Striking the Right Balance: How to Rebuild the Afghan National Police

Abstract

A well-trained, professional police force dedicated to upholding the rule of law and trusted by the population is essential to fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan and creating stability. However, the police programmes in Afghanistan have often been dominated by different national agendas and hampered by too few resources and lack of strategic guidance. These issues pose an enormous challenge for the Afghan government and the international community in rebuilding the police. This article argues that it is imperative that the international effort strike a balance between the short-term needs of fighting an insurgency and the long-term needs of establishing an effective sustainable policing capability when building up the police force – and that the process must not be subject merely to satisfying current security challenges or traditional state-building needs.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to thank Dr Obaid Younossi, RAND Corporation, and Dr Peter Viggo Jakobsen, University of Copenhagen, and reviewers for their comments. The final responsibility for the article is, however, that of the author alone.

Notes

Author interview, COIN academy, Kabul, 28 May 2009.

Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, 2009 (at: www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table).

Casualties.org, Operation Enduring Freedom, 15 Dec. 2009 (at: http://icasualties.org/oef)

Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Kabul, 2009.

See, for instance, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, Counter-Insurgency in Modern Warfare, Wellingborough: Osprey, 2008.

David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, New York: Praeger Security International, 1964, p.4. A French officer, Colonel Galula, fought during World War II in North Africa, Italy and France. He was subsequently involved in the fighting in China, Greece, Indochina and Algeria.

US Army & Marine Corps, Counter-Insurgency Field Manual, Chicago University Press, 2007, pp.7:5–7:6.

Marcus Skinner, ‘Counter-Insurgency and State Building: An Assessment of the Role of the Afghan National Police’, Democracy and Security, Vol.4, 2008, p.292.

Dan De Luce, ‘As Afghans Vote, US Raises the Stakes in War’, AFP, 15 Aug. 2009 (at: www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i7Lj2xyA7T3Wh6bjJFEruxo7Oi8g).

Author interview with officers of the British-led Operation Panther's Claw in Helmand Province, July 2009. See Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, London: Hurst, 2007, p.111.

Author interview, Regional Command South and Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands (ARSIC), Kandahar, 30–1 May 2009 (see also n.13 below). Seen also in Iraq, where police and police recruits were deliberately targeted by insurgents to undermine police recruiting and the perceptions of a strong and capable government.

US Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation, GAO, 2009, p.6 (at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf).

Author interview with commander of the Danish Battle Group, Central Helmand, 3 June 2009.

See, e.g., Nabi Misdaq, Afghanistan: Political Frailty and Foreign Interference, London: Routledge, 2006.

See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002.

Mark Sedra, ‘Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide towards Expediency’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.1, 2007, p.96.

The number of police officers that Germany has actually deployed to Afghanistan has varied from 40 to 80. See Skinner (n.8 above).

This early programme is not to be confused with the Focused District Development (FDD) programme of late 2007.

Author interview, OSC-A in 2005 and CSTC-A in 2007 and 2009.

See GAO (n.12 above), pp.18–19.

German Foreign Ministry, ‘Funding for Police Assistance in Afghanistan Tripled’ (at: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/AktuelleArtikel/071115-Erhoehung-Polizeimittel,navCtx=67996.html).

For more on the pay and rank reform see Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Reforming the Afghan National Police, London 2009.

Author interview, Kabul, December 2005.

See GAO (n.12 above), p.9.

GAO (see n.12 above), p.7.

Author interview, EUPOL, Kabul, June 2009.

Author interview, EUPOL and Kabul City police, Kabul, June 2009.

Author interview, EUPOL and ISAF HQ, Kabul, May–June 2009.

Author interview with Kai Vittrup, EUPOL, Kabul, 3 June 2009.

A decision on an interim increase of 4800 police for Kabul was taken by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board on 19 April 2009.

NATO, ‘NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan’, 4 April 2009 (at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52802.htm?selectedLocale=en).

The International Coordination Police Board (ICPB) ‘formulates the strategy. Several actors consult the IPCB: the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), the US “Combined Security Transition Several actors consult the ICPB: the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), the US “Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) responsible for building up the Afghan army and police, the EU-led EUPOL mission, and a number of bilateral donors that are contributing to the police reform under the EU European Security and Defence Policy pillar (ESDP).’ Citha D. Maass, European Union, Germany and Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, Berlin, German Insitutute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 2009, p.6 (at: www3.grips.ac.jp/~pinc/data/09-05.pdf).

Author interview with Vittrup (see n.29 above).

See also Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghan National Security Forces: Shaping the Path to Victory, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, 2009, pp.27,34.

CSTC-A is represented in the regions by Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands (ARSICs). CSTC-A and the ARSICs are designed to support the build-up of the Afghan national security forces. CSTC-A does this in conjunction with ISAF. The Afghan government ‘plans, programs and implements the generation and development of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). CSTC-A, Mission, Kabul, 2009 (at: www.cstc-a.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124&Itemid=1).

Author interview, Regional Command South and ARSIC South, Kandahar, 30 May 2009.

PMTs are also sometimes called Police Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLT).

Author interview with the leader of the British PMT, Forward Operating Base Price, Helmand Province, 15 May 2008.

The tendency was confirmed in author interviews, Regional Command South, Kandahar, 30 May 2009. A year after a district has been through the FDD programme, only 0–50 per cent of the FDD-processed officers are still working in the given district.

Author interview with DynCorp instructor and US Army representative, regional training centre, Kandahar, and at Regional Command South, Kandahar, 30 May 2009.

Author interviews, Regional Command South, Kandahar, 30–1 May 2009.

Author interview with officers in the British-led Operation Panther's Claw, Helmand Province, July 2009.

Author interview with former ISAF officer stationed in Helmand Province from February to Aug. 2009, Copenhagen, 4 Oct. 2009.

See T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 2000, article 15.

Author interview with a CSTC-A representative, Kabul, 1 June 2009.

Report to Congress, ‘Progress towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan’, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defence Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), 2009, p.44, accessed at www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/USDoD_ProgressTowardSecurityStability_Afghanistan_Jan2009.pdf. Each ANP unit will have a PMT attached to it (with 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, five regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 Afghan Border Police (ABP) battalions and 135 ABP companies).

Michael Brzoska has identified six dilemmas in conducting what he calls external security-sector reforms: (1) how rapidly security can be provided to the people; (2) when and how to introduce local ownership; (3) the lack of an external ability to shape, direct and control domestic politics; (4) a preference for institution-building over democratic consolidation; (5) the self-interests of national players; and (6) contradictory international interests and resource allocations. All these dilemmas seem still to be very much present in the Afghan case. Michael Brzoska, ‘Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.1, 2007, pp.6–8.