Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Reflections from Abyei

Abstract

Abyei was one of the most contested areas of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005. Drawing on direct experience, the article examines the agreement and the experience of trying to support its implementation. It analyses the relationship between this and the overall problems of the CPA, and of peacekeeping in the newly independent South Sudan. Drawing on relevant literature, it examines the wider issues for the negotiation of peace agreements; for UN mandates, including the protection of civilians; for the limitations of peacekeeping; and for the importance of continuing political engagement. It argues that in some situations smaller missions without a heavy military component might in fact achieve more.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the United Nations.

Notes

See the website of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (at: www.aec-sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf).

In a similar way they were ignored in Afghanistan, see Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, London: Zed, 2005.

John Ryle, ‘The Road to Abyei’, Granta, No.26, 1989, pp.41–104.

Douglas H. Johnson, ‘The Road Back From Abyei’, 14 Jan. 2011 (at: www.cmi.no/sudan/resources.cfm?id=876-the-road-back-from-abyei).

A referendum was also part of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but was later blocked by the National Congress Party (NCP), contributing to the eventual resumption of civil war.

Abyei Protocol, CPA (see n.1 above).

For a discussion of border demarcation see Douglas H Johnson, When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impact of Boundary-Making in Southern Sudan's Frontier Zones, Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2010.

See the on-line news source Sudan Tribune [Paris] (at: www.sudantribune.com/TEXT-Abyei-Boundary-Commission,11633).

The JIU rotating command was at the time with the SPLA.

The SSPS in Abyei tended to act autonomously and frequently went against the wishes of the Security Committee, JIU and SPLA.

The SSDF was composed of southerners who fought on the side of the north.

This was confirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which through the local Red Crescent had the task of burying the unclaimed dead.

See Sudan Tribune (at: www.sudantribune.com/TEXT-Abyei-Roadmap-Agreement, 27519).

Even the GOS police were mainly people originating from the south of Sudan.

Co-location was also found positive in the Nuba Mountains Joint Military Commission. Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg, ‘Lessons Learned from the Joint Military Commission’, New York: Best Practices Section, DPKO, 2005, pp.6, 9.

See website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (at: www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306).

Interview with Deng Alor quoted in Johnson (see n. 4 above).

Small Arms Survey, ‘The Crisis in Abyei’, in Human Security Baseline Assessment Update, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 10 Oct. 2011, p.6.

Ibid. p.7.

See, Small Arms Survey (at: www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/abyei/Addis-Ababa-Agreement-20062011.pdf).

Small Arms Survey (see n.18 above), pp.7, 9.

Johnson (see n.4 above), p.2.

Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, ‘In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation’, New York: Center on International Cooperation New York University, May 2008.

An AU peacekeeping mission took over in 2006, and was replaced in 2008 by the hybrid AU/UN UNAMID mission.

See Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Jon Harald Sande Lie, ‘Challenges to Protection of Civilians in South Sudan: A Warning from Jonglei State’, Security in Practice, No.8, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Department of Security and Conflict Mitigation, 2011 p.23.

Brahimi and Ahmed (see n.23 above), p.2.

Administrative boundaries of Abyei had at times extended as far north as Muglad.

Johnson (see n.7 above) pp.10, 19.

For a thorough discussion of the stresses on Misseriya livelihoods see, Sara Pantuliano Omer Egemi, Babo Fadlalla and Mohammed Farah with Mohammed Elamin Abdelgadir, ‘Put out to Pasture: War, Oil and the Decline of Misseriya Pastoralism in Sudan’, London: Overseas Development Institute, Mar. 2009.

Ryle (see n.3 above).

Interview by author with Dinka Ngok Paramount Chief, Abyei, May 2008.

Unity was the vision of Dr John Garang, but most of the SPLM leadership and popular sentiment were for secession. Garang died in a helicopter crash in 2005 and with him the vision. Deputy Vice President, Ali Osman Taha, another principal architect of the CPA, lost influence in the NCP.

This problem was recognized in ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’, New York: DPKO/DFS, 2009, p.20.

A few Sudanese sheltered with UNMIS, but the safest option for the 30,000 Dinka Ngok who lived in the town was to flee.

Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, ‘Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations, Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges’, New York: DPKO/OCHA/UN, 2009.

Ibid., p.321. The UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo also faced this problem, see Alan Doss, ‘Great Expectations: UN Peacekeeping, Civilian Protection and the Use of Force’, Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2011.

An UNMIS PoC ‘Security Concept’ was developed in July 2009 and a ‘PoC Strategy’ in November 2010. Its guidance was that ‘the threshold for deciding on UNMIS’ armed intervention will increase in view of the expected seriousness of consequences for UNMIS' overall mandate', quoted in Breidlid and Lie (see n.25 above). On that basis UNMIS would not have intervened militarily as it would certainly have wrecked the mission's ability to support CPA implementation (the overall mandate), but this would not have lessened the sense of betrayal felt by the Dinka Ngok.

Briefing to the SRSG, Khartoum, 20 Oct. 2007.

The new agreement gave UNMIS greater access; the separation of forces and the efforts of the JIU to patrol the area were also helpful.

The exception being Médecins Sans Frontières, which brought in tents.

This is because countries contract to provide resources to specific locations, not generically to a mission.

Such lessons are reflected in other documents, e.g., Ingrid Marie Breidlid, Cedric de Coning, Rebecca Jovin and P.K. Singh, ‘Report of the Conference on Peacekeeping Vision 2015: Capabilities for Future Mandates’, Security in Practice, No.6, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2011.

Astri Suhrke, When More is less: The International Project in Afghanistan, London: Hurst, 2011.

The Nuba Mountains JMC cost under US$ 9 million per six-month mandate period, Souverijn-Eisenberg (see n.15 above), p.7. The UNMISS, 2011/12 budget was more than US$ 700 million, see (at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/facts.shtml).

Small Arms Survey, ‘Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Sudan’, HSBA, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 15 Sept. 2001; OHCHR, ‘Preliminary Report on Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Southern Kordofan from 5 to 30 June 2011’, OHCHR, Aug. 2011; ‘Sudan: Southern Kordofan Civilians Tell of Air Strike Horror’, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 30 Aug. 2011.

OHCHR (see n.45 above).

Personal communication, UNMIS staff, Jul. 2011. See also, Holt, Taylor and Kelly (see n.35 above) p.203, for a discussion on how Troop Contributing Countries receive instructions from their respective capitals.

Personal communication, UNMIS staff, Jan. 2012; see also, ‘South Sudan: UN Blue Helmets Deploy to Deter Ethnic Violence in Key Town’, UN News Centre, 30 Dec. 2011.

Breidlid and Lie (see n.25 above).

Astri Suhrke, ‘UN Support for Peacebuilding: Nepal as the Exceptional Case’, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2009; Ian Martin, ‘All Peace Operations are Political’, New York: Center on International Cooperation New York University (at: www.cic.nyu.edu/politicalmissions/docs_missions_10/chapters/martin_allpeace2.pdf).

See Doss (see n.36 above), pp.14–21 for a discussion of these issues in relation to other missions.