Strange Battlefield Fellows: The Diagonal Interoperability Between Blue Helmets and the Congolese Army

ABSTRACT

The literature on peacekeeping has paid scant attention to the interaction between peacekeeping troops and host country military. Addressing this gap in scholarly knowledge, this paper conceptualizes such interaction as ‘diagonal interoperability’. The latter is situated in-between ‘horizontal interoperability’ on the one hand, relating to interaction between different components of a peacekeeping mission, and ‘vertical interoperability’ on the other, referring to the relations between international peacekeepers and ‘peace-kept’ populations. The paper focuses on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where UN forces and the Congolese army are engaged in joint military operations and army reform is part of the peacekeeping mission’s mandate. Studying both mutual representations and joint practices, the paper explores the organizational, political, discursive, and security-related factors that shape diagonal interoperability. It concludes that diagonal interoperability between the two forces is weak, as reflected in mutual distrust and ‘not-so joint’ joint operations. Perhaps surprisingly, it finds that shared military identities do not seem to facilitate collaboration. Rather, mutual perceptions of the ‘military Other’ are infused with discourses of cultural and political difference, therefore accentuating the power asymmetries that undermine diagonal interoperability.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the author

Judith Verweijen is an FWO Postdoctoral Fellow based at the Conflict Research Group at Ghent University in Belgium. She specializes in the study of militarization, the micro-dynamics of civilian–military interaction, and the internal workings of state and non-state armed forces in the eastern DRC, where she has conducted regular field research since 2010.

Notes

1 Autesserre, “Going Micro.”

2 This line of enquiry was pioneered by Moskos, Peace Soldiers.

3 Early attention to these themes can be found in Galtung and Hveem, “Participants in Peace-Keeping Forces” and Heiberg and Holst, “Comparing UNIFIL and the MNF.”

4 Jennings, “Life in a ‘Peace-Kept’ City”; Jennings and Bøås, “Transactions and Interactions.”

5 Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished”; Paddon Rhoads, Taking Sides in Peacekeeping.

6 General Assembly of the UN Security Council, Identical Letters.

7 Ben-Ari and Elron, “Blue Helmets and White Armor.”

8 Verweijen, “Ambiguity of Militarization.”

9 For an explanation of the FARDC command chain and the 2011 reform process that transformed brigades into regiments, see Verweijen, “Ambiguity of Militarization.”

10 Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, “Volatility.”

11 Rubinstein, Keller, and Scherger, “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions.”

12 Elron, Shamir, and Ben-Ari, “Why Don’t They Fight Each Other?”

13 Rubinstein, “Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping.”

14 Ben-Ari and Elron, “Blue Helmets and White Armor.”

15 Duffey, “Cultural Issues.”

16 Ben-Ari and Elron, “Blue Helmets and White Armor,” p.297.

17 See also Moskos, Peace Soldiers.

18 Higate and Henry, Insecure Spaces.

19 Ibid.

20 Jennings, “Blue Helmet Havens.”

21 Pouligny, Peacekeeping Missions Seen from Below; Autesserre, Peaceland; Higate and Henry, Insecure Spaces.

22 Even while anachronistic when referring to the mission before 2010, this contribution uniquely employs the designation MONUSCO for the sake of simplicity.

23 While on 30 June 2015, total uniformed personnel was 19,784, Security Council resolution 2277 (2016) of 30 March 2016 authorizes a deployment of 22,016 uniformed personnel. MONUSCO, “Facts and Figures.”

24 Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

25 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo; Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz, The National Army.

26 Pouligny, Peacekeeping Missions Seen from Below; Higate and Henry, Insecure Spaces.

27 Tull, “Peacekeeping”; de Vries, Going Around in Circles.

28 E.g. Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo; Reynaert, MONUC/MONUSCO and Civilian Protection; de Vries, Going Around in Circles; Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?

29 de Vries, Going Around in Circles, p.32.

30 Quick, Follies in Fragile States.

31 Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?

32 An example is the more robust approach adopted in Ituri in 2005 and 2006, see Cammaert and Blythe, The UN Intervention Brigade.

33 Tull, “Peacekeeping”; Cammaert and Blythe, The UN Intervention Brigade.

34 de Vries, Going Around in Circles.

35 Between 2007 and 2008, MONUSCO trained 12 FARDC battalions, see UN Secretary-General, Fourth Special Report.

36 Kets and De Vries, Limits; Onana and Taylor, “MONUSCO and SSR.”

37 Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished”; International Crisis Group, No Stability.

38 UN Secretary General, Thirtieth Report, p.4.

39 NGOs on DRC, “Too Much Lost.”

40 Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished.”

41 Verweijen, “Ambiguity of Militarization.”

42 Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished”; International Crisis Group, No Stability.

43 UN Secretary General, Thirtieth Report.

44 UN Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General, p.11.

45 Human Rights Watch, “Arrest Bosco Ntaganda.”

46 Olivier, “How M23 Was Rolled Back.”

47 Interviews FARDC lt.col. and maj., May 2016; Interview FARDC col., July 2015; Interview FARDC maj., July 2015. Such views were also circulated in the press, e.g. Le Palmarès, “Traque des FDLR.”

48 Interview FARDC lt.col., January 2012.

49 Interview FARDC sous-lt., April 2016.

50 Higate and Henry, Insecure Spaces.

51 Interview FARDC maj., March 2010.

52 Interview FARDC lt. col., April 2016.

53 Interview FARDC col., February 2012.

54 A recent report similarly highlights the dependence of MONUSCO on FARDC intelligence, see Spink, From Mandate to Mission.

55 Interview FARDC maj., November 2011.

56 Interview FARDC maj., February 2010.

57 Interview FARDC maj., March 2010.

58 There is a striking parallel with the ways in which MINUSTHA peacekeepers in Haiti are labelled ‘Turista’ peacekeepers. See Higate and Henry, Insecure Spaces.

59 Interview FARDC lt., November 2011.

60 Interview FARDC maj., March 2010.

61 This reading of the ONUC intervention is shared by certain scholars. E.g. Gibbs, “The United Nations.”

62 Higate and Henry, Insecure Spaces.

63 Reference is made to DDRRR, or the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement of foreign fighters.

64 Interview FARDC maj., December 2010.

65 Eriksson Baaz and Stern, “Willing Reform.”

66 Interview PakBatt officer, March 2010.

67 Interview IndBatt officer, January 2012.

68 Interview PakBatt officer, March 2010.

69 Interview IndBatt officer, January 2012.

70 Interview PakBatt officer, March 2011.

71 Interview PakBatt officer, March 2010.

72 Cf. Eriksson Baaz and Stern, “Willing Reform.”

73 Interview PakBatt officer, March 2011.

74 Interview IndBatt officer, January 2012.

75 Interview IndBatt officer, January 2012.

76 Interview PakBatt officer, March 2011.

77 Interview PakBatt officer, December 2010.

78 E.g. Ben-Ari and Elron, “Blue Helmets and White Armor.”

79 See also Spink, From Mandate to Mission.

80 Interview FARDC col., May 2010.

81 Interview human rights defender, March 2010.

82 Fieldwork observations South Kivu, December 2011.

83 Interview, European officer, April 2011.

84 Cf. Verweijen, “Ambiguity of Militarization.”

85 Interview PakBatt officer, January 2012.

86 Interview PakBatt officer, December 2010.

87 Interview Pakbatt officer, December 2010.

88 Interview PakBatt officer, March 2010.

89 Interview PakBatt officer, March 2010.

90 Interview COB commander, December 2010.

91 Interview FARDC col., March 2010.

92 Interview COB commander, December 2010.

93 Elron, Shamir, and Ben-Ari, “Why Don’t They Fight Each Other?”

94 Ben-Ari and Elron, “Blue Helmets and White Armor,” p.273.

95 Kets and De Vries, Limits.