A European return to United Nations peacekeeping? Opportunities, challenges and ways ahead

ABSTRACT

This introductory article outlines the main rationale of the Special Issue and places the topic of the so-called ‘European Return to United Nations Peacekeeping’ in the wider context of recent policy developments and conceptual discussions related to the literature on UN troop contributions. It then outlines some of the key findings of the nine case studies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) included in this issue. The article concludes that despite a recent engagement of a group of European countries in the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), expectations of a large-scale ‘return of Europe’ to UN peacekeeping are premature. While the MINUSMA experience will certainly spark important discussions and developments related to the future of UN peacekeeping and Western contributions, European countries will continue to commit only selectively troops on a case-by-case basis and only if a wide range of facilitating factors align as much as they did in the Mali case.

Introduction

During recent years, and in particularly in the context of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the draw-down of major troop commitments of European countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) operation in Afghanistan, there have been wide-ranging discussions, hopes and speculations about the possibility of a marked increase in the European supply of troops and capabilities to United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping. While European countries had been at the forefront of shaping the beginnings of UN Peacekeeping in the early 1950s and 1960s, sustained contributions throughout the Cold War and saw their biggest combined numbers of troops deployed in the mid-1990s, the supply of European boots on the ground declined sharply after the wind-down of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia in 1995. As a result of their negative experiences in Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans, European countries shifted their political and military attention to alternative fora, such as NATO and from 2003 the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).¹ Even groups of countries with a strong UN-focused tradition, such as the ‘Nordics’ Finland, Sweden and Norway, invested more heavily into EU initiatives during the early 2000s, while Denmark increased its involvement in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).² As a result – and with a few exceptions such as the reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2006 – European countries supplied little more than ‘token contributions’ to blue helmet operations during the last two decades.³

As a result, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has stepped up its efforts to persuade partners across Europe to enhance their contributions to blue helmet operations.⁴ These efforts have not only been aimed at the member state level, but also at the promotion of far-reaching inter-organizational initiatives and action plans with the EU.⁵ In 2011, the UN opened its first permanent Liaison Office for Peace and Security (UNLOPS) in Brussels order to facilitate a constant dialogue with EU and NATO representatives, and national delegations.⁶ It is important to keep in mind that the goal has not only been the increase of numbers of European troops on the ground, but the emphasis has increasingly been placed on the potential contributions of ‘critical enablers’ or high-value ‘niche capabilities’, such as formed police units, attack helicopter units, tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and ‘information fusion units’, medical evacuation capacities, counter-IED companies as well as robust force protection, strategic airlift and rapid reaction capabilities.⁷

However, such cost-intensive resources have not only been rather limited across Europe itself, but the majority of these capacities were tied up during the last decade in EU CSDP activities as well as NATO’s ISAF operation. This is one of the core reasons why the systematic reduction of troop numbers in Afghanistan since December 2014 – as a result of the transition from ISAF to ‘Resolute Support’ – on the one hand, and the slowing down of EU CSDP activities since 2010 on the other hand have been regarded as a potential ‘window of opportunity’ for a ‘European return’ to UN peacekeeping.⁸ High-level initiatives at the political level, such the European regional consultations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in Brussels in February 2015, the ‘leaders summit on peacekeeping’ convened by US President Barack Obama and Ambassador Samantha Power in September 2015 and the follow-up summit in London in September 2016 have all underlined the political attention given to the issue of increasing Western and European troop contributions to the UN. On the field level, given the decision by the Dutch government to contribute from April 2014 onwards both a significant number of troops (up to 400) and key enablers to the MINUSMA operation in Mali and given the ‘knock-on effects’ the Dutch presence has had on other European troop contributors, the debate on a ‘European return’ to blue helmet operations has received another important dimension and impetus.⁹

Rationale of the Special Issue and clarification of key concepts

The editors of this Special Issue convened in 2014 an international Collaborative Research Network (CRN) of think tanks, policy-makers, academics and country experts in order to examine the opportunities, challenges and further potentials of a selected group of European countries’ stronger engagement in UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁰ The three-year project, funded by the University Association of Contemporary European Studies (UACES), aimed to complement existing research projects and policy-oriented activities on the supply of troop contributors by focusing in particular on the European dimension.¹¹ The articles in this Special Issue have emanated from discussions with policy-makers and peacekeeping scholars during the project’s workshops and policy round-tables and combine the author’s long-standing theory-informed research with more recent insights gained from field visits as well as wide-ranging interviews with UN staff and senior officials in European capitals.

The main rationale of this collection of articles is to provide in-depth case studies of a selected sample of European countries in order to assess the opportunities, challenges and future possibilities of a ‘European return to UN peacekeeping’. The articles consist of both policy papers and theory-guided research in order to connect the analysis of recent and policy-oriented developments to wider and more general theoretical debates on the supply of peacekeeping troops and on the history, track-record and future potentials of European approaches to blue helmet operations. Authors were asked to set current discussions into the historical context of the specific country’s approach to UN peacekeeping, examine facilitating and inhibiting factors related to the country’s decisions to deploy troops and assess the likelihood of a stronger engagement in the future. This also includes a comparative analysis of competing organizational frameworks and of the extent to which preferences for operations under the EU or NATO banner place strains on the countries commitments to the UN. Finally, authors were asked to provide an initial assessment of what their country’s experience in MINUSMA indicates about the opportunities and challenges of a European return.

What do we mean by a ‘European return’ to UN peacekeeping?

Even though the phrase of a ‘European return’ to UN peacekeeping has become common in policy-making and think tank circles, it is neither uncontroversial nor easy to define or operationalize for research purposes. At the policy level, European decision-makers and national officials tasked with peacekeeping portfolios have argued that their country in question ‘has never really left the UN Peacekeeping family – so it makes no sense to talk about a return’.¹² Such line of argumentation rests on the fact that indeed most European countries have continued throughout the last two decades to provide at least some numbers of troops to UN operations or have contributed to the UN peacekeeping budget. Yet, this perspective cannot mask the fact that, as outlined above, countries have often only provided ‘token contributions’ to UN missions while committing a significantly higher number of troops to EU or NATO operations at the same time. We follow Katharine Coleman’s definition of token contributions being ‘forty’ troops or less to any given mission.¹³ This is not to argue that small numbers cannot make a difference. It depends on the type and quality of troops as well as the type of critical enablers that come with the contribution. A strong commitment to UN peacekeeping also does not merely find its expression in the supply of troops in absolute numbers or relative to commitments to alternative fora, but also in the official national discourse, policy guidelines and even attitudes of senior policy-makers in defence ministries and ministries of foreign affairs. Last but not least, a country’s commitment to UN peacekeeping can also be gauged from the number of senior positions (e.g. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Force Commander) provided, which may or may not result in more troops supplied by the same country (see below). In the final analysis and despite the importance of the outlined aspects above, we argue that the numbers of troops supplied do matter as an important indicator for gauging a country’s concrete commitment to UN peacekeeping. Placing a significant number of troops in harm’s way and sharing the burden of troops on the ground not only underlines the importance attached to a specific mission by national policy-makers, it also opens up the possibility for a more focused and more concrete dialogue about the positive and negative aspects of the implementation of peacekeeping in the field. Furthermore, focusing on troop numbers as a key indicator – while also allowing authors the freedom to focus on other factors – provides a contribution to the wider and increasingly rich scholarship on troop contributions (see below).

Overall, we define a ‘European return to UN Peacekeeping’ as a systematic and long-term commitment to blue helmet operations, consisting of troop deployments beyond ‘token contributions’, the provision of critical enablers as well as support among European policy-makers and the wider public. Since the word ‘return’ implies also an absence from peacekeeping or a commitment on a lower scale compared to contributions made by the same countries during the Cold War or the 1990s, authors were asked to provide a concise analysis of the historical track-record of their country’s peacekeeping approaches before assessing current and future potentials and constraints.

While the case of MINUSMA provides important insights into the opportunities for a wider participation of European countries, it is also crucial to keep in mind that one mission on its own cannot serve as a reliable indicator for a systematic ‘return’ nor should it serve as a basis for wider generalizations. As the case of the European enhancement of UNIFIL in 2006 highlighted, a strong commitment to one operation does not necessarily signify a general, systematic and structural commitment to other or future operations. While commentators at the time welcomed the fact that the Europeans – led by Italy and France – increased their collective contributions to 70 per cent of the mission’s total troop strength, the European ‘rediscovery’ of peacekeeping in this very specific case did not translate into a wider ‘return’ to UN peacekeeping more generally.¹⁴ More problematically, the insistence of the Europeans on restructuring the organizational design of the operation – including the set-up of a European strategic cell within DPKO and the redesigning of Command and Control structures – led to significant frictions and fundamental disagreements between the UN Secretariat and European troop contributors.¹⁵ Similarly, the brief experiences of European contributions to MINUSMA so far have also underlined core challenges, frustrations and tensions between European contributors used to NATO standards, non-Western participating countries and UN officials.¹⁶ Whether or not the current trend related to MINUSMA can be translated into a more systematic ‘European return’ to UN peacekeeping will also depend on the extent to which the Europeans, non-Europeans and the UN system can agree on common standards, draw the right lessons and promote collective adaptation and improvements.

Case study selection

While the potential relevant sample for the research focus of this Special Issue could consist of at least 30 EU or NATO member states that could be classified as ‘European’, we decided to focus on nine country case studies capable of generating enough varied insights into the opportunities, challenges and future potentials of a stronger European commitment to UN peacekeeping. In the selection, we tried to strike a balance between countries that had a reputation as a strong UN peacekeeping contributor in the past (such as the Nordic states Denmark, Norway and Sweden as well as Ireland), UN Security Council members (France and the United Kingdom (UK)) as well as the Netherlands as a key driver behind the European contributions to MINUSMA. Germany and Italy were chosen for slightly different reasons. While both countries have been advocating a permanent UN Security Council seat for themselves, they have also been at the forefront of promoting stronger inter-organizational relations between the EU and the UN in peacekeeping.¹⁷ Most importantly, however, Italy was the key motor behind the European enhancement of UNIFIL in 2006 and therefore warrants further analysis in terms of the potentials and limitations of a systematic return. Germany has not only assumed a pre-eminent political role in European foreign affairs, but has also undergone far-reaching transformations in the military and security policy realms and decided to contribute, in close cooperation with the Dutch contingent, to MINUSMA. While the nine case studies have generated important and to some extent representative insights, we are also aware of their limitations and the need for connecting the collective conclusions of this Special Issue to future research on other European countries’ contributions to UN peacekeeping.

Link to wider policy-oriented and theoretical research on UN troop contributions

By examining the rationales, facilitating and inhibiting factors as well as future potentials of behind the decisions of a selected number of European countries to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations, this Special Issue also hopes to contribute to the wider scholarly debate on the supply of UN troops.

After initial attempts during the 1990s to provide more general explanations of motivations and rationales of a country’s decision to deploy troops, the topic has generated significant interest among both policy-oriented and theory-minded scholars during the last five years. Early studies focused mostly on two broad themes: motivations influenced by ‘idealism’ or a commitment to world peace on the one hand and ‘self-interest’ or ‘realism’ on the other.¹⁸ This dichotomous debate provides some basic explanations in terms of ‘liberal institutionalism’ and an altruistic commitment to uphold the UN system through ‘humanitarianism and peacekeeping’ on the one hand and an instrumentalist approach, guided by power politics, to utilize UN peacekeeping for the purposes of national interest on the other.¹⁹ Thus, in this view, idealist countries either contribute troops – or indeed provide ‘cosmopolitan militaries’²⁰ – in order to offer their share to the maintenance of international peace or participate in peacekeeping in order to ‘establish, preserve or increase a state’s own position and power base in the world’.²¹ Of course, many scholars acknowledge that a country might pursue mixed motives and act out of both a desire to increase its image and prestige in international affairs, while at the same time seeking to contribute to regional or international peace. Indeed, both public goods theory (viewing peacekeeping and the establishment of international peace as a shared international public good that also satisfies self-interest)²² and military-bureaucratic approaches stress that rationales for contributing can be influenced by idealist/liberal and at the same time realist self-interested reasoning. In more recent analyses of ‘small states’ search for relevance’ and the bureaucratic dynamics between foreign and defence ministries, several scholars underline that countries decide to deploy to UN peacekeeping operations in order to enhance their socially constructed national interest and status within the UN, values and conceptions of international peace and security,²³ but also to either promote cooperation with other powers (and members of subregional organizations) or to prevent other regional powers from gaining too much influence within a particular region.²⁴ During the last three years, more nuanced and differentiated studies of different rationales for ‘providing for peacekeeping’ have emerged. Philip Cunliffe offers a critical analysis of how Western and UN Security council powers maintain the status quo by instrumentalizing peacekeeping contributions by the ‘global south’.²⁵ In addition, he also argues that ‘peacekeeping can be used to boost a state’s standing in seeking one of the elective, rotating seats on the Security Council’, a past practice of many European countries.²⁶ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams offered one of the most systematic and encompassing frameworks for examining ‘the politics, challenges and future of United Nations peacekeeping contributions’ by distinguishing between five main categories of rationales: political, economic, security, institutional and normative. This framework captures and synthesizes most of the preceding theoretical research on the topic while providing an important template for exploring key facilitating and inhibiting factors.²⁷

Despite the advances made in theory-guided and more conceptually oriented research on troop contributions, we agree with Bellamy and Williams’ conclusions that the search for general theories of UN peacekeeping contributions will remain ‘quixotic’.²⁸ One major reason remains the importance of the specific circumstances and characteristics of a particular operation at the time as well as the complex interaction of a variety of internal motivations and external factors at the international, organizational, inter-organizational, national, bureaucratic and public opinion levels. Member states do not only balance carefully domestic interests with multinational demands, but also respond differently to cooperation requests from bilateral or regional partners. Furthermore, as the case of the Netherlands highlights, often a commitment to contribute emerges from context-specific factors at the individual level, such as the appointment of a national politician to a UN operation’s leadership post. However, while this factor, i.e. the appointment of Bert Koenders as Special Representative of the Secretary-General of MINUSMA, led in the Dutch case to the generation of up to 400 troops, the similar factor (appointment of the Danish General Michael Lollesgaard as Force Commander) did not lead to a significant increase of Danish troops for the same operation. Thus, similar factors do not lead to the same outcomes, but depend on the specific domestic circumstances and other contributing factors. Despite all advances in the excellent scholarship of the last 50 years, it is also important to keep in mind what Herbert Nicholas observed as early as 1963 in one of the first comparative case studies of UN peacekeeping operations: often UN deployments and member state contributions are ‘due in large parts to a series of happy accidents’.²⁹

As this special issues highlights, the series of ‘happy accidents’ in the case of European contributions to MINUSMA were not only the presence of the Dutch – and the robust presence of the French forces in their parallel non-UN operation – which generated significant knock-on effects on its closest allies, but also regional and domestic security calculations and – for some countries – the presence of small-scale EU missions. Yet, none of these factors proved decisive enough to explain the country’s specific decision-making rationales without an in-depth assessment of their own national perspective and domestic configurations.

We therefore hope that the collective insights generated by the nine in-depth analyses in this Special Issue shed further light on specific facilitating and inhibiting factors and thereby help to contribute to the refinement and further advancement of existing conceptual and policy-oriented research on UN Troop contributions.

Overview of contributions to this Special Issue

The first two articles of the Special Issue focus on the two European permanent members of the UN Security Council: France and the UK. In his article on France, Thierry Tardy offers a narrative of French policy vis-à-vis the virtues and limits of UN peacekeeping operations. In particular he analyses the dichotomy between the political role that France plays at the UN Security Council and its general absence from UN-led operations. According to Tardy, France’s strategic priorities, its preference for unilateralism and other institutional frameworks as well as the persistent scepticism towards UN peacekeeping make a French return to peacekeeping very unlikely.

David Curran and Paul D. Williams outline in their article on the UK the core challenges that explain the UK’s limited contributions since the 1990s. Chief among them are constraining internal decision-making processes, strategic priorities that favour non-UN approaches and the widespread perception among military leaders that the operational capabilities available to UN operations remain limited. The authors nevertheless conclude that recent events indicate that there are ‘real but not insurmountable’ factors that might lead to an increase in the UK’s contributions.

Joachim A. Koops places Germany’s decision to contribute to MINUSMA into the wider historical context of its development as a ‘cautiously evolving contributor’. While its increasing power and international influence were for a long time not matched by commensurate contributions to UN peacekeeping, it has nevertheless advanced deployments as a tool for internal changes and adaptations of its traditional ‘culture of military restraint’. The article highlights the facilitating factors of bilateral relationships, multilateral pressures and bigger ambitions as an international security actor.

In her article on Italy, Giulia Tercovich presents the four turning points that characterized the Italian engagement in UN peacekeeping. Despite political and normative support for the UN, changing Italian efforts in the field are explained in terms of recurring changes in the country’s foreign policy priorities. Italian contributions could increase in the future as a result of three key factors: the Mediterranean as a re-emerging priority, the Italian involvement in UN negotiations with Libya and the Italian candidacy for a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council elections.

Niels van Willigen explores the case of the Netherlands’s recent ‘return to UN peacekeeping’ as well as the historical track-record of its previous political and military involvement in UN peacekeeping. While the country’s contributions waxed and waned throughout the Cold War, the catastrophic experience with UNPROFOR in the mid-1990s still acts as a negative influence in Dutch decision-making. Yet, the country’s recent experience as a leading European troop contributor in Mali and its close cooperation with NATO allies in providing niche capabilities could provide an important impetus for future contributions.

Raymond Murphy argues in his analysis of Ireland that the country stands out compared to its European allies as a consistent contributor to UN peacekeeping ever since its first deployment in 1958. As a neutral country, UN peacekeeping has become a key ingredient of Ireland’s security identity and the UN has been the key focus organization of the military. Yet, the articles explore a wide range of challenges that prevents Ireland from increasing its contributions in the future.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen analyses Denmark’s ‘glorious past and dim future’ as a UN peacekeeper and challenges some of the common assumptions about the country as a willing and substantive troop supplier. The article outlines crucial post-Bosnia shifts in the Danish peacekeeping identity, from a UN focus to stronger involvement with NATO and great powers (US, UK, France). The article argues that a strong Danish return to UN peacekeeping remains unlikely and would require substantive presence of other NATO allies.

Kristina Zetterlund and Claes Nilsson explore the dramatic shifts and changes in Sweden’s contributions to UN peacekeeping since 1948 and assess the relative decline since the mid-1990s as a result of growing commitments to EU- and NATO-led operations. While the participation in MINUSMA meant a cautious re-engagement with UN peacekeeping, changing security threats in Sweden’s immediate neighbourhood, financial constraints and commitments to NATO will make a systematic and significant future contribution unlikely.

Finally, John Karlsrud and Kari Osland re-assess Norway’s track-record as a historically firm supporter of UN peacekeeping in the light of competing commitments to NATO as well as recent decisions to contribute niche capabilities to MINUSMA. Pursuing a policy between self-interest and solidarity, the strong bilateral relations with the US and the resulting commitment to NATO have become a stronger part of Norway’s organizational menu of choice. For a greater re-engagement in UN peacekeeping a range of institutional, political and material obstacles need to be overcome.

Taken together, the articles in this Special Issue highlight that all-too optimistic expectations about a grand and systematic return of European countries to UN peacekeeping might be misplaced. With the possible exception of Ireland, the different country case studies highlight that 20 years of cooperation within the alternative NATO and EU frameworks have left their marks on the Europeans’ strategic and operational thinking, perceptions and expectations. Despite the draw-down of ISAF and the slowing down of EU CSDP activities, key decision-makers in the capitals still view both organizations as the preferred framework for their security activities. Yet, UN peacekeeping has not been completely abandoned, but is also seen as a viable option within an organizational menu of choice. Despite a wide range of domestic constraints and some residual reservations towards UN peacekeeping in general, a mutual learning curve in the context of MINUSMA could serve as an important impetus for a more structured, more concrete and more open dialogue between the Europeans, the UN and other troop contributing countries. If this is embraced as an opportunity rather than a threat and if future European regional security concerns overlap even more with the operational area of blue helmet operations, then the ‘European return to UN Peacekeeping’ could be more substantial and longer lasting than simply a one-off engagement.

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank Luca Nuvoli for his assistance in this project as well as Philip Cunliffe for his excellent comments and support.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

About the authors

Joachim A. Koops ([email protected]) is Dean of Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), a Research Professor at the VUB’s Institute for European Studies (IES) and Director of the Global Governance Institute (GGI).

Giulia Tercovich ([email protected]) is an Erasmus Mundus Fellow, GEM PhD School in Globalization, the EU and Multilateralism at the University of Warwick (UK) and the Université Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium). She is also a Senior Analyst in the Peace and Security Section of the Global Governance Institute (GGI).

Additional information

Funding

The editors gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies for the international Collaborative Research Network, which convened the international network underpinning this Special Issue.

Notes

1 Koops, “Military Crisis Management.”

2 Jakobsen, “The Nordic Peacekeeping Model.”

3 Katharine Coleman defines token contributions as ‘less than forty troops’. Coleman, “Token Troop Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” 48–9.

4 International Peace Institute, “Enhancing European Military and Policy Contributions to UN Peacekeeping,” 2.

5 Hummel and Pietz, “Partnering for Peace.”

6 Koops and Tardy, “The United Nations’ Inter-organizational Relations in Peacekeeping,” 64.

7 UN Force Link, “Uniformed Capability Requirements for UN Peacekeeping,” 1–7; HIPPO, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, 26; EEAS, Strengthening UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping, 6.

8 Smith and Boutellis, “Rethinking Force Generation,” 5.

9 Karlsrud and Smith, “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa?”

10 For further information, see the project website on http://www.globalgovernance.eu/work/projects/europe-return-to-un-peacekeeping/.

11 See, for example, the ‘Providing for Peacekeeping Project’ at http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org.

12 Interview with Belgian senior official of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 17 May 2014; Interview with German senior military advisor, 26 Jan. 2016, Berlin; Remarks by Hannu Teittinen, Defence Policy Unit, Finnish Ministry of Defence at the ‘UN-ZIF-EUISS: High level seminar on peacekeeping – a dialogue with EU troop contributing countries’ on 13 July 2016 in Brussels. Transcripts available from editors.

13 Coleman, “Token Troop Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” 48–9.

14 Mattelaer, for example, did not refer to a ‘return’, but instead preferred the phrase that ‘Europe rediscovered UN Peacekeeping’ – see Mattelaer, Europe Discovers Peacekeeping?

15 Ibid., 25–6.

16 Karlsrud and Smith, “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa?” 5–14.

17 Italy was behind the landmark ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management’, while Germany was the initiator of the ‘Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management’ of Sept. 2007, both of which laid the foundations for a wide range of far-reaching cooperation initiatives. See Novosseloff, “EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping.”

18 Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping?”; Monnakgotla, “The Naked Face of UN Peacekeeping.”

19 Pugh, “Humanitarianism and Peacekeeping.”

20 Elliott and Cheeseman, Forces for Good.

21 Noack, “UN Peace-keeping,” 188.

22 Bobrow and Boyer, “Maintaining System Stability.”

23 do Céu Pinto, “A Small State’s Search for Relevance.”

24 Sotomayor Velázquez, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not.”

25 Cunliffe, Legions of Peace.

26 Ibid., 177.

27 Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers.

28 Ibid., 436.

29 Nicholas, “UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe,” 323.