A question of legitimacy: West Bank rightwing activists explain violent clashes with the state

ABSTRACT

Many members of minority groups clash violently with state agents. The case of West Bank rightwing activists is particularly paradoxical. Unlike disempowered groups whose ability to bring about change is limited, these activists constitute a powerful sociopolitical force, and the security forces with which they clash also protect them in the territories to which they claim sovereignty. Based on 20 interviews with rightwing protest activists, this article explores what interpretation activists give to their part in violent clashes. The article offers two main contributions. First, it proposes the concept of perceived state legitimacy as a theoretical construct for evaluating the degree to which citizens view their state as legitimate. Unlike previous studies that define legitimacy as a unidimensional construct, perceived state legitimacy is defined here as made up of five different components: identification, trust, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legality. Second, the article shows empirically that violent clashes can indicate undermining distinct components of state legitimacy. Thus, West Bank rightwing activists who took part in violent clashes with state agents undermine the state’s legitimacy components of trust, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legality – but not identification.

KEYWORDS:

• settlers; West Bank
• rightwing activists
• violent clashes
• perceived state legitimacy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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2. Eiran and Kraus, “Old (Molotov) Cocktails,” 637–57.

3. Pedahzur, Hasisi and Brichta, “Political Violence in Israel,” 18–27.

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5. Weinberg and Assoudeh, “Political Violence,” 1–10.

6. Eldar and Zertal, Lords of the Land, 1–10.

7. Sprinzak, “The Process of Delegitimization,” 50–68.

8. Berenson and Atmor, “Social Psychology of Protest,” 1–5.

9. Ben-Porat and Ghanem, “Introduction: Securitization,” 861–71.

10. Miodownik and Nir, “Receptivity to Violence,” 22–45.

11. della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 1–10.

12. Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi, Dynamics of Radicalization, 1–10.

13. Roggeband and Klandermans, Handbook of Social Movements, 1–20.

14. Jost and Van der Toorn, “System Justification Theory,” 313–43.

15. See note 7 above.

16. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 1–10.

17. Newman, “Hungry for Change?,” 300–24.

18. Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy, 1–20.

19. Weber, Politics as a Vocation, 1–10.

20. Wajner and Kacowicz, “Regional Legitimation,” 1–33.

21. Crews, Crews and Burton, “NRA’s Proposal,” 183–99.

22. Beetham, Legitimation of Power, 1–12.

23. Perry, Jonathan‐Zamir and Weisburd, “Protest Policing,” 602–34.

24. Lamont, Distributive Justice, 1–20.

25. Tyler et al., “Procedural Injustice,” 138–52.

26. Zilis, “Judicial Legitimacy,” 270–83.

27. See note 7 above.

28. Catlaw, Fabricating the People, 1–12.

29. Feige, Settling in the Hearts, 1–10; and Feige, “Rabin’s Murder,” 31–56.

30. Gorny, “Roots of the Conflict,” 25–31.

31. Rot, Not at All Costs, 1–20; and Schwartz and Wilf, War of Return, 1–10.

32. Shehade`, “Settler Welfare State,” 203–22.

33. Yesha council, “Population 2019.”

34. Pease now, “Settlements”; and Sasson, Unauthorized Outposts, 1–15.

35. See note 33 above.

36. Note however that the Palestinians in East Jerusalem are not citizens but only ‘permanent residents’, and that in practice they are subject to many of the same restrictions applied to Palestinians elsewhere in the West-bank.

37. Shenhav, Green Line, 1–13.

38. Guttwin, “Classical Foundations,” 203–11.

39. Roded, “Hebron,” 303–30.

40. Aran, Gush Emunim, 1–10.

41. Inbari, Temple Mountain, 1–12.

42. Greenblum, “Religious Zionism,” 1–20; and Pedahzur and McCarthy, “West-bank Settlers,” 443–61.

43. Schwarzmantel, Democracy and Political Violence, 1–20.

44. Harel, “Post Gush Emunim,” 159–80.

45. Feige, “Rabin’s Murder,” 31–56.

46. See note 2 above.

47. Levitt et al., “Article Reporting Standards,” 26–46.

48. Ibid.

49. Miles, Huberman and Saldana, Qualitative Data Analysis, 1–21.

50. Daphna-Tekoah and Harel-Shalev, “Beyond Binaries,” 253–73.

51. Gilley, “State legitimacy,” 499–525.

52. See note 22 above.

53. See note 23 above.

54. Alimi, “Radicalization,” 910–29.

55. A body in charge of implementing Israel’s civil policy in the West-bank. It operates as a civilian entity, but is subordinated to the military authority.

56. See note 24 above.

57. See note 38 above.

58. See note 32 above.

59. See note 25 above.

60. Eldar and Zertal, Lords of the Land, 1–10; and Shehade`, “Settler Welfare State,” 203–22.

61. An expression that became common in Israeli public discourse: violence is perceived as a way of naming a price the state would have to pay each time it seeks to evacuate settlements.

62. See note 26 above.

63. The law favors the Jewish citizens of the state over others, thus creating a hierarchy of citizenship.

64. Mitnik, Cumberworth and Grusky, “Social Mobility,” 140–84.

65. Abu, Yuval and Ben-Porat, “Stigmatization,” 688–706.

66. Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques,” 294–308.

67. Pierson, “Increasing Returns,” 251–67.

68. Lowndes, Marsh and Stocker, Theory and Methods, 1–20.

69. Opotow, “Protest and Policing,” 1–12.

70. Gallagher-Cunningham, Dahl and Fruge´, “Strategies of Resistance,” 591–605.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yair Yassan

Dr. Yair Yassan is a lecturer in the Conflict Management and Resolution Program in Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.