https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1869-0997
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ABSTRACT
The peacekeeping literature has primarily documented correlations between peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and their effectiveness or has focused on the decisions of troop-contributing countries participating in PKOs. Unlike the extant research, this paper shifts the focus to the decision-making process within PKOs. More specifically, this paper focuses on the timing of peacekeeper deployment by investigating how contributor leaders are distinguished from contributor followers. To tackle this topic, I use deployment-map data from 13 UN PKOs in Africa from 1990 to 2016. When a leader country deploys to a region before other countries, the followers will thus face an incentive to free ride because waiting to deploy to the region until it is secure is less risky. In short, there is a second-mover advantage that induces other countries to delay deployment until much later in a given UN PKO’s designated deployment window. This study finds that countries that could deploy more troops at their initial time of deployment and that have many previous UN PKO experiences are more likely to be leaders. Results also suggest that contributors engaging in multiple UN PKOs contemporaneously are less likely to be leaders.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for valuable feedback from Todd Sandler. I also thank two anonymous reviewers for excellent comments.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Rappa, “The Challenges of Full Deployment on UN Peace Operations.”
2 Sundberg and Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.”
3 Henke, “UN Fatalities.”
4 The UN General Assembly gives a period of 30 days within which to establish a traditional peacekeeping mission and 90 days within which to establish a multi-dimensional mission (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations).
5 Passmore, Shannon, and Hart, “Rallying the Troops.”
6 Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, “On the Frontline Every Day.”
7 Bove and Ruggeri, “Kinds of Blue”; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, “Beyond Keeping Peace”; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, “On the Frontline Every Day?”; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen, “Managing Mistrust”; Victor, “African Peacekeeping in Africa.”
8 Sandler, “International Peacekeeping Operations.”
9 Stojek and Tir, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”
10 Gilligan and Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?”
11 Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?”; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?
12 Victor, “African Peacekeeping in Africa.”
13 Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions.”
14 Uzonyi, “Refugee Flows and State Contributions.”
15 Bove and Elia, “Supplying peace.”
16 Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris, “Oil above Water.”
17 Kathman and Melin, “Who Keeps the Peace?”
18 Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, “On the Frontline Every Day?”
19 Passmore, Shannon, and Hart, “Rallying the Troops.”
20 Regan, “Third-party Interventions.”
21 Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?”
22 It investigates the effectiveness of UN and non-UN peacekeeping during the post-World War II and the post-Cold War periods. She indicates that UN peacekeeping plays a significant role in preventing the recurrence of wars in the post-Cold war period.
23 Kim, Sandler, and Shimizu, “A Multi-transition Approach.”
24 DeRouen and Chowdhury, “Mediation, Peacekeeping.”
25 Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, “United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics”; Kathman and Benson, “Cut Short?”
26 Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding.”
27 Bara and Hultman, “Just Different Hats?”; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson, “Protection through Presence”; Haass and Ansorg, “Better Peacekeepers”; Hultman, “Keeping Peace”; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, “United Nations Peacekeeping.”
28 Haass and Ansorg, “Better Peacekeepers.”
29 Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson, “Protection through Presence”; Haass and Ansorg, “Better Peacekeepers”; Hultman, “Keeping Peace”; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, “United Nations Peacekeeping.”
30 Ihori, “Defense Expenditures”; Kempf and Graziosi, “Leadership in Public Good Provision”; Sandler, “Impurity of Defense.”
31 Kempf and Graziosi, “Leadership in Public Good Provision.”
32 This process reflects a Stackelberg situation with a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) in which one leads and the other follows.
33 Gaibulloev, Sandler and Shimizu, “Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping.”
34 Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions.”
35 There are additional monthly stipends of $68 for equipment and clothing, $5 for personal weaponry, and $303 for specialists.
36 Coleman, The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping.
37 Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, “On the Frontline Every Day?”
38 Kathman and Melin, “Who Keeps the Peace?”
39 Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions.”; Victor, “African Peacekeeping in Africa.”
40 This article does not focus on exploring where contributors deploy and how to choose their operational regions because this decision mostly depends on the headquarters in an operation. Also, this topic has already been well addressed by Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2018). After deciding assigned location, the timing of deployment is totally at the discretion of contributors.
41 International Peace Institute, “IPI Peacekeeping Database.”
42 The dataset is recorded on the last day of each month. It is thus assumed here that contributors deploy at the same time into a conflict region when they are newly recorded in the dataset as having deployed in the same month.
43 United Nations Peacekeeping: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate.
44 ONUMOZ started in December 1992. However, the deployment map for May 1993 is the oldest available from the Secretary-General of the United Nations after the operation had started.
45 There were some countries that deployed less than 100 troops between December 1992 and April 1993 in the IPI dataset. These countries are not marked on deployment maps. Given the definition of leader used in this study, these countries are ignored.
46 In Appendix B, it is shown how to read the military map.
47 Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding”; Kathman, “United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments.”
48 Walter, Committing to Peace; Kathman, “United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments.”
49 Kathman, “United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments”; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, “Beyond Keeping Peace”; Haass and Ansorg, “Better Peacekeepers.”
50 Regarding Previous PKOs, current PKOs are left out if those missions have not ended to avoid multicollinearity.
51 The multicollinearity between casualties and previous PKO is checked but no multicollinearity is found between them (Yoo et al., A Study of Effects of MultiCollinearity, 9–19).
52 Henke, “UN Fatalities 1948-2015.”
53 There are five types of fatality counts: total fatalities, accidents, illnesses, malicious acts, and other incidents types. In this study, total fatalities are used.
54 Bove and Elia, “Supplying Peace.”
55 Globe feed. “World Distance Calculator.” Globefeed.com https://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/World_Distance_Calculator.asp (accessed August 30, 2017). This distance between two places is calculated in hundreds of kilometers.
57 Barbieri, Kechk, and Pollins, “Trading Data.”
58 Lebovic, “Uniting for Peace?”; Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions.”
59 Rappa, “The Challenges of Full Deployment on UN Peace Operations.”
60 This value follows because 1.07743 = exp{ln(2.187)ln(1.1)}. Hereafter, the transformed odds ratio is provided.
61 Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions.”
62 In appendix A, the marginal effects for are reported in Table A2.
63 Stojek and Chacha, “Adding Trade to the Equations”; and Williams, “Temporal Dependence.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Wukki Kim
Wukki Kim is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics and Law at the Korea Military Academy, Seoul, Republic of Korea with a PhD from the University of Texas at Dallas. He holds the rank of Major in the Korean armed forces. His research interests are in defense economics, peacekeeping, and terrorism. His work has appeared in Kyklos, Defence and Peace Economics, and Global Policy.