Biblical military ethics and the Israel defence forces: the case of special reconnaissance

ABSTRACT

The deployment of special forces in hostile or politically volatile environments in search of strategic/operational intelligence, though not a 21st century novelty, appeared as a distinct military activity in literature only in the early 2000s under the label ‘Special Reconnaissance’ (SR). This article argues that the concept of SR (a) originated in the biblical Israelite military tradition and is depicted in the Bible as the lapis angularis of military strategy and a practice capable of dictating military and political norms; (b) has been used as a key element of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) modus operandi since 1948 thenceforth functioning in an analogous manner. To support these arguments, the theoretical and practical characteristics of Moses’ intelligence mission to Canaan as well as the IDF’s proclivity to SR are scrutinised under the general theoretical framework of political realism that assumes rational and pro-state interest course of actions. Accordingly, SR emerges as a distinctive common instrument of biblical and contemporary Israeli strategy, a fact that underlines the uninterrupted socio-political and cultural links between the past and the present of the Israeli ontology, this time via the wider concept of the Israeli military ethics.

KEYWORDS:

• Bible
• IDF
• military ethics
• Israel
• Israeli military strategy
• special operations
• special reconnaissance
• military intelligence
• strategic intelligence
• operational intelligence

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Department of the Army, FM 31-20-5, glossary-10.

2. NATO, Glossary, 121.

3. Ibid., 93.

4. Ibid., 125.

5. Ibid., 121.

6. Ibid., 94.

7. Ibid., 125.

8. Department of the Army, FM 3-05-20, 2-15.

9. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, 2-6.

10. NATO-RUSSIA Joint Editorial Working Group, NATO-Russia Glossary, 197.

11. Written Ministerial Statement (5 April, Column 130WS).

12. Eriksson and Pettersson, Special Operations, 107.

13. Henderson, “Chinese Special Forces,” 31.

14. Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics among Nations, 4–14.

15. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics, 2.

16. Wight, International Theory, 126.

17. Pettman, World Politics, 74–5.

18. Bull, The Anarchical Society, 63–4.

19. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism,” 244.

20. Berlin and Brettler, The Jewish Study Bible.

21. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 2–4.

22. Ibid.

23. NATO, Glossary, 118.

24. European External Agency Service, EUMC Glossary, 88.

25. Ibid.

26. U.S. Department of Defence, “Dictionary,” 199–200.

27. Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, I-1.

28. Eriksson and Pettersson, Special Operations, 121.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Leebaert, To Dare and to Conquer, 22.

34. Ibid., 44.

35. Thomas, “Commando Operations in Modern Warfare,” 689–90.

36. Leebaert, To Dare and to Conquer, 28–34.

37. Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, 3–5.

38. Department of the Army, FM 34-2-1, glossary-5.

39. Ibid., 1.1.

40. Ibid., 2–3.

41. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, Vol. III, 131.

42. Fagles and Knox, Homer: The Iliad, 283–95.

43. Finley and Warner, History of the Peloponnesian War, VIII-100.

44. Brownson, Xenophon, 465.

45. Milner, Vegetius, 75, 109.

46. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, 62.

47. Luvaas, “Napoleon’s Use of Intelligence,” 42–3.

48. Andrew, The Secret World, 497.

49. McGrath, The Development of Reconnaissance Units, 42.

50. Kummer, U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 291.

51. Westberg, “In Silence Toward the Unknown,” 1-2.

52. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 108.

53. Gentry, “Intelligence Services and Special Operations Forces,” 657–66.

54. Ibid., 657–58.

55. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service, 48–9.

56. Westberg, “To See and Not to be Seen,” 128.

57. Henriksen, The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare, 14.

58. The White House, The National Security Strategy, 16.

59. Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, 1.3-1.4.

60. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, 3-1-3.2.

61. Bukkvoll, “Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government,” 608.

62. Westberg, “To See and Not to be Seen,” 125.

63. Ibid., 124.

64. Katz, Soldier Spies, 319.

65. Numbers: 13.1–29.

66. Feldman, “Moses the General,” 4.

67. Gabriel, The Military History of Ancient Israel, 99–100.

68. Sicker, The Theopolitical Discourses of Moses, 34–5.

69. Serrano, Biblical Principles for Resilience in Leadership, 40.

70. Numbers: 1.1–47.

71. Ibid., 2.1-34.

72. Ibid., 2.1-31, 10.11-28.

73. As in Numbers: 2.1–34, 7.10–83, 10.11–28, and 13.1–16 respectively.

74. The version of the Tanakh that the authors use for the purpose of this study makes use of the words ‘troops’ and ‘chieftains’ respectively.

75. Numbers: 13.1-4.

76. See note 69 above.

77. Numbers: 13.21.

78. Ibid., 13.27-31.

79. Yonge, The Works of Philo, On the Life of Moses I, XL (224).

80. Musco, “Intelligence Gathering,” 8.

81. Gabriel, The Military History of Ancient Israel, 100.

82. Curzer, “Spies and Lies,” 194–95.

83. Numbers: 13.25-14.45.

84. Ibid., 14.1-38.

85. Ibid., 14.39-44.

86. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 12.

87. Ibid.

88. Westberg, “To See and Not to be Seen,” 126–27.

89. Exodus: 17.8-16.

90. Numbers: 20.14-21.

91. Joshua: 9.1-2.

92. Katz, Soldier Spies, 52.

93. Katz, “The Most Technologically Advanced Military.”

94. Ziv, “Shimon Peres and the French-Israeli Alliance,” 407.

95. Meir, “Israel in Search of Lasting Peace,” 447.

96. Katz, Soldier Spies, 192–93.

97. Ibid., 103–04.

98. Ibid., 68–70.

99. Ibid., 68–9.

100. Ibid., 69.

101. Ibid., 70.

102. Ibid.

103. Henriksen, The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare, 13–4.

104. Ibid., 14.

105. Ibid., 14–5.

106. Ibid., 14.

107. Katz, Soldier Spies, 103.

108. Ibid., 129–31.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Leslau, “Israeli Experience and the Utility of Special Operations Forces,” 516.

112. Katz, Soldier Spies, 143.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, 118.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid., 147.

119. Katz, Soldier Spies, 109–10.

120. Ibid.

121. Betser and Rosenberg, Secret Soldier, 6.

122. Ibid., 7.

123. Katz, Soldier Spies, 213–14.

124. Ibid., 214.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid., 341.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Blum, “What Trump Really Told Kislyak.”

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Elgot and Chulov, “UK Bans Laptops.”

134. Middle East Eye, “New Details of Botched Israeli Operation.”

135. Ibid.

136. Katz, Shadow Strike, 32.

137. Ibid., 40–1.

138. Ibid., 42.

139. Ibid., 13.

140. Ibid., 96.

141. Ibid., 15.

142. Ibid., 120–22.

143. Ibid., 160.

144. Ibid., 62.

145. Ibid., 159–60.

146. Ibid., 159.

147. Ibid., 162–63.

148. Ibid., 163.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid., 164.

151. Ibid., 182.

152. Ibid., 275.

153. Ibid., 282.

154. Numbers: 13.17-20.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Spyridon N. Litsas

Spyridon N. Litsas is Professor of International Relations at the University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece & Rabdan Academy, UAE.

Georgios K. Papadimitriou

Georgios K. Papadimitriou is PhD Candidate at the University of Macedonia.