https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4584-2389
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ABSTRACT
On 23 June 2021, after months of deliberations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) approved the establishment of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in response to escalating violent extremism and insurgency by an Islamist armed group, Al-Shabaab or Al-Sunnah wa Jama’ah (ASWJ), in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province, which posed the risk of regional contagion. SAMIM was deployed under scenario 6 of the African Standby Force (ASF) with a mandate focused on supporting the Mozambican government to combat terrorism and violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. Its mandate also centred on strengthening and maintaining peace and security; restoring law and order; and assisting the government and humanitarian agencies to provide humanitarian relief to the affected population. This paper contributes to raising public understanding of the regional and continental policies and principles underpinning the SADC decision-making process regarding the deployment of peace missions and the effectiveness of SAMIM in fulfilling its mandated tasks until its first anniversary. It identified the relative pacification of Cabo Delgado as a crucial strategic and operational impact of SAMIM’s exceptional military intervention, which facilitated its segue into a multidimensional peacebuilding mission. Six principal constraints-cum-opportunities of SAMIM, which had a significant bearing on its effectiveness, are discussed.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 See, for example, UNHCR, “Nearly 1 Million”; Amnesty International, “‘What I Saw is Death’”; Cabo Ligado, Cabo Ligado Weekly: 19–25 July; Cabo Ligado, Cabo Ligado Weekly: 20–26 June; Centre for Democracy and Development, Has the Government “shelved”; Chingotuane et al., Strategic Options; Human Rights Watch, “Mozambique”; Dzinesa, “Mozambique’s Forever Wars”; Ewi et al., Violent extremism in Mozambique; Louw-Vaudran, “The many roots”; Cilliers et al., “What Would It Take”; Hanlon, “Mozambique’s Insurgency”; Matsinhe and Valoi, The Genesis; Morier-Genoud, “The Jihadi Insurgency”; World Bank, “Northern Mozambique”.
2 Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network, 2019 Methodological Framework for EPON Case Studies (on file with the author), 2.
3 Moffat, “SADC and Mozambique”.
4 See, for example, Parliamentary Monitoring Group, “SANDF deployment”; Basch, “SANDF”.
5 SADC, The Treaty, art 10; SADC, “Protocol”, art 11(3); SADC, “Mutual Defence Pact”, art 6.
6 SADC, “Protocol”, art 4 and 5; SADC, “SADC Ministerial Committee”.
7 See, for example, Svicevic and Walker, “Limited legal options”.
8 Sheehy, “Five Keys”; Mahtani et al., “Understanding”; Ewi et al., Violent extremism in Mozambique; Columbo and Doctor, “Foreign Fighters”.
9 Oosthuizen, The Southern African Development Community, 283. Aeby, How African Organisations Envision Peacemaking.
10 SADC, The Treaty, art 4; SADC, “Protocol”, preamble; SADC, “Mutual Defence Pact”, preamble and art 7; SADC, Revised Edition; SADC, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan; SADC, SADC, Vision 2050; AU, “Memorandum of Understanding; AU, Protocol”, preamble and art 30.
11 Dzinesa, “Malawi’s Peace Policy”; Aeby, “SADC”; Nathan, Community of Insecurity.
12 SADC, “Experts Agree that Foreign Intervention”.
13 Ewi and Louw-Vaudran, “Insurgents”; Centre of Public Integrity, How much does the state spend; Powell, “What's Happening in Mozambique's Violent North?”.
14 Africa Confidential, “Nyusi angers the region”.
15 Martin, “No Clear Exit for SAMIM in Mozambique”; Mmeso, “Mozambique frustrates SADC”.
16 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, “SANDF deployment”.
17 Hill and Nhamirre, “Naledi Pandor”.
18 Africa Confidential, “Nyusi Angers the Region”.
19 Ibid.
20 SADC, “Communiqué of The Extraordinary Double Troika Summit”, Maputo.
21 SADC, “SADC has Responsibility”.
22 Ibid.; Mmeso, “Mozambique Frustrates SADC”.
23 SADC, “SADC Extraordinary Troika Summit”.
24 Handy and Djilo, “The African Union’s Peace and Security Dilemma”; SADC, “Experts Agree that Foreign Intervention”; South African Government, “Opening Remarks”.
25 Boutellis and Williams, Peace Operations, 7 and 9; AUPSC, Report of the Chairperson, para. 71.
26 See Handy and Djilo, “The African Union’s Peace and Security Dilemma”; Dessu and Yohannes, “Can the African Standby Force”. The AUPSC recognizes terrorism and violent extremism are among Africa’s greatest contemporary security threats and has dedicated 24 sessions to the issue, making it the most discussed by the AUPSC since its operationalisation in 2004.
27 International Crisis Group, Winning Peace; SADC, “SADC Executive Secretary presents instruments of authority”.
28 SADC. “SADC Mission in Mozambique”; Amani Africa, “Briefing”.
29 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, “SANDF deployment”; SADC, “SADC Mission in Mozambique”.
30 Pigou, “SADC’S Mission in Mozambique”.
31 Polity, “Ramaphosa Extends SANDF Deployment”; Pigou, “SADC’S Mission in Mozambique”.
32 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Regional Body”; Martin, “No Clear Exit for SAMIM in Mozambique”.
33 Institute for Security Studies, Resolving the African Standby Force’s Identity Crisis.
34 AU, Report of the Independent Panel of Experts, 19.
35 Amani Africa, “Briefing”.
36 Handy and Djilo, “The African Union’s Peace and Security Dilemma”.
37 Nathan, “UN Preventive Diplomacy”, 7; Handy and Djilo, “The African Union’s Peace and Security Dilemma”; Pigou, “SAMIM Extension and Funding Constraints”.
38 Amani Africa, “Briefing”.
39 AUPSC, “Communiqué of the 1062nd Meeting”.
40 Amani Africa, “Ministerial Meeting”.
41 South African Government, “Opening Remarks”.
42 Amani Africa, “Ministerial Meeting”.
43 Pfeifer, “Multilateral Peace Operations”; Republic of Rwanda, “Rwanda Deploys Joint Force”.
44 DW, “SADC Upset by Rwanda’s Military Aid”.
45 AUPSC, “Communiqué of the 1062nd Meeting”.
46 Ibid.
47 Pigou, “SAMIM-A Year in Review”.
48 Louw-Vaudran, “Lessons for Mozambique”.
49 Deleglise, “Issues and Options”.
50 Hunt and Zimmerman, Counter-Terrorism & Peace Operations; Handy and Djilo, “The African Union’s Peace and Security Dilemma”.
51 UNODC, “UNODC and Southern Africa”; Deleglise, “Issues and Options”.
52 ACSRT, “SADC Regional Workshop”.
53 Centre for Conflict Resolution, Region-Building and Peacebuilding, 9.
54 SADC, SADC, “Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit”, Lilongwe; South African Government, “Opening Remarks”.
55 See Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, National and Regional Responses; Ewi et al., Violent Extremism in Mozambique; Louw-Vaudran, “The Many Roots”.
56 South African Government, “Opening Remarks”.
57 defenceWeb, “Chinese Military Equipment”; DW, “Rwanda’s Military Intervention”, Centre for Democracy and Development, One Year.
58 South African Government, “Opening Remarks”.
59 See van Nieuwkerk, “A Toothless Lion?”, 152.
60 SADC, “Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit”, Lilongwe.
61 Ibid., Lilongwe; Cheatham et al., “Regional Security Support”; Sen, “Russia’s War in Ukraine”.
62 Amani Africa, “Briefing”.
63 Ibid.
64 AU, Report of the Independent Panel of Experts, 43.
65 In September 2022, which was beyond the period under study, SADC expected €15 million in support of SAMIM under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which was announced in 2021 to replace the APF and permit the purchase of lethal military equipment by African countries or RECs/RMs and thus more appropriate for SAMIM’s mandate. By July 2022, the EU had announced a total of €2.5 billion to in financing for military assistance to Ukraine through the EPF.
66 See SADC, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, 38; Sikuka, “Understanding the SADC Standby Force”.
67 See, for example, SADC, “Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit”, Lilongwe; South African Government, “Opening Remarks”; SADC, “Opening Remarks”.
68 Centre for Democracy and Development, One Year, 2.
69 Pigou, “SAMIM-A Year in Review”.
70 International Crisis Group, Stemming the Insurrection; SADC, “SADC Mission in Mozambique”; SADC, “Experts Agree that Foreign Intervention”; Basch, “SANDF”; Nhamirre, “Mozambique Shifts Gear”; International Crisis Group, Winning Peace; Dzinesa, “How Adaptive DDRR”; UNHCR, “Nearly 1 Million”.
71 Cabo Ligado, “Vital Trends”, 1; UNHCR, “One Year”; Centre for Democracy and Development, One Year.
72 International Crisis Group, Winning Peace. See also Africa Confidential, “The Jihadists”.
73 Cabo Ligado, “February Situation Summary”, 1.
74 Ibid., 2. See also Lima, “Rwandan Forces”.
75 Pigou, “SAMIM-A Year in Review”; Ballard and Columbo, “Enhancing Humanitarian Aid”.
76 SADC, “Experts Agree that Foreign Intervention”.
77 SADC. “SADC Mission in Mozambique”
78 Cheatham et al., Regional Security Support.
79 Martin, “No Clear Exit for SAMIM in Mozambique”.
80 Cheatham et al., Regional Security Support; defenceWeb, “Pemba Peacebuilding Meeting”.
81 Reliefweb, “SADC begins Peace Building Support”; SADC, “Corrections Officers”.
82 Reliefweb, “Rebuild Trust”.
83 SADC, Report of the Double Troika Plus Angola Technical Assessment Mission; International Crisis Group, Stemming the Insurrection, ii; Sutton, “Covert Shores Guide To Mozambique Navy”.
84 Pigou, “SAMIM Extension and Funding Constraints”.
85 Fabricius, “‘Wars can’t be Fought on the Cheap’”.
86 defenceWeb, “Mozambique Duty for SAS Spioenkop”.
87 Helmoed-Römer Heitman, “South Africa Increasing Mozambique deployment”.
88 defenceWeb, “Mozambique duty for SAS Spioenkop”, 19 April 2022.
89 Fabricius, “‘Wars can’t be fought on the cheap’”; defenceWeb, “SAMIM seemingly going nowhere”.
90 Basch, “SANDF”.
91 SADC, “Experts Agree that Foreign Intervention”.
92 Institute for Security Studies, “Mozambique insurgency”.
93 SADC, SADC Disaster Preparedness and Response Strategy and Fund: 2016-2030, Gaborone: SADC, 2017.
94 SADC, “Experts agree that foreign intervention”; Basch, “SANDF”; Louw-Vaudran, “Lessons for Mozambique”; OCHA, “Mozambique”; UNHCR, “Nearly 1 Million”.
95 Ballard and Columbo, “Enhancing Humanitarian Aid”.
96 OCHA, “Mozambique”; Ballard and Columbo, “Enhancing Humanitarian Aid”.
97 Ibid.
98 Club of Mozambique, “SADC Extraordinary MCO Troika”; Reliefweb, “SADC begins Peace Building”; SADC, “Corrections Officers”; SADC, “Opening Remarks”; EU, “European Peace Facility: EU agrees Support”.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa
Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of Johannesburg. He has extensive experience delivering strategic publications on topics including peacebuilding, DDR, infrastructure for peace (I4P) and regional integration in Southern Africa.