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ABSTRACT
Forty years after its occurrence, the 1982 Lebanon war remains academically understudied with the received wisdom about the conflict largely based on political and journalistic accounts. According to these accounts, the war was a political ploy by Defence Minister Ariel Sharon and Prime Minister Menachem Begin aimed at achieving far-reaching political goals rather than a defensive attempt to remove the terrorist threat to Israel’s northern areas. By placing the conflict within the context of Israeli history and the Arab-Israeli conflict, on the one hand, and the nature and characteristics of modern warfare, on the other, this article offers a more nuanced interpretation of the Lebanon War, showing that it was not fundamentally different from past military encounters.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. See, for example, Gruen, “The United States and Israel”; Abraham, “The Lebanon War”; Khalaf, “The Lebanon War”; and Schulze, “Israeli Crisis Decision Making.”
2. Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, 9 (emphasis added).
3. Erlich, The Lebanon Tangle, 361–2, 378–86, 413–22.
4. Naor, Begin in Power, 267–8; and Schiff and Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War, 43, 301–3.
5. Silver, Begin, 223; Zipori, In a Straight Line, 277; Peleg-Uziyahu, “A Moral War of Choice,” 219–48; and Golan, Israel’s War in Lebanon, 581.
6. Benziman, Sharon, 223–4, 245; and Zipori, In a Straight Line, 272.
7. Weitz, “From Peace in the South to War in the North,” 152; Zipori, In a Straight Line, 278; Schiff and Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War, 301–3; and Oren, “The Betrayal of the ‘Son of Begin’.”
8. Oren, “The Road to Beirut.”
9. Haber, “Why a War Would Break Out.”
10. Interview with Yehoshua Sagi, Head of Army Intelligence during the war, VD-065, transcription, Oral Documentation Project, Begin Heritage Center in Jerusalem, November 18, 2008; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, 130.
11. Bartov, “A Big Question”; and Bitsur, “Begin.”
12. Evron, “There is No Consensus.”
13. Tzur, “The Right for Information and the Obligation to Argue”. That was before the Sabra and Shatila massacre that led to the establishment of the Kahan Commission.
14. Schiff and Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War, 301.
15. Benziman, Sharon, 238 (English version).
16. See, for example, Oren, “The Betrayal of the ‘Son of Begin’”; and Morris, “Sheleg in Lebanon.”
17. See, for example, Israel’s National Archive (ISA), HZ 6806-2: telegram from the foreign ministry to embassies in New York and Washington, November 15, 1970.
18. Erez, ‘IDF Attacked Terrorist Concentrations in North Lebanon’; IDF Website, ‘Operation Spring of Youth’.
19. Ben-Amir, “There is New in the North”; Ben-Amir, “The IDF Brought 3 Lebanese Citizens for Investigation.”
20. ISA, A 8163-4: Minutes of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, April 13, 1973; Naor, “‘Spring of Youth’ in Beirut,” 410–25.
21. Rahat, “The Northern Fence – Second Edition.”
22. Hamizrahi, The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt, 54–67; and Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone,” 40–2.
23. Eisenberg, “History Revisited or Revamped?” 384–5.
24. ISA, HZ 6806-3: telegram from the Israeli embassy in Washington to the foreign ministry, September 25, 1972; ISA, HZ 6806-3: telegram from the foreign ministry to the Israeli embassy and consulate in Washington and New York, September 25, 1972; US National Archives, College Park, Maryland (NA), RG 59, Box 2448/F. POL LEB-US 1-9-70: “Statement about Recent Events in Lebanon,” September 17, 1972; Public Record Office, Kew, London (PRO), FCO 17/1708: “Lebanon/Fedayeen,” September 19, 1972; PRO, FCO 17/1708: “Lebanon, Israel and the Fedayeen,” September 26, 1972.
25. Milstein, “His Jerusalem.”
26. Golan, Israel’s War in Lebanon, 55–6.
27. Ibid., 57 (emphasis added).
28. Ibid., 56.
29. Ibid., 115–18. It should be mentioned that alongside its comprehensive plans, the IDF also planned limited operations with modest goals. From these plans, the IDF could continue to the more comprehensive ones.
30. Gazit, At Key Points of Time, 297–8.
31. Peleg-Uziyahu, “A Moral War of Choice,” 244.
32. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 158; and Levy, “An Unbearable Price,” 70.
33. Mandel, “Israel in 1982,” 7–12; and Golan, Israel’s War in Lebanon, 184.
34. See, for example, Evron, “There is No Consensus”; and Tzur, “The Right for Information and the Duty of the Debate.”
35. Sofer, Begin, 203.
36. Yehoshua, “The Lebanon War,” 235.
37. Yariv, “A War of Choice,” 10–15.
38. Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 76.
39. Ibid., 81.
40. Ibid., 83, 85.
41. Inbar, “Attitudes toward War in the Israeli Political Elite,” 432.
42. Rubinstein, Moral Enforcement in a Permissive Society, 18.
43. Inbar, “Attitudes toward War in the Israeli Political Elite,” 432–3.
44. IDF Archive, 225-441/1973: “Kauchuk – Main Plan,” October 29, 1969.
45. See note 30 above.
46. Golan, Israel’s War in Lebanon, 486.
47. Vardi, “‘Pounding Their Feet’”; Shamir, Transforming Command; and Ben Shalom and Shamir, “Mission Command between Theory and Practice.”
48. Siboni, Michael and Kurtz, “Introduction.”
49. Goldstein, “Menachem Begin during the Six Day War,” 145–56.
50. Oren, Six Days of War, 278–80.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Dan Naor
Dan Naor is a Lecturer at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science at Ariel University.
Eyal Lewin
Eyal Lewin is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science at Ariel University.