Notes
1 Pugh, “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory.”
2 Pugh, Cooper and Turner, Whose Peace?.
3 Kühn, “The Peace Prefix”. Pugh, “Reflections on Aggressive Peace.”
4 Cunliffe, Legions of Peace.
5 The UN Security Council has historically been profoundly divided over the use of force. See Lowe et al., The United Nations Security Council and War; Weller, The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force.
6 Novosseloff, “UN Peacekeeping.”
7 Karlsrud, The UN at War.
8 On the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, see Andersen, “The HIPPO in the room.”
9 Levine, The Morality of Peacekeeping.
10 Of course, implementing and interpreting the meaning of this ‘holy trinity’ are at the heart both of peacekeeping politics and of tactical and operational matters.
11 The fact that other types of military operations have also been described as peacekeeping is another issue entirely. While the plasticity of the concept of ‘peacekeeping’ might constitute its political utility to interveners (see Cunliffe, Legions of Peace), this is not the argument that I want to make; thus my emphasis on UN peacekeeping.
12 Prior to Resolution 2100, the UNSC had voted Resolution 2085 authorizing the deployment of an African-led ‘support mission’ (AFISMA) which was to be operational in September 2013. It is reasonable to assume that this resolution precipitated the move south by Malian insurgents to capture the strategic airport of Sévaré; which prompted the French to intervene.
13 The European Union is an important financial, military and diplomatic supporter of the international management of the Sahel (see Lopez Lucia, The European Union integrated and regionalised approach towards the Sahel). African regional organizations support the ‘war against terrorism’ posture, but show divergence of interests in cooperation (see Diallo, “L’architecture africaine”).
14 Charbonneau, “Intervention in Mali.”
15 Novosseloff and Sharland, Partners and Competitors.
16 Charbonneau, “Intervention as Counterinsurgency Politics.”