Transnational State-Building in Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Strengthening or Shattering the Peace?^*

* The article proposes an empirical study, which is an in-depth comparison of two externally supported state-building initiatives. It analyses the link between state-building and the strengthening of peace, and the role played by foreign interventions in the process.

ABSTRACT

When civil wars end, political institutions are the main topics of conflict. The implementation of peace settlements often stall, and foreign sponsored initiatives might be put in place to build the state as to strengthen peace. This article aims to explain their impact. It proposes that post-conflict reconstruction follows a cycle, which alternates between phases of status quo, debate, and crisis. It argues this process is powered by the struggles between coalitions of political forces, including foreign parties, promoting their own understanding of the peace deal. It compares two cases of deeply divided societies located in a complex geopolitical environment: Lebanon and Bosnia-and-Herzegovina. The analysis focuses on the interrelations between foreign and domestic parties and their evolution by tracing the formation and collapse of transnational coalitions. It shows the major role these coalitions played in breaking the political deadlock and starting constitutional negotiations, but also in triggering a political crisis. The similarities between these otherwise unique cases highlight the limits set on foreign interventions, and explains how actors of the two environments interact. It concludes that if state-building initiatives under external influence can make significant gains, they leave the states highly vulnerable to political instability.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the author

Kathia Légaré has recently completed a PhD thesis on the role of transnational coalitions in post-conflict reconstruction of the state in Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina. She has published several chapters and articles on peace-building and the evolution of peace operations, and she is presently working on the role of informal institutions in post-conflict reconstruction and their impact on power-sharing structures. She is a lecturer at the Political Science Department of the Université Laval in Québec City.

Notes

* The article proposes an empirical study, which is an in-depth comparison of two externally supported state-building initiatives. It analyses the link between state-building and the strengthening of peace, and the role played by foreign interventions in the process.

1 See, among others, Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding.

2 See, for instance, the work of David Chandler, Oliver Richmond, etc.

3 Campbell and Peterson (“Statebuilding”) make a good summary of these propositions.

4 There are some notable exceptions, including both traditional as well as critical studies, for instance, studies by Narten (“Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”) and by Barnett and Züercher (“The Peacebuilder’s Contract”) Roger Mac Ginty has proposed interesting ideas about the ‘hybridity of peace’ (“Hybrid Peace,” 391–412), but has fallen short to show how this peace is taking form.

5 See Migdal. State in Society.

6 For instance, Latham, “Mapping Global/Local Spaces,” 139.

7 Some of the newspapers have been accessed through World News Connection, and translated into English. The review is wide enough to represent various political perspectives, but is constrained by accessibility. For a matter of readability, we have included only specific references. Reports from think tanks of different tendencies, for instance, the International Crisis Group and European Stability Initiative, as well as official documents from the UN, have been reviewed as well.

8 See Migdal, State in Society.

9 We are partly taking from social movements literature, especially McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly who define brokerage

as the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites. … it can also become a relational mechanism for mobilization during periods of contentious politics, as new groups are thrown together by increased interaction and uncertainty, thus discovering their common interests. (Dynamics of Contention, 142)

10 Among others, Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur in the introduction of Making States Work.

11 See Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics.

12 Rothchild, “Settlement Terms and Postagreement Stability,” 124.

13 Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon, 134.

14 Predominantly mixed before the war, populations have become homogeneous in most regions since 1995. See Calic, “Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes 1991–1995.”

15 The Constitution is included in the Dayton Peace Agreement (Annex 4). The RS is unitary and represented by a president and an assembly of 83 members. The Federation of Bosnia-and-Herzegovina is decentralized into 10 cantons, most of those along ethnically homogeneous.

16 Meetings between Syrian and American officials took place a few times before the Gulf War. See Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 261.

17 Rafiq Hariri will be Lebanon's prime minister from 1992 to 1998 and from 2000 to 2004.

18 Iran and Syria supported rival Shia militias in the late 1980s. Amal and Hezbollah fought each other during the war of the camps, and came to an understanding after several attempts under the sponsorship of Syria and Iran in November 1990, that is a few weeks after the Taif agreement was approved by the Lebanese legislature. See Lamloum, Retour sur les traces d’un conflit.

19 The PIC included 55 states, international agencies, and organizations. Its steering board includes the 11 most important contributors, in alphabetic order: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Presidency of the European Union, European Commission, and Organization of the Islamic Conference, represented by Turkey.

20 See Bildt, Peace Journey.

21 Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 261.

22 Débié and Pieter, La paix et la crise, 75.

23 Described by many analysts and by the United Nations Development Program 2009 report on Lebanon.

24 It gained its function as the ‘national resistance’ following 1996 Israeli military operation according to Picard (“Autorité et souveraineté de l’État à l’épreuve du Liban sud,” 32).

25 See Harik, “Syrian Foreign Policy … ”

26 The prime minister participates in the donors’ conferences, manage foreign financial assistance, control the Ministry of Finance and other organizations allocating funds to the reconstruction, especially the Council for Development and Reconstruction.

27 The two countries signed on 22 May 1991 the ‘Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Coordination’ according to which (article 5.3):

… the Governments of the two countries shall endeavour to coordinate their inter-Arab and international policies, to achieve the fullest co-operation in inter-Arab and international institutions and organizations and to coordinate their positions on the various regional and international issues.

28

The inter-party agreement became a mechanism with which the three national parties controlled personnel decisions in a wide array of organizations. Socialist era organizations, managed in large measure by the League of Communists, gradually came under the influence of three separate but parallel monopolistic patronage networks, each controlled by one of the nationally-based parties. … The three national parties were particularly intent on establishing control over Republican and local security organs. (Donia, Parties, Patronage and Constitutional Change in Bosnia and Hercegovina)

29 The way the three parties maintain control over institutions is well explained by ESI, Reshaping International Priorities, 1999. During the war, Bosniaks were the only group to consistently support the integrity of the state.

… the state administration was at first a domain of the SDA. The minimal investment in the state by the Croat and Serb nationalist parties coincided with their goal of keeping the state weak and the entities and cantons strong. The constitutional powers of the state were thus largely viewed as a ceiling up to which the state could evolve. (Bieber, “After Dayton, Dayton?”)

30 Especially Abd Halim Khaddam, responsible for the political affairs in Lebanon, who lost his job in 1998, and Ghazi Kanaan, the military commander and head of the intelligence service in Lebanon, who lost his position in 2002. Nassif, “Dossier: Abdul Halim Khaddam.”

31 See “Plavsic Views Relations with, ‘Meddling’ by Milosevic,” Belgrade BETA, 4 July 1997, etc. International support and of the role NATO played is well accounted in the press: “Plavsic – Gelbard – Holbrooke Meeting: Aid Those Who Respect Dayton Agreement,” AIM, August 8, 1997; “‘No Major Surprises’ Seen in RS Elections,” Belgrade BETA, September 3, 1998, etc. See also ESI, Reshaping International Priorities, 12; and Caspersen, “Contingent Nationalist Dominance.”

32 Peranic, “Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of RS.”

33 Two important Croatian figures supporting Bosnian Croat died in 1999, the president Franjo Tujman and minister of Defence Gojko Susak.

34 See Gosztonyi, “Non-existent States with Strange Institutions”; Grandits, “The Power of ‘Armchair Politicians’.”

35 Interveners made change to the electoral rules only weeks before the 2000 elections with the aim to weaken the nationalist parties. Ante Jelavic, head of the HDZ since 1998, contested these changes as aiming to marginalize the community (See Letter to the UN Secretary General, March 2000 A/54/777–S/2000/170). A referendum was organized in Bosnian Croat regions in parallel to the elections. Jelavic was later dismissed and one of the main financial institutions supporting the parallel institutions was dismantled with SFOR's assistance (‘Herzegovina Banka’). See Bieber, Croat Self-Government in Bosnia … .

36 Bougarel, “Fin de l’hégémonie du S.D.A.,” 48.

37 For instance, Hariri was close to France's president, Jacque Chirac, and had relations in Saudi Arabia where he made his fortune. Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon, 67.

38 The signatories of the Bristol Hotel gathering Declaration of the 14 December 2004 also included representatives from the Maronite formation Qornet Shehwan, Lebanese forces as well as Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement and the Kataeb (the Lebanese Palange Party), the Druze Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblat, along with small pro-democracy parties.

39 See Julia Choucair-Vizoso, “Lebanon,” in Beyond the Façade.

40 See Sharp, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East.

41 The candidates of the HDZ, SDS, and SDA won the seats of the collective presidency in 2002, as well as the biggest number of deputies from their respective community in the assembly.

42 See ICG, Bosnia's Alliance for (Smallish) Change.

43 Ashdown, “The Savage War,” Swords and Ploughshares, 247.

44 Including many high-level personalities with elected political positions, the police, the military, and the administration. The US also adopted sanctions against individuals seen as opposing reforms.

45 Aoun's party was the most popular among the Maronite in the 2005 elections.

46 As stated in the UN Third Semi-annual Report on the Implementation of SCR 1559 (2004).

47 The Resolution 1701, adopted on the 11th day of August 2006 was agreed by all members of the Council as well as Israel and Lebanon.

48 The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was set up in 1978 following Israel first invasion of Lebanon to monitor the country's withdrawal, assist the Lebanese government, and restore international peace and security. In 2006, its mandate and resources were enhanced. Among other task, it was to assist the LAF, secure the borders. A maritime task force was also created.

49 The European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe, “Opinion on the Constitutional Situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative.”

50 The proposed amendments included a series of changes to the functioning of the collective presidency, and of the upper and lower assemblies. The parties also agreed to formally expand the central government authority by creating new ministries. The package also proposed to give ‘the state government all authority necessary to implement all requirements for EU accession and membership’. Hays and Crosby, Dayton to Brussels, 9–10.

51 The Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution: ‘During the transitional phase … The sectarian groups shall be represented in a just and equitable manner in the formation of the Cabinet.’

52 The Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman discussed about the political cost of this military operation in a cable to Washington (classified as ‘confidential’) obtained via Wikileaks (Israeli Attacks on North Coast Bridge Hurt Embassy Operations).

53 It also includes Milorad Dodik's party, the SNSD, the Alliance of Independent Socio-Democrats.

54 See Toal, “Republika Srpska Will Have a Referendum,” 178.

55 The ESI web site describes Schwarz-Schilling as ‘one of the main supporters of ESI when it was set up in 1999’. See Knaus and Martin, “Lessons for Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 60–74.

56 In March 2007, UN special envoy Matthi Ahtisaari recommended that Kosovo should become independent under international supervision. Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008, but was not recognized by the Security Council. See FPI BH, “Bilateral Relations Between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.”

57 In at least in one instance, the Russian Federation expresses its dissent of the measures taken by the High Representative in a footnote of the Declaration by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, PIC SB political directors, Office of the High Representative, October 31, 2007.

58 See Catusse, Karam, and Lamloum, “Introduction.”

59 See ICG, Bosnia's Future.

60 Bosnia has been engaged in the accession process for many years now: it has been a ‘potential candidate’ since 2003, signed a Stability and Association Agreement which took nearly eight years to come into effects – and submitted a EU membership application in February 2016. For instance, no progress has been made to implement the Sejdic – Finci judgement for the European court of Human Rights from December 2009, which states that Bosnia's institutions are discriminatory since they deny minorities the right to be elected to many public offices.

61 Maïla, “Le Liban à la recherche d’un pacte civil.”

62 Bayart, La greffe de l’État, 19, which quoted Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley, and Migdal, State in Society, 23.

63 See Barnett and Züercher's paper.

64 For instance, the SFOR seized control of radio transmission towers of media hostile to Dayton, intervene to prevent protests, etc. It is during this period that NATO started to arrest individuals accused of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague.