Counter-IED Technology in UN Peacekeeping: Expanding Capability and Mitigating Risks

Abstract

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) pose a significant threat to UN peacekeepers. This article argues that the UN needs to draw on the lessons from multinational engagements such as Afghanistan to identify, generate and deploy counter-IED technology to UN peacekeeping operations in a more systematic manner. It examines lessons emerging from the application of counter-IED technology in past multinational operations in order to identify areas to expand capabilities and mitigate risks in addressing the threat in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. First, it examines the evolving nature of the IED threat. Second, it surveys some of the lessons emerging from the use of technology in multinational engagements such as the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Third, it explains some of the approaches already in place in UN peacekeeping operations. Fourth, it identifies potential challenges and limitations to employing more technology solutions to counter IEDs in UN peacekeeping missions, offering some thoughts on areas requiring broader reform to address the growing IED threat in UN peacekeeping missions. It concludes that technology can improve force protection, intelligence and the medical support available to peacekeeping missions to prevent and mitigate the effect of IEDs, thereby strengthening the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel, enhancing mission mobility, and improving the effectiveness of mandate implementation when it comes to the protection of civilians and early peacebuilding efforts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The views expressed in this article represent those of the author and should not be seen as representing the formal position of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute or the International Peace Institute (IPI). This article was developed in part by drawing on interviews with officials and experts from national militaries, as well as the United Nations. The author would like to thank those individuals for their cooperation and sharing their insights. This article was developed from an earlier paper prepared for IPI as part of a Providing for Peacekeeping project on New Issues in Peacekeeping, supported by funding from the French government. The author would like to thank the team at IPI for their assistance on the paper.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Lisa Sharland is an Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra, Australia and former Defence Policy Adviser at the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, New York.

Notes

1. See United Nations, ‘Secretary-General's Remarks at Security Council Open Debate on Trends in United Nations Peacekeeping’, New York, 11 Jun. 2014 (at: www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7769). Also refer to Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ‘Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnership and People', 16 Jun. 2015 (at: www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf).

2. For example, peacekeepers and civilians have been victims of IED attacks in Mali. See United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali', UN doc., S/2015/426, 11 Jun. 2015.

3. As of 31 Dec. 2014, 32 peacekeepers in MINUSMA had died as a result of malicious acts, see UN Peacekeeping ‘Fatalities by Year, Mission and Incident Type’, 30 Sept. 2015 (at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_5a.pdf). More than 21 of those peacekeepers died as a result of IED attacks – see UN News Centre, ‘Mali: Security Council, Ban Condemn Attack that Killed Five UN Peacekeepers’, 19 Sept. 2014 (at: www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48750#.VKJrhfXABg).

4. United Nations General Assembly, ‘Financing Arrangements for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for the Period 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015; Note by the Secretary-General’, UN doc., A/69/828, 23 Mar. 2015, p.2 (hereafter ‘Note by Secretary-General on Financing for MINUSMA 2014–15, A/69/828′).

5. United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the Period 4 December 2013 to 10 March 2014′, UN doc., S/2014/199, 18 Mar. 2014, p.6. See also BBC News, ‘Lebanon Blast Kills UN Soldiers', 24 Jun. 2007 (at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6235224.stm).

6. See United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia', UN doc., S/2015/331, 12 May 2015, p.15.

7. See remarks by representative of Chad in UN Security Council, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 7275th Meeting’, UN doc., S/PV.7275, 9 Oct. 2014. Chad expressed concern at the lack of Council response to IED attacks after the deaths of several Chadian peacekeepers from IED attacks in MINUSMA.

8. See, for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2164, para.13(c).

9. See United Nations, ‘Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping’, Feb. 2015 (at: www.performancepeacekeeping.org/).

10. Ibid., p.7.

11. There has been military analysis in the last decade examining counter-IED approaches in Afghanistan and Iraq. See, for example, Andrew Smith, Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003–2009: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011; David Eisler, ‘Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War’, Military Review, Jan.–Feb., 2012, pp. 9–15; John Moulton, ‘Rethinking IED Strategies from Iraq to Afghanistan’, Military Review, Jul.–Aug., 2009, pp. 26–33.

12. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, International Ammunition Technical Guideline, Feb. 2015 (Second Edition), IATG 1.40, para.3.140.

13. See generally, Smith (n.11 above).

14. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, ‘Small Arms Survey 2013′, Geneva: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.224 (at: www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2013.html (hereafter ‘Small Arms Survey 2013′).

15. Michael D. Barbaro, ‘Improvised Explosive Devices Are Here to Stay', Washington Post, 17 May 2013 (at: www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/improvised-explosive-devices-are-here-to-stay/2013/05/17/8d9c9d7c-be64-11e2-9b09-1638acc3942e_story.html).

16. The internet is providing means and opportunity for terrorist organizations to share propaganda and information on constructing improvised explosive devices. See ‘Sixteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2161 (2014) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities’, UN doc., S/2014/770, 29 Oct. 2014, p.9 (hereafter ‘Sixteenth Report of the Al Qaida Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2014/770′).

17. United Nations Security Council, ‘Fifteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Established Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities’, UN doc., S/2014/41, 23 Jan. 2014, p.16 (hereafter ‘Fifteenth Report of the Al Qaida Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2014/41′).

18. Victim-operated devices rely on inadvertent action by an individual to initiate the explosion (e.g. through pressure plates which close the electrical circuit on a device). For further information, see ‘Small Arms Survey 2013′ (n.14 above), p.221.

19. Pierre Claude Nolin, ‘Countering the Afghan Insurgency: Low-Tech Threats, High Tech Solutions’, NATO Parliamentary Assembly Special Report, 189 STC 11, Oct. 2011, p.5 (at: www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2551).

20. United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’, UN doc., A/69/642, 9 Dec. 2014, p.9.

21. United Nations (see n.9 above), p.45.

22. Barbaro (see n.15 above).

23. See, for example, Smith (n.11 above).

24. Examples include the Australian Defence Force Counter-IED Task Force, the United States Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the Canadian Counter Explosive Threat Task Force and the Netherlands Joint Taskforce CIED.

25. For example, JIEDDO argues that solutions can be acquired up to 75 per cent faster than the normal military acquisition process, see ‘The Official Website of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’ (at: www.jieddo.mil/about.aspx).

26. See, for example, European Defence Agency, ‘Counter-IED', 13 Aug. 2012 (at: www.eda.europa.eu/our-work/projects-search/counter-ied); NATO, ‘Countering Improvised Explosive Devices', 27 Jan. 2015 (at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_72809.htm).

27. Nolin (see n.19 above), p.7.

28. See, for example, United States Army, ‘US Military Fields New Mine Roller Technology to Defeat IEDs’, 3 Jan. 2011 (at: www.army.mil/article/49983/); Australian Government Minister for Defence, ‘Force Protection Measures’, 1 Jun. 2010, Media Release MIN57/10 (at: www.defence.gov.au/minister/90tpl.cfm?CurrentId=10360).

29. Nolin (see n.19 above), p.15.

30. Ibid., p.9.

31. Ibid., p.11.

32. Ibid., p.13.

33. Ibid., p.9.

34. Nonetheless, sustaining these efforts remains an ongoing challenge. See Tim Craig, ‘Afghan Army, Police Struggle to Combat IED Threat as U.S. Forces Prepared to Leave', Washington Post, 6 Mar. 2014 (at: www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/afghan-army-police-struggle-to-combat-ied-threat-as-us-forces-prepare-to-leave/2014/03/06/f3724c7a-9cba-11e3-975d-107dfef7b668_story.html).

35. European Defence Agency, ‘Counter IED Lab Saves Lives in Afghanistan’, 7 Jan. 2013 (at: www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/news/2013/01/07/counter-ied-lab-saves-lives-in-afghanistan).

36. See Small Arms Survey, ‘Research Note Countering Improvised Explosive Devices’, Oct. 2014 (at: www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-46.pdf). The Australian Defence Force has initiated the AXON Global IED Partnership pilot programme to develop a secure web-based system to track IED events.

37. ‘Small Arms Survey 2013′ (see n.14 above), p.224.

38. Nolin (see n.19 above), p.13.

39. For example, the US MRAP Task Force was allocated more than USD 40 billion in funding from 2005 through until 2010 (in addition to USD 18 billion appropriated for the US Joint Improvised Explosive Device Task Force from 2006 until 2012). See United States Government Accountability Office, ‘DOD Needs Strategic Outcome-Related Goals and Visibility over Its Counter IED Efforts’, Feb. 2012, GAO-12-280 (at: www.gao.gov/assets/590/588803.pdf).

40. Nolin (see n.19 above), p.15.

41. ‘Small Arms Survey 2013′ (see n.14 above), p.226.

42. Ibid.

43. Michael D. Barbero, ‘Statement Before the United States Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs’, 13 Dec. 2012 (at: www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/General_Barbero_Testimony.pdf).

44. ‘Fifteenth Report of the Al Qaida Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2014/41′ (see n.17 above), p.17.

45. Edmond Mulet, ‘Briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on Operational Issues’, 19 Feb. 2015 (copy on file with author).

46. Author correspondence with UN official, Dec. 2014.

47. See United Nations Security Council (n.6 above), para.38.

48. The Secretary-General subsequently requested additional funding in the amount of approximately US$80 million for the 2014/15 financial year, noting the ‘increased lethality’ of the operating environment and newly mandated requirements to expand the mission presence. See ‘Note by Secretary-General on Financing for MINUSMA 2014–15′, A/69/828.

49. Ibid.

50. Presentation by Andreas Joedecke, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations during event hosted by International Peace Institute, ‘Technology and Innovation in Peacekeeping Panel Discussion’, 7 Apr. 2014 (at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvTAOF6WN7o).

51. United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the Period from 4 December 2013 to 10 March 2014′, UN doc., S/2014/199, 18 Mar. 2014, p.9.

52. Author interview with Dutch Defence official, Nov. 2014.

53. For example, UNIFIL has only a coordination component, as de-mining is conducted solely by troop contributing countries. See United Nations General Assembly, ‘Observations and Recommendations on Cross-Cutting Issues Related to Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions’, UN doc., A/67/780, 30 Apr. 2013, pp.49–50 (hereafter ‘ACABQ Report on Peacekeeping, A/67/780′).

54. Concerns about the emerging IED threat were raised during the Council's briefing with Heads of Military Components in October 2014, United Nations Security Council Meeting, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, UN doc., S/PV.7275, 9 Oct. 2014. The UN Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations met to discuss the issue of asymmetric threats for the first time in March 2015.

55. See United Nations (n.9 above), p.48. These included physical force protection measures such as mine-protected vehicles, electronic counter-measures, ‘bolt on’ armour, ground-penetrating radar and hand-held explosive composition detection devices, as well as surveillance technologies such as the use of small tactical UAVs for reconnaissance and security.

56. The Security Policy Manual defines a remnant IED as ‘an IED that has been declared so through official procedures governing such decisions within the United Nations system, involving the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, in consultation with the UN Country Team and mine-action advice, if necessary’. An operational IED is ‘an IED that has not been officially declared a Remnant IED’. If there is any doubt, an IED is assumed to be an operational IED. See UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), Security Policy Manual, Chap.IV, Sec.Y: Improvised Explosive Devices, p.2 (hereafter ‘UNDSS Security Policy Manual’).

57. Author correspondence with UN official, Dec. 2014.

58. For example, the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Manual 2014 (A/C.5/69/18) details reimbursement categories for a range of equipment that may be deployed by contingents as part of peacekeeping missions. However this is largely focused on de-mining and EOD efforts. The UN Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM) recognizes the increased threat of potential attacks from IEDs and subsequently includes an annex detailing a policy on ‘UN Handling of Improvised Explosive Devices’. However the types of technology that might be employed to benefit the mission – equipment such as mine protected vehicles, ground radar and UAVs – are listed in an annex on high technology equipment. They are not standard requirements. See United Nations, United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume II, Aug. 2012 (at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/UNIBAM.Vol.II.pdf).

59. United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Mali’, 26 Mar. 2013, UN doc., S/2013/189, p.14.

60. UN DPKO/DFS, ‘Uniformed Capabilities Required for UN Peacekeeping: Current Gaps, Commitments to Enable More Rapid Deployment, and other Capability Requirements’, 19 Feb. 2015, p.2, copy on file with author.

61. For 2014–15, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) had a mine action activities budget of US$42.4 million, MINUSMA's budget was approximately US$28 million and UNIFIL's budget was US$1.33 million. See United Nations General Assembly, ‘Observations and Recommendations on Cross-Cutting Issues Related to Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions’, UN doc., A/68/782, 5 May 2014, p.96.

62. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) recommended that the General Assembly request more detail in overview reports of mine action activities. See ‘ACABQ Report on Peacekeeping, A/67/780′ (n.53 above), pp.49–50.

63. See United Nations General Assembly, ‘Financing Arrangements for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for the Period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions’, UN doc., A/69/889, 1 May 2015.

64. Author correspondence with UN official, Dec. 2014.

65. This could include the inclusion of language regarding counter-IED capacity in mission mandates, to secure assessed budget funding. See Concept Note, UN Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers: Asymmetric Threats’, 23 Mar. 2015, p.5.

66. See remarks by David Haeri, ‘Chiefs of Defence Conference – Agenda Item 10: Future of United Nations Peacekeeping’, 27 Mar. 2015 (copy on file with author). See also Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ‘Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnership and People', 16 Jun. 2015, p.31.

67. See remarks by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Herve Ladsous, UN Security Council, ‘The Situation in Mali’, UN doc., S/PV.7274, 8 Oct. 2014, p.3.

68. UNDSS Security Policy Manual (n.56 above), p.3.

69. UN DPKO/DFS Policy, ‘The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping’, 1 Apr. 2015.

70. Ibid., p.18.

71. Ibid., p.16.

72. United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2015′, UN doc., A/69/19, para.48.

73. United Nations (see n.9 above), pp.22–3.

74. ‘Sixteenth Report of the Al Qaida Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2014/770′ (see n.16 above), p.23. The Monitoring Team notes that ‘use of other expanding technologies such as drones should not be ruled out’.

75. The Expert Panel Report's recommendation for a dedicated office for innovation could address this challenge. See United Nations (n.9 above), p.105.

76. See, for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2164 (Mali), para.13(c)(iii).

77. ‘Fifteenth Report of the Al Qaida Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2014/41′ (see n.17 above), p.17.