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Abstract
How do we create an effective change in situations of intractable conflict where ordinary people are at the centre of the struggle? Distinguishing between top-down contractualism and bottom-up contractualism, this article presents the South African peace process of the 1990s as an example of top-down contractualism. In contrast, it raises the question as to whether bottom-up peace-making contractualism can emerge in the Israeli–Palestinian case.
Notes
1. See Banks, ‘The Evolution of International Relations Theory’, 3–21; Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution.
2. Cf. Murshed, ‘Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment’, 387–393.
3. Compare to the concept of ‘security community’, which was proposed in Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.
4. Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine, 111–112.
5. Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine, 91–107; Handelman, ‘Two Complementary Views of Peace-making’, 58–60.
6. For a comprehensive account of the South African case, see Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country; For a comprehensive account of the Northern Ireland case, see Mitchell, Making Peace.
7. See Kelman, ‘Reflections on the history and status of peace research’, 95–96.
8. See Banks, ‘The Evolution of International Relations Theory’, 20; Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 1–2; Hopmann, ‘Two Paradigms of Negotiation’, 24–47.
9. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 220.
10. Cf. Allison, Essence of Decision, 3.
11. Allison, Essence of Decision.
12. See, for example, Thomas Schelling’s (2005) Nobel Prize Lecture at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2005/schelling-lecture.pdf.
13. Cf. Banks, ‘The Evolution of International Relations Theory’, 19; Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics’, 432.
14. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 6.
15. Cf. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 220.
16. Banks, ‘The Evolution of International Relations Theory’, 20.
17. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 21–23.
18. Ibid., 25–26.
19. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics’, 460.
20. Cf. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics’, 433.
21. Kelman, ‘Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving’, 99–123.
22. Cf. Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion’, 510.
23. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics’, 460.
24. Cf. Murshed, ‘Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment’, 388.
25. In contrast, Huntington noted: ‘Two groups which see each other only as archenemies cannot form the basis of a community until those mutual perceptions change.’ See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 9; Cf. Handelman et al., ‘A Palestinian–Israeli Public Assembly and the American Black Church’, 33–34.
26. Handelman, ‘Between the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict and the East–West Pakistan Struggle’, 25–26.
27. According to Huntington, three main elements are necessary to turn different groups into a community: agreement on rules, common interest and institutions. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 9–10.
28. Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine, 92.
29. Constitutional economists argue that constructive competition can emerge only in an adequate framework of rules and institutions. See, for example, Buchanan, Moral Science and Moral Order; Vanberg, ‘Market and State’, 23–49.
30. See Sisk, ‘South Africa’s National Peace Accord’, 52.
31. See, for example, Mitchell, Making Peace, 117.
32. See, for example, Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country.
33. Cf. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 3.
34. Gaza is not completely independent. It is under siege by Israel and Egypt.
35. See, for example, Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine, 53–57.
36. See, for example, Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine, 4–5.
37. Cf. Kelman, ‘Social-psychological Dimensions Of International Conflict’.
38. Mitchell, Making Peace, 35–36.
39. Sisk, ‘South Africa’s National Peace Accord’, 53–54.
40. Ibid., 60–66.
41. The Norwegians, the hosts of the Oslo accord during 1992–1993, were a third-party facilitator without leverage and without any direct interest in the region. See Kelman, ‘Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough’, 183–194.
42. Sisk, ‘South Africa’s National Peace Accord’, 66.
43. Cf. Zartman, ‘Negotiating the South African Conflict’, 147.
44. See Huntington ‘How Countries Democratize’, 596–598.
45. Indeed, one of the first moves of Nelson Mandela after his release from jail was to announce a unilateral suspension of the ANC’s armed struggle (Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 124).
46. Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 104.
47. Ibid., 101.
48. Ibid., 101–119.
49. See Zartman, ‘Negotiating the South African Conflict’, 148.
50. See Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 457.
51. Quoted in Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 128.
52. See Ottaway, South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order, 10–11.
53. According to the initial power-sharing programme of the National Party, the whites and their allies could be able to block any attempt to change the socio-economic structure of South Africa (Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 126).
54. Quoted in Zartman, ‘Negotiating the South African Conflict’, 155.
55. Compare to Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine, 1–3.
56. Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 130.
57. See Courtney and Shapiro, ‘South Africa’s Negotiated Transition’, 269–308.
58. See Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 189–190.
59. For a discussion of the difficulties of establishing the multiparty talks in Northern Ireland during the troubles, see Courtney, Lust-Okar and Shapiro, ‘Problems and Prospects for Democratic Settlements’, 302; Dixon, ‘Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation?’, 725–741.
60. See Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 128–129.
61. As Joe Slovo, the leader of the South African Communist Party and leading member of the ANC, put it: ‘we can win political office, but we won’t have political power’ (quoted in Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 182).
62. http://web.archive.org/web/20,061,012,064,901/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/record.html.
63. See Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 184.
64. Compare to Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 194.
65. See, for example, Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine; Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East.
66. For a comprehensive discussion of the classical symptoms of intractable conflict, see Louis Kriesberg, ‘Intractable Conflicts’, 417–421; Bar-Tal, ‘Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict’, 22–50; Coleman, ‘Intractable Conflict’, 428–450.
67. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 41.
68. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 35.
69. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 34; Bickerton and Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli Conflict, 250.
70. Bickerton and Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli Conflict, 250–251.
71. Cf. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 54.
72. Kelman, ‘The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes’, 292.
73. Cf. Kelman, ‘The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes’, 292.
74. A ‘two-state solution’ is not mentioned in the Oslo agreement. However, as Kelman noted, the logic of the process is to progress the idea of a ‘two-state solution’. See Kelman, ‘Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough’, 184–185.
75. For example, the government response to the South African congress of the people, which was organized by the ANC in 1955, was further repressive legislation and the arrest of 156 people charged in conspiracy. See Thompson, A History of South Africa, 209.
76. Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment’, 2–3.
77. Compare to Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 8–12.
78. See, for example, de Klerk, ‘South Africa’s Negotiated Transition’.
79. See, for example, Sisk, ‘South Africa’s National Peace Accord’.
80. Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment’, 511–528.
81. Cf. Kelman, ‘Negotiation As Interactive Problem Solving’, 106.
82. Cf. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty; Buchanan, ‘The Status of the Status Quo’, 133–144.
83. Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment’, 511–514.
84. Cf. Hamdan and Pearson, Arab Approaches to Conflict Resolution.
85. Cf. Kriesberg, ‘Mediation and Transformation’, 378.
86. A detailed analysis of the first rounds of the experiment and their practical implications is beyond the scope of this article and can be found in Handelman, People-to-People Diplomacy in Israel and Palestine. The agreements can be viewed at http://mindsofpeace.org/.
87. Selecting the negotiators was made by Israelis and Palestinians independently and was affected by available population samples in the region of the dialogue. As yet, there has been little direct representation of Hamas in the talks, although the initiative was reported on web sites of Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestine Today, Amad and IBA news in Arabic.
88. Pearson, ‘Locational Factors in Citizen Peace Negotiations’, 74–87.
89. See, for example, Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment’, 522–524.
90. Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine, 53–57.
91. Here is a short video documenting the second day: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xx4L4Uwbo7c.
92. Here is a short article describing the event: www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4,138/palestinians-israelis-minds-of-peace.
93. Public diplomacy is a controversial term. Recent studies have suggested that this new field of practice and research is based upon the relationship between three elements: government, media and public opinion. A major public negotiating congress is designed to connect the three elements: influencing the leadership, involving the public in the struggle for change and utilizing the media to promote the culture of peace in these two levels (leadership and people). For a further discussion of the very essence of public diplomacy, see Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, 55–77; Soroka, ‘Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy’, 27–48.
94. Galtung, ‘Three Approaches to Peace’, 292–304.
95. For example, there is no sequence of land between Gaza and the West Bank; the complexity of the Jerusalem issue requires special arrangement; Palestinians citizens of Israel are relatives of the Palestinians in the territories; and so on. See, for example, Handelman, Conflict and Peace-making in Israel–Palestine.
96. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 5.
97. The Northern Ireland assembly was established as a result of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The assembly has been suspended on several occasions and for a quite long time. However, the different parties did not renew the violent struggle.