The Credibility of European Union Military Operations’ Deterrence Postures

ABSTRACT

Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched eight military operations with an executive mandate in the framework of its European (now Common) Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP), all of which have utilized deterrence to fulfil their missions. Some have done so implicitly by having a mission that requires them to keep certain actors from doing something unwanted, whilst others have done so explicitly by having deterrence clearly mentioned as one of their core tasks in their mandates. Despite this, deterrence in the context of CSDP has been an almost totally neglected subject in the academic literature. Furthermore, the EU itself has tended to take the deterrence effect of CSDP operations for granted, which is dangerous because it may blind it to potential problems that may in fact be undermining their credibility. This article seeks to launch a more focused discussion on deterrence in the context of EU security policy by analysing the credibility of CSDP operations’ deterrence postures. Based on findings from case studies on operations Althea and Atalanta, it argues that CSDP operations’ deterrence postures lack credibility because they have insufficient resources for taking care of their deterrence tasks. Furthermore, they do not communicate threats effectively.

Acknowledgements

An early draft of this article was presented in a panel titled ‘EU Understandings of Defence and Security’ at the UACES 46th Annual Conference at Queen Mary University of London on 5 September 2016. The author would like to thank Dr Jocelyn Mawdsley for organizing the panel and commenting on the presented paper. Whilst revising the manuscript, the author benefited greatly from discussions he had with Dr Hylke Dijkstra and Prof Sophie Vanhoonacker at Maastricht University. The author would also like to thank the two reviewers’ for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the author

Dr Niklas I.M. Nováky holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Aberdeen. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at Maastricht University's Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASoS).

Notes

1 Hill, “The EU’s Capacity,” 320.

2 Freedman, Deterrence, 6.

3 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy, i.

4 Koepf, “The Problems,” 339; Interviews in Brussels, 2015–2016.

5 George and Bennett, Case Studies, 206.

6 Della Porta and Keating, “How Many Approaches,” 34.

7 Manners, “Normative Power Europe.”

8 Emerson and Gross, “Introduction,” 9.

9 EU, “Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP,” 60.

10 EU, “Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP,” 11; EU, “Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP,” 34.

11 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy, i.

12 On deterrence in the context of the deployment of CSDP operations see, for example, Germond and Smith, “Re-Thinking”; Riddervold, “Finally Flexing”; Dijkstra, Policy-Making; Engberg, The EU and Military Operations. On deterrence in the context of the lessons learned from them see, for example, Norheim-Martinsen, “Our Work”; Ehrhart and Petretto, “The EU, the Somalia Challenge”; Koepf, “The Problems”; Dembinski and Schott, “Converging Around Global Norms?”; Rodt, The European Union.

13 Mattelaer, The Politico-Military Dynamics, 42–79.

14 Germond and Smith, “Re-Thinking,” 589; Rodt, The European Union, 73.

15 Dembinski and Schott, “Converging Around Global Norms?,” 285; Ehrhart and Petretto, “The EU, the Somalia Challenge,” 275–6.

16 Norheim-Martinsen, “Our Work,” 22.

17 CEU, A Secure Europe; Report on the Implementation, 8.

18 CEU, “European Union Maritime Security Strategy,” 10.

19 Ibid.

20 EU, Shared Vision, 19.

21 Ibid.

22 CEU, “EU Maritime Rapid Response,” 5.

23 CEU, “EU Maritime Security Operations,” 7.

24 CEU, “EU Military Rapid Response,” 45.

25 CEU, “Concept for EU Monitoring Missions,” 6.

26 Nováky, “Why So Soft?,” 257–8.

27 Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence, 5.

28 EU, Shared Vision, 23.

29 Ibid., 23–4.

30 Ibid., 48, 51.

31 Juncos, “Resilience,” 12.

32 See, for example, Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited”; Knopf, “The Fourth Wave”; Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave”.

33 OED Online, s.v. “Credibility,” http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/44108?redirectedFrom=credibility& (accessed November 1, 2016).

34 Press, Calculating Credibility, 10.

35 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 259.

36 Walter, Committing to Peace.

37 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 55.

38 See, for example, Mercer, Reputation; Huth, “Reputations”; Tang, “Reputation”; Press, Calculating Credibility.

39 Tang, “Reputation,” 54.

40 See, for example, Kennedy, Deterrence and Crime Prevention.

41 Morgan, “Collective-Actor Deterrence,” 159.

42 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 172.

43 Morgan, “Collective-Actor Deterrence,” 163.

44 EU, “Consolidated Version,” 28.

45 EU, Shared Vision, 8.

46 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 177.

47 Ginsberg and Penksa, The European Union, 37.

48 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 36.

49 Ibid.

50 Hyde-Price, “Neorealism,” 22.

51 Saideman and Zahar, “Causing Security,” 8.

52 Ibid., 8–9.

53 Morgan, “Collective-Actor Deterrence,” 171.

54 See, for example, Gallois, The Balance of Terror, 109; Mercer, Reputation, 15.

55 Huth, Reputations, 74.

56 See, for example, Gallois, The Balance of Terror, 109; Mercer, Reputation, 15.

57 Stone, “Conventional Deterrence,” 110.

58 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 36.

59 See, for example, Bassuener and Ferhatovic, “The ESDP in Action,” 174; Zwolski, Rozée, and Kaunert, “‘Human Face’ or No Face?,” 306.

60 On the difference between deterrence through denial and punishment, see, for example, Freedman, Deterrence, 32–41.

61 Bertin, “The EU Military Operation,” 64.

62 UNSC, “Resolution 1575 (2004),” 4.

63 UNSC, “Resolution 2315 (2016),” 2–3.

64 EU, “Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP,” 11.

65 CEU, “2922nd Council Meeting,” 12.

66 See, for example, CEU, “Council Conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 3.

67 The second largest ESDP/CSDP military operation to date has been the 3300-strong EUFOR Tchad/RCA, which contributed to the establishment of a safe and secure environment in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR in 2008–2009.

68 “Admiral: Für Bosnien 7000 EU-Soldaten nötig,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 14, 2004, Nachrichten section, Munich edition.

69 Bassuener and Ferhatovic, “The ESDP in Action”; Bertin, “The EU Military Operation.”

70 Bassuener and Ferhatovic, “The ESDP in Action,” 174.

71 Ibid.

72 EUFOR, “About EUFOR.”

73 CEU, “Operation ALTHEA,” 5.

74 See, for example, Domm, “Next Steps”; Knauer, EUFOR Althea; Gros-Verheyde, “Le battlegroup.”

75 Domm, “Next Steps,” 58.

76 Ibid., 61.

77 Knauer, EUFOR Althea, 17.

78 Ibid., 21.

79 American official, in discussion with the author, Brussels, March 2012.

80 CEU, “EU Battlegroup Concept,” 9–10.

81 EUFOR, “Incident in Rogatica.”

82 Bassuener and Ferhatovic, “The ESDP in Action.”

83 FFP, Fragile State Index 2016, 6; IEP, Global Peace Index 2016, 11.

84 CEU, “Initial Public Master Messages,” 3.

85 Ibid.

86 CEU, “ESDP Mission,” 3.

87 EUFOR, “EUFOR Completes Successful Exercise.”

88 Gros-Verheyde, “Le Battlegroup.”

89 UNRCB, Public Opinion Poll Results, 46.

90 Bertin, “The EU Military Operation”; Kirchner, “Common Security and Defence Policy”.

91 See, for example, Kirchner, “Common Security and Defence Policy,” 48.

92 IISS, “Africa,” 306; Kraska, “International Law and the Future.”

93 IISS, “Africa,” 254.

94 EU, “Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP,” 37.

95 EU, “Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2082,” 54.

96 EU, “Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP,” 34.

97 USEU, “EU Preparing.”

98 Ehrhart and Petretto, “The EU, the Somalia Challenge,” 273.

99 Cook and Garret, “Somali Piracy”; EUNAVFOR, “Mission.”

100 Ehrhart and Petretto, “The EU, the Somalia Challenge,” 272.

101 Ibid., 275.

102 House of Lords, Combating Somali Piracy.

103 Ibid.

104 EUNAVFOR, “Operation Atalanta’s First Pirate Engagement.”

105 EUNAVFOR, “EU Naval Force Delivers.”

106 EUNAVFOR, “Key Facts and Figures.”

107 PSC Ambassador, in discussion with the author, Brussels, June 2011.

108 CEU, “EU Military Operation,” 3.

109 Ibid.

110 CEU, “Atalanta,” 5.

111 Ibid.

112 Hatcher, “Somali Pirates Find Life in Kenyan Jail”.

113 World Bank, Pirate Trails, 45.

114 EUNAVFOR, “European Union's Naval Force.”

115 IISS, “Sub-Saharan Africa,” 254.