrud, ‘Matching Robust Ambitions with Robust Action in UN Peace Operations – Towards a Conceptual Overstretch?’, Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2009.

Thanks to one of the peer reviewers for suggesting this table.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘The Emerging Consensus on Grey Area Peace Operations Doctrine: Will It Last and Enhance Operational Effectiveness?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.7, No.3, 2000, pp.36–56

For a discussion about neutrality and new impartiality in the UN context see Hikaru Yamashita, ‘“Impartial” Use of Force in United Nations Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.5, No.5, pp.615–30.

Stedman (see n.3 above); Ulriksen (see n.15. above).

Tull (see n.4 above); Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’, A/60/640, 29 December 2005, para.33.

‘AU Attack Blamed on Darfur Rebels’, BBC News, 1 Oct. 2007 (at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7022586.stm).

‘Obama Considers Strategy Shift in Afghan War’, New York Times, 22 Sept. 2009 (at: www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html?_r=1&ref=world).