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ABSTRACT
Why do international peace- and state-building interventions regularly fail to transform conflict-ridden countries into liberal states? This paper argues that interventionists’ practices and dependency on local intermediaries help explain the disappointing outcomes of intervention. Based on a relational theoretical approach and original empirical material, the paper compares two of the largest peace- and state-building interventions in recent years. For practical and normative reasons, peacebuilders need to find local partners who help them instil change. However, as partners of peace- and state-building interventions, local elites may appropriate international resources and use them to strengthen their own positions. Interventionists abstain from sanctioning such appropriation as long as their own short-term and purpose-oriented goals are not undermined. Contrary to assumptions in much of the literature, interventionists do not eagerly defend their alleged liberal agendas. Instead, their pragmatism strengthens existing neo-patrimonial figurations rather than fostering fundamental transformation. The paper argues that research should focus on peacebuilders’ actual practices rather than normative statements. Such an approach allows for a better understanding of evolving political orders in conflict societies.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Anne Menzel, Klaus Schlichte and the three anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Philipp Münch teaches Security Policy at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College in Hamburg. Previously, he worked as a research fellow at the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences and at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), where he conducted research on Afghanistan (Dr. phil. 2014, University of Münster).
Alex Veit is currently heading a research project on 'International interventions against sexual violence in conflicts: Intended and unintended consequences' at the University of Bremen. Previously, he undertook research at the Humboldt-University Berlin (Dr. phil. 2010) and the European University Institute in Florence.
Notes
1 The term ‘local’ is used here to describe all indigenous actors of an intervention host state, including political players on the national stage.
2 Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher, “Compromised Peacebuilding,” 613.
3 Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace.” See as a good overview of this strand of literature: Leonardsson and Rudd, “The ‘Local Turn’ in Peacebuilding.”
4 Richmond and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace, 1. See also MacGinty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 240.
5 See the following section.
6 Schlichte, Der Staat in der Weltgesellschaft, 292.
7 Elias, What Is Sociology?
8 E.g. Fukuyama, State-Building, 137; Fortna and Huang, “Democratization after Civil War.”
9 E.g. Lipson, “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?”; Rampton and Nadarajah, “A Long View of Liberal Peace.”
10 Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, 286.
11 Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding”; Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, “The End of History and the Last Liberal Peacebuilder.”
12 Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”; Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.
13 Paris, At War’s End, 289.
14 Autesserre, “International Peacebuilding and Local Success.”
15 Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, Illusion Statebuilding, 215.
16 Koddenbrock, “Recipes for Intervention.”
17 Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher, Compromised Peacebuilding, 609–13.
18 Richmond, and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace, 323; MacGinty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 240.
19 Weber, Economy and Society, 24–6.
20 See as a notable exception the study of Rayroux and Wilén, “Resisting Ownership” who point to the self-interest of interveners (EU) and local national level elites in Congo in implementing ‘local ownership’.
21 Sabaratnam, “Avatars of Eurocentrism.”
22 Weber, Economy and Society, 217–20, 231–7.
23 Von Trotha, Koloniale Herrschaft.
24 Médard, Etats d'Afrique Noire; Bayart, The State in Africa.
25 Pouligny, Ils Nous Avaient Promis La Paix.
26 Morrow, “Norbert Elias and Figurational Sociology.”
27 But see Linklater, “Global Civilizing Processes”; Mennell, “Realism and Reality Congruence.”
28 The following is based on Elias, What Is Sociology; Elias. “The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present”; Elias, The Civilizing Process.
29 Weber, Economy and Society, 212–54.
30 Médard, Etats d'Afrique Noire, 342–3.
31 Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison.”
32 In 2010, MONUC was renamed into ‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (MONUSCO).
33 Kaelble, “Historischer Vergleich.”
34 Dijkstra, International Organizations and Military Affairs.
35 In 2015, Ituri’s administrative status was changed from district to province.
36 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
37 Barfield, Afghanistan, 152–3; Holzwarth, “Segmentation und Staatsbildung in Afghanistan,” 225.
38 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 99–108, 119–22, 181–2, 220–1.
39 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 275–7.
40 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 278, 281–3; Barfield, Afghanistan, 261, 289–93, 304.
41 See the core strategic NATO/ISAF document for wording: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, SACEUR OPLAN 10302 (Revise 1), 1.
42 Stapleton, “A Means to What End?” 47–8.
43 Münch, Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, 164–70.
44 Larsdotter, “Exploring the Utility of Armed Force,” 361–3.
45 See for these tasks: Chiari, “A New Model Army,” 142–5.
46 Deutscher Bundestag, 16. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 16/2380, 10.
47 German senior officer, 2010, personal communication; Zudrop, “Der ‘Vernetzte Ansatz’,” 5–9, 8–9. We use the term ‘corruption’ only to describe interveners’ negative perspective on sometimes locally legitimate forms of neo-patrimonial material exchange.
48 Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention, 28, 31, 67, 81–90.
49 Former member of Kunduz Provincial Council, 2012, personal communication; former German intelligence officer, 2012, personal communication; Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, Policing Afghanistan, 90, 99.
50 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan, 2.
51 Groeters, German General Staff Officer Education and Current Challenges, 37.
52 Giustozzi and Orsini, “Centre-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan,” 8–9, 13.
53 Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention, 19, 51.
54 Chiari, A New Model Army, 142–3; Stachelbeck, “‘Serving at a Remote Outpost’,” 169.
55 Former DDR caseworker, 2012, personal communication; The Liaison Office researcher, 2011, personal communication; Hewad, “Legal, Illegal”; Giustozzi and Orsini, Centre-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan, 8–9.
56 Former senior Afghan intelligence official, 2012, personal communication; former German intelligence officer, 2010, personal communication.
57 Member of Afghan parliament, 2011, personal communication; “Focus on Warlordism in Northeast”; Schwitalla, Afghanistan, jetzt weiß ich erst … , 100–1.
58 Wilder, A House Divided?, 16–17; Electoral Complaints Commission of Afghanistan, Final Report, 14.
59 Auswärtiges Amt et al., Das Afghanistan-Konzept der Bundesregierung, 19.
60 Auswärtiges Amt, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, and Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Für eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung, 5.
61 Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention, 34–5; Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 17/4792, 12–19.
62 German senior officer, 2010, personal communication; German officer, 2010, personal communication; German intelligence officer, 2012, personal communication; UN official, 2013, personal communication; Embassy Kabul, “PRT/Kunduz.”
63 Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention, 31, 53–4.
64 Former European diplomat, 2013, personal communication; Röder and Saleem, Provincial Needs Assessment, 5.
65 Mirza Ali Darai, 2012, personal communication; Wahidullah Rahmani, 2012, personal communication; Broschk, “Dynamics of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Northern Afghanistan,” 46–8.
66 Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention, 31.
67 Stapleton, Disarming the Militias, 1–2, 11.
68 National Democratic Institute, The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, 38, 40; European Union Election Assessment Team, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 25, 27.
69 Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 16.
70 Giustozzi and Orsini, Centre-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan, 13; Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention, 64–5.
71 Young, Politics in the Congo, 438–74; Musambachime, “Military Violence Against Civilians.”
72 Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, 32–8; Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire, 228; Schatzberg, Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire; Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle.
73 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila; Turner, The Congo Wars.
74 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003); United Nations Secretary General, Second Special Report of the Secretary-General, §§48–54.
75 Turner, The Congo Wars; Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo.
76 BBC, “Congo Ambush Kills Nine UN Troops”; BBC, “UN Troops Strike Back in DR Congo”; MONUC officials 2005, personal communication.
77 Veit, Intervention as Indirect Rule, 146–86.
78 Baaz and Verweijen, “The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse.”
79 Sharou Sharif, personal communication; MONUC officials, 2006, personal communications.
80 MONUC officials and military officer, 2006, personal communications; Veit, “Figuration of Uncertainty.”
81 United Nations, unpublished security reports 2006; Modibu Traoré, 2006, personal communication; Sharou Sharif, 2005, personal communication; MONUC officials and military officers, 2006, personal communication.
82 EU commission official, 2005, personal communication; Olivier Mputu, 2005, personal communication; Sharou Sharif, 2006, personal communication; MONUC officials, 2005–2006, personal communication; local humanitarian worker, 2006, personal communication.
83 MONUC officials, 2005–2006, personal communication; MONUC military officers, 2006, personal communication; Belgian diplomat, 2005, personal communication; EU commission official, 2005, personal communication; former members of non-state armed groups, 2005–2006, personal communication.
84 Rayroux and Wilén, “Resisting Ownership”; John Penza, 2008, personal communication; human rights activist, 2008, personal communication; EU commission officials, 2005, personal communication; Belgian diplomat, 2005, personal communication; EU military officer, 2006, personal communication; MONUC official, 2006, personal communication; Eric Mankesi, 2006, personal communication.
85 UN Department of Safety and Security, Rapport Hebdomadaire; US Embassy, Ituri Update.
86 Vainqueur Mayala, 2006, personal communication; Boltanski, Minerais de sang, 150–2; US Embassy, Senior Advisor Shortley’s Meetings; Berwouts, “Congo: Military Reshuffle”; De Vries, Going Around in Circles.
87 Expatriate humanitarian worker, 2008, personal communication; human rights activist, 2008, personal communication; Radio Okapi, “RDC : L’opération conjointe FARDC-MONUSCO”; Radio Okapi, “Ituri: Diverses incursions des miliciens enregistrées en 2015.”
88 Weiss, “Voting for Change in the DRC.”
89 Trefon, “Uncertainty and Powerlessness in Congo 2012.”
90 Stearns, Qui sont les tueurs de Beni?