Divided We Stand: The US Foreign Policy Bureaucracy and Nation-Building in Afghanistan

Abstract

Afghanistan was the first major test for US nation-building efforts in the twenty-first century. Previous analyses have identified many of the barriers that prevented the USA from engaging in effective infrastructure development, governance, security, counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics. Drawing upon interviews with senior US officials, this article offers an alternative account of the nation-building experience that highlights problems within the US government. Building on the assertions of Graham Allison, it focuses on the behaviour of the agencies and individuals within the US bureaucracy. It is argued that a lack of effective leadership permitted bureaucratic disorder between and within the military establishment, the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The conflict that was precipitated by this dissonance prevented the emergence of a cohesive nation-building strategy.

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Erratum

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Conor Keane (PhD Macquarie) is a lecturer in politics and International Relations at the Department of Modern History, Politics and International Relations at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. His research interests include counterterrorism, state-building, and US foreign policy. He has several forthcoming articles on these topics.

Glenn Diesen (PhD Macquarie) is an Associate Lecturer at the Department of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-terrorism at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. His research interests include state-building, Russian foreign policy and democratisation; global energy politics; European and Eurasian integration.

Notes

1. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston, MA: Little & Brown, 1971.

2. See ‘Special Issue, Afghanistan in Transition: Security Governance and Statebuilding', International Peacekeeping, Vol.14, No.1, 2007, pp.1–194.

3. Harry Eckstein, Internal War: Problems and Approaches, New York: Free Press, 1964, p.28; Roland Paris, ‘Peace Building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', International Security, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, p.57.

4. See James Dobbins et al., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, New York: RAND, 2003; Kate Jenkins and William Plowden, Governance and Nation-Building: The Failure of International Intervention, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006.

5. Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.4.

6. Pauline Baker, ‘Forging a US Policy Toward Fragile States', PRISM, Vol.1, No.2, 2010, p.74.

7. One member of a Commission on Wartime Contracting Hearing observed that the use of the phrase SRO ‘strikes me as nation-building’ was utilized because ‘we don't want to deal with the reality that we're into nation-building … We don't describe it that way, but that's what we're doing.’ Commission on Wartime Contracting, An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabilization in Contingency Operations, Washington, DC: Commission on Wartime Contracting Hearing, 2010, p.34.

8. Carolyn Stephenson, ‘Nation-Building', Beyond Intractability, Jan. 2005 (at: www.beyondintractability.org/essay/nation-building).

9. Tariq Ali, Bush in Babylon: The Recolonization of Iraq, London: Verso, 2004; Chalmers Johnson, Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010; Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, New York: Times Books, 2010.

10. Ray Jennings, The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan, for Postwar Iraq, Peaceworks No.49, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003; Francis Fukuyama (ed.), Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006; Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, ‘Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building', Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 24 May 2003, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.

11. This was encapsulated in various documents, including the Quadrennial Defence Reviews, the National Security Strategy, the State Department's Transformational Diplomacy Initiative and USAID's Fragile State Strategy.

12. Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton, 2010; William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould, Invisible History: Afghanistan's Untold Story, San Francisco, CA: City Light Books, 2009.

13. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, pp.1–8.

14. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, New York: Viking, 2008, p.xliv.

15. Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, New York: Random House, 2011; David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America's Longest War, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

16. Edward Girardet, Killing Cranes: A Reporter's Journey through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan, Vermont: Chelsea Green, 2011; Nick Mills, Karzai: The Failing US Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons: 2011.

17. Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014, New York: Houghton Miflin, 2014.

18. Oliver Richmond, ‘Peace During and After the Age of Intervention', International Peacekeeping, Vol.21, No.4, 2014, p.513; Anthony Giustozzi, ‘Privatizing War and Security in Afghanistan: Future or Dead End?’, Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol.1, No.2, 2007, pp.30–4.

19. Jacob E. Jankowski, Corruption, Contractors and Warlords in Afghanistan, New York: Nova, 2011.

20. Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012; David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

21. Allison (see n.1 above), p.250.

22. See James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet, New York: Viking, 2004; Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010.

23. Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy', American Journal of Political Science, Vol.44, No.4, 2000, p.734.

24. Allison (see n.1 above), pp.3, 80 and 67; also see David Welch, ‘The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect', International Security, Vol.17, No.2, 1992, p.138.

25. Allison (see n.1 above), pp.144–6; Edward Rhodes, ‘Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Discomforting Findings from the Case of the US Navy', World Politics, Vol.47, No.1, 1994, p.2; Robert Jervis, ‘Why Intelligence and Policy-Makers Clash', in James McCormack (ed.), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, pp.267–85; Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, New York: Norton and Company, 2012.

26. Roland Paris, ‘Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Postwar Statebuilding', in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.59.

27. Author interview with Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defence (Comptroller) 2001–04, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, 15 Jul. 2013.

28. Author interview with John Herbst, United States Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2006–10, Washington, DC, 30 Apr. 2012; author interview with David Barno, Commander of the Combined Forces Afghanistan 2003–05, Washington, DC, 29 Apr. 2012.

29. Author interview with Ronald Neumann, US Ambassador to Afghanistan 2005–07, Washington, DC, 18 Apr. 2012; Ronald Neumann, The Other War: Winning and Losing Afghanistan, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009, p.11.

30. Author interview with James Dobbins, Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, in both 2001 and 2013, Washington, DC, 15 Apr. 2012; author interview with Michael Miklaucic, Department of State Deputy for War Crimes Issues 2002–03 and USAID representative on the Civilian Response Corps Inter-Agency Task Force 2003–08, Washington, DC, 23 Apr. 2012.

31. Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, ‘The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Perspective', in Halperin and Kanter (eds), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective, Boston, MA: Little & Brown, 1973, pp.6–7; Allison (see n.1 above), p.148; I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, p.88; Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, New York: Free Press, 1991, p.11.

32. Author interview with Ronald Neumann (see n.29 above); author interview with John Herbst (see n.28 above); author interview with James Dobbins (see n.30 above); Dobbins James, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008.

33. See Douglas Porch, Counter-Insurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013; Rodrigue Tremblay, The New American Empire: Causes and Consequences for the United States and for the World, Haverford, PA: Infinity, 2004; Scott A. Bonn, Mass Deception: Moral Panic and the US War on Iraq, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010.

34. Caldwell, for example, acknowledges its involvement but claims it had little impact on agency behaviour. Dan Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict: US Policy toward Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011, pp.187–207.

35. See Roger George and Harvey Rishikof (eds), The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011.

36. Commission on Wartime Contracting (see n.7 above), p.11.

37. Author interview with Ronald Neumann (see n.29 above).

38. John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, p.302.

39. Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014, p.482.

40. Dobbins, After the Taliban (see n.32 above).

41. Author interview with David Barno (see n.28 above).

42. Author interview with Ronald Neumann (see n.29 above).

43. Jeremie Lucia, ‘Thoughts of a Landlocked Sailor: Mission in Afghanistan, Dispatches from America's “Other” War', New York Times, 21 Nov. 2006 (at: http://missionafghanistan.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/11/21/thoughts-of-a-landlocked-sailor/?_r=0); Benjamin Tupper, Greetings from Afghanistan: Send More Ammo, New York: Penguin, 2011, pp.136–7; Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban, Saint Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2006, p.107; Dion Nissenbaum, ‘Roads to Nowhere: Program to Win over Afghans Fails', Wall Street Journal, 10 Feb. 2012 (at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203554104576655280219991322).

44. The military sphere is divided between the armed forces and their civilian colleagues at the Department of Defence, but we have organized both under the broader heading of the US military establishment.

45. Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990, p.203; Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics Of Civil–Military Relations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957, p.11; Michael Meese and Isaiah Wilson, ‘The Military: Forging a Joint Warrior Culture', in Roger George and Harvey Rishikof (eds), The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001, pp.117–39.

46. Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Remarks at the National Press Club', 2 Feb. 2006 (at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=908); Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand, America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East, New York: The Penguin Press, 2010, pp.496–99.

47. Author interview with James Dobbins (see n.30 above).

48. Rashid (see n.14 above).

49. David Cloud, ‘Gates Says Military Faces More Unconventional Wars', New York Times, 11 Oct. 2007 (at: www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/washington/11gates.html).

50. Wade Markel et al., Developing US Army Officers' Capabilities for Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational Environments, Washington, DC: RAND, 2011, p.36.

51. Author interview with Michael Miklaucic (see n.30 above).

52. Conor Keane and Steve Wood, ‘Bureaucratic Politics, Role Conflict and the Internal Dynamics of US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan', Armed Forces and Society (Online First, Mar. 2015) (at: http://afs.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/02/23/0095327X15572113.abstract).

53. See Michael McNerney, ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?’, Parameters, Vol.35, No.4, 2005–06, pp.32–46; Craig Cobane, ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Security Assistance: Comments on an Evolving Concept', Journal of International Security Assistance Management, Vol.27, No.4, 2005, pp.91–8.

54. USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, Washington, DC: USAID, 2006, p.5.

55. Joel Hafvenstein, Opium Season: A Year on the Afghan Frontier, Guildford: Lyons Press, 2007; Barbara Stapleton, ‘A Means to an End? Why PRTs Are Peripheral to the Bigger Political Challenges in Afghanistan', Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol.10, No.1, 2007, p.43.

56. USAID (see n.54 above), p.2.

57. Carlos Hernandorena, ‘US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 2003–2006: Obstacles to Interagency Cooperation', in Joseph Cerami and Jay Boggs (eds), The Interagency Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, pp.121–71; United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington, DC, 2008, pp.22 and 72; McNerney (see n.53 above), pp.36–40.

58. Keane and Wood (see n.52 above); also see Stapleton (n.55 above), p.24; cf. Hafvenstein (n.55 above), p.312; Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, p.6.

59. Harry Kopp and Charles Gillespie, Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the Foreign Service, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011, pp.2–3; Destler (see n.31 above), p.31.

60. Kori Schake, State of Disrepair: Fixing the Cultures and Practices of the State Department, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2012; Andrew M. Scott, ‘The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.13, No.1, Mar. 1969, p.2; Barry Rubin, Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p.261; John Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory, New York: Basic Books, 1971.

61. Author interview with James Dobbins (see n.30 above).

62. Chris Johnson and Leslie Jolyom, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, London: Zed Books, 2005, p.33.

63. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, United Nations, Dec. 2001 (at: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf).

64. Patrick Stewart and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing ‘Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States, New York: International Peace Academy, 2007, p.36.

65. Dobbins, After the Taliban (see n.32 above), p.18.

66. Author interview with Dov Zakheim (see n.27 above). The CRC started with 250 positions, divided between USAID and the State Department, but quickly shrank to 89 individuals, who were unable to influence established agency factions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

67. Patrick Stewart, ‘The US Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining Obstacles to Coherence', in Stefani Weiss (ed.), International Responses to Precarious States: A Comparative Analysis of International Strategies with Recommendations for Action by European Institutions and Members States, Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2007, p.7.

68. Renanah Miles, ‘The State Department, USAID, and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction', PRISM, Vol.3, No.1, 2011, p.40; Stewart and Brown (see n.64 above), p.39.

69. Stuart Brown, Jr, ‘No More Adhocracies: Reforming the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations', PRISM, Vol.3, No.27, 2012, pp.3–18.

70. Author interview with Dov Zakheim (see n.27 above).

71. Commission on Wartime Contracting (see n.7 above).

72. David Rohde, ‘Richard Holbrooke's Last Mission in Afghanistan', The Daily Beast, 26 Nov. 2011.

Jodi Kantor, ‘Hoolbrooke: A Larger Than Life Statesman', World Security Network, 19 Feb. 2009 (at: www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/United-States-Afghanistan/Kantor-Jodi/Holbrooke-A-larger-than-life-statesman);

73. David Rohde, ‘The Lost Mission', in Derek Challet and Samantha Powers, The Unquiet American, New York: Perseus Books, 2012, pp.282–96.

74. ‘Richard Holbrooke, Bullish and Bullying: The Rise of an American Diplomat’, The Economist, 3 Dec. 2011 (at: www.economist.com/node/21540990).

75. George Packer, ‘The Last Mission: Richard Holbrooke's Plan to Avoid the Mistakes of Vietnam and Afghanistan’, The New Yorker, 28 Sep. 2009 (at: www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/28/the-last-mission); Julian Borger, ‘New Direction for US in Afghanistan Following Richard Holbrooke Death', Guardian, 15 Dec. 2010 (at: www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/14/richard-holbrooke-afghanistan-us-un).

76. Destler (see n.31 above), p.195.

77. Bernard Wood, Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building: An Independent Study Prepared for the Emergency Response Division, United Nations Development Program, 2003, p.11, (at: http://pdf2.hegoa.efaber.net/entry/content/658/3_Development_Dimensions_of.pdf).

78. Andrew Natsios, ‘USAID in the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Service Journal, Jun. 2006.

79. Ibid.; David Rohde and Carlotta Gall, ‘Delays Hurting US Rebuilding in Afghanistan', New York Times, 7 Nov. 2005 (at: www.nytimes.com/2005/11/07/international/asia/07afghan.html?pagewanted=all).

80. Andrew Natsios, ‘Five Debates on International Development: The US Perspective', Development Policy Review, Vol.24, No.2, 2006, pp.131–9; Donald Steinberg, interview with PRISM, Vol.3, No.2, 2012, pp.157–63; author interview with Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Washington, DC, 20 Apr. 2012.

81. Author interview with William Taylor, Coordinator of United States Government International Assistance to Afghanistan 2002–03, Washington, DC, 21 Apr. 2012.

82. Author interview with Michael Miklaucic (see n.30 above); author interview with Joseph Collins, Deputy Secretary of Defence for Stability Operations 2001–04, Washington, DC, 18 Apr. 2012.

83. Committee on Armed Services, ‘Assessment of US Strategy and Operations in Afghanistan and the Way Ahead', House of Representatives, Jan. 2008 (at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg44095/html/CHRG-110hhrg44095.htm).

84. Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.175; Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005, p.251.

85. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, ‘How a “Good War” in Afghanistan Went Bad', New York Times, 12 Aug. 2007, p.2.

86. Dov S. Zakheim, A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, pp.171–213.

87. David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq, Redwood: Stanford University Press, 2013, p.121.

88. Author interview with James Dobbins (see n.30 above).

89. Author interview with William Taylor (see n.81 above).

90. Author interview with Joseph Collins (see n.82 above).

91. Author interview with David Barno (see n.28 above).

92. Author interview with Ronald Neumann (see n.29 above); also see Neumann, The Other War (n.29 above).

93. Author interview with James Dobbins (see n.30 above); Strategy and Operations Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Assessment of Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Development in US House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, 13 Feb. 2007.

94. Author interview with David Barno (see n.28 above); David Barno, ‘Fighting “the Other War,” Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005', Military Review, Sep.–Oct. 2007, pp.32–44.

95. Author interview with Dov Zakheim (see n.27 above).

96. Edward Burke, ‘Leaving the Civilians Behind: The Soldier-Diplomat in Afghanistan and Iraq', PRISM, Vol.1, No.1, 2009, p.34.

97. Strimling Yodsampa, ‘No One in Charge: A New Theory of Coordination and an Analysis of US Civil–Military Coordination in Afghanistan 2001–2009', unpublished PhD thesis, Tuffings University, 2011, p.100.

98. Author interview with a senior State Department official, Washington, DC, 28 Apr. 2012.

99. Andrew Natsios, ‘The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development', Parameters, Autumn 2005, pp.63–75.

100. Author interview with Joseph Collins (see n.82 above).

101. Author interview with Andrew Natsios (see n.80 above).

102. Author interview with Joseph Collins (see n.82 above).

103. Author interview with Andrew Natsios (see n.80 above); Renanah Miles, ‘The State Department, USAID, and Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction', PRISM, Vol.3, No.1, 2011, p.42.

104. Ibid.

105. Author interview with John Herbst (see n.28 above). In an interview with the author (Washington, DC, 18 Apr. 2012) Joseph Collins, the Deputy Secretary of Defence for Stability Operations 2001–04, also identified this problem.

106. Carlotta Gall, ‘Afghanistan Lacks $10 billion in Aid Report Says', New York Times, 26 Mar. 2008 (at: www.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/world/asia/26afghan.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0). During a five-year contract, one of the agency's contractors spent $4 million just on the salaries of foreign agents. Sarah Chayes, ‘A Voice from Kandahar: Tangled in Red Tape', New York Times, 30 Jul. 2006 (at: http://chayes.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/tangled-in-red-tape/).

107. Joe Stephens and David Ottaway, ‘A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks', Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2005 (at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/19/AR2005111901248.html).

108. This is something that a number of the officials who were interviewed by the first author acknowledged. Also see Joel Brinkley, ‘Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan', World Affairs, Vol.175, No.5, Jan./Feb.2013, pp. 13–24.

109. David Rohde, ‘Little America: An Afghan Town, an American Dream and the Folly of For-Profit War', Reuters, 1 Jun. 2012. USAID continues this controversial practice today. See www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/careers/hiring-mechanisms/personal-services-contractors.

110. Michael Carroll, Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges for the US Agency for International Development, Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2013.

111. Stephens and Ottaway (see n.107 above).

112. Andrew Feickert, US Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines and Colombia, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005, p.5; Carlotta Gall, ‘Opium Harvest at Record Level in Afghanistan', New York Times, 24 May 2006 (at: www.nytimes.com/2006/09/03/world/asia/03afghan.html?pagewanted=print).

113. Kirk Semple and Tim Golden, ‘Afghans Pressured by US on Plan to Spray Poppies', New York Times, 8 Oct. 2007 (at: www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/world/asia/08spray.html?pagewanted=print); author interview with Ronald Neumann (see n.29 above).

114. Dane Smith, US Peacefare: Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Santa Barbara: CSIS, 2010, pp.80–1.

115. Ibid.

116. Semple and Golden (see n.113 above); Alissa Rubin and Matthew Rosenberg, ‘US Efforts Fail to Curtail Trade in Afghan Opium', New York Times, 26 May 2012 (at: www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/world/asia/drug-traffic-remains-as-us-nears-afghanistan-exit.html).

117. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, US Counter-Narcotics Strategy in Afghanistan, Washington, DC, Jul. 2010, pp.11–28.

118. Ali Jalali, Robert Oakley and Zoe Hunter, Combating Opium in Afghanistan, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Nov. 2006, p.3; John Glaze, Opium in Afghanistan: Reassessing US Counter-Narcotics Strategy, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Oct. 2007, p.9.

119. Drug Enforcement Administration, FY2011 Performance Budget: Congressional Budget Submission, Washington, DC: DEA, 2011, pp.3 and 10.

120. James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration, New York: Free Press, 2006, pp.157–8; Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, p.263.

121. See Rashid (n.14 above).

122. Jim Hoagland, ‘Poppies vs Power in Afghanistan', Washington Post, 23 Dec. 2007 (at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/21/AR2007122101918.html).

123. US soldier quoted in Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Afghanistan: When Counter-Narcotics Undermines Counter-Terrorism’, Washington Quarterly, Vol.28, No.4, 2005, pp.55–72, at p.65.

124. Paul Williams, ‘US Marines Protect Afghanistan's Poppy Fields', Canada Free Press, 8 Jul. 2009 (at: www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/12707).

125. Thomas Shanker, ‘Pentagon Sees Aggressive Anti-Drug Effort in Afghanistan', New York Times, 25 Mar. 2005 (at: www.nytimes.com/2005/03/25/politics/25military.html).

126. Ronald Nordland, ‘Fearful of Alienating Afghans, US Turns a Blind Eye to Opium', New York Times, 20 Mar. 2010 (at: www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/world/asia/21marja.html).

127. Author interview with David Barno (see n.28 above).

128. Neumann, The Other War (see n.29 above); author interview with Ronald Neumann (see n.29 above).

129. In spite of the fact that according to some estimates, the USA and NATO committed $119 million towards the ALP in its first year alone, only $4 million had actually been spent by 2005. Rashid (see n.14 above), p.323.

130. Andrew Natsios, ‘Time Lag and Sequencing Dilemmas of Post-Conflict Reconstruction', PRISM, Vol.1, No.1, 2009, p.65.

131. Author interview with Andrew Natsios (see n.80 above); Brinkley (see n.108 above).

132. Brinkley (see n.108 above).

133. See Brinkley, ‘Millions More Squandered by USAID in Afghanistan’, World Affairs, 28 Jun. 2013 (at: www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/joel-brinkley/millions-more-squandered-usaid-afghanistan); Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West Program, Kabul: USAID, Office of Inspector General, 29 Jun. 2012, p.2; Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, US Counter-Narcotics Strategy in Afghanistan, Washington, DC: Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Jul. 2010, p.41.