All necessary means to what ends? the unintended consequences of the ‘robust turn’ in UN peace operations

ABSTRACT

A ‘robust turn’ in UN peace operations has ushered in a new generation of missions that are epitomized by increased authorization and willingness to use force towards the protection of vulnerable civilians and the implementation of stabilization strategies. This forceful transformation has important implications for not only particular components of the peace support effort but the overall endeavour. However, the potential unintended consequences remain underexplored and require further attention. This article examines the impacts of this so-called ‘robust turn’ in UN peace operations. The first section maps trends in modern peace operations that comprise the ‘robust turn’. It proceeds to explore a range of repercussions precipitated by these trends with particular focus on unintended consequences. The article concludes by identifying the associated implications for specific missions as well as the peacekeeping endeavour as a whole. It argues that the unintended consequences of the robust turn present significant principled and practical challenges for mission architects and managers, as well as their political masters, in achieving unity of effort in UN peace operations. It further argues that this could have ramifications for the future reputation, substance and viability of UN peacekeeping.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to all interviewees who generously gave their time to inform this research. He would also like to thank Mark Malan, Peter Nadin, Luisa Ryan, Melanie Moore and Katie Linnane for constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this article, as well as the anonymous reviewers and the journal editors for their suggestions that helped to improve this manuscript. Some of the research that contributed to this article was funded through an Australian Research Council Discovery Project [DP160102429].

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the author

Charles T. Hunt is Vice-Chancellor’s Research Fellow at the Centre for Global Research in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Melbourne, and honorary Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. His research focuses on peace operations, security and justice sector reform in conflict-affected societies and impact assessment in stabilization, peacebuilding and development programming. His most recent book is UN Peace Operations and International Policing: Navigating Complexity, Assessing Impact and Learning to Learn (Routledge, 2015).

ORCiD

Charles T. Hunt http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3172-3901

Notes

1 In this article I understand UN peace operations to encompass the wide range of mission types deployed under a UN flag, blurring the lines between traditional understandings of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement.

2 UN, ‘Report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’ (henceforth, HIPPO), x.

3 Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 173–6.

4 A notable exception was the ONUC mission in the Congo – 1960–64.

5 UN, Brahimi Report, 51. See Malan, ‘Concise Conceptual History’, 20. The extension of ‘self-defence’ to include defence of the mandate was actually first introduced for UNEF II by Kurt Waldheim in 1973 but never gained traction among troop contributing countries. Muscular force mission postures were, however, emblematic of the new missions created in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Haiti and Liberia at the turn of the century.

6 UN, New Partnership Agenda.

7 UN, Capstone Doctrine, 19. Emphasis added by author.

8 HIPPO, 29, para. 108. In this context, ‘spoilers’ are defined as: ‘those who lie outside and seek to undermine the peace process including through violent means’.

9 UN OIOS, Evaluation of the Implementation, 1.

10 UNSC Resolution 2086 (2013), 3–4, para. 8; see also Sloan, ‘Evolution of the Use’.

11 Bellamy and Hunt, ‘Twenty-First Century UN’, 1279–80.

12 Tardy, ‘Critique of Robust Peacekeeping’.

13 For a guide to evolving thinking, see UN, Draft DPKO/DFS Concept Note.

14 Peter, ‘Between Doctrine and Practice’, 352.

15 Hunt, ‘UN Peace Operations’, 2.

16 For full explanation of this political strategy, see Guéhenno, Fog of Peace.

17 For instance, in South Sudan the robust protection response to outbreak of civil war has led to displaced people flooding into UN bases/protection sites so that UN police became central to the response.

18 UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013), 6, para. 9. Principles of peacekeeping commonly agreed to be: consent; impartiality; and the minimum use of force.

19 UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013), 9, para. 18.

20 UN Security Council Resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2149 (2014). Author interview with official from UN DPKO, New York, Feb. 2015.

21 ‘Civilians Caught in Crossfire during Port-au-Prince Raids.’ Independent, 2 Feb. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/civilians-caught-in-crossfire-during-port-au-prince-raids-434723.html.

22 Amnesty International, ‘CAR’.

23 Mincieli, ‘UN's Unprecedented Gamble’.

24 See UN, Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

25 Author correspondence with MONUSCO official, May 2016.

26 Author interview with official from UN DPKO Office of Military Affairs, New York, Feb. 2015. See also Aust, ‘UN Human Rights’.

27 Oxfam International, Observers No More?

28 Author interview with CARE International official, Geneva, Sept. 2015.

29 Author interviews with DPKO officials, New York, Feb. 2015.

30 For reaction to attack on UN compound in Baghdad, Iraq and report following attack on UN base in Algeria, see UN, ‘Towards a Culture of Security’.

31 See Willmot et al., Safety and Security Challenges.

32 Author interviews with UN DPKO officials, New York, Feb. 2015. See also Haq, ‘Statement at the Fourth Committee’.

33 The UN has not become a party to the conflict between the DRC government and the various rebel groups in the eastern provinces, but instead has become a party to a new conflict that it has created by joining the fight (in partnership with the DRC government and FARDC). Interview with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) official, Geneva, Sept. 2015.

34 See Sheeran and Case, Intervention Brigade.

35 Author interview with UN DPKO official, New York, Feb. 2015.

36 Reuters, ‘Mali Islamist Group’.

37 Al-Jazeera, ‘UN Peacekeepers Killed’.

38 Dionne Searcey and Adam Nossiter, ‘Deadly Siege Ends after Assault on Hotel in Mali.’ New York Times, 20 Nov. 2015. www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/world/africa/mali-hotel-attack-radisson.html?_r=0.

39 As well as other attacks in Mali (see Cisse, ‘Mali Hotel Attack’) UN humanitarian workers were among those killed in attacks on UN protection sites in South Sudan in Feb. 2016 (see Reuters, ‘Fighting at U.N. Compound’). See also AWSD, ‘Aid Worker Security Report’.

40 Karlsrud, ‘UN at War’.

41 Action Contre la Faim (ACF), ‘Consequences of the Structurally’.

42 Bellamy, ‘Are New Robust’.

43 Hofman, ‘Evolution from Integrated Missions’.

44 Jennings and Kaspersen, ‘Introduction’.

45 Metcalfe et al., UN Integration; Stoddard et al., ‘Providing Aid’.

46 For more detail, see Smirl, Spaces of Aid.

47 Interviews by author with officials from MSF and ICRC, Geneva, Sept. 2015.

48 Author interview with official from MSF, Geneva, Sept. 2015.

49 ACF, ‘Consequences of the Structurally’.

50 UN, ‘Human Rights Up Front’.

51 Author interview with UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) official, Geneva, Sept. 2015.

52 Human Rights Watch, ‘Darfur’.

53 Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan's New War’.

54 The case of Côte d’Ivoire presented similar issues, particularly in the aftermath of the demise of Gbagbo when it is generally believed that victor's justice has prevailed and the human rights reporting by United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire on abuses by Ouattara affiliated militia was at best ineffective and at worst misrepresentative. See Hunt, ‘Côte d’Ivoire’.

55 Piccolino and Karlsrud, ‘Withering Consent’.

56 Author interviews with officials from Oxfam, CARE International and UN OCHA, Geneva, Sept. 2015. See also ACF, ‘Consequences of the Structurally’.

57 Author interviews with UN DPKO officials, New York, Feb. 2015.

58 Vogel, ‘Islands of Stability’.

59 Malan and Hunt, ‘Between a Rock’, 17–18.

60 Gordon, ‘Security Sector Reform’.

61 For a more detailed explication of these issues, see Richmond, Failed Statebuilding.

62 Guéhenno, Fog of Peace.

63 For example, in Madagascar since 2009.

64 The FIB was originally conceived as an inter-position force by the ICGLR, a position adopted by SADC but ultimately integrated under the mandate and chain of command of MONUSCO.

65 Author interview with UN DPA official, New York, Feb. 2015.

66 Guéhenno, Fog of Peace.

67 For instance, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) claim to represent a particular community of people as do many of the Mayi Mayi groups operating in eastern DRC.

68 For excellent exposition of this in the case of the DRC, see Autesserre, Trouble with the Congo.

69 UN, HIPPO, x.

70 NB: President Obama's conference on contributing to peacekeeping at 70th Anniversary General Assembly, Sept. 2015.

71 Bellamy and Williams, ‘Explaining the National Politics’.

72 UN, HIPPO, 9–10, para. 38.iii.