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ABSTRACT
While new ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping missions emerged at the end of the Cold War, more ‘traditional’ monitoring missions continue to operate. This work reviews the three current peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, with mandates to monitor buffer lines or zones between Israel and its previously warring neighbours: the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). We provide an overview of these three missions, their mandates, the circumstances from which they emerged and evolved. We then consider causal factors that have contributed to their effectiveness over the years and examine how such factors apply in the current state of these missions. Finally, noting that the region evolves and so must the missions, we offer recommendations for how they could remain effective into the future by investing in new technological capabilities and maintaining the integration between their analysis units.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Guterres, “Remarks to Security Council”.
2 See Dorn “The Evolution of Peacekeeping” for an overview.
3 Boot, “Paving the Road to Hell: The failure of UN Peacekeeping,” 143 and Autesserre “The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can’t End Wars,” 101.
4 See Walter, Howard, and Fortna, “The Astonishing Success of Peacekeeping: The UN Program Deserves More Support—and Less Scorn—From America.” See also Dorn and Collins, “Peacekeeping Works: The UN Can Help End Civil Wars.”
5 Dorussen, “Peacekeeping works, or does it?” 527–537, Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova “Research Findings on the Evolution of Peacekeeping,” and Fortna “Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War.”
6 Walter, Howard, and Fortna, “The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace,” 1–18.
7 Fortna, “Interstate peacekeeping: causal mechanisms and empirical effects,” 481–519.
8 United Nations, “UNMOGIP Fact Sheet”. While these monitoring missions are not all situated in the Middle East most of them are; with UNMOGIP in the Kashmir region between Pakistan and India being a notable exception.
9 For a comprehensive overview of the proposed causal mechanisms for interstate missions’ effectiveness, see Fortna “Interstate peacekeeping: causal mechanisms and empirical effects,” 481–519.
10 Werner notes that changes in relative capabilities are the most important cause for resuming conflict, “The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement and Renegotiating the Terms.”
11 Revoking consent is much more significant on multidimensional missions as they do much more than keeping the peace in the traditional sense but also provide humanitarian assistance. The more complex the mandate, the more entrenched the UN becomes, the less likely the host nation is to revoke its consent.
12 Laurence, “An ‘Impartial’ Force?”
13 Ibid. Laurence has argued that new practices emerge “through two distinct processes: innovation and improvisation. The former involves conscious reflection, while the latter occurs when practitioners make a series of unconscious, incremental adjustments to existing practices. New practices then spread … as communities of peacekeepers embrace new standards for judging competence.”
14 The United Nations now considers UNTSO as its first peacekeeping operation, though there were earlier operations established for Greece, the Balkans, Korea and Kashmir.
15 Because the UN Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, was head of UNTSO, when he was assassinated, the leadership of UNTSO was to be handed over the Chief of Staff, a position that carries the title of head of mission to this day.
16 The following year, UNMOs arrived at the UN Military Observer Group India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) with a similar mandate to supervise a ceasefire between India and Pakistan (UNSCR) 47(1948). Following renewed hostilities of 1971, UNMOGIP has remained in the area to observe developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire and reports thereon to the Secretary-General.
17 Fortna, “Interstate peacekeeping: causal mechanisms and empirical effects,” 481–519.
18 United Nations, “UNEF Background”. The first mission sanction in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
19 Fortna, “Interstate peacekeeping: causal mechanisms and empirical effects,” 511.
20 Inspections have been limited by security conditions on the Syrian side during its internal conflict in recent years.
21 The United Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is similar in its primary task of monitoring a disputed line (Green Line) but is mandated to undertake humanitarian activities as well.
22 MINUSMA, “MINUSMA Fact Sheet”. MINUSCA subsumed the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) on the date of the establishment. On 15 September 2014, the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) transferred its authority over to MINUSCA, in accordance with resolution 2149 (2014).
23 Ibid.
24 UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA, 2013, UNSCR 2100)
25 MINUSMA, “MINUSMA Fact Sheet”. It has since been expanded by UNSCR 2164, 25 June 2014.
26 The UN Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO, UNSCR 1925, 1 July 2010).
27 MONUSCO, “MONUSCO Fact Sheet”. MONUSCO took over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation – the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
28 United Nations, “Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping”. Chapter VII of the UN Charter contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of UN peace operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order. This is in contrast to traditional Chapter VI missions that focus on “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” and rarely apply force.
29 Article 2, paragraph 7 states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”
30 UNTSO, “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization”; UNDOF, “UNDOF Facts and Figures”; UNIFIL, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon”; UNFICYP, “UNFICYP Fact Sheet”; UNMOGIP, “UNMOGIP Fact Sheet”; MINUSCA, “MINUSCA Fact Sheet”; MINUSMA, “MINUSMA Fact Sheet”; and MONUSCO, “MONUSCO Fact Sheet”.
31 See Fortna “Interstate peacekeeping: causal mechanisms and empirical effects,” 481–519, (fn. 53); Ma’oz, “Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking”.
32 United Nations Security Council, Document 11302-Add.1.
33 United Nations Codification Division, “Extracts relating to Article 98”.
34 Molloy, “A Reflection of 2006 War”; Wheeler, “Canadian killed at UN post in Lebanon”; and Department of Public Information, “Attacks against UN Personnel go Unpunished”.
35 Yossef “Israel’s Campaign Between Wars: Lessons for the United States?” and Yaldin and Orion “The Campaign Between Wars: Faster, Higher, Fiercer?”
36 Jervis, “Perception and Misperception in International Politics.”
37 See Canadian Armed Forces, “The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process”. A common breakdown of operational functions according to Canadian doctrine.
38 Katsos, “The United Nations and Intergovernmental Organization Command Relationships: Part III of III,” 97-99.
39 UNDOF, Golan January – March 2008.
40 UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Statement on Firing Incidents”.
41 UNDOF also retains robotic capabilities to conduct explosive ordinance disposal, but this is brought by a particular national contingent, rather than part of the mission’s assets.
42 US Department of State, “Press Statement: Syria: Eighth Anniversary of Ghouta Chemical Weapon Attacks.”
43 UNDOF also included a budget for an “early-warning missile system for the safety and security of the Force” in the FY17/18 budget. However, this plan was shelved as the security situation in the AO improved. United Nations Secretary-General, Budget Performance of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, para. 38.
44 Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret”; and Dorn and Bell, “Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping”.
45 United Nations Department of Peace Operations, “2020.06 policy on JMAC”.
46 United Nations Department of Peace Operations, Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence.
47 Each of the desk officers is tasked with covering one of the UNTSO countries (Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Syria) and goes through a selection process to determine their capacity for this type of analysis.
48 The liaison office for Amman/Tel Aviv is co-located in the UNTSO Headquarters in Jerusalem.
49 A high degree of state regulation in Syrian media outlets has been noted to shape the narrative of specific events pertaining to national stability and security. This can make the confirmation and corroboration of such events difficult.
50 UNDOF, “March 2021 Monthly Forecast”. 2020 alone saw several Israeli airstrikes within the AOS.
51 The country of Lebanon remains in turmoil due to many factors: a fledgling governmental apparatus and economy; large scale infrastructural damage from the Beirut Port blast (4 August 2020); limited support from the international community, primarily due to Hezbollah’s involvement in state affairs.
52 United Nations Secretary-General, Budget for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
53 Ibid.
54 Kiley, “Israel is making the case for War against Lebanon”.
55 UNIFIL is already seen as partial to Israel given that its UNMOs conduct their observation patrols solely on the Lebanon side.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Zachary Myers
Zachary Myers is a defence scientist with Defence Research and Development Canada where he specializes in bringing science and technology solutions to national security challenges. Prior to this he served as a Canadian Army Engineering Officer. During his time in the military, he specialized in nuclear, biological, and chemical threat mitigation both domestically and overseas. From 2019 to 2020 he served as a Military Observer with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). While there, he worked both as part of Observer Group Golan, as well as part of UNTSO’s analysis team in Jerusalem where he worked directly with the mission leadership and participated in its diplomatic liaison function. He remains actively engaged in peacekeeping studies. Email: [email protected]
Walter Dorn
A. Walter Dorn is Professor of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and the Canadian Forces College (CFC). He teaches officers of rank major to brigadier-general from Canada and about 20 other countries. As an ‘operational professor’ he participates in field missions and assists international organizations. For instance, he was a UN Electoral Officer for the 1999 referendum in East Timor and a Visiting Professional with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2010. He also served as a consultant with the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including in 2014 on the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping. In 2020, during sabbatical leave, Dr. Dorn was with the UN as a ‘Technology Innovation Expert’ exploring technologies for testing, piloting and employing in UN field operations. Website: www.walterdorn.net