Needs or Interests: Drivers of China’s Peace Engagement in Conflict-affected Countries

ABSTRACT

What drives China’s peace engagement in conflict-affected countries: does China provide peacebuilding support where its help is needed the most or to advance its own interests? Despite a growing body of literature addressing this question, the analytical scope remains limited to China’s short-term peacebuilding measures and individual case studies. In this article, we build on longitudinal large-N data addressing China’s long-term peacebuilding. We detect a strong association between Chinese peace engagement and the economic needs of recipients. Mixed results are obtained regarding the role of China’s interests. While security and diplomatic interests appear to drive its peace engagement to some extent, there is no clear evidence of its economic interests influencing the engagement in conflict-affected countries. The article makes three contributions. First, we add to the growing literature on China’s peace engagement by adopting a broad definition of peacebuilding and, by doing so, expanding the analytical scope. Second, we contribute to the literature on emerging peacebuilding actors drawing on the case of China. Last, we make a policy-relevant contribution by demonstrating the complexity of peacebuilding actors’ motivation in engaging with conflict-affected countries.

KEYWORDS:

• peacebuilding
• China
• conflict
• conflict-affected countries
• developmental peace
• foreign aid

Introduction

Nowadays, the world is facing the highest number of violent conflicts since the Second World War.¹ Against this backdrop, it is important to understand how international peace players – both traditional ‘Western’ countries that have historically played an important role and emerging ones – can contribute to peacebuilding and what drives their engagement in the process. With this background, a body of research within International Relations (IR) has examined the role of emerging powers in peacebuilding efforts.² Their engagement is often discussed in comparison to liberal peace, a mainstream peace framework led by Western actors. Among the countries that these works focus on, China undoubtedly has been at the center of scholarly attention as an emerging peacebuilding actor with vast financial capacity.³ Numerous studies have examined China’s peace-related policies and practices.⁴ China has developed a distinct approach to peacebuilding which emphasizes economic development as the foundation for sustainable peace. This approach is often referred to as ‘developmental peace’. It is grounded in China’s own experience of economic development, hence placing a major emphasis on state-led economic growth.⁵

This article explores the drivers of China’s involvement in international peacebuilding efforts.⁶ In this article, we review and test two competing perspectives on the drivers of China’s engagement in peacebuilding. The first perspective suggests that China might favor countries with the most needs. This argument is in line with the Chinese government’s official rhetoric on its engagement in international peace and development, portraying China as a ‘responsible great power’.⁷ From this vantage point, literature suggests that in peacebuilding, China promotes own vision of peace placing a major emphasis on economic development, unlike Western actors who focus on political norms and values (e.g. democracy, human rights, the rule of law, etc.).⁸ The second perspective asserts that China’s peace engagement is mainly motivated by own interests. This argument contends that China’s engagement in conflict-affected countries can be understood as a way to pursue own interests.⁹ From this standpoint, existing works argue that China is involved in peacebuilding activities to access natural resources overseas, further own foreign policy objectives,¹⁰ and protect its assets overseas.¹¹

In this article, we ask: Is China’s peace engagement driven by recipients’ needs or China’s self-interests? In addressing this research question, we focus on conflict-affected countries, as they are the ones in the most in need of sustainable peace. In this article, we build on and contribute to the literature on China’s peacebuilding and the notion of developmental peace.

Existing literature provides useful insights into China as an emerging peacebuilding actor and the implications this might have for conflict-affected countries, as well as for the overall international peace governance. However, existing research has a major limitation: works on China’s peace engagement often emphasize short-term peacebuilding measures, such as conflict mediation and peacekeeping, while long-term peacebuilding measures, including development assistance and post-conflict reconstruction, are understudied. This is surprising given that economic development is at the very core of China’s peace engagement. We aim to fill this gap by adopting a novel analytical approach to China’s peacebuilding. Namely, we propose to consider long-term peacebuilding efforts in the form of development assistance in the midst and the wake of conflict which we further justify in the following section.

Empirically, we offer a large-N longitudinal study. Existing works, which mostly focus on short-term peacebuilding measures, primarily build on case studies. Although providing valuable insights into bilateral relations between China and individual countries, such works give us only a partial understanding of China’s peace engagement. To address this gap, we study all conflict-affected countries, allowing us to identify the drivers of peacebuilding. To understand the cross-country and long-term dynamics, we build on a dataset that covers 18 years (2000–2017) and includes all conflict-affected countries that received Chinese developmental assistance.¹² Hence, when referring to the recipients in this article, we address countries affected by conflicts which have received aid from China.

In so doing, we obtain two important insights. First, we show that recipient countries’ economic needs affect China’s peace engagement. Second, we obtain mixed results about the role of China’s interests. While diplomatic and asset protection interests appear to impact its peace engagement, economic interests are not associated with it. With these insights, we make four important contributions. Primarily, we add to the literature on China’s peacebuilding and the discussion on the drivers of its peace engagement by expanding the analytical scope. Specifically, we add to the literature by conducting a longitudinal study, which complements existing findings based on case studies. Secondly, we contribute to the literature on emerging peacebuilding actors, which may differ from traditional ‘Western’ actors. Thirdly, we draw attention to a distinct group of countries that need peace the most – i.e. conflict-affected countries. Conflict-affected and fragile states are a distinct group of countries with their distinct needs that differ from the needs of other countries. They are explicitly prioritized by Western and Chinese donors and therefore deserve scholarly attention. By doing so, we contribute to the literature on foreign actors’ engagement in conflict-affected countries. Lastly, we make a policy-relevant contribution by demonstrating the complexity of donor’s drivers to engage in peacebuilding in fragile contexts – in countries that either undergo or have recently undergone conflicts.

The article proceeds as follows. Section II lays out the conceptual framework used by the article. It also surveys the existing literature on the linkage between foreign aid and peacebuilding and develops an argument on (Chinese) aid as a peacebuilding instrument. Section III reviews related works and formulates hypotheses on the drivers of China’s peace engagement via aid allocation. It is followed by Section IV on research design where details on data and methods are introduced. It then proceeds to Section V which discusses the findings. The article concludes in Section VI with suggestions on avenues for future research.

China and Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding

While peacebuilding has been an important topic in peace and conflict studies since the 1990s, there is no widely accepted definition of the term.¹³ It can be defined as narrowly as specific actions related to peace, but it can also be defined broadly to encompass long-term and structural changes.¹⁴ The scope of the term can also extend beyond a war-torn state to encompass all issues faced by decision-makers.¹⁵ Although a broader definition of peacebuilding allows for analyses of the complex nature of peace, in our study, we adopt the concept of peacebuilding that focuses on efforts specifically within wartime or post-conflict societies.¹⁶

In line with existing research on China’s peacebuilding, we define peacebuilding as a process that consists of a range of activities that occur in conflict-prone or post-conflict countries.¹⁷ We approach peacebuilding as a process aimed at preventing the re-emergence or escalation of a conflict by addressing its immediate consequences and root causes. More concretely, we conceptualize peacebuilding as a range of peace-related activities that encompass both short-term and long-term measures aimed at supporting peace. Short-term peacebuilding measures refer to actions that take place during or immediately after a conflict has ended with the signing of peace agreements. These measures typically include activities such as peacekeeping operations and conflict mediation. Long-term peacebuilding measures refer to actions that take place in various stages of conflict. These measures include development cooperation in times of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction.

Over the years, China has developed a distinct approach to peacebuilding as an alternative to liberal peace, the mainstream approach to peacebuilding promoted by liberal democracies.¹⁸ While liberal peace has largely focused on liberal political reforms, principles of good governance, and accountable state institutions, China has emphasized economic development as the foundation for sustainable peace.¹⁹ Existing works convincingly demonstrate that Chinese peacebuilding policy emphasizes the relationships between development, social stability, and a strong state as a triadic model.²⁰ The Chinese model of peacebuilding with a focus on economic development is labeled by the scholarly community as ‘developmental peace’. He (2021) defines developmental peace as an approach to peacebuilding that echoes China’s experience of economic development. It dwells on the assumption that ‘with political and social stability as a prerequisite, development can lead to sustainable peace’ (He 2021: 47).

In this article, we address China’s long-term peacebuilding efforts focusing on development assistance, which is largely missing in the literature on China’s peacebuilding. More specifically, we suggest operationalizing Chinese peacebuilding engagement via development assistance. Namely, we examine the drivers of China’s peacebuilding via foreign aid allocated to stimulate economic development in conflict-affected countries. China does not distinguish between a general foreign aid approach and its specific aid to conflict-affected countries.²¹ While a systematic comparison of Chinese development assistance in these two groups of countries is beyond the scope of this article, distinguishing between them can provide useful context to China’s peacebuilding measures.

Although China’s foreign policy is framed as being guided by the principle of non-interference in the domestic politics of other countries, some scholars demonstrate that China has recently changed its attitude towards the principle, especially, in conflict settings.²² With social stability as one of the core elements of China’s triadic model of peace, Chinese aid projects have included the promotion of social stability, which entails engagement in domestic political issues. For example, a recent aid project in Fiji was aimed to ‘help ensure safety and order during the 2014 elections and play a positive role in guaranteeing long-term security and stability’.²³ In its projects, China devotes much attention to supporting internally displaced persons and refugees (e.g. in Iraq and Jordan), humanitarian relief (in Lebanon), and demining (in Laos and Cambodia), all of which are associated with conflict-related instabilities.²⁴ The special attention to conflict-affected countries also transpires when comparing the number of projects allocated to conflict-affected and non-affected countries, the former are prioritized. During the period from 2000 to 2017, the majority of projects were allocated to conflict-affected countries.²⁵ Taken together, these factors point in the same direction: in the implementation of development assistance, China may differentiate between conflict-affected and non-affected countries.²⁶

Moreover, there is an implication for distinguishing between the two groups of countries. From a policy-making standpoint, conflict-affected countries are especially fragile and thus have distinct needs²⁷ that differ from those of countries unaffected by conflicts.²⁸ Fragile and conflict-affected countries have attracted a significant amount of donor attention in recent years. The volume of foreign aid to conflict-affected countries has steadily increased over time, and conflict-affected countries are frequent recipients of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) official development assistance (ODA)²⁹ – as well as Chinese aid.³⁰ In the 2022 States of Fragility report released by the OECD, it was noted that the total aid directed to fragile contexts amounted to USD 91.4 billion, marking the highest volume ever recorded.³¹ The growing recognition of the differing needs between conflict-affected countries and those unaffected by conflict underscores the importance of scholarly investigation into the factors motivating donor engagement in these distinct groups of states.

Peacebuilding via Development Assistance

Existing works suggest the link between peacebuilding and development assistance. Economic prosperity is associated with fewer grievances and higher opportunity costs to war, which lower the possibility of a war.³² Others also argue that assistance to a government could help prevent conflict recurrence during the transition period.³³ For example, research shows that post-conflict countries that have not relapsed into conflict tend to receive notably larger portions of aid designated for peacebuilding compared with those that experience a recurrence of conflict.³⁴ These works, in particular, stress economic and social needs in rebuilding post-conflict societies. They contend that foreign aid can be used to address both immediate concerns, such as displacement, and longer-term needs, such as the delivery of basic services, the rule of law, and economic revitalization.³⁵ They indicate that foreign aid can serve as an instrument to prevent violence and sustain peace.

The theoretical link between peacebuilding and development assistance is closely associated with the ‘security–development nexus’.³⁶ The nexus is not unique to China, in fact, it is a well-established international view that development and security are closely connected. For example, the nexus has been featured in the 2004 statement by Kofi Annan that ‘development and security are inextricably linked’.³⁷ It has become more prominent over time, especially since 9/11 and currently is widely accepted in both national and international policy-making and related scholarly works.³⁸ More recently, the UN’s 2030 Agenda builds on the recognition of the intrinsic link between peace and development. Similarly, Sustainable Development Goal 16 ‘On Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions’ underlines the role of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.³⁹

It is commonly acknowledged by various international organizations and individual donors that peace and stability can be boosted by development assistance.⁴⁰ For example, the OECD recognizes ODA as a source for peace financing.⁴¹ Likewise, development assistance from the European Union privileges conflict-affected states as it is seen as a way to support security and stability in beneficiaries.⁴² A similar policy also steers the World Bank’s aid allocation.⁴³

However, unlike Western actors’ involvement in international peacebuilding via the provision of development assistance, China’s engagement in this process is less addressed in existing literature,⁴⁴ despite China’s ambition to become the world’s leading actor in international development.⁴⁵ This gap is particularly surprising given that China’s peacebuilding policy has almost an exclusive focus on economic development.⁴⁶ Chinese official policies on engagement in conflict-affected countries stress economic development.⁴⁷ Previous research demonstrates that China intends to promote peace through both the provision of aid and increased economic ties.⁴⁸ Consequently, conflict-affected countries are frequent recipients of Chinese aid.⁴⁹ Combined, China’s foreign aid in conflict-affected countries can be seen as an instrument of peacebuilding.

Theory and Hypotheses

We examine the drivers of China’s peace engagement. To do that, we develop two hypotheses that individually emphasize the functionalist needs of recipients and China’s self-interest. Both hypotheses build on the assumption of rational cost–benefit calculations on behalf of China. On the one hand, aspiring to become one of the world’s leading international actors, consistent foreign policy, especially on peacebuilding is a key for establishing an international reputation as a reliable partner. On the other hand, as a growing power, China might prioritize engaging with countries where it has material interests.

Building on existing research, we develop and empirically test hypotheses that individually suggest two possible drivers. First, the functionalist perspective suggests that China provides assistance to those countries that need help the most; the needs-based driver is also brought up in official statements in the context of China’s self-portrayal as a responsible great power.⁵⁰ According to this self-portrayal in official statements, China seeks to prioritize the least-developed countries in their post-conflict engagement because they need help the most.⁵¹ Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasized economic growth as a prerequisite for ensuring stability and peace⁵² and underdevelopment as the root cause of conflicts.⁵³ Scholarly literature discusses China’s international development policy in a wider context of China’s increasing role in the post-World War II global order. For example, Rosemary Foot demonstrates that China increasingly engages in the United Nations (UN) policy-making, programs and missions, but also seeks to reform it. More specifically, China declares its willingness to promote human protection and provide public goods using the UN framework, for example, via active participation in UN peacekeeping operations and UN-China’s Peace and Development Trust Fund. Yet, it also proposes an alternative normative model which emphasizes development rather than liberal norms and values.⁵⁴ This approach to peace is intrinsically linked to the notion of developmental peace stressing that economic development is a central part of peacebuilding.

Thus, we hypothesize that recipient countries’ economic needs are associated with peace engagement.⁵⁵ If this is true, China is expected to allocate more foreign aid to conflict-affected countries with greater economic needs and it would indicate that China’s peace engagement is driven by its official policy that explicitly highlights the role of the recipients’ needs. In our first hypothesis, we assume that economic needs rather than other factors drive China’s peace engagement via aid.

Hypothesis 1: Economic needs of conflict-affected countries drive China’s peace engagement via aid allocation.

The other prominent perspective in the existing literature stresses the role of China’s interests and inconsistent application of its developmental peace principle. More precisely, this perspective suggests that China’s peace engagement is driven by its interest to strengthen own political and economic power.⁵⁶ For example, existing works suggest that China’s engagement would be used to gain access to the natural resources of recipient countries.⁵⁷ There is also an argument that China’s diplomatic interests overseas, such as increasing trust and political favors, may play a role in its peace engagement.⁵⁸ Others argue that China’s peace engagement is associated with its concern that instability resulting from conflicts would negatively affect its assets overseas.⁵⁹ Assets are understood broadly as investments in natural resources’ extraction, infrastructure investments, trade, etc.

According to this perspective, if China’s interests drive its peace engagement, China is expected to engage more frequently in conflict-affected countries where it has interests. If we find support for this hypothesis, it would indicate that China is inconsistent in its peacebuilding engagement and that it engages in peacebuilding to promote own interests. Therefore:

Hypothesis 2: China’s interests drive its peace engagement via aid allocation in the conflict-affected countries.

Research Design

Data Structure

To test the hypotheses about the drivers of peace engagement via aid, we construct a novel longitudinal dataset. The dataset includes measures of China’s aid allocation, independent variables, and several control variables that capture country-level characteristics suggested by existing research. The structure of the data is time-series cross-sectional, whereby the unit of analysis is a country-year.

We assign the ‘conflict-affected’ status to countries if they are either undergoing a conflict or had a recent experience of a conflict. We treat a country-year as exposed to conflict if there were at least 25 recorded battle-related deaths in that calendar year. This operationalization of conflict follows the approach of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). To collect data on conflicts and their intensity, we use three datasets provided by the UCDP, i.e. the datasets on state-based armed conflicts, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence. In our operationalization of the conflict-affected status, we label countries as conflict-affected in a specific year if there was a recorded conflict within the past 10 years (see Appendix A). We chose a 10-year period to encompass the lasting effects of conflicts. Such countries often have a higher likelihood of experiencing a relapse into conflicts and prolonged crises during the period. For a robustness check, we adopt an alternative approach to operationalization, categorizing country-years as conflict-affected if the country experienced a conflict within the past 5 years (see Appendix Table D1, Model 8–10).

Dependent, Independent and Control Variables

The dependent variable in our study is Chinese peace engagement. We capture peace engagement via foreign aid. Empirically, we focus on ODA, which is the main channel of foreign aid. ODA is defined by the OECD as ‘government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries’.⁶⁰ To capture Chinese aid, we use AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset Version 2.0 (2000–2017). Although being one of the most widely used datasets to study Chinese aid, there are works that suggest that the dataset introduces some confusion about what aid can be regarded as ‘ODA-like’.⁶¹ This confusion arguably is also present among Chinese officials.⁶² While acknowledging this limitation, however, the dataset remains the most comprehensive source of information available given the lack of disclosure from the Chinese government. Therefore, following scholarly works in the field, we use the AidData dataset and take AidData’s analytical approach of distinguishing between China’s ODA and other official finance (OOF), defined as official sector transactions that do not meet the ODA criteria.⁶³ OOF, by nature, is not primarily aimed at contributing to development in the recipient countries, but instead at contributing to commercial purposes, such as official sector loans and export credits that are non-concessional or semi-concessional.⁶⁴ We focus on ODA and not OOF because the latter includes a broader range of financial flows that have various objectives grants with commercial or representational intent, official bilateral transactions, export credits, funds in support of private investment, etc. Therefore, it cannot be reliably categorized as having a development intent. For this reason, the OECD also acknowledges ODA as a source for peace financing.⁶⁵ What is more, China’s OOF is provided by two policy banks – the China Export-Import Bank and the China Development Bank – and they provide non-concessional loans and export credits.⁶⁶ Due to their primary objective, therefore it makes it more challenging to categorize as an official finance with a development intent. For this reason, we focus on ODA flows, which is in line with the focus of this article on peacebuilding.

To be classified as ODA, aid projects must meet the following criteria: (i) the official purpose of the project must be the promotion of development in the recipient country; (ii) the official commitment must be concessional in nature (i.e. grant, technical assistance, scholarship, debt forgiveness, or loan with a grant element of at least 25%); and (iii) the project must take place in a country that qualifies for ODA.⁶⁷ A ‘project’ can have various forms, such as grants, technical assistance, scholarships, concessional loans, and debt relief, as long as its primary purpose remains exclusively focused on development.

The dataset that we use provides data on the period from 2000 until 2017. We use data on the number of projects instead of the total sum of aid due to the presence of many missing observations for the latter. Unlike DAC donors, who adhere to OECD policies for aid allocation, China, as a non-member of DAC, does not have the same level of transparency in reporting. Due to this reason, the data on financial flows are missing for several individual countries. Meanwhile, there is more data on the number of projects. Therefore, scholars often analyse project data to capture Chinese aid.⁶⁸ Moreover, to enable a country-level analysis, we exclude projects with a multi-country focus.

The data captures commitments rather than disbursements of projects due to the following reason. This approach follows AidData’s recommendation, namely, to use the dataset that was collected with the Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology. Since official comprehensive data from Chinese aid disbursements are not available, it is ‘virtually impossible to consistently measure with open-source data collection methods’.⁶⁹ In this regard, therefore, we include only those projects that are coded as ‘recommended for research’. This helps us exclude from the analysis all the suspended and cancelled projects and as well as projects that never reached the official commitment stage.⁷⁰ Furthermore, we deem following the approach already used by AidData’s research projects most suitable.⁷¹

The independent variables in this study capture the potential drivers of Chinese aid allocation to conflict-affected countries. To operationalize Hypothesis 1, we capture the needs of conflict-affected countries via (log) GDP per capita (in current USD).⁷² This variable is aimed to capture the level of economic development of the recipient country. We consider this operationalization of the needs of recipients appropriate because the official Chinese policies define needs primarily in terms of economic development.

To operationalize Hypothesis 2, we construct three measures of China’s interests. The concept of interests is multifaceted and can have different interpretations. Existing works detect three groups of interests in China’s foreign aid policy. For example, some works suggest that China engages in peace-related activities to gain access to natural resources overseas.⁷³ Some works show an association between Chinese aid allocation among African countries and their voting alignment with China in the UN General Assembly (UNGA).⁷⁴ Such works suggest that aid might be used by China to pursue its diplomatic interests. Lastly, existing works also define China’s interests in terms of asset protection overseas.⁷⁵ It is associated with the Chinese government’s concern that instability resulting from conflicts may negatively affect China’s investments. In light of existing works, we distinguish between China’s interests in natural resources, diplomatic interests, and asset protection interests in conflict-affected countries that may drive its aid allocation.

To capture China’s potential interests in natural resources, we construct a variable that reflects the total value of natural resources in the recipient country such as oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, and forests. The variable is captured by a (log) total value of these resources in million USD.⁷⁶ To capture China’s diplomatic interests, we use a measurement of political alignment that is most widely used in existing research on Chinese aid allocation, such as in Dreher and co-authors.⁷⁷ We measure the degree of similarity in voting patterns at the UNGA between China and the recipient countries.⁷⁸ The variable is expressed as the share of aligned votes from the total number of votes.⁷⁹

To capture Chinese assets overseas, the data on (log) foreign direct investment (FDI) stock from China is used.⁸⁰ We employ a stock measurement instead of a level measurement to reflect the accumulated FDI in beneficiary countries. This allows us to capture the total amount of FDI that has been invested in conflict-affected countries over a given period of time, providing a broader perspective on the extent of foreign investment in these countries.

We add two control variables that may explain China’s aid allocation. First, we control for the intensity of a conflict. It is measured by the (log) number of battle-related deaths per 100,000 population. Higher intensity of conflicts could lead to more aid because of the higher need for recovery, but also it could lead to less aid because the Chinese government could decide that it would be too risky to implement projects. We use the UCDP data for this.⁸¹ Second, we add a variable capturing (log) commitments of ODA in USD received from other donors (i.e. OECD DAC countries).⁸² The presence of traditional donors and their ODA could attract China’s aid to compete with them. There is also a possibility that China could focus on recipient countries that are not prioritized by OECD DAC.

Model Specification

The outcome variable in our analysis is the number of ODA projects, which is a count variable. We therefore opted for a model designed for count data, which is both skewed and discrete. We use a two-way fixed-effects negative binomial regression model (NBRM) with a lagged dependent variable to account for the presence of autocorrelation. The NBRM is chosen over a Poisson model due to the dispersion statistic (i.e. the variance of the outcome variable is larger than the mean). We use country-fixed effects to account for differences across units of analysis (i.e. countries) and year-fixed effects to account for time-specific exogenous shocks.

We run a series of statistical tests to decide on the model specification. We use alternative model specifications for a robustness check (see Appendix Table D1). We incorporate lags of the independent variables (1–5 years). This approach serves two purposes. Firstly, it helps mitigate the potential endogeneity effect, as lagging the independent variables allows for a temporal separation between their values and the outcome variable. Second, it acknowledges the possibility that independent variables may take some time to manifest their effects on the dependent variable, thereby accounting for any time delays in the causal relationship between variables under consideration. Due to data availability, we refrain from introducing longer lags.

Results

The results reported in Table 1 support Hypotheses 1 and 2. Across all the models, log GDP per capita is negatively associated with aid allocation. It means that more peacebuilding efforts via aid allocation are invested in countries where the level of economic development is lower. This confirms our hypothesis which highlights the role of recipients’ needs in Chinese aid allocation.

Table 1. Results of regression analysis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5
GDP per capita (log)	−0.2516*** (0.0384)	−0.2548*** (0.0376)	−0.2613*** (0.0376)	−0.2577*** (0.0418)	– 0.2550*** (0.0452)
Natural resources (log)	−0.0162 (0.0124)	−0.0086 (0.0129)	−0.0147 (0.0120)	−0.0218 (0.0144)	−0.0213 (0.0173)
UNGA voting alignment	0.1531 (0.1988)	0.2986* (0.1456)	0.3349. (0.1713)	0.1922 (0.1208)	0.4135*** (0.1225)
FDI stock (log)	0.0324* (0.0157)	0.0148 (0.0162)	0.0230. (0.0124)	0.0300* (0.0122)	0.0273 (0.0220)
Battle-related deaths (log)	0.0133. (0.0069)	0.0104. (0.0062)	0.0095 (0.0082)	0.0185. (0.0107)	0.0177* (0.0493)
ODA from DAC countries (log)	0.0165 (0.0685)	0.0620 (0.0651)	0.0030 (0.0666)	0.0600 (0.0528)	0.0193 (0.0494)
ODA project (t-1)	0.0551*** (0.0069)	0.0546*** (0.0064)	0.0523*** (0.0074)	0.0469*** (0.0062)	0.0528*** (0.0044)
Observations	663	632	580	525	474
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Levels of statistical significance: ‘***’ 0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’ 0.05, ‘.’ 0.1, and ‘ ’ 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. The effects were estimated using a two-way fixed-effects negative binomial regression model with a lagged dependent variable.

Additionally, China’s interests, operationalized via FDI stock and UNGA voting, are positively associated with peace engagement via aid allocation. Statistically significant effects of UNGA voting alignment on China’s peace engagement via aid are detected in models with a lag of 2, 3 and 5 years. The effects of FDI stock on China’s peace engagement via aid are detected in models 1, 3 and 4. At the same time, China’s interests captured by natural resources appear to not have any statistically significant effects on China’s peace engagement via aid allocation. Considering the level of statistical significance, we conclude that FDI stock and UNGA voting play a weaker role in peace engagement via aid compared to the effects of the economic needs of recipients. Additionally, unlike the effects of other independent variables, the effects of economic needs are consistent across models with different lags. This indicates that the economic needs of recipients are the strongest predictor of China’s peace engagement via aid allocation.

Taken together, these results indicate that China’s engagement in peacebuilding through aid is driven by both the needs of conflict-affected countries, as well as self-interest (diplomatic and asset protection). At the same time, economic needs appear to be a stronger and more consistent driver of Chinese peacebuilding effort: the lower the economic performance of conflict-affected recipients is, the more foreign aid is allocated. Although China’s attempt to protect its assets as well as its diplomatic interests also play a role in China’s peacebuilding, their relevance appears somehow weaker than the economic needs of the conflict-affected countries.

We conduct a robustness check with an alternative operationalization of independent variables. First, instead of considering all UNGA votes, we use votes that the US Department of State considers important (so-called ‘key votes’) (Appendix Table D1, Model 6). This follows existing works that use important votes with the assumption that there is ‘good reason to believe that China will lobby extensively in [the] UNGA on certain issues it deem[s] important’⁸³ and that ‘votes that the United States considers politically important are likely also significant to other great powers, including China’.⁸⁴ Second, instead of using the total natural resources, (log) natural resources per capita in USD are used (Appendix Table D1, Model 7). Third, we operationalize conflict-affected countries as those that experienced conflict in the past 5 years (Appendix Table D1, Model 8–10). The results reported in this section are robust to alternative model specifications.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this article, we analyzed the drivers of China’s peace engagement via aid allocation to conflict-affected countries. We demonstrated that China’s engagement in peacebuilding is driven by both recipient countries’ needs, as well as the diplomatic interests and asset protection interests of China. However, the economic needs of recipients is the strongest and most systematic predictor.

The results have policy-related implications. Namely, they indicate that developmental peace – the Chinese approach to peacebuilding which emphasizes economic development – is implemented in China’s actual peacebuilding practice. This may be explained by China’s both principled and strategic considerations. This behavior aligns with China’s self-positioning as a responsible great power. In line with the ‘responsible great power’ rhetoric, China prioritizes countries facing the most pressing needs. An alternative explanation of the detected effects of the economic needs of recipients may be that China seeks to use its peacebuilding efforts through aid strategically, namely, as an instrument of gaining a positive international reputation. China may attempt to obtain international recognition and improve its reputation through the promotion of its own vision of peace using aid. Future works should investigate the exact motives of China to engage in long-term peacebuilding.

Additionally, the insights from the analysis contribute to existing scholarly literature in two ways. First, we add to the literature on China’s peace engagement. By synthesizing the literature on China’s peacebuilding and development aid, we expand the conceptual scope of China’s peace engagement and introduce a novel approach to studying peace promotion from a long-term perspective. Second, the study contributes beyond the literature on China by demonstrating that the drivers of emerging peacebuilding actors may be complex and multifaceted. Lastly, this might also have implications for policymaking demonstrating the complexity of donor’s motivation when engaging in peacebuilding.

In all, the topic of China’s peace engagement is a broad subject which in light of the findings we described above, deserves future research. We suggest several avenues for future research on this topic. First, future research could examine the impacts of China’s peace engagement using the newly available data adopted in our study. Especially, future research could address whether Chinese peacebuilding via aid contributes to economic growth in conflict-affected countries. This will help explore to what extent the principle of developmental peace is adopted in practice and to what effect. Second, future studies can compare China’s short-term and long-term peacebuilding measures, their motivations, priorities and impacts on the beneficiaries, as well as whether these measures are used jointly.

Furthermore, as our findings revealed multiple drivers behind Chinese peacebuilding via development aid, future works should investigate the policy priorities of such engagements. For example, scholars should effectively address whether the intensity of conflicts affects the patterns and volume of Chinese aid, its format, and cross-sectoral differences. Relatedly, a thorough comparison of Chinese aid to conflict-affected countries, as a distinct group of recipients, and to countries that are not affected by conflicts can be conducted. Such a comparison could shed new light on the patterns of China’s aid allocation and the role of conflict therein contributing to the broader literature on development finance, as well as relevant policy-making. Last, a systematic comparison of China and the DAC countries is needed. For example, researchers could look into whether the drivers and the effects of peacebuilding engagement via aid to conflict-affected countries are different in the case of different donors. This comparison could shed new light on the drivers of peace engagement of different donors.

Overall, future works should pay more attention to whether and how conflicts play a role in Chinese peacebuilding via aid allocation, how China’s vision of peacebuilding differs from the vision of actors that promote liberal peace, and whether China’s aid is effective in promoting development and peace.

Data Availability Statement

The data are available at: https://github.com/YeonjuJung/ChinaPeace.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yeonju Jung

Yeonju Jung is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Economic History and International Relations at Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.

Karina Shyrokykh

Karina Shyrokykh is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Economic History and International Relations at Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.

Notes

1 United Nations Security Council, “With Highest Number of Violent Conflicts since Second World War, United Nations Must Rethink Efforts to Achieve, Sustain Peace, Speakers Tell Security Council.”

2 Richmond and Tellidis, “Emerging Actors in International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding- Status Quo or Critical States”; Ghimire, The Politics of Peacebuilding; Jütersonke et al., “Norm Contestation and Normative Transformation in Global Peacebuilding Order(s).”

3 China has become the largest aid donor in Africa and one of the most significant UN peacekeeping operation financial and personnel contributors today (UN Peacekeeping 2022).

4 He, “China Rising and its Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping”; Wang, “Developmental Peace.” Zhang, “Emerging Alternative”; Foot, China, the UN, and Human Protection; Alden and Yixiao, “China’s Changing Role in Peace and Security in Africa.”

5 For example, see He, “China Rising and its Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping”; Lei, “Two Pillars of China's Global Peace Engagement Strategy.” Wang, “Developmental Peace”; Zhang, “Emerging Alternative"; Kuo, Chinese Peace in Africa; Teitt, “China’s Developmental Peace and North Korea’s Security Challenges”; Kwon, “Red under Blue: Chinese Humanitarian Action in UN Peacekeeping Missions.”

6 We use the terms ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘peace engagement’ interchangeably.

7 He, “Developmental Peace”; Kuo, “Chinese Peace?”

8 Teitt, “China’s Developmental Peace and North Korea’s Security Challenges”; Wong, “The Rise of China’s Developmental Peace”; Yuan, “The Chinese Approach to Peacebuilding: Contesting Liberal Peace?”

9 For example, Hirono, Jiang, and Lanteigne, “China's New Roles and Behaviour in Conflict-affected Regions.”

10 Gong, “Non-traditional Security Cooperation between China and South-East Asia: Implications for Indo-Pacific Geopolitics.”

11 Ghiselli, Protecting China's Interests Overseas; Hirono, Jiang, and Lanteigne, “China's New Roles and Behaviour in Conflict-affected Regions.”

12 We use the terms ‘development assistance’ and ‘foreign aid’ interchangeably.

13 Ryan, “The Evolution of Peacebuilding.”

14 Goetze, The Distinction of Peace. Call, Building States to Build Peace.

15 Wallensteen, Quality Peace.

16 Goetze, The Distinction of Peace. Call, Building States to Build Peace.

17 Yuan, “The Chinese Approach to Peacebuilding”; Lei, “Two Pillars of China's Global Peace Engagement Strategy.”

18 He, “A Tale of Two ‘Peaces’”; Selby, “The Myth of Liberal Peace-building.”

19 Mariani, China’s Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Settings.

20 Foot, China, the UN, and Human Protection.

21 For example, China’s latest white paper titled ‘China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era’ does not specify its aid strategy to the conflict-affected countries.

22 Toogood, “Understanding the Emerging Relationship between China and Africa”; For more detailed discussion on China’s non-interference principle, see: Hirono, Jiang, and Lanteigne, “China's New Roles and Behaviour in Conflict-affected Regions.” See also Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”

23 Project ID 64719 in AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset Version 2.0 (2000-2017); Custer et al., “Tracking Chinese Development Finance.”

24 These examples are drawn from the dataset that is analysed in this article.

25 Over the period from 2000 till 2017, 4754 projects were allocated to conflict-affected states and 4364 to conflict unaffected countries; AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset Version 2.0 (2000–2017); Custer et al., “Tracking Chinese Development Finance.”

26 We acknowledge the significance and relevance of comparing China's overall aid strategy with its foreign aid approach in conflict-affected countries. However, we consider this topic to be beyond the scope of the article. Therefore, we propose further research on this matter in the conclusion.

27 International Monetary Fund, “Fragile and Conflict-affected States” (2024). https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fragile-and-conflict-affected-states (accessed 9 March 2024).

28 European Commission, “EU Aid in Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries” (2024). https://commission.europa.eu/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/human-rights-non-eu-countries/ensuring-aid-effectiveness/eu-aid-fragile-and-conflict-affected-countries_en (accessed 9 February 2024).

29 Findley, “Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?”

30 Yuan, “The Chinese Approach to Peacebuilding: Contesting Liberal Peace?”

31 OECD, State of Fragility 2022.

32 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.

33 Findley, “Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?”

34 Lilja and Milante, Mapping Pathways for Peace through the Composition of Official Development Assistance.

35 Baranyi and Desrosiers, “Development Cooperation in Fragile States”; Gisselquist, “Good Aid in Hard Places.”

36 For the well-established connection between the two, see: Ellison, “Can the New Deal Solve the Old Problem of Aid Orphans and Darlings?”; Findley, “Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?”; Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”; Baranyi and Desrosiers, “Development Cooperation in Fragile States”; Gisselquist, “Good Aid in Hard Places.”

37 United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: United Nations.

38 Stern and Öjendal, “Mapping the Security – Development Nexus.”

39 Findley, “Does Foreign Aid Build Peace?”

40 Mandon and Woldemichael, “Has Chinese Aid Benefited Recipient Countries?”

41 OECD, Peace and Official Development Assistance.

42 European Commission, “EU aid in Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries” (2024). https://commission.europa.eu/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/human-rights-non-eu-countries/ensuring-aid-effectiveness/eu-aid-fragile-and-conflict-affected-countries_en (accessed 9 February 2024).

43 The World Bank, “Supporting the Most Vulnerable: Scaling Up Support to Address Fragility, Conflict, and Violence” Results Briefs, 14 June 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2023/06/15/supporting-the-most-vulnerable-scaling-up-support-to-address-fragility-conflict-and-violence (accessed 9 Februrary 2024).

44 This is with the exception of Strange et al., “Tracking Underreported Financial Flows” who argue that Chinese aid could prevent armed conflict by substituting for sudden withdrawals of aid from other donors. Other relevant work such as by Abb et al. (2021) illuminates both positive and negative impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on local conflict dynamics. Strange et al., “Tracking Underreported Financial Flows”; Abb, P., Swaine, R., & Jones, I. (2021). Road to Peace or Bone of Contention? The Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on Conflict States. (PRIF Reports, 1). Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-73448-2.

45 Zhang and Olander, “China wants to Become a Major Player in International Aid.”

46 Campbell et al., “China and Conflict-affected States.”

47 Guillon and Mathonnat, “What Can We Learn on Chinese Aid Allocation Motivations from Available Data?”; Campbell et al., “China and Conflict-affected States.” He, “China Rising and its Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping”; Wang, “Developmental Peace,”

48 Campbell et al., “China and Conflict-affected States.”

49 Yuan, “The Chinese Approach to Peacebuilding.”

50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Making Every Effort for Peace and Development and Shouldering the Responsibility for Solidarity and Progressm, Statement by H.E. Wang Yi.”

51 Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, “Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to UN at the Security Council on the Topic of ‘Peace-Building: Towards a Comprehensive Approach’”; “Statement by Ambassador Liu Zhenmin at Security Council Open Debate on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 22 July 2009.”

52 Dreher et al., “Aid, China, and Growth”; Kitano and Harada, “Estimating China's Foreign Aid 2001–2013.”

53 Government of the People's Republic of China, “Peacekeeping, Mediation, Assistance, Escort, Development – Wang Yi Talks About Five Keywords of China’s Assistance to Peace and Security in Africa.”

54 Foot, China, the UN, and Human Protection.

55 Hirono, Jiang, and Lanteigne, “China's New Roles and Behaviour in Conflict-affected Regions.”

56 Ibid.; Adhikari, “Peacebuilding with ‘Chinese Characteristics’?”; Wong, “The Rise of China’s Developmental Peace.”

57 Richmond and Tellidis, “Emerging Actors in International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding- Status Quo or Critical States”; Berthelemy, “China’s Engagement and Aid Effectiveness in Africa”; Mohan and Power, “New African Choices?”

58 Dreher et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits,”; Gong, “Non-traditional Security Cooperation between China and South-East Asia.”

59 Hirono, Jiang, and Lanteigne, “China's New Roles and Behaviour in Conflict-affected Regions”; Ghiselli, Protecting China's Interests Overseas.

60 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Official Development ssistance” (2022). https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm#:~:text=Official%20development%20assistance%20(ODA)%20is,and%20welfare%20of%20developing%20countries (accessed 25 December 2022).

61 For more on this topic: Zhang, “The Aid-contracting Nexus,” 17–27.

62 Zhang, “The Aid-contracting Nexus.”

63 Custer et al., “Tracking Chinese Development Finance.”

64 Dreher et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits.”

65 OECD, Peace and Official Development Assistance.

66 UNDP China, China’s Overseas Development Finance.

67 Custer et al., “Tracking Chinese Development Finance.”

68 Guillon and Mathonnat, “What Can We Learn on Chinese Aid Allocation Motivations from Available Data?”

69 Dreher et al., “Aid, China, and Growth.”

70 According to the Field Definitions in AidData's Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0, using projects marked “recommended for research” ensures that: (1) financial values are not double-counted; (2) all selected projects have moved beyond the pledge stage; and (3) all suspended or cancelled projects are excluded.

71 Dreher et al., “Aid, China, and Growth”; Bluhm et al., “Connective Financing.”

72 The World Bank Data: GDP per capita https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (accessed 25 December 2022).

73 Richmond and Tellidis, “Emerging Actors in International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding- Status Quo or Critical States.”

74 Dreher et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits.”

75 Ghiselli, Protecting China's Interests Overseas.

76 The World Bank Data: Total natural resources rents https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS (accessed 25 December 2022). The original data (% of GDP) is modified as total natural resources (mil USD) by multiplying the GDP of the given year.

77 Dreher et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits.” Guillon and Mathonnat, “What Can We Learn on Chinese Aid Allocation Motivations from Available Data?”

78 There are works which use alternative proxies to capture China’s diplomatic interests in third counties, for example, their position on diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. We do not adopt this measurement because our data is limited to conflict-affected countries that received aid from China. It is very possible that those beneficiaries have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan, otherwise, they would not have received Chinese aid. This question merits further investigation in scholarly works.

79 Harvard Dataverse, United Nations General Assembly Voting Data, Version 29.0. https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ (accessed 25 December 2022).

80 Investment Map, FDI statistics. https://www.investmentmap.org/home (accessed 25 December 2022).

81 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Dataset Download Center, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ (accessed 25 December 2022).

82 OECD.Stat, Aid (ODA) commitments to countries and regions, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE3A (accessed 25 December 2022).

83 Wu et al., “China’s Economic Weight on the Scale of Sino-Us Confrontation – Evidence from the United Nations General Assembly Voting Data.”

84 Dreher et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits.”