https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0924-1911
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ABSTRACT
Brazil’s role in UN peacekeeping operations has been subject to increasing attention from academics and policy makers alike. While some authors praise Brazil’s engagement in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a case of innovative South-South cooperation, others accuse Brazil of using Haiti as a ‘testing ground’ for repressive anti-gang tactics that have subsequently been introduced at home. This article challenges these two dominant views on Brazil’s role in Haiti. Based on a period of six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince and interviews with key Brazilian actors, the article draws a parallel between MINUSTAH’s military raids in gang-ruled neighbourhoods coupled with police reform in Haiti, on one hand, and the Pacifying Police Units (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora) plus the accompanying UPP Social in Rio de Janeiro, on the other hand. It is argued that Brazil’s peacekeeping strategy, at home and abroad, is a mix of coercive and cooperative measures reminiscent of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics already employed during the French colonial war in Algeria. Moreover, it is shown that policing techniques borrowed from the US are employed to ease the tension between carrots and sticks, notably so in the urban environment in which Brazilian peacekeeping is taking place.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Fiona Macaulay, Owen Greene and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Moritz Schuberth completed his PhD in Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. His research focuses on security governance, non-state armed groups, peacekeeping, statebuilding and urban violence. He is the author of recent articles in Africa Spectrum; Conflict, Security & Development; the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development; Contemporary Security Policy; Stability: International Journal of Security and Development; International Peacekeeping, and Environment and Urbanization.
ORCID
Moritz Schuberth http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0924-1911
Notes
1 Paris, “The Geopolitics of Peace Operations.”
2 Norheim-Martinsen, Brazil, 2.
3 Stuenkel and Tourinho, “Regulating Intervention.”
4 Malamud, “A Leader Without Followers?”.
5 Sánchez Nieto, “Brazil’s Grand Design”; Hirst and Nasser, Brazil’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations.
6 By ‘peacekeeping’, the author refers in this context not only to UN peacekeeping operations, but also to domestic efforts to ‘pacify’ and subsequently ‘keep the peace’ in gang-ruled neighbourhoods. As this article shows, the lines between the two are blurred, even though the Brazilian military or foreign policy community might not necessarily agree with this broad definition of peacekeeping.
7 Muggah, “The Effects of Stabilisation on Humanitarian Action in Haiti.”
8 Feldmann et al., “Lost in Translation.”
9 Kernic and Karlborg, “Dynamics of Globalization,” 731.
10 Sotomayor, “Peacekeeping Effects in South America,” 631.
11 Yazdani, Bercovitch, and Charles-Voltaire, “Knowledge Transfer on Urban Violence.”
12 Muggah and Szabó de Carvalho, The Southern Effect, 2.
13 Braga, “MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti,” 718; Kenkel, “South America’s Emerging Power,” 657.
14 Braga, “MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti,” 718.
15 Sánchez Nieto, “Brazil’s Grand Design,” 168.
16 Braga, “MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti.”
17 Hirst and Nasser, Brazil’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, 1, 4.
18 Author interview with Rubem César Fernandes, November 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
19 Bertazzo, “Brazilian Security and Defence Policy under President Dilma Rousseff,” 814.
20 Harig, “Synergy Effects,” 153f.
21 Hoelscher and Norheim-Martinsen, “Urban Violence and the Militarisation of Security,” 964.
22 Riccio et al., “Community Policing in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro.” A notable exception was the ‘pacification’ of Complexo do Alemão in November 2010, in which an impressive ‘combined force of two thousand seven hundred soldiers, and civil and military police’ were involved. See Foley, Pelo Telefone, 4. Moreover, Navy troops participated on the pacification of Rocinha and Vidigal in late 2011. See Denyer Willis and Mota Prado, “Process and Pattern in Institutional Reforms,” 238.
23 Hamann, Brasil e Haiti, 39.
24 The author used snowball sampling based on the networks and recommendations of initial contacts. The point of saturation was reached after the author had conducted 37 interviews with the military and civilian sections of MINUSTAH, Viva Rio and numerous international agencies working in gang-controlled neighbourhoods, but also with community leaders, religious leaders, current and former gang members, local NGOs, CSOs, peace workers and members of security forces.
25 Some authors have also highlighted that BRABATT combined a robust use of force with a comprehensive and culturally sensitive approach in Haiti, as epitomized by the Brazilian army’s motto ‘Strong Arm, Friendly Hand’ (‘Braço Forte, Mão Amiga’). See Kenkel, “South America’s Emerging Power.”
26 Schuberth, “Divergent Worldviews among Peacebuilders.”
27 Lacey, U.N. Troops Fight Haiti’s Gangs.
28 Colonel Marcus Jardim, cited in Human Rights Watch, Lethal Force, 38.
29 Sérgio Cabral Filho, cited in Gay, “From Popular Movements to Drug Gangs to Militias,” 29.
30 Schuberth, “The Challenge of Community-based Armed Groups.”
31 Author interview with Viva Rio, Pétion-Ville, November 2013.
32 Yazdani, Bercovitch, and Charles-Voltaire, “Knowledge Transfer on Urban Violence,” 461; Schuberth, “To Engage or Not to Engage Haiti’s Urban Armed Groups.”
33 MINUSTAH went through four distinct phases: (1) restoring peace and stability after the fall of Aristide, (2) pacifying gangs who had taken control over parts of Port-au-Prince; (3) rebuilding the justice and security sector; (4) providing humanitarian assistance after the 2010 earthquake. As Brazil’s contribution was most important for gang control, the argument presented in this section focuses primarily on the second phase.
34 Cockayne, “Winning Haiti’s Protection Competition.”
35 Moestue and Muggah, Social Integration Ergo Stabilization, 51.
36 Erickson, Exploiting Inequalities, 26.
37 Schuberth, “A Transformation from Political to Criminal Violence.”
38 Author interview with former social mobilization consultant, Pétion-Ville, October 2013. Translated from French by author.
39 Mobekk and Street, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, 3.
40 Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping.”
41 Perito, Haiti, 4.
42 Cockayne, “Winning Haiti’s Protection Competition,” 87.
43 Perito and Dziedzic, Haiti, 4.
44 Cockayne, “The Futility of Force,” 738.
45 Hammond, Saving Port-au-Prince, 21f.
46 Muggah, “The Effects of Stabilisation on Humanitarian Action in Haiti,” S449.
47 Hammond, Saving Port-au-Prince, 25, 42.
48 Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping,” 819.
49 Schuberth, “Growing the Grassroots or Backing Bandits,” 96. For a practitioner’s critique of this approach, see Garbino, “Quick Impact Projects.”
50 Muggah, “The Political Economy of Statebuilding in Haiti,” 297; Perito and Dziedzic, Haiti, 14.
51 Hammond, Saving Port-au-Prince, 16f.
52 Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping,” 817.
53 Cockayne, “Winning Haiti’s Protection Competition.”
54 Schuberth, “Beyond Gang Truces and Mano Dura Policies.”
55 Muggah and Souza Mulli, “Paving the Hills and Leveling the Streets.”
56 Human Rights Watch, Lethal Force, 4.
57 Muggah and Souza Mulli, “Rio Tries Counterinsurgency,” 64.
58 Huguet and Szabó de Carvalho, “Violence in the Brazilian Favelas and the Role of the Police,” 104–7.
59 Leeds, “Rio de Janeiro,” 31f.
60 Author interview with Colonel Ubiratan Angelo, November 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
61 Felbab-Brown, “Crime–War Battlefields,” 149.
62 Serrano-Berthet et al., Bringing the State Back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 35.
63 Author interview, November 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. On GAPE, see also Ribeiro, “O Nascimento da Polícia Moderna.”
64 Pinto and Do Carmo, “The Pacifying Police Units of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UPPs),” 122; Rodrigues, “The Dilemmas of Pacification,” 4.
65 Werling, Rio’s Pacification, 4. Cano and Ribeiro, “Old Strategies and New Approaches,” 370.
66 Foley, Pelo Telefone, 37.
67 Serrano-Berthet et al., Bringing the State Back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 124.
68 Halais, Pacifying Rio.
69 Muggah and Souza Mulli, “Paving the Hills and Leveling the Streets,” 204.
70 Lessing, “When Business Gets Bloody,” 66f.
71 Author interview with Rubem César Fernandes, November 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
72 Author interview with Colonel Ubiratan Angelo, November 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
73 Muggah and Souza Mulli, “Paving the Hills and Leveling the Streets,” 211.
74 Denyer Willis and Mota Prado, “Process and Pattern in Institutional Reforms,” 232.
75 Serrano-Berthet et al., Bringing the State Back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 119f.
76 von Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti.”
77 Donais, “Back to Square One,” 270; Muggah, “The Political Economy of Statebuilding in Haiti,” 296.
78 After then-President Michel Martelly promised to reestablish the Haitian military in 2011, incumbent President Jovenel Moïse formally reconstituted the Defence Force of Haiti in October 2017.
79 Kolbe and Muggah, “Securing the State,” 229.
80 Fortin and Pierre, “La Réforme de la Police Nationale”. Following the earthquake, Brazilian peacekeepers were incapable of shifting their focus from public security to humanitarian assistance, which prompted the U.S. to deploy over 2,000 forces to restore airports and roads. See Sotomayor, The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper.
81 Author interview with International Rescue Committee, Pétion-Ville, October 2013.
82 Author interview with MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, November 2013.
83 Author interview with Viva Rio, Pétion-Ville, October 2013. Translated from French by author.
84 Author interview with Colonel Ubiratan Angelo, Pétion-Ville, November 2013.
85 Ibid.
86 Donais and Burt, “Peace-building in Haiti.”
87 Laurince, Rapprocher la Police.
88 Yazdani, Bercovitch, and Charles-Voltaire, “Knowledge Transfer on Urban Violence,” 465.
89 Author interview with Colonel Ubiratan Angelo, Pétion-Ville, November 2013.
90 UN OIOS, Audit of the Community Violence Reduction Programme, p. 6.
91 Author interview with CVR section of MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, October 2013. Translated from French by author.
92 Donais and Burt, “Peace-building in Haiti,” 14.
93 Author interview with Viva Rio, Pétion-Ville, November 2013.
94 International Crisis Group, Keeping Haiti Safe, 13.
95 Ball, “The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda,” 33f.
96 Moore, “Problem-Solving and Community Policing.”
97 Author interview with Rubem César Fernandes, November 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
98 Author interview with Colonel Ubiratan Angelo, November 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
99 Author interview with Rubem César Fernandes, November 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
100 Harig, “Synergy Effects between MINUSTAH and Public Security in Brazil,” 145, 52.
101 In the cases where military troops have been involved in the pacification of Rio’s favelas, it has been estimated that between 60% and 90% had previously been deployed to Haiti. See Kenkel, “Conclusions,” 194f; Hirst and Nasser, Brazil’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, 4.
102 Felbab-Brown, “Crime–War Battlefields”; Halais, Pacifying Rio.
103 Task Team on South-South Cooperation, Colombia.
104 Author interview with international expert, Haiti, October 2013. Even though CVR in Haiti has been praised by practitioners as a role model for DDR interventions in comparable settings, its track record has been decidedly mixed. See Schuberth, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Unconventional Settings.”
105 Rid, “Razzia,” 617.
106 Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins.” French colonial COIN has often been portrayed as overly coercive as compared to the alleged minimum force used in British colonial COIN operations, even though a growing number of authors is questioning this distinction. See Porch, Counterinsurgency.
107 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, xv.
108 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 62.
109 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 265.
110 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains.
111 Felbab-Brown, Bringing the State to the Slum, 6.
112 Muggah and Souza Mulli, “Rio Tries Counterinsurgency,” 64.
113 It can be argued that in addition to wielding the sticks, BRABATT has also been distributing carrots in the form of quick impact projects and civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) activities aimed at providing assistance to the local population.
114 Author interview with Colonel Ubiratan Angelo, Pétion-Ville, November 2013.
115 Smith, The Utility of Force.
116 Howland, “Peacekeeping and Conformity with Human Rights Law.”
117 Kolbe and Hutson, “Human Rights Abuse,” 870.
118 Author interview with former DDR officer, Haiti, October 2013. Translated from French by author.
119 Amnesty International, You Killed My Son, 7.
120 Muggah and Souza Mulli, “Paving the Hills and Leveling the Streets.”
121 Lessing, “When Business Gets Bloody,” 70.
122 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 38.
123 Author interview with MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, November 2013.
124 It should be noted that together with the HNP, MINUSTAH continued to engage in joint operations against gangs in Cité Soleil.
125 Schuberth, “The Impact of Drug Trafficking.”
126 Barrera, “The Congo Trap.”