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Abstract
This article challenges the convention that political-elite diplomacy should be the main instrument for coping with difficult violent conflicts. Its main argument is that a multifaceted approach to peace-making that creates equilibrium between political-elite diplomacy and public diplomacy has the greatest potential to generate a positive change in difficult situations of protracted violent conflicts where ordinary citizens are at the centre of the struggle. To demonstrate our central claim, the paper analyses three case studies that are considered to be significant cases within the realm of geopolitics and the history of modern statecraft: the Oslo Accord in the Israeli–Palestinian situation, the Dhaka negotiations that preceded the civil war between East and West Pakistan, and the Mandela–de Klerk interactions that led to a revolutionary transformation in South Africa.
Notes
1. For example, the fundamental dispute between two major paradigms in international relations and peace research ‘realism’ versus ‘world society’ and its contemporary version ‘conflict management’ versus ‘conflict resolution’, especially in regard to the Israeli–Palestinian situation. For a further discussion, see Handelman, ‘Conflict and Peacemaking in Israel–Palestine’, 37–43; Nye, ‘Understanding International Conflicts’, 220; Banks, ‘The Evolution of International Relations Theory’, 3–21; Fisher, ‘Interactive Conflict Resolution’.
2. See, for example, Hamilton and Langhorne, ‘The Practice of Diplomacy’; Agha, et al., ‘Track-II Diplomacy’.
3. Ironically, The Prince, which was written by Niccolo Machiavelli about 500 years ago, demonstrates this very point more than anything else. For a further discussion upon the limitations of a Machiavellian prince, see Handelman, ‘Conflict and Peacemaking in Israel–Palestine’, 50–53; Silone, ‘School for Dictators’.
4. Observations show clearly that public opinion constrains leadership behaviour, plays a major role in the formation of foreign policy, and puts limits to the influence of political elites. See, for example, Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion’, 510.
5. For example, political-elite diplomacy is the main peace-making channel in the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Israeli–Palestinian struggle. See, for example, Bickerton and Klausner, ‘A Concise History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict’; Agha et al., ‘Track-II Diplomacy’.
6. See, for example, Agha et al., ‘Track-II Diplomacy’, 1–3; Handelman, ‘Conflict and Peacemaking in Israel–Palestine’, 82–85. Closed-door diplomacy can be regarded as an example of track-I engagement. The public knows that there are official negotiations, but the content is secret. For example: the Camp David Accord of 1978 and John Kerry attempt to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 2013–4.
7. Compare to Agha et al., ‘Track-II Diplomacy’, 3, who distinguish between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ track-II interactions. The first is ‘aimed at an exchange of views, perceptions, and information between the parties to improve each side’s understanding of the other’s positions and policies’. The second is intended to ‘help negotiate political agreements between governments’.
8. For a comprehensive account of the conflict, see Bickerton and Klausner, ‘A Concise History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict’.
9. Agha et al., ‘Track-II Diplomacy’, 35.
10. Agha et al., ‘Track-II Diplomacy’, 34; Bickerton and Klausner, ‘A Concise History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict’, 250–251.
11. Cf. Kelman, ‘Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough’, 189–193; Kriesberg, ‘Mediation and Transformation of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict’, 378.
12. Compare to Agha et al., ‘Track-II Diplomacy’, 41.
13. Savir, ‘The Process’.
14. Agha et al., ‘Track-II Diplomacy’, 54, claim that ‘the Oslo talks can be considered “the mother of all track II talks” in the Middle East’.
15. Kelman, ‘The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes’, 292, claims that the disaster was that both Rabin and Arafat prepared a reserve option in case the process collapsed: ‘On the Israeli side, the reserve option was to resume control over the Palestinian territories; on the Palestinian side, it was to resume the armed struggle.’ My main point is that, in general, political leaders should not be trusted. Their ability to shape the foundations of a new social order is limited. Therefore, even, full commitment to a historic peace-making task is not enough.
16. There is a lot of literature focused on why the Oslo peace process failed. We discuss one hypothesis that certainly does not give a complete picture. Our main point is that the political-elite model, interactions between elites, cannot alone bring a sustainable peace in the complicated situation of the Israeli–Palestinian struggle.
17. For a detailed explanation on the ‘Two Nations Theory’ please see Marshall, ‘The Oxford History of the British Empire’.
18. Haquani, ‘Pakistan’, 4–6.
19. Sisson and Rose, ‘War and Secession’.
20. Van Schendel, ‘A History of Bangladesh’, 114.
21. Talbot, ‘Pakistan’, 170.
22. Asghar Khan, ‘Generals in Politics’, 28.
23. The classical definition of public diplomacy is ‘direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments’. See Malone, ‘Managing Public Diplomacy’, 199. We suggest to expand the concept and to view public diplomacy as a political instrument that operates in two different directions. In one direction, public diplomacy provides political tools for leaders to prepare the people for an effective peace-making process and create public support to endorse innovative agreements (top-down). In the other direction, public diplomacy offers political instruments for people to influence political leaders and demand of them initiation of the peace-making process (bottom-up). For a further discussion, see Handelman, ‘Two Complementary Settings of Peacemaking Diplomacy’.
24. Siddiqi, ‘East Pakistan The Endgame’, 43, 45–46, 49–50.
25. Sisson and Rose, ‘War and Secession’, 103.
26. Pakistan Observer [Dhaka], 21 December 1970.
27. Islam, ‘Making of Nation Bangladesh’, 88, 93–97.
28. Jahan, ‘Pakistan’.
29. Raghavan, ‘1971’, 49.
30. Zartman, ‘Negotiating the South African Conflict’, 147 noted: ‘In history there is no precedent anywhere for successful negotiations allowing a poor majority to take over from or even to share power with a rich minority when majority and minority identify and are identified inscriptively. That only happens by revolution or by postcolonial replacement.’ We argue that the South African transition to Democracy was a revolutionary peace-making process.
31. For a general definition of revolution, see Friedrich, ‘Revolution’, 4.
32. Visionary leaders, according to our perception, are leaders who can challenge entrenched conventions and lead to effective change in difficult situations of social crisis.
33. Huntington, ‘How Countries Democratize’, 596–597, claims that the disaster was that Botha initiated major liberalizing reforms but without any intention to transform South Africa into a full non-racial Democracy. Botha’s reforms stimulated intensified demand from the black community for their full incorporation into the political system that was suppressed by military force.
34. Indeed, one of the first moves of the new negotiating partner (Nelson Mandela) after his release from jail was to announce a unilateral suspension of the ANC’s armed struggle. See Sparks, ‘Tomorrow Is Another Country’, 124.
35. Sparks, ‘Tomorrow Is Another Country’, 104.
36. The fear was of mass reaction similar to the demonstrations which had followed the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Teheran in 1979. See Sparks, ‘Tomorrow Is Another Country’, 101.
37. Sparks, ‘Tomorrow Is Another Country’, 101–119.
38. William Zartman, ‘Negotiating the South African Conflict’, 148.
39. See Mandela, ‘Long Walk to Freedom’, 457.
40. Quoted in Sparks, ‘Tomorrow Is Another Country’, 128.
41. Ottaway, ‘South Africa’, 10–11.
42. Of course, democracy is characterized by other constrains, such as the ability to replace governments without bloodshed. For a further discussion, see Popper, ‘The Open Society and its Enemies’.
43. According to the initial power-sharing programme of the National Party, the whites and their allies could be able to block any attempt to change the socio-economic structure of South Africa. See Sparks, ‘Tomorrow Is Another Country’, 126.
44. Quoted in Zartman, ‘Negotiating the South African Conflict’, 155.
45. Ibid., 155.
46. Cf. Handelman, ‘Conflict and Peacemaking in Israel–Palestine’, 91–95.
47. In Northern Ireland’s multiparty negotiations every political party had to commit to principles of democratic and peaceful means of dialogue, known as the ‘Mitchell Principles’. See Mitchell, ‘Making Peace’, 35–36.
48. Sparks, ‘Tomorrow Is Another Country’, 130.
49. See Courtney and Shapiro, ‘South Africa’s Negotiated Transition’, 269–308.
50. Sparks, ‘Tomorrow is Another Country’, 189–190.
51. For a discussion upon the difficulties of establishing the multiparty talks in Northern Ireland during the troubles, see Courtney et al., ‘Problems and Prospects for Democratic Settlements’, 302, and Dixon, ‘Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation?’, 725–741.
52. Sparks, ‘Tomorrow is Another Country’, 128–129.
53. Joe Slovo, the leader of the South African Communist Party and leading member of the ANC, put it: ‘we can win political office, but we won’t have political power’ (quoted in Sparks, ‘Tomorrow Is Another Country’, 182).
54. http://web.archive.org/web/20061012064901/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/record.html.
55. Sparks, ‘Tomorrow is Another Country’, 184.
56. Compare to Sparks, ‘Tomorrow is Another Country’, 194, who claims that in contrast to the composition of the US constitution that was written in private, the constitution of South Africa was drafted in a public forum.
57. Public diplomacy is a controversial term. Recent studies have suggested that this new field of practice and research is based upon the relationship between three elements: government, media and public opinion. The multiparty talks were peace-making institutions that influenced these three elements simultaneously. For further discussion of the very essence of public diplomacy, see Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, 55–77; Soroka, ‘Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy’, 27–48.
58. See Sparks, ‘Tomorrow is Another Country’, 194.
59. It helps to replace the entrenched convention that there is no solution to the conflict by bringing the people in the opposing societies to consider different solutions to the struggle. For a further discussion, see Handelman, ‘Two Complementary Views of Peacemaking’, 60.
60. The multiparty talks succeeded in creating public debate and critical discussion which are necessary to transform the violent struggle into political dialogue by peaceful means. For a further discussion upon the importance of public debate in a pluralistic society, see Joseph Agassi, Technology: Philosophical and Social Aspects (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1995); Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. Moreover, the multiparty talks succeeded in creating a major peace-making coalition of the moderate centre against the extremes. Cf. Curran and Sebenius, ‘The Mediator as Coalition-Builder’, 111–147.
61. One of the symptoms of intractable conflict like the Israeli–Palestinian case is that almost any progression in the peace-making process is likely to increase the level of violence. One of the reasons is that spoilers tend to increase efforts to sabotage any progression toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict through violence. For a further discussion, see Handelman, ‘Conflict and Peacemaking in Israel–Palestine’, 66–70.
62. As noted previously, public diplomacy is a controversial term. Recent studies have suggested that this new field of practice and research is based upon the relationship between three elements: government, media and public opinion. Creation of a major public negotiating congress, our proposal for a peace-making institution that has the potential to create a positive change in the Israeli–Palestinian struggle, is designed to connect the three components: influencing the leadership, preparing the public for a new social order, and utilizing the media to promote the culture of peace in these two levels (leadership and people). For further discussion upon the very essence of public diplomacy, see Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’; Soroka, ‘Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy’.
63. For a further discussion, see Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment’, 1–3.
64. According to Huntington, ‘the mobilization of new groups into politics and the creation of new political institutions’ are characteristics of a major revolution. A major public negotiating congress, that provides political alternative to the violent struggle, might be able to create coalition of the moderate center in a way that could invite a new peacemaking force to the stage of politics’. See Huntington, ‘Political Order in Changing Societies’, 266.
65. For a further detailed discussion upon the idea to establish a major Israeli–Palestinian public negotiating congress, see, for example, Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment’, 511–528; Handelman, ‘Conflict and Peacemaking in Israel–Palestine’, 91–106; Handelman, ‘People-to-People Diplomacy’; Handelman, ‘Peacemaking Contractualism’, 123–144.