Particularized protection: UNSC mandates and the protection of civilians in armed conflict

ABSTRACT

The protection of civilians at risk in armed conflict has, since the late 1990s, become institutionalized at the United Nations (UN), gaining acceptance as a normative rationale for UN peacekeeping. However, the bulk of civilians in need of protection in armed conflict are unlikely to attain it. The article develops an argument on ‘particularized protection' – particularized in that UN Security Council (SC) mandates are formulated and adjusted over time to direct mission protection to specific subsets of civilian populations, that is, those relevant to the UN itself, the host state, other states, NGOs and the media, leaving most local civilians receiving little effective protection. Particularized protection, we argue, is a result of the institutional dynamics involving actors producing mandates – the UNSC – and those providing protection – peacekeeping missions – whereby mandates are specified to direct mission protection to selected, particularized groups. We demonstrate these dynamics in two cases, Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia.

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Acknowledgements

Support for research and writing is acknowledged from the University of British Columbia Liu Institute of Global Issues (both authors) and from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Yale University MacMillan Center (Shesterinina). Ashley Bowron provided valuable research assistance. The manuscript benefited substantially from review by Katharina Coleman, Arjun Chowdhury, Walter Dorn, Eva Busza, Michael Schroeder, Margaret Karns, Stewart Prest, Chris Tenove and Elise Leclerc-Gagne. Any errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

About the authors

Anastasia Shesterinina is a Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow at Yale University's MacMillan Center Program on Order, Conflict and Violence. Her current research focuses on foreign fighter mobilization in civil wars and post-conflict patterns of violence. Anastasia holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of British Columbia. Her fieldwork–intensive doctoral dissertation examines violent mobilization across the pre-, civil war and post-war stages in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Anastasia's parallel project explores international intervention in armed conflict. As part of this research, she worked at the Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt on the links between peacebuilding, democratization and civil violence. Her collaborative and co-published work with Brian Job has examined norms of civilian protection in armed conflict. Anastasia's research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada, the Security and Defence Forum, Yale University's MacMillan Center, the University of British Columbia and the Liu Institute for Global Issues.

Brian L. Job is Professor of Political Science and currently Associate Director, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, having previously served as Director of the Liu Institute for Global Issues and the Centre of International Relations. His teaching and research agenda proceeds on two dimensions: the development and implementation of norms regarding human security, R2P and the protection of civilians, with particular attention to the role of emerging powers; and the evolution of the Asia Pacific security order with attention to multilateral security cooperation. Job is active in regional, Track 2, unofficial diplomacy, having served as Regional Co-chair and Canadian Member Committee Chair of the Council for Security Cooperation of the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). He established and directed the Canadian Centre for Human Security. He currently is Co-Editor of Global Governance and serves on the editorial boards of International Relations of the Asia Pacific and the International Journal.

Notes

1. Brahimi Report (UN, Report of the Panel, 5).

2. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians, para. 8.

3. UN Office of Internal Oversight Report (UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 18).

4. General UNSC resolutions on POC include Resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006) and 1738 (2006). POC was implemented for the first time in Resolution 1270 (1999) on Sierra Leone. UN, Review of the Reporting, para. 11.

5. UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 3.

6. UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 5.

7. See, for example, Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection; Giffen, Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit; Reynaert, MONUC/MONUSCO. See also Barnett and Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question.

8. Kelly with Giffen, Military Planning to Protect Civilians, 13. See also Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?’.

9. UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 3.

10. Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?.

11. Holt and Taylor with Kelly, Protecting Civilians.

12. UN, Evaluation of the Implementation. See also White, ‘Empowering Peace Operations; Marks, ‘The Pitfalls of Action.

13. We surveyed the UN document database (www.un.org/en/documents) to identify and review 34 UN and UN-authorized missions across 18 conflict areas with mention of civilian protection in UNSC Resolutions since 1999, including most recently Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Somalia and South Sudan. Earlier cases were excluded as the UNSC ‘did not explicitly direct peacekeepers to “protect civilians” [ … ] in mandates prior to 1999’. Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?, 201. A full list of cases is available upon request. See also Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?, Table 5–1, p. 87, Annex 1, pp. 201–24; UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 5.

14. While we recognize challenges in distinguishing civilians from combatants in situations of armed conflict (Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection, 14–15), we define ‘civilians’ broadly as ‘persons who have not taken, or are no longer taking, a direct part in hostilities’ (Willmot and Sheeran, ‘The Protection of Civilians Mandate’, 525. See also Van Engeland, Civilian or Combatant?). We differentiate between groups of civilians (e.g. women and children, internally displaced persons (IDPs), state officials, foreign nationals, humanitarian workers and journalists) and view ‘UN peacekeepers as more analogous to civilians or non-combatants than to a party to the armed conflict’ (Willmot and Sheeran, ‘The Protection of Civilians Mandate’, 526).

15. Winckler, ‘Managing the Complexities’, 83. See also Campbell, ‘(Dis)integration, Incoherence; Felix da Costa and Karlsrud, ‘“Bending the Rules”'; Winckler, ‘Exceeding Limitations.

16. For the most recent UN report, see UN, Uniting Our Strengths.

17. See UN, The Causes of Conflict; UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Protection for Humanitarian Assistance; UN, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 1999.

18. UNSC Resolution 1270 (1999). See also UN, Review of the Reporting, para. 11. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) defines POC more broadly ‘as a “whole-of-mission” effort under three tiers: protection through political process, protection from physical violence, and establishing a protective environment’ (UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 6). We focus on the second tier – protection of civilians from physical violence. Of the combatant, humanitarian, UNSC and peacekeeping notions of protection, we focus on UNSC decisions to extend protection to civilians caught up in conflict through mandates and the provision of protection by UN and UN-authorized peacekeeping missions on the ground (Breakey, ‘The Protection of Civilians').

19. UN, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 1999. See also UN, Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.

20. UNSC Resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) concerning POC generally; 1325 (2000) concerning women and children; 1502 (2003) concerning violence against UN, associated and humanitarian personnel; 1674 (2006) recognizing the role of regional organizations; 1738 (2006) condemning attacks against journalists. A recent presidential statement on POC is UN, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 2014.

21. Security Council Report (SCR), UN Documents www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/protection-of-civilians.

22. We follow Betts and Orchard in defining institutionalization as ‘the way in which norms emerge at the international level and become reflected in international law and organizations’ (Betts and Orchard, ‘Introduction’, 1). On institutionalization of POC at the UN, see Paddon, ‘Peacekeeping in the Congo. For an alternative account of the development of the concept, see Orford, ‘Who Decides?'.

23. Thirty-nine of 41 relevant resolutions in 2014 incorporated POC language, following 29 of 29 in 2013 (Security Council Report (SCR), Cross-Cutting Report No. 1, 3–4).

24. Bellamy and Williams, ‘The New Politics', 826.

25. UN, Implementation of the Recommendations, para. 40; UN, DPKO/DFS Policy.

26. These issues are addressed in ongoing thematic and country-specific discussions at the UN, including biannual open debates on POC, activities of the informal expert group ‘in connection with the renewal of relevant UN mandates’, and briefings by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ‘for consideration in the drafting of country-specific resolutions’ (SCR, Cross-Cutting Report No. 1, 3–4).

27. Hultman, ‘UN Peace Operations', 60.

28. Townsen and Reeder, ‘Where Do Peacekeepers Go?’.

29. Hultman et al., ‘United Nations Peacekeeping', 876; see also Kathman and Wood, ‘Stopping the Killing.

30. UN, Uniting Our Strengths, ix.

31. Brahimi Report (see UN, Report of the Panel, para. 63). See also UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians, para. 8; UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, 2; UN, Uniting Our Strengths, para. 101.

32. See note 13 above.

33. Typically the UNSC ‘limits the realm of the mission's responsibility to protect civilians to “within its area of deployment” and “within its capacity”’ (Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?, 86).

34. A mission may still operate under Chapter VII, this authorization given for reasons other than POC.

35. See note 20 above.

36. Brahimi Report (UN, Report of the Panel, para. 63). See also Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?’, 14.

37. UN Security Council Resolution 1528, 27 February 2004, para. 6(j). Note that Resolution 1528 also has substantial ‘declaratory’ protection components. Its preamble ‘Reaffirm[s] also its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1379 (2001) and 1460 (2003) on children in armed conflicts as well as its resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts’ and para.6 ‘decides’ to include protection of ‘United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians’.

38. ‘Defending Peacekeeping Mandates’.

39. Brahimi Report (UN, Report of the Panel, para. 62). See also UN, Uniting Our Strengths, para. 90.

40. UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, 1.

41. See note 7. Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?; Holt and Taylor with Kelly, Protecting Civilians.

42. See n.13 above.

43. We draw on Barnett and Finnemore's view of the UN as an organization ‘with its own internal logic and behavioral proclivities’ (Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 4).

44. Lipson, ‘Performance under Ambiguity’, 259–60.

45. Barnett and Finnemore (Rules for the World, 8) call this ‘a search for symbolic legitimacy rather than efficiency'.

46. UN, Protection of Civilians, 17; interview with former UN official, 1 August 2013; personal correspondence with Walter Dorn, 23 July 2013.

47. Breakey, ‘The Protection of Civilians', 52.

48. Ki-Moon, ‘Human Protection'; UN, Uniting Our Strengths, para. 174.

49. Brahimi Report (UN, Report of the Panel, para. 266).

50. Malan and Hunt, ‘Between a Rock’, 2.

51. Gray, ‘Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report', 278. See also Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 8.

52. Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?, 3–4, emphasis in original. Dielh and Druckman (‘Peace Operation Success', 215) summarize peacekeeping goals as ‘violence abatement, conflict containment, and con­flict settlement'. See also Hirschmann, ‘Peacebuilding in UN.

53. Breakey, ‘The Protection of Civilians', 52.

54. Bellamy and Williams, ‘The New Politics’.

55. Lipson, ‘Performance under Ambiguity’, 259.

56. Gill, ‘Legal Aspects’, 39. See also UN, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 2010 Substantive Session.

57. Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication, 301.

58. Brahimi Report (UN, Report of the Panel, para. 104); personal correspondence with Katharina Coleman, 19 July 2013. See also Cunliffe, ‘The Politics of Global Governance'.

59. Gray, ‘Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report’, 267. The problem was identified in the Brahimi Report (UN, Report of the Panel, para. 61), acknowledged in UNSC Resolution 1327 (2000) and again emphasized in a recent UN report (UN, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2014, 48–9).

60. Lipson, ‘Performance under Ambiguity’, 258.

61. Ibid., 253.

62. Holt and Taylor with Kelly, Protecting Civilians, 76.

63. Mission protection from physical violence is typically realized through deterrent military presence, day and night foot, vehicular and air patrols, establishment of safe areas, escorting and evacuation, use of force and preventive information-gathering (see, for example, Holt and Taylor with Kelly, Protecting Civilians, 166; UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, 9–10).

64. Reynaert, MONUC/MONUSCO.

65. UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 15.

66. UN, Implementation of the Recommendations, para. 30.

67. See, for example, Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?, 83.

68. UN, Implementation of the Recommendations, para. V.1.

69. Holt and Taylor with Kelly, Protecting Civilians, 165.

70. Felix da Costa and Karlsrud, ‘“Bending the Rules”’, 308. On the HQ–mission disconnect, see also Winckler, ‘Protectionism within the Organization‘; Campbell, ‘(Dis)integration, Incoherence'; Lipson, ‘Performance under Ambiguity'.

71. UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 23.

72. Gray, ‘Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report, 280. ‘This partial transfer of authority [from the UNSC to TCCs] results in complex multilayered command structures’ in peacekeeping missions (Gill, ‘Legal Aspects', 37) and raises serious ‘questions about the division of power between the Security Council and troop-contributors’ (Gray, ‘Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report’, 267).

73. Winckler (see. n.15 above), 89.

74. See Shesterinina, ‘Evolving Norms’.

75. UN, Implementation of the Recommendations, para. 47.

76. UN, Evaluation of the Implementation, para. 31.

77. UN, Implementation of the Recommendations, para. 47.

78. UN, Third Progress Report, para. 15.

79. Other communication tools are used as well, including daily, weekly and monthly situation reports, code cables and informal interactions. However, SG reports constitute the main reporting channel between the UNSC and the mission. See Winckler (n.15 above).

80. Winckler (see. n.15 above), 96. See, for example, UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. On the role of the SG, see Chesterman, Secretary or General?; Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General; Goulding, ‘The UN Secretary-General'.

81. Weschler, ‘UN Peace Operations', 41.

82. Campbell and Kaspersen, ‘The UN's Reforms’, 479. See also Winckler (n.15 above); Peck, ‘Special Representatives; De Conig, ‘Mediation and Peacebuilding'. Bellamy (‘The Responsibility to Protect’) discusses the importance of SRSGs in the case of Somalia.

83. Winckler (see. n.70 above), 80–2.

84. Karlsrud, ‘Special Representatives’, 525. See also Felix da Costa and Karlsrud, ‘“Bending the Rules”’, 299.

85. ‘SRSGs roles are often conflicting, with overlapping mandates and duties without resources, and the context contingencies rarely allow for consistent action’ (Sisk, ‘Introduction’, 238). See also Winckler (n.70, 82)

86. Interview with a senior UN official, Human Rights Watch, ‘Country on a Precipice’, 24.

87. Security Council Report (SCR), Cross-Cutting Report No.3, 25.

88. Of the cases (see note 13) surveyed for this study, we select Côte d'Ivoire, where wide variation on the outcome of particularized protection allows us to trace the institutional dynamics behind it, and Somalia, where the institutional dynamics may have differed due to the complexities of past engagement and present situation. Case studies that follow are based on a comprehensive review of relevant UN documents.

89. Tardy, ‘Hybrid Peace Operations', 110.

90. For conflict background and analysis, see, for example, Bellamy and Williams, ‘Local Politics.

91. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Trapped between Two Wars'.

92. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire, paras 71–2.

93. Holt and Taylor with Kelly, Protecting Civilians, 159. The National Armed Forces and the Forces Nouvelles represent two central sets of actors involved in the armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire.

94. UN, First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire, paras 5–6, 37–8; UN, Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire’, 2003, paras 13–14.

95. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission, para. 61.

96. UN, Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, 2004.

97. UN, First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, para. 10.

98. Ibid., para. 17.

99. Ibid., para. 71.

100. Ibid., para. 19.

101. Ibid., para. 34; UN, Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, 2004, paras 3–4. See also Holt and Taylor with Kelly, Protecting Civilians, 298.

102. UN, Protecting Civilians, paras 17–18, 23.

103. UN, Fifth Progress Report, para. 65; Bellamy and Williams, ‘The New Politics', 831.

104. UN, Third Progress Report, para. 78.

105. UN, Fourth Progress Report, para. 26.

106. UN, Fifth Progress Report, paras 71–2. See also UN, Sixth Progress Report, paras 13, 26; UN, Seventh Progress Report, paras 33, 40.

107. UN, Eleventh Progress Report, para. 20.

108. See UNSC Resolutions 1765 (2007); 1795 (2008); 1826 (2008); 1865 (2009); 1880 (2009).

109. UN, Sixteenth Progress Report, para. 34.

110. UN, Twenty-Fourth Report, para. 54.

111. UNSC Resolution 1962 (2010), para. 15.

112. UNSC Resolution 1975 (2011), para. 6.

113. Bellamy and Williams, ‘Local Politics', 274.

114. Ibid., 265.

115. On the situation in Somalia and UN response in the 1990s, see, for example, Boulden, Peace Enforcement, 51–82.

116. See Stepanova, ‘Trends in Armed Conflicts', 46–52 www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB0902.pdf.

117. SCR, Cross-Cutting Report No.3, 2–3.

118. See UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Pursuant to Paragraphs 3 and 9.

119. Williams, ‘Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom’, 522. See also UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, UN doc., S/2007/658, 2007, para. 43; Lotze and Kasumba, ‘AMISOM and the Protection’, 21.

120. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, UN doc., S/2007/381, 2007, para. 101.

121. SCR, Cross-Cutting Report No.3, 27.

122. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, UN doc., S/2009/132, 2009, paras 56, 67. See also UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1863, paras 82–7.

123. See UNSC Resolutions 1801 (2008); 1814 (2008); 1816 (2008); 1831 (2008); 1838 (2008); 1846 (2008); 1851 (2008).

124. See, for example, UNSC Resolutions 1838 (2008); 1851 (2008).

125. UNSC Resolution 1863 (2009), para. 6a–d.

126. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, para. 39.

127. UN, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1846, para. 27.

128. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, UN doc., S/2009/373, 2009, para.72. See also UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, UN doc., S/2008/178, 2008, paras 44, 77.

129. UNSC Resolution 1910 (2010), preamble, 2, para. 17, emphases in original.

130. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, UN doc., S/2007/658, 2007, para. 29. Note that the first mention of Al Shabaab in the UNSC resolutions appears in 1907 (2009) on Djibouti.

131. SCR, Cross-Cutting Report No.3, 24. Targeted sanctions were extended in Resolution 2002 (2011) to include the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and targeting of civilians.

132. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, UN doc., S/2010/675, 2010, para. 29.

133. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, UN doc., S/2010/234, 2010, para. 24.

134. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, UN doc., S/2010/675, 2010, para. 72.

135. UNSC Resolution 2010 (2011), para. 7. The Council ‘urge[d] AMISOM to continue to undertake its efforts to prevent civilian casualties and to develop an effective approach to the Protection of Civilians’.

136. For example, in UNSC Resolution 2036 (2011), the Council ‘welcomes the progress made by AMISOM in reducing civilian casualties during its operations’ (para. 17, emphasis in original).

137. See UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, UN doc., S/2011/549, 2011, para. 28; UNSC Resolution 2060 (2012).

138. See UNSC Resolution 2067 (2012); 2077 (2012).

139. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, UN doc., S/2012/283, 2012, para. 91.

140. Lotze and Kasumba, ‘AMISOM and the Protection’, 20.

141. UN, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, para. 36.

142. Studies have begun to address these issues. See n. 15.

143. UNSC Resolution 2169 (2014) extending the mandate of UNAMI is the latest in the string of resolution ‘strengthening’ the condemnation of acts of violence against civilians. For Syria, the language of UNSC Resolution 2191 (2014) is similarly limited to ‘condemning’ attacks on civilians and ‘demanding’ the withdrawal of foreign fighters – this as the destruction of life and property continues to grow.

144. UN, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace.

145. Baines and Paddon, ‘“This Is How We Survived”.

146. Gorur, ‘ Community Self-Protection Strategies'.