Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Does the Road to Confederation go through the EU?

Abstract

This article considers Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)'s constitutional reform path options following the 20-year anniversary of the Dayton Agreement that ended the war. The need for substantive structural and constitutional reform has not gone away, and there is an open question on whether and how Euro-Atlantic integration processes might influence reform outcomes. First, a brief review of constitutional reform efforts to date is presented. Second, arguments for and against constitutional reform in BiH are summarized. Next, some characteristics of federal and confederal systems are introduced to frame discussions on BiH decision-making capabilities, and the role of the state vs lower levels of government. This includes a discussion on the issue of a BiH ‘coordination mechanism’ to manage EU integration, and whether or not the state might need some sort of supremacy clause. The article closes with some musings on the apparent trajectory of the country. The case of BiH is not sui generis, and can contribute to the literature and potentially influence policy-makers interested in the implementation and possible re-negotiation of peace treaties and constitutions – issues relevant to any countries emerging from divisive, violent conflict.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to Armina Mujanović for general research support, to John Hulsey for helpful comments, to Helene Mastowski for research on the history of the Directorate for European Integration and to Therese Nelson for her review and suggestions. All opinions and errors are the author's alone.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Valery Perry, PhD, has worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the late 1990s, conducting research and working for organizations including the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), the European Center Minority Issues (ECMI), the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) and several NGOs. She is currently a Senior Associate in the Democratization Policy Council, an assistant professor of conflict analysis and resolution at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology and an independent researcher and consultant based in Sarajevo.

Notes

1. Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western, ‘The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia from Falling Apart', Foreign Affairs, Sept.–Oct. 2009, pp.69–83; Philippe Leroux-Martin, Diplomatic Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

2. Paul T. McCartney, ‘“Peace without Victory”: The Promise and Constraints of Third-Party Mediation in Civil Wars', in Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr and William J. Lahneman (eds), From Mediation to Nation Building: Third Parties and the Management of Communal Conflict, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013, pp.19–32.

3. Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

4. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, art.III2(a). This right has been enjoyed most formally and institutionally by the RS/Serbs in terms of their relations with Serbia. Following the death of Franjo Tudjman, Croatia began to pull back from direct and structured relations with BiH's Croats/Herceg-Bosna structures, but now as an EU member is increasingly exercising influence through those channels. The Bosniaks have not sought to utilize this article to establish relations more formally, with, say, Turkey, as there is no definition of what is meant by ‘neighboring’ states.

5. Article X: ‘[t]his Constitution may be amended by a decision of the Parliamentary Assembly, including a two-thirds majority of those present and voting in the House of Representatives.’

6. For a thorough review, see Valery Perry, ‘Constitutional Reform Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Top–Down Failure, Bottom–Up Potential, Continued Stalemate', in Soeren Keil and Valery Perry (eds), Statebuilding and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, London: Ashgate, 2015, pp.1–15; Sofia Sebastian, ‘Breaking the Impasse: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia', FRIDE Policy Brief No.68, March 2011 (at: www.fride.org/download/PB_69_Bosnia_Eng.pdf).

7. Case U 5/98 Partial Decision III 1(A), 1(B), Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 July 2000. The Republika Srpska (RS) constitution recognized only Serbs as its constituent people, and the Federation (FBiH) constitution recognized only Bosniaks and Croats, while the BiH constitution acknowledges BiH's three constituent peoples. The Croat and Serb judges expressed substantial reservations. International Crisis Group, ‘Implementing Equality: The ‘Constituent Peoples’ Decision in Bosnia and Herzegovina', ICG Balkans Report No.128 n.10, 16 Apr. 2002 (at: reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6C1D3A9D91EC29EC85256B9D00640396-icg-bos-16apr.pdf).

8. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘The Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative', CDL-AD (2005) 004 2, 11 Mar. 2005 (at: www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-AD(2005)004-e.pdf).

9. While a vital national interest veto is common to countries with consociational systems of government, BiH in addition has a so-called entity veto which further complicates state-level legislation development and adoption. See Birgit Bahtić-Kunrath, ‘Of Veto Players and Entity-Voting: Institutional Gridlock in the Bosnian Reform Process', Nationalities Papers, Vol.39, No.6, 2011, pp.899–923.

10. The SNSD, led by Milorad Dodik, has been the main Serb political party in BiH since 2006. The HDZ BiH has been the primary Croat party in BiH since the war; it split into two factions (HDZ BiH and HDZ 1990) during the April Package process. Stranka za BiH is a Bosniak party that was led by Haris Silajdzic, who strongly advocated for a stronger BiH at the state level, including through the slogan ‘BiH without Entities'. While other parties such as the Bosniak SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) were closely involved in these talks, the support of the SNSD, and the loss of April Package support from Silajdzic and the split HDZ (HDZ 1990 representatives voted against the Package), shaped the dynamics. See Sofia Sebastian, Post-War Statebuilding and Constitutional Reform: Beyond Dayton in Bosnia, Palgrave, 2014; Sofia Sebastian, ‘Leaving Dayton Behind: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina', FRIDE Working Paper 46, Nov. 2007.

11. Dan Bilefsky, ‘Tensions Rise in Fragile Bosnia as Country's Serbs Threaten to Seek Independence', New York Times, 27 Feb. 2009; for a review of the escalating political rhetoric in BiH in recent years see Vlado Azinović, Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, ‘Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Security Risk Analysis', Report, Sarajevo: Atlantic Initiative and Democratization Policy Council, 2011; Robert Belloni, ‘Dayton Is Dead! Long Live Dayton!’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.15, No.3–4, pp.355–75.

12. This resulted merely in a restatement of principles for reform, though it did prompt the first amendment to the BiH constitution – the incorporation of the Brćko District under the jurisdiction of BiH state institutions and the Constitutional Court. See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ‘The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 3.1, Doc.12112, 11 Jan. 2010 (at: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12112.htm).

13. International Crisis Group, ‘Bosnia's Dual Crisis’, Europe Briefing No.57, pp.7–8, 12 Nov. 2009 (at: www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/b057-bosnias-dual-crisis.aspx).

14. The case challenged the inability of representatives of the Jewish and Roma communities (or any other non-constituent peoples) seeking election to BiH's Presidency and House of Peoples – each of which is limited to BiH's three constituent peoples. In July 2015 the ECtHR decided in the Zornić case, finding that Azra Zornić was denied rights by being unable to stand for certain offices due to her unwillingness to declare as anything other than as a citizen of BiH. A decision in the Pilav case, which considers whether Ilijas Pilav's inability to stand for the Serb position on the Presidency without declaring himself as a Serb is an infringement of his rights, is pending.

15. Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment 9, 22 Dec. 2009 (at: cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=860268&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649).

16. It deserves note that the period of robust state-strengthening coincided with the period of time in which there was substantial return of refugees and internally displaced persons. See Toal and Dahlman (n.3 above); Roberto Belloni, ‘Peacebuilding at the Local Level: Refugee Return to Prijedor', International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.3, 2005, pp.434–47.

17. Azinović et al. (see n.11 above), pp.7–18.

18. See Elvira M. JUKIĆ, ‘UK, Germany Launch Joint Initiative on Bosnia', BIRN, 5 Nov. 2014 (at: www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/uk-germany-propose-bosnia-s-renewed-eu-perspective). See also EU FAC Conclusions, ‘Press Release – 3361st Council Meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, December 15, 2014′ (at: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/146293.pdf).

19. Venice Commission (see n.8 above).

20. Ibid., point 26.

21. Ibid., point 6.

22. Oscar Fernandez, Valery Perry and Kurt Bassuener, ‘Making the Market on Constitutional Reform in the Wake of the EU Initiative', Democratization Policy Council Policy Brief, Mar. 2015 (at: www.democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/DPC%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20CR%20after%20the%20new%20EU%20initiative.pdf).

23. Foreign Policy Initiative BH, About Us (at: www.vpi.ba/eng/about_us.html).

24. Association Alumni of the Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies (at: www.acips.ba).

25. Swiss Cooperation Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Contribution to Constitutional Reform Project, Phase III: Final Report’, 3 (2010). Bosnia and Herzegovina: SCO.

26. Asim Mujkić, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, Sarajevo: Constellations, 2008.

27. For more on the dynamics of these civic efforts, see Perry (n.6 above).

28. The reform proposal is available at: tpo.ba/inicijativa/dokumenti/P%20Ust%20proCol%20Final%20Web%20.pdf. A previous gender sensitive reform effort, limited to gender issues, was prepared in 2008 with the support of UNIFEM.

29. See www.k143.org.

30. See www.green-council.org.

31. The Croat People's Assembly adopted a declaration prioritizing constitutional reform to assure that the rights of the Croat people in BiH are protected (at: hnsbih.org/deklaracija-6-zasjedanja-hns-a/); ‘The President of HDZ BiH, Dragan Čović stated that a Declaration will be adopted in the session of the Croatian National Assembly, which will define key directions for the Croatian policy in BiH and which suggests a federal arrangement for BiH’ (at:www.republikasrpska.net/2015/02/covic-hrvati-ce-traziti-federalizaciju-bih/).

32. Nezavisne novine – 19 Mar. 2015 (at: www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Covic-Sa-SDA-dogovorena-tri-prioriteta-295051.html).

33. In 2006 and again in 2010, Željko Komšić of the SDP (Social Democratic Party), identifying as a Croat, but not from a Croat-oriented party, won the seat on the three-member BiH Presidency reserved for Croats, likely with the support of non-Croat voters in the Federation. This demonstrated the quirk of a Federation organized as a single electoral unit, in which residents could choose whether to vote for the Bosniak or Croat candidate. See John Hulsey, ‘Party Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina', in Soeren Keil and Valery Perry (eds), Statebuilding and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2015, pp.41–60.

34. The arguments in this document include an explanation of why the RS is fundamentally different from the Federation, and notes that there are only two options for BiH: (1) constitutionally reconstructing the Federation to create a Croat territorial unit, thereby creating the conditions for a confederal state with shared competencies as outlined in Dayton; and (2) dissolution of BiH into three territorial units, even if the Croat territorial issue is not solved. Dodik echoed the message of BiH as a confederation or ‘union of three countries’ in October and November 2014. See ‘Dodik: Spremni za konfederaciju', b92.net portal, 9 Oct. 2014 (at: www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2014&mm=10&dd=09&nav_id=909461); ‘BiH: Ili konfederacija ili unija ili razlaz', Vesti-online portal, 4 Nov. 2014 (at: www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/446151/BiH-Ili-konfederacija-ili-unija-ili-razlaz).

35. In November 2013, in a document entitled ‘Dejtonska struktura Bosne i Hercegovine i pravni polozaj Republike Srpske', the status of defence reform was challenged on the basis that according to the BiH constitution, the country still had two armies.

36. ‘Lost in the Bosnian Labyrinth', European Stability Initiative, 7 Oct. 2013 (at: www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_143.pdf). The European Stability Initiative (ESI) has aggressively lobbied in European capitals using talking points that deny constitutional reform is needed.

37. International Crisis Group, ‘Bosnia's Future', Report No.232, 10 Jul. 2014 (at: www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/232-bosnia-s-future.pdf).

38. Fernandez et al. (see n.22 above).

39. ‘Constitutional Reforms for Acceding to the European Union: Comparative State Practice', Legal Memorandum, Nov. 2012 (at: www.mreza-mira.net/wp-content/uploads/Constitutional-Reforms-for-European-Union-Accession-Nov-2012.pdf).

40. Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Kingston, Ontario: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1996.

41. Alfred Stepan, ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model', Journal of Democracy, Vol.10, No.4, 1999, pp.19–34.

42. Matthew Hoddie, ‘Introduction: Segments States in the Developing World', Ethnopolitics, Vol.13, No.1, 2014, p.2, emphases added. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. Philip G. Roeder, 'Secessionism, Institutions, and Change', Ethnopolitics, Vol.13, No.1, 2014, pp.86-104.

43. Ibid.

44. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, ‘Must Pluri-National Federation Fail?’, Ethnopolitics, Vol.8, No.1, 2009, pp.5–25.

45. Soeren Keil, Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013.

46. Venice Commission, point 6 (see n.8 above).

47. The author would like to thank Aarif Abraham and members of the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) team for their past research on this issue. Any errors in this summary are the author's alone.

48. Vienna Convention Law on Treaties, art.1 (1969) (at: treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-52%20AM/Ch_XXIII_01p.pdf).

49. Ibid.

50. Matej Avbelj, ‘Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law – (Why) Does It Matter?', European Law Journal, Vol.17, No.744, 2011, p.746 (at: www.cesruc.org/uploads/soft/130301/1-130301225200.pdf).

51. Ibid.

52. Federal Constitutional Act on the Accession of Austria to the European Union (Austria, 1994) (at: www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1994_744/ERV_1994_744.pdf); see also the Austrian Foreign Ministry, Austria in the EU, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs (2013) (at: www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/europe/european-union/austria-in-the-eu.html).

53. The Belgian Constitution provides that governmental authority may be transferred to international legal institutions. The Constitutional Court has interpreted this provision as authorizing the supremacy of EU law over domestic law. See Christian Franck, Herve Leclercq and Claire Vandevivere, ‘Belgium: Europeanisation and Belgian Federalism', in Wolfgang Wessels, Andreas Maurer and Jurgen Mittag (eds), Fifteen into One? The European Union and Its Member States, 2003, p.1, at p.15 (at: www.uni-koeln.de/wiso-fak/powi/wessels/DE/PUBLIKATIONEN/texte/TextMaurer/andreas/Belgium.pdf).

54. Anneli Albi, ‘Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States: Bringing Parliaments into the Equation of Co-operative Constitutionalism', European Constitutional Law Review, Vol.3, No.1, 2007, p.19 (at: kar.kent.ac.uk/424/1/Supremacy_30OCT07DP.pdf); Julia Laffranque, ‘A Glance at the Estonian Legal Landscape in View of the Constitution Amendment Act’, Juridica International, Vol.12, No.1, 2007 (at: www.juridicainternational.eu/?id=12684).

55. Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution, art.III(3)(b) (1995) (at: www.ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf).

56. Ibid., art.III(2)(b).

57. Ibid., art.III(3)(a).

58. Ibid., art.III(4).

59. Ibid., art.III(4).

60. Stabilization and Association Agreement, art.70 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2009) (at: www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm77/7743/7743.pdf).

61. Ibid., art.70(4).

62. Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Republic of Croatia (at: www.mvep.hr/en/).

63. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Government of Montenegro (at: www.mvpei.gov.me/en/ministry).

64. Government of the Republic of Serbia, European Integration Office (at: www.seio.gov.rs/office/about-us.58.html).

65. Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Secretariat for European Affairs (at: www.sep.gov.mk/en/content/?id=1#.Umpy0XCBmmo).

66. Republic of Kosovo, Ministry of European Integration (at: www.mei-ks.net/?page=2,1).

67. About the Stability Pact (at: www.stabilitypact.org/about/).

68. Directorate for European Integration, available on the website of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina (at: www.vijeceministara.gov.ba/stalna_tijela/dei/default.aspx?id=1719&langTag=en-US).

69. International Crisis Group, ‘Bosnia's Alliance for Smallish Change', Balkans Report No.132, 2 Aug. 2002 (at: www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/132-bosnias-alliance-for-smallish-change.aspx).

70. ‘Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina', website of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (at: assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=11406&Language=EN).

71. Adnan Terzic, SETimes.com (at: www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/infoBios/setimes/resource_centre/bio-archive/terzic_adnan).

72. David Chandler, ‘State-Building in Bosnia: The Limits of “Informal Trusteeship”', International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol.11, No.1, 2006, p.30 (at: www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_1/11n1Chandler.pdf).

73. ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina – Relations with the EU’, website of the European Commission (at: http:ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidate-countries/bosnia_and_herzegovina/eu_bosnia_and_herzegovina_relations_en.htm).

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. See Jukić (n.18 above). See also EU FAC Conclusions (n.18 above).

77. See ‘Written Commitment of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Feb. 2014) (at: http://europa.ba/documents/delegacijaEU_2015022513454549eng.pdf).

78. ‘Law of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina', website of the Office of the High Representative (at: www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=28609).

79. European Commission ‘Progress Report – Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005′, p. 12 (at: http:ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1422_final_progress_report_-ba_en.pdf).

80. European Commission, ‘Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006′, p.7 (at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/bih_sec_1384_en.pdf).

81. International Crisis Group, ‘Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU', Europe Report No.164, 6 Sept. 2005; Daniel Lindvall, ‘The Limits of the European Vision in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Analysis of the Police Reform Negotiations', Stockholm Studies in Sociology, New Series 40, 2009 (at: www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:276829/FULLTEXT02.pdf).

82. European Commission, ‘Progress Report – Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008′ (at: http.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/bosnia_herzegovina_progress_report_en.pdf).

83. European Commission, ‘Progress Report – Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009′ (at: http.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ba_rapport_2009_en.pdf).

84. European Commission, ‘Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010’ (at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/ba_rapport_2010_en.pdf).

85. European Commission, ‘Progress Report – Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011′ (at: http.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ba_rapport_2011_en.pdf).

86. European Commission, ‘Progress Report – Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012′ (at: http.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/ba_rapport_2012_en.pdf).

87. Elvira Jukic, ‘Fule Hands Bosnian Leaders EU “Road Map”', Balkan Insight, 28 Jun. 2012 (at: www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/brussels-gives-bosnia-list-of-deadlines).

88. European Commission, ‘Joint Conclusions from the High Level Dialogue on the Accession Process with Bosnia and Hercegovina and the Road Map for BiH's EU Membership Application', 27 Jun. 2012 (at: www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-503_en.htm).

89. Ibid.

90. European Commission, ‘EU-BiH: After the 3rd Round of High Level Dialog on Accession Process', 10 Oct. 2013 (at: http.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-874_en.htm).

91. Ibid.

92. Eldin Hadžović, ‘Bosnia: Dodik Agrees to Drop Disputed Referendum', Balkan Insight, 13 May 2011; Duska Jurišić, ‘Izvinite, ministre, ali rusite drzavu', Dani, 23 Dec. No.758, 2011 (www.bhdani.ba/portal/clanak/758/arhiva/izvinite-ministre-ali-rusite-drzavu).

93. The 2011 Dodik–Lagumdžija quarrel about the IPA funds was not unrelated to debates on ministerial allocations split between the SNSD and the SDP, as well as the list of IPA projects proposed by the RS and accepted by the CoM, but rejected by the Federation Government. Later, Lagumdžija and Dodik held discussions in a hotel in Laktaši to agree on how to unblock the IPA funds. See ‘Zlatko Lagumdžija: S Dodikom sam se dogovorio o deblokadi IPA sredstava', seebiz.eu portal, 20 Sept. 2011 (at: ba.seebiz.eu/politika/zlatko-lagumdzija-s-dodikom-sam-se-dogovorio-o-deblokadi-ipa-sredstava/ar-13953/); ‘Dogovor Lagumdžije I Dodika o IPA fondovima', balkans.aljazeera.net portal, 26 Sept. 2011 (at: http.balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/dogovorlagumdzije-i-dodika-o-ipa-fondovima).

94. Srecko Latal, ‘Serb Leaders Quarrel over Bosnia's EU Path', Balkan Insight, 6 Apr. 2015.

95. ‘Vijece Ministara BiH Imenovalo Tim za Izradu Mehanizim Koordinacije', BHRT, 2 Jun. 2015 (at: www.bhrt.ba/vijesti/bih/vijece-ministara-bih-imenovalo-tim-za-izradu-mehanizma-koordinacije-2/).

96. In 2014 then Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vjekoslav Bevanda proposed a decision to amend the ‘Decision on the Establishment of Working Groups for EU Integration', to introduce representatives of certain cantons (Posavina, West Herzegovina, Herzegovina-Neretva and Canton 10; all of which have substantial Croat populations). SDP Ministers in the CoM did not adopt this decision, explaining it was another way of introducing a third entity in BiH. Bevanda then blamed the SDP for the country failing to have a coordination mechanism. ‘Bevandin ured pokušava uvesti treći entitet u mehanizam koordinacije', Depo portal, 21 Mar. 2014 (at: depo.ba/clanak/110021/bevandin-ured-pokusava-uvesti-treci-entitet-u-mehanizam-koordinacije); ‘Vjekoslav Bevanda: Bošnjačke stranke ne dopuštaju da Hrvati dobiju samo ono što im pripada', hrsvijet.net portal, 25 Mar. 2014 (at: www.hrsvijet.net/index.php/arhiva-clanaka-hrsvijetnet/137-arhiva-stari-hrsvijet-net-1/31788-vjekoslav-bevanda-bonjake-stranke-ne-doputaju-dahrvati-dobiju-samo-ono-to-im-pripada).

97. These talking points have made their way to civil society. In fact, one of the only open discussions on this matter in BiH, organized by the Vanjskopolitička Inicijativa BH (Foreign Policy Initiative BiH; VPI) with financial support from the UK Embassy, was titled, ‘Principles of an Efficient Coordination Mechanism in the EU Integration Process', tacitly accepting the notion that the existing DEI and Council of Ministers will be replaced by something consisting of the RS, and some other presumably ethno-national structures to be hammered out within the Federation. The title speaks volumes, eliminating from the discussion any links that might relate a coordination mechanism to the RS, or to Brčko District for that matter. It focuses primarily on coordination between the cantons, the Federation and the state, skirting the fact that this discussion is inherently political, and inextricably related to the Federation constitutional structure, and its position within the BiH constitutional structure. However, the VPI considers that the issue of a coordination mechanism is in fact not a constitutional question, arguing that the Federation as it is has the constitutional basis for an effective coordination mechanism to resolve issues and cooperate with the EU – again, if there is sufficient political will. See Vanjskopolitička Inicijativa BH, ‘Principles of an Efficient Coordination Mechanism in the EU Integration Process', Mar. 2015 (at: www.vpi.ba).

98. The author would like to thank Soeren Keil for this observation.

99. See the Dzankic article in this issue.

100. For a lively comparative of the EU's approach to conditionality vs. the conditionality of international football associations, see Laurence Cooley and Jasmin Mujanovic, ‘Changing the Rules of the Game: Comparing FIFA/UEFA and EU Attempts to Promote Reform of Power-Sharing Institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina', Global Society, 17 Nov. 2014, pp.42–63.