The 1974 Asian Games in Tehran: Israel’s final countdown

ABSTRACT

As a close ally of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Israel participated in the September 1974 Asian Games – the ‘Asian Olympics’ – that were held in Tehran. Among the 18 sports in which athletes competed, football attracted the most attention, especially after Iran’s historic victory over Israel in the AFC Asian Cup in 1968. As both countries reached the final of the Games’ football tournament, the match came to be seen by Iranians as nothing short of war. Standing in stark contradiction to the close and multifaceted relations between Jerusalem and the monarchical regime, this public attitude was lost on Israeli decisionmakers in what foreshadowed the failure to anticipate the Islamic revolution and the attendant collapse of Iranian-Israeli relations five years later.

KEYWORDS:

• Iran
• Israel
• Asian Games
• football
• Muhammad Reza Pahlavi

‘Football is not a very exciting sport. At least in my opinion’, said Arcadi Gaydamak, former owner of Beitar Jerusalem Football Club. ‘So why is it attracting so many fans? Because subconsciously, football represents a conflict between different groups. It’s kind of a war’.¹ In September 1974, the Iranian and Israeli national teams met in a football match that most Iranians, certainly those of the lower and middle classes, as well as the clerics, viewed as nothing short of war.

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Muslim loyalty and solidarity became paramount issues in Iran. Yet it was only after the June 1967 war, in which Israel routed the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (as well as an Iraqi expedition force), that these issues came to play a significant role in the public discourse. Even then, during the golden age of relations between Jerusalem and Tehran, the Iranian people increasingly identified with the defeated Arabs rather than with the powerful and victorious Israeli ally. The results of the October 1973 war forged an even stronger bond between the Iranian people and the Arab camp, which emerged from the conflict in a superior position.

About a year later, in September 1974, Tehran put on a lavish display when it hosted the Asian Games – the ‘Asian Olympics’. The imperial regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi wanted to show off the modern, progressive, and open Iran. In addition to the national prestige involved, the Shah wanted to demonstrate that his country could handle the organisational and logistic challenge so that at some future date it could host the Olympics. In his eyes, hosting the games with all the international participants and the attendant media coverage was a mark of enormous prestige.²

Among the 18 sports in which the athletes competed, it was football that attracted the bulk of attention in Iran, especially after the country’s historic victory over Israel in the AFC Asian Cup in 1968. Football was a symbol of the social changes that the Shah and modernists were bringing to Iran and the switch from a focus on the individual to a focus on the group and from looking back to the past to looking ahead towards the modern era and the future. Hence for the locals, the football tournament was the pinnacle of the competition. The Iranian side was the natural favourite, but in the final it faced an opponent that was certainly its equal – the Israeli squad. A close study of the 1974 Asian Games, especially the football match between Iran and Israel, shows that the regime’s attitude towards Israel differed drastically from that of most Iranians and that Israel grossly misunderstood the situation.

For most Iranians, the match with Israel was not yet another sport competition but a national clash and an opportunity to vaunt the popular desire to show solidarity with the Arabs. For the Shah and his court, Iran’s success in the games as a whole, especially a triumph in the football tournament, would be a demonstration of power and stability both internally and externally, as well as confirmation of the regime’s success and the country’s prosperity under his rule. But it was all a sham: the regime was blind to the rift that had emerged between it and its subjects, which would lead to its collapse five years later.

For its part, Israel failed to identify the winds of change blowing in Asia as a whole and in Iran in particular. The Israeli delegation to the Games was boycotted throughout the competitions; the football team reached the final match only after several political events whose link to sports was totally incidental. Israel’s relations with its most prominent regional ally, Iran, hit a low point; and as if this was not enough, the Iranian populace, whose ideas about Israel were far from those of the regime, was not afraid to give them a violent physical expression. The loud anti-Israeli voices heard in Tehran and the hostility that swept across the stands during the match helps explain how only five years later the Shah’s Iran, so modern, progressive, and open to the West, slammed shut its gates to the world and changed its character beyond recognition.

This article examines the roles played by sports, especially football, in monarchical Iran, and the purposes it was enlisted to serve. It will consider how the regime exploited sports to enhance its power, status, and the country’s international standing; will analyse how domestic processes affected the football final between Iran and Israel in the 1974 Asian Games; and will discuss how this confrontation on the pitch influenced the relations between the two countries and the Jewish minority in Iran.

The early 20th century: football arrives in Iran

In the Muslim world, as everywhere else, football has become one of the most popular sports. This should not be taken for granted, however, because it is a modern game that was born in Europe and spread throughout the world along with British colonialism. ‘British rulers used the sports they exported to the countries they conquered as a tool for co-opting local elites and inculcating “British” as well as Christian values in the natives’.³ For this reason, Muslim clerics in Iran tended to see football as one more element of Western imperialism. Like many locals, they were afraid of the strange and unfamiliar, and especially of the potential threat to traditional Iranian culture. The first Iranian footballers were subjected to fierce criticism by their compatriots for playing the ‘infidels’ game. In some cases they were even assaulted physically, among other things, because they played in short pants with bare legs, contrary to the precepts of Sharia.⁴

Three main agents of modernisation brought football to the Iran: missionary schools, the oil industry, and the British armed forces. Physical education and football were part of the curriculum in the Western schools that fielded football teams. The children of the elite were exposed to the sport because most of them attended missionary schools. In some of them (such as the America-run Community School) they played other ball games in order to involve the locals in them. Finally, in 1919, physical education was added to the curriculum of local Iranian schools as a way to build a healthy nation.⁵

Working class Iranians were introduced to football by British employees of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company who played the game in the oilfields of Abadan, Masjed Soleyman, and Bandar Abbas. The company’s local workers, who at first watched from the sidelines, slowly began to replace the British players and eventually set up their own teams. Over time, football was spread to the south of the country by the British officers who commanded the Iranian battalions of the South Persia Rifles.⁶

The matches, including tournaments of foreign and local sides organised by the British embassy in Iran, continued until World War I. At its end, the games between the British and Iranians resumed. Iran FC, the first official team with exclusively Iranian players, was established in 1920. That same year, the Iranian Football Federation was founded to promote and encourage the game and to serve as an umbrella organisation for the teams fielded by local schools. Iranian entrepreneurs soon began manufacturing footballs for use by local teams, both professional and amateur; and while the teams were set up to play friendly matches, it was not long before politics entered the picture.⁷

The kick-off: football as a tool used by the Pahlavi regime

In 1925, Reza Khan Pahlavi crowned himself Shah of Iran. He opened the country to the West and instituted a series of social, economic, and political reforms, thus laying the foundations of the modern Iranian state. Reza Shah identified football’s potential and used it as a tool to realise his goals. Under his patronage, in the 1920s football became a symbol of modernisation; many tournaments and matches were played, usually on the facilities of British and American institutions.⁸

In early 1926 a squad of carefully selected footballers from Tehran faced off a team of British oil prospectors. The Shah made sure to attend in order to encourage the locals to cheer on the Iranian side. But an early goal by the British threatened to do just the opposite. The Shah’s aides stubbornly insisted that he not leave the stadium and he stayed for the second half. To his great joy, the local team booted home two goals and won by a score of 2:1. Iranians saw the victory over the British as a national achievement. For the first time ever, they had bested the British at their own game. For Reza Shah, too, it was a major accomplishment, because the victory increased his political capital and made him aware of the latent potential of football.⁹

The Shah exploited the sport to turn tribal loyalties into loyalty to the regime and unite all of Iran behind a single team – the Iranian national team. In 1926, plans were approved for the construction of the first regulation-size football pitch in the country, so that athletes could train to represent Iran internationally. Nevertheless, the Iranian team was not particularly successful and went down to a series of defeats. As a result of the humiliation, football’s popularity declined for a number of years.¹⁰

When the National Association for Physical Education was established in 1934, it encouraged Iranian schools to establish football teams and hold tournament among themselves. Within a year the number of clubs in Iran jumped from 152 to 367. Football returned to its former upward trajectory and the regime began building more fields for the locals, including the first stadium in the country, Amjadiyeh Stadium. The game became the main recreational pastime of an increasing number of young Iranians. The regime emphasised its development in the armed forces and secondary schools, with the goal of instilling soldiers and students with positive values and the tools of teamwork, fair play, and cooperation.¹¹

During the course of the 1930s there was a change in the mix of spectators, as members of the lower classes began frequenting the football fields. The regime was leery about this development because of the volatile potential of solidarity among the masses, all the more so those who were critical of the regime. Hence it decided that the matches would be run by a referee who was usually a military officer. This step corroborates the assertion that the regime attached great importance to keeping the masses in order; in its eyes the armed forces were the agent that could ensure this. In the coming years, military men had an increasing presence in Iranian football even as the regime continued to bring the game to the common folk.¹²

In 1941, during World War II, Reza Shah abdicated and left Iran; his son, Muhammad Reza, replaced him on the throne.¹³ The new monarch, who had himself played football in his youth, continued his father’s path, not only promoting the sport but also using it to enhance the sense of national identity. Several weeks after he came to power religious elements, who felt threatened by football and hoped to chart a new course in the wake of Reza Shah’s departure, submitted an official letter of complaint to the Prime Minister. In it they claimed that the regime had turned mosques into football fields. The young Shah was not troubled by the complaint and may even have seen it as an attempt to challenge him. He chose to continue the modernising line of his father and to promote football in Iran.¹⁴

Because the Shah came to the throne in wartime, when foreign troops were occupying Iran, the presence of many soldiers from several countries offered an opportunity for matches between them and young Iranians. These matches, along with the aspiration of the Shah and his associates to develop sports in general and football in particular, made him aware of the need to reorganise the sport in the country and run it in accordance with international standards. Accordingly, the Iranian Olympic Committee was established in 1947. It prepared Iranian athletes for the 1948 London Olympics and sketched the outline of the sports organisations that were required in Iran. Later that year, the Iranian Football Federation was founded and affiliated with the International Football Federation, FIFA.¹⁵

Like his father, Muhammad Reza involved the military in Iranian football. Most of the players on the national team had a military background; many were still on active duty and had ties with the royal house. This approach produced success: in 1951, under the sponsorship of the armed forces, the Iranian team did well in an international competition for the first time, winning second place in the Asian Games. The Pahlavi regime exploited the positive momentum of the team and began injecting football with the concepts of honour and brotherhood. A loss to a foreigner or ‘Other’, certainly those considered to be inferior, became an unforgivable blow to the national honour. So in 1958, when the Iranian squad lost 5:0 to South Korea and 4:0 to Israel, the entire country felt humiliated. Once again the pendulum reversed direction and football’s prestige tumbled.¹⁶

Going on the attack: Iranian football in the 1960s and 1970s

Continuing the misfortunes of the late 1950s, the Iranian national team opened the next decade with failure. In June 1962 Iran played two consecutive matches again Iraq, ‘the inferior Arab’. In one of them it managed a draw (1:1), only to suffer an embarrassing loss in the other (2:1). The defeat angered Prime Minister Ali Amini, who said that the money would have been better spent on other projects than football and the national team. The Shah, too, was furious and ordered that several players be dropped from the squad.¹⁷

Iran got its revenge two years later. Thanks to a series of victories over Iraq, India, and Pakistan, it advanced to the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. This achievement demonstrated the progress that Iranian football had made. When the team returned to the country, a huge crowd, composed mainly of members of the working class, turned out spontaneously and gave a warm welcome. Immediately afterwards there was a carefully planned military parade in its honour, organised by the regime as a way to raise the armed forces’ prestige among the people.¹⁸

The success on the pitch coincided with the strong Iranian economic growth in the 1960s. By the end of the decade the sport had overtaken wrestling to become the most popular in Iran, a result of the processes that were taking place in the country during these years. First of all, thanks to the industrialisation and modernisation pushed by the regime, millions of people moved from rural districts to large industrial cities, especially Tehran. This meant that many Iranians were no longer farmers toiling around the clock to produce a crop. As urban residents, for the first time in their lives they had free time at their disposal and spent much of it in football stadiums.¹⁹

Second, for many Iranians the urbanisation and migration severed their close ties with the traditional community and left a void for the creation of new identities. Filling this vacuum, football clubs became an object of collective loyalty; cheering for them became part of the migrants’ shared new identity. The modern stadiums built all over the country made a significant contribution to the consolidation of this identity. Tens of thousands of fans could gather in the new facilities. At the same time, in the mid-1960s, Iranian television began broadcasting football matches, which brought the game into the homes of the masses.²⁰

For Iranian football, 1968 was the turning point. In May, the Iranian and Israeli squads met in the last game of the Asian Cup tournament, played in Tehran. The game is considered to be one of the most significant points in football’s elevation to the role of the national sport. It was also one of the best-remembered politicised games in the history of football in Iran and the Middle East.²¹ It was only a year after the Arab armies had been routed in the June 1967 war. Despite the warm ties that existed between Iran and Israel, the conflict affected their relations. The first cracks began to appear, especially in how the Iranian street felt about Israel, which was perceived as a colonialist power and enemy state; hence many Iranians saw the Shah as collaborating with the enemy.²²

In general, after Iran granted Israel de facto recognition in 1950, relations between the two states proceeded on two separate levels: the official and the practical. On the official level, there were no diplomatic ties between the two states. The Shah himself acknowledged this when he said that Iran and Israel had economic but not diplomatic relations. In fact, while there was an Israeli representative office in Tehran, the Iranian foreign ministry raised obstacles to bilateral relations in several domains. It did not allow high-ranking persons to pay official visits to Israel, made it difficult for advanced students to study there, and thwarted cultural cooperation. In addition, after the Six-Day War the Iranian mission in Israel, which in any event had a much smaller staff than its Israeli counterpart in Tehran, reached its lowest ebb.²³

In the international arena, too, the Iranian foreign ministry continued to impede relations between Tehran and Jerusalem. It instructed its UN representatives to vote with the Arabs against Israel, and the Iranian delegates repeatedly blasted Israel in their speeches. What is more, Tehran insisted on implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 according to the Arab (mis)interpretation, that is, complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in June 1967 – ‘including recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’ (in fact, Resolution 242 made no mention of the Palestinians) – and was fiercely opposed to any change in the status of Jerusalem.²⁴ Israel strove to persuade the senior echelons in Tehran not to be drawn into the Arab bloc. In advance of a visit by Foreign Minister Yigal Allon to Iran, foreign ministry officials and the embassy in Tehran recommended that he explain to the Shah that ‘a strong and great Iran that champions peace and progress does not have to give the Arabs the impression that it is in their pocket’. On the contrary, Tehran should position itself as the leading player in Asia and the Middle East by adopting an independent policy that kept the good of the entire region before its eyes.²⁵

As for the practical level, despite the chill between Tehran and Jerusalem, military cooperation flourished, especially between the intelligence services. On the economic front, Iran continued to supply oil to Israel; Israeli civilian exports to Iran totalled some $20 million (in 1969), in addition to defence-related exports. Israeli contractors worked in Iran; El Al, the Israeli national airline, flew to Tehran twice a week and published ads in the Iranian press. In addition, Tehran was a stopover for foreign airlines linking Israel with the Far East. All of this made Iranians and the Arab world see the Shah as an ally of the leading colonialist enemy state.²⁶

The Arab defeat in 1967 increased Iranian society’s solidarity with the Palestinians and the Arab states, resulting in heavy pressure on the regime to join the Arab boycott. When Tehran hosted international conferences, the Israeli delegation participated openly. But the Iranians were not keen on bilateral meetings with the Israelis and did their best to keep them under the radar. The local press, too, chose to conceal the relations between Iran and Israel, including the Shah’s statements to the foreign press when abroad about the trade and economic relations between the two states. Iranian newspapers regularly printed fiercely anti-Israel articles, which generally produced an Israeli protest. Pro-Israel pieces were not published because of the authorities’ opposition and the hostile local opinion.²⁷ Iranians’ solidarity with the Arabs influenced their attitude towards the local Jewish community, which became victim of abuse and violent assaults. In April 1968, for example, an entire Jewish family (husband, wife, and daughter) was murdered by Iranian Muslim rioters in the town of Toyserkan.

All the same, the Jewish Agency continued to operate in Iran without any restrictions, but was doubly cautious and made sure its information activities maintained a low profile. Teachers from Israel taught in Jewish schools; the Jewish education network included 15 institutions of the Alliance, ORT, and Otzar Hatorah. Despite the Jewish Agency’s activity and its efforts to boost identification with Israel, despite Iranian Jewry’s modest sociocultural situation, and despite being able to leave Iran freely, there was no mass migration to Israel. That did not change until after the events that surrounded the final match of the 1968 Asia Cup tournament in Tehran.²⁸

On May 19, the day of the match, the tension in the streets of Tehran was palpable. The rivalry was not so much a sporting event in the stadium as a confrontation between the two countries. Rumours spread that Habib Elghanian, a prominent leader of the Jewish community in Iran, had purchased 5,000 tickets for distribution to Jews who would cheer the Israeli side.²⁹ In reaction, the gates of Amjadiyeh Stadium were opened several hours before game time so that the local team’s fans could enter en masse. This step triggered a rumour that the Shah had been trying to polish his public image and demonstrate his pro-Islamic and pro-Iranian sentiments by making sure that Iranian and Muslim spectators would be a majority in the stands.³⁰

In the stands, many antisemitic slogans punctuated the match; it may well have been the first time that the cry ‘death to Israel’ resounded in a football stadium. In addition to other anti-Jewish songs, many threats were directed at the Israeli bench and the referees. Vinyl records and chicken heads were hurled at the Israeli players; balloons decorated with swastikas were released in their direction. The final score was 2:1 for Iran, which became the Asian champion. After the final whistle, millions of fans inside and outside Iran went mad with joy, and all the more so the tens of thousands of spectators in the stadium. The streets of many towns and cities all over Iran were flooded with people who celebrated and blew their car horns throughout the night. The immediate fear was that the unstable atmosphere might at any moment explode into uncontrollable violence and destruction.³¹

The mass intoxication was indeed accompanied by violence against the Jews of Tehran. Jews were attacked physically; the Jewish hospital, dozens of Jewish-owned shops, and the Tehran offices of El Al were ransacked. But it stands to reason that the injuries and property damage would have been much worse had Israel won the match. Consequently many Jews went to the hotel where the Israeli side was staying, consoled them, and thanked them for coming. They gave the players gifts, and said, quite unambiguously: ‘We wanted you to win, but it’s good that you lost. Otherwise, you simply cannot imagine what would’ve happened here’.³²

Although the match had been played between two countries, it was actually a frontal confrontation between two much larger identities; some saw it as a clash between two religions. The Iranian spectators vented their fierce hatred of Israel, supposedly the leading enemy of Islam, drawing a clear distinction between the good guys (Iran) and the bad guys (Israel). The mass demonstrations, the hostile attitude and anti-Semitic manifestations during the entire tournament, especially the final match, traumatised Iranian Jews, especially those of Tehran. In the days following the match many of them, including the Jewish Community Council in the capital, contacted the local Israeli mission and Ambassador Meir Ezri, asking him to take steps to facilitate aliya.³³ The events that swept Iran after the finals of the Asia Cup led Ambassador Ezri to conclude it ‘proven beyond all doubt that Judophobia is deeply rooted in the hearts of the Muslims in Iran, and this was an opportune and convenient moment to reveal it in a mass spontaneous fashion’. The community leadership’s decision to quietly encourage aliya soon produced results.³⁴

Iran’s victory in the Asian Cup triggered a meteoric rise in the popularity of football in the country. It also intensified the love of the game and was inscribed in people’s minds as one of the first collective memories broadcast on Iranian television. Famous singers, such as Viguen Derderian and Esmat Bagherpour Baboli (Delkash), recorded songs in praise of the win over Israel. The victorious players were interviewed regularly on radio and their pictures were displayed everywhere. Mainly, however, the victory captured the hearts of Iranian children and teenagers who began playing football and enrolling in formal programmes to practice the game.³⁵

In addition, the defeat of Israel in 1968 was the first in a series of Iranian victories, which continued with two more Asian Cup championships (1972 and 1976). It was the golden age of Iranian football. But the national team did not live up to expectations and twice failed to reach the World Cup (Mexico 1970 and West Germany 1974). As a result of these failures, the regime launched several programmes to train the next generation of Iranian footballers. At the same time, Iranian companies began setting up their own clubs, which further developed the sport. The Iranian National Oil Company financed the San’at-e Naft (‘petroleum industries’) club in the southern town of Abadan. The Steel Corporation supported Rah Ahan (‘rails’), while the National Bank and Peykan automotive company also sponsored teams bearing their names.³⁶

Another important stage in the rise of Iranian football came in 1974, when a new national league was established that included, for the first time, teams from outside Tehran. Major economic enterprises stepped up to sponsor the provincial teams. Tractor Sazi, in Tabriz, represented the local tractor manufacturer, and competed in the local derby against Mashin Sazi, affiliated with the local automobile manufacturer. In Isfahan, there was Zob Ahan, sponsored by the steelworks, and Sanʿat-e Naft-e Abadan, sponsored by the Abadan Province petroleum industry. Foolad Khuzestan was supported by the metals industry in Khuzestan Province. Malavan-Anzali (‘the Anzali sailors’), in the port city of Bandar Anzali, represented the naval personnel stationed there.³⁷

For the football world, the climax of 1974 was certainly the Asian Games hosted by Iran. The Shah sought to exploit the tournament in order to bolster his country’s international standing. It was not enough for the Iranians to run the event and host the delegations; it also had to register victories in the various competitions and win as many medals as possible. Consequently, government circles gifted the organisers with caviar and expensive rugs and persuaded them that in team sports all members of the winning team would receive a medal. As a result, its victory in the football final, the focus of this article, added 17 gold medals to Iran’s haul, though the victory was really considered to be only one medal.³⁸

Frank O’Farrell, Manchester United’s former manager, was hired to coach the Iranian side for the Asian Games. His arrival in the country, made possible by the Pahlavi regime’s openness to the West, was part of a general trend to employ foreign coaches and raise the level of Iranian football. The assumption was that foreign managers could bring the high standards of international football to Iran. In addition to training the national squad, O’Farrell instructed local coaches. In 1978 the team that O’Farrell had built, now coached by his protégé, Heshmat Mohajerani, reached the World Cup in Argentina.³⁹

The 1974 Asian Games

In September 1974, Iran hosted the Asian Games (often referred to as the ‘Asian Olympics’). For the Shah, who wanted to upgrade Iran’s standing in the world and move closer to the West, playing host to a major international sporting event was an excellent opportunity to attain his objectives. Such an event could add Iran to the roster of developed countries, just as Tokyo Olympics in 1964 had done for Japan. The world oil crisis that followed the October 1973 war had brought vast sums to Iran, which helped finance the ambitious project of hosting the games.⁴⁰ The regime invested huge amounts in the construction and development of sports infrastructure throughout the country, including the erection of new facilities. One of them was the 100,000-seat Aryamehr Stadium, which was considered to be on a par with the most advanced European stadiums of those years. The regime saw hosting the Asian Games as the opening shot for bids to host other international events and competitions, especially the Olympics.⁴¹

The Iranians did everything in their power to make the games a success. They consulted with foreign advisors and even hired the services of the German sports professionals and television who had run the Munich Olympics in 1972. In addition, they made vigorous efforts to brand the Asian Games as a national triumph for Iran. The preparations extended for several years; already in 1967 Tehran hosted the meeting of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). At its opening session the Shah endeavoured to convey this message when he shook hands with the IOC president, the American Avery Brundage, and told him that he saw the organisation of the games as ‘a national challenge and mission’. To make sure that the goal would be achieved and that he would be in full control of the games’ organisation, and also of course to enhance his image, the Shah named his half-brother Gholam Reza as president of the Asian Games Federation and Gen. Ali Hojjat as head of the Games’ organising committee. The marketing, branding, and positioning of Iran and the royal house were unprecedented, both domestically and internationally, and continued at full steam throughout the games. For example, foreign media representatives who came to cover the event received brochures that presented the Shah, photographed in his imperial robes, as the Games’ patron (the same pictures appeared all over the country).⁴²

Israel, too, was involved in the Iranian preparations for the Asian Games. The 1960s were an especially warm interlude in the relations between the two countries. As part of this cooperation, Israel made a major contribution to the development of Iranian agriculture. To show his gratitude, the Shah permitted Israeli representatives to attend various international conferences held in Tehran. In 1966, Education Minister Zalman Aranne and the director general of his ministry attended the UNESCO conference on education there. In that same spirit of partnership, Yosef Inbar, chairman of the Israeli Olympic Committee, and Shmuel Lalkin, executive director of the Sports Federation and head of the Israeli delegation, were invited to take part in the preparatory and coordination meetings of the Asian Games organising committee. In light of all this, the Israeli delegation arrived in Tehran full of hope that it would enjoy cordial and sportsmanlike treatment.⁴³

Nevertheless, there was also no little trepidation in Israel, beginning with the fact that it was only two years after the traumatic murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. There were also fears about showing up in Tehran in the shadow of the October 1973 War, which had set off an Arab and Muslim boycott of Israel. So despite the friendly relations between the Shah’s regime and Israel, the mere presence of an Israeli delegation in Iran, a Middle Eastern Muslim power, triggered concern about the Israeli competitors’ security and safety. Consequently, before they left Israel all members of the delegation, both the athletes and their support staff, were given a course on security. ‘We had many lectures on safety delivered by security personnel. They took us to the shooting range … and taught us how to use real weapons’, recalled Oded Machnes, then a high-school senior, who was a member of the Israeli football team. What is more, as a lesson from the Munich disaster, some of the walls of the Israeli delegation’s quarter were built of plasterboard, he explained. ‘Everyone who lived in the rooms knew that if, heaven forbid, something happened, it was possible to run at the wall and get through it’.⁴⁴

The 94-member Israeli delegation landed at Tehran International Airport at night and was kept out of sight.⁴⁵ After their arrival the Israelis were always under heavy guard by the Iranian internal security forces. At the opening ceremony the Israeli delegation marched between Indonesia and Japan, rather than in its original position after Iraq. In addition, the delegation was accompanied by a dense cordon of security personnel who made themselves obvious, along with snipers and commandos. When the athletes left Amjadiyeh Stadium the order of the procession was changed again, and the Israelis were among the last delegations to leave.⁴⁶ The delegation members felt that the hosts treated them with cordiality, warmth, and fairness. The Iranians evinced full understanding of the Israelis’ fears about security and promised there would be no repetition of Munich. As the Israeli mission in Tehran viewed the matter, this was because the Iranians were serious about the ‘national prestige’ associated with hosting the game and wanted to prove that they could host the Olympics and other major international competitions.⁴⁷

From the athletic perspective the Games were a great success for Israel, which won 19 medals: seven gold (in tennis, swimming, basketball, and track and field), four silver, and eight bronze. On the diplomatic front, though, Israel suffered badly, with several unpleasant incidents. The Chinese were the first to refuse to compete against Israelis, to be photographed with them, or even to greet them. They were joined by athletes from Pakistan, Kuwait, and North Korea, who refused to compete against them or even to meet an Israeli opponent. ‘It isn’t possible to go on this way’, fumed Lalkin. In reaction, the heads of the Israeli delegation decided that first they would sit down with the organisers ‘in order to be polite and so as not to wound the hosts’, and to make them aware of the gravity of the situation before publishing a formal announcement about it.⁴⁸

‘The atmosphere here is far from being objectively sporting, and as in every international encounter today there are political pressure groups that are injecting politics into the game’, reported Uri Lubrani, the Israeli ambassador in Tehran, to Jerusalem.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, he was opposed to a press conference at which the heads of the Israeli delegation would publicly condemn the Chinese athletes’ boycott. ‘It wouldn’t be right for us to give the matter any publicity; the local press has done our work not badly’, wrote Lubrani.⁵⁰ As we will see later, the main reason for Lubrani’s hesitation was that the office of the Iranian prime minister had got the local press to publish articles supporting Israel and rebuking the boycotters. The inference from his statement is that any public complaint might embarrass the Iranians, be perceived as ingratitude, and harm the relations between Tehran and Jerusalem.

But the Israeli delegation could not remain silent when the boycott intensified, and issued an official condemnation on September 14. ‘We would like to emphasize our displeasure and our discomfiture in the face of the conduct of the representatives of the People’s Republic of China, who have repeatedly violated the basic rules of the Federation, which they ceremoniously committed to follow’. In addition, Israel criticised the Pakistani delegation, which ‘took such a negative step’, after it was chosen to host the Asian Games in 1978 and promised to invite every country with no distinction of religion, race, or nationality.⁵¹

In the general boycott atmosphere the medals ceremonies provided a repeated opportunity to insult Israel. After Orit Abramovitz won the gold medal in the high jump, her Chinese and Japanese opponents refused to shake her hand on the podium. Similarly, when Esther Roth-Shahamorov captured her third gold medal and the Israeli national anthem was being played, tens of thousands Iranians shouted catcalls and screamed ‘Iran! Iran!’ Yitzhak Pistiner, an international basketball and water polo referee, was sent to the stands after the North Korean team refused to play if he was blowing the whistle.⁵²

The boycott of Israel overshadowed the spirit of the games and detracted from the effort invested by the Iranian organisers. Fans who had purchased tickets to watch the Israeli football team made the long trip to the stadium only to learn that the game had been cancelled because the opponent refused to take the field. This happened in other sports as well – fencing, tennis, and basketball – but elicited no official reaction by the organisers. It was only towards the end of the games, and after the Israeli delegation expressed its strong displeasure, that the executive committee of the Asian Games Federation held a special session. At this meeting, run by its president, Prince Gholam Reza, the delegations that had decided to inject politics into sports were criticised. In an official statement, the executive committee expressed hope that the boycott would not be repeated in the future and that the fundamental principles of the Asian Games Federation would be respected by all representatives of the teams and groups. The committee also expressed

its great concern and displeasure with the attitude of those teams who did not complete their participation in certain events of the seventh Asian games by withdrawing from competitions. These actions were contrary to the fundamental principles of the Asian Games Federation and are in disregard of their obligations as sportsmen.⁵³

The politicisation of sports did not escape the attention of the Israeli media. Despite hints by the Israel embassy in Tehran that the issue should not be given extensive play critical of the Iranian regime, the Israeli journalists covering the games took an uncompromising stand. ‘In Tehran the dam burst and there was a flood of anti-sporting decisions, all of them directed against one country, for now: Israel’, wrote Maariv correspondent Yeshayahu (Shaye) Porat. He added that there were countries in Asia that did not have diplomatic relations with other countries on the continent, such as China with South Korea – but only the Israeli athletes were being boycotted, including by the Chinese. Summing up, Porat wrote:

It is a mistake to bring up young Israelis to feel that when people spit in their face they should wipe off the saliva, as if it was raining; and to ignore the fact that more and more countries are relating to them as lepers who must not be approached, and that they are not given the opportunity to say so publicly and demonstrate that this is an outrageous libel and conduct by representatives of countries that are desecrating sportsmanship.⁵⁴

In contrast to the football team, Israeli basketball team had a very different experience, except for the boycott by Pakistan.⁵⁵ The local Jewish community turned out for all its games to cheer on the Israelis. The Israeli victory was a source of pride for the 3000 Jews (in a crowd of 5000 spectators) in the stands during the final against South Korea. When the game was over they burst onto the court, jumped with joy on the players, and danced while singing ‘Am Israel Hai’ (the Jewish People lives) and ‘David Melech Israel’ (David King of Israel). The excitement reached its peak when the medals were awarded and Hatikva was played, though the Korean players didn’t face the flags as was customary when the winning country’s anthem was played.⁵⁶

These incidents came on top of an incident that cast a shadow on the Israeli delegation on the very first day of the games. On September 1, when the executive committee of the Asia Games Federation met, the Arab representatives instigated a decision to terminate Yosef Inbar’s membership. For the first time in 20 years no Israeli sat on the committee. This was such an extraordinary event that when he met with Hassan Rasouli, the committee’s secretary general, the latter expressed his dismay that Inbar had not been re-elected. Rasouli blamed the bloc forged by the representatives of China and the Arabs and their desire to prevent the Israeli delegate’s re-election. This assessment was shared by Lalkin, who asserted, on the eve of the Games’ opening, that the political developments ‘were crystallizing new power relations’ and that this bloc ‘would have a decisive impact on our continued affiliation with the continent with regard to sports’.⁵⁷

Two weeks later, on September 14, just before the Games were over, Israeli football was expelled from the Asian Football Confederation (AFC). This meant that the Israeli national team could no longer compete in official AFC matches and that Israel could not host games under its auspices. As a result, the Asian Nation’s Cup qualifiers scheduled for Israel in March 1975 were cancelled.⁵⁸

Kuwait, which had introduced the motion to expel Israel, argued that the Jewish state’s presence prevented many countries from competing. But the debate was clearly political, since the Kuwaiti representative attacked Israel ‘for what it has done to the Palestinians from 1948 until the present [1974]’. This assertion underlay the Kuwaiti proposal that Israel not be permitted to compete.⁵⁹ ‘We no longer have anything to look for in Asia’ said Menachem Heller, chairman of the board of the Israel Football Federation and the country’s representative on the AFC’s executive committee. ‘The Arabs and their supporters have taken over the Asian Football Confederation and there is no hope that the power balance will change anytime soon. This is a very good reason for us to request a transfer to the European region’. Thus the Asian Games in Tehran sounded the final discordant note for Israel in this international competition.⁶⁰

Iran versus Israel and the football tournament final

Most sports attracted scant attention in Iran, so it was possible to tolerate Israel’ successes in them; but the football tournament of the ‘Asian Olympics’ was quite a different story. Whether intentionally or not, when it became clear that Israel was Iran’s main rival the Iranian organisers seem to have tried to influence the outcome. For example, three Iranian referees were assigned to the Israeli side’s three matches in the second round, but no Israeli referee was included in this stage. ‘This is unheard of in an international tournament’, said the Israeli coach, David Schweitzer, angrily. ‘If the Iranians want to win in football at any cost, they should say so openly. This isn’t sports. This is against every norm of sportsmanship’.⁶¹

There was another incident when the date of the final was switched from September 15 to September 16, which happened to be the eve of Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year. The change caught the Israeli delegation by surprise. Dov Shahar, one of the leaders of the Israel football delegation, immediately announced: ‘It’s unacceptable. That is a Jewish holiday and we will not play’. The representatives of the Iraqi delegation said that the final was a sports holiday for all Asian nations and no special account should be taken of one country.⁶² The affair was summed up by Alex Giladi, the Israeli TV broadcaster who covered the games: ‘The atmosphere in Tehran was that Iran must win this tournament, win and be victorious in the final even if it goes on for five years’.⁶³ And indeed, the final match of the football tournament, in which Iran and Israel faced each other, was the high point of the Games.

Even before the starting whistle, it was clear that the match’s importance on the political and social planes exceeded its role as a sports event. At this stage, with the Jews of Iran looking on fearfully, the Muslims saw the final as Tehran’s opportunity for revenge and as a way to demonstrate solidarity with the Arabs and be part of their success in the October 1973 war. On this day the football pitch was Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘contested terrain’: a field on which different groups test their power relations, expressing the collective identity that they have consolidated for themselves and in whose name they act.⁶⁴ What is more, the contested terrain of the match between Iran and Israel reflected two levels of the game: the first and obvious one, the competition on the pitch between two teams, whose result is determined by the balance of professional skill, but is important for the players and fans only in the short term; and the second and hidden one, the social sphere, where the power relations between the competing parties are reflected in a battle for consciousness, which shapes the future of this arena and of the long term balance of power.⁶⁵

Just as during the 1968 Asian Cup matches, the Iranian spectators demonstrated their solidarity with the Arabs, this time seen as victors of the 1973 war, and with the Palestinians. The crowd’s hostility to Israel was already tangible in the preliminary round of the football tournament, when the local crowd of 50,000 cheered on Israel’s opponents, the Philippines. Some Iranians considered Israel an enemy state and it became a hot topic in the streets and in mosque sermons. Zvi Rosen, the captain of the 1974 team, recalled that the final game was perceived as nothing short of war. ‘We saw other matches [in the tournament], which were half friendly. [Iran] against Israel, that was war’. In this situation, just as six years earlier, the football final was no longer a sports event, and this feeling was a source of anxiety. ‘In [other] matches the team played abroad, everything was in sporting terms’, said Rosen. ‘Here [in Iran] that disappeared; football was secondary … Suddenly you find yourself in a place where the wind isn’t blowing in your direction. In other words, it’s not that if you’re better you’ll win’.⁶⁶

The day before the match the atmosphere was so tense that the Jews of Tehran began fearing for their safety. ‘Before the match important Jews from the Tehran community came to members of the Israeli delegation and told them: “play well, but lose”’, recalled Gideon Hod, a sportscaster who accompanied the Israeli team.⁶⁷ Rosen corroborated this statement and added that members of the community told the players ‘to be careful not to win the match here … because all the Jews’ lives are in danger.’ The players received similar hints from the Israel embassy in Tehran, which, in contrast to earlier matches in the tournament, now asked the local Jews not to come to the stadium for the match. Yeshayahu (Shaye) Feigenbaum, one of the Israeli stars, agreed with Rosen: ‘They wanted to slaughter them! The day before the game they were telling the Jews not to leave home, marking their houses, and checking. Not a single Jew came [to the final]’.⁶⁸

The fate of the Jewish community had concerned Israel even before the start of the Games, especially given the possibility of a clash between the Iranian and the Israeli football teams. As early as July 1974 Israeli officials contacted the Games’ organising committee and asked them not to slot Israel in the same bracket as Iran in the Asian Cup. The request came in the wake of recommendations by ‘a government ministry’, which initially suggested that Israel not even send a team to the games, on the grounds that ‘this might cause various problems for the Jews of Iran’. It was the only after discussions and consultations that the ministry staff was persuaded that an Israeli football team should take part in the Asian Games, in response to a hint that ‘it is desirable for Israel to be represented at the Games by a large delegation’. In light of these facts and information received from Iran that Israeli successes might trigger riots in Tehran and a reprisal campaign against the Jewish community, it was decided to request that Israel be assigned to a different group than Iran, in the hope that the two countries would meet only in the finals, if at all, and not earlier.⁶⁹

As expected, the Tehran Jews identified strongly with the Israeli delegation to the Games and were proud of its achievements. Their identification was manifested not only in support for the Israeli athletes during the Games but also in meetings with them. Even before the opening of the Games, the Jewish Agency organised a get-together of the Israeli athletes and young local Jews. The community itself organised a fancier and more formal event at the Kings Hotel in honour of the Israeli team. The community’s chairman, Habib Elghanian, gave the visitors a portrait of the Shah in a silver and gilt frame, and every member of the delegation received a one-Pahlavi gold coin.⁷⁰

Though Israel was one of the leading contenders for the gold medal in football, an assessment shared by the Iranians’ manager Frank O’Farrell, it reached the finals only after the North Korean and Kuwaiti teams refused to play against it for political reasons.⁷¹ ‘I can only drink coffee with you, but playing football – we can’t’, said a smiling Ali Sabri, an Egyptian journalist and television broadcaster stationed in Kuwait, to Moshe Lehrer of Maariv. ‘We have instructions, there is a government, we took a decision not to appear against Israel. It’s forbidden, it’s forbidden’. The players, too, felt the intrusion of politics into sports and the tense atmosphere. ‘In talks among the players, we knew that we were going to Aryamehr Stadium … We knew that if we won we wouldn’t leave the game alive’, recalled Machnes. ‘The day before the match, we were talking about the match and saying, “we’re here alone, however much security there is, it will be very difficult to leave the pitch if we win” … In no stadium in Israel, no match in Israel, no match in the World Cup final … could have felt what we felt there’.⁷²

Many preparations were made all over Iran in advance of the final. After it was announced that the match would be broadcast live on national radio and television – a rarity in those days – colour televisions were set up in Tehran coffeehouses, in Farahnaz Park in Shiraz, and in other central locations throughout the country so that people could watch the game together. Because all tickets were sold in advance, the box office was closed on the morning of the game. The national bus system was beefed up so that people who lived outside Tehran could reach the stadium. Many Iranians prayed, and some even lit candles in the Shahecheragh Shrine and prayed for a victory by the Iranian side. Even manager O’Farrell went to church and did the same.⁷³

Some 120,000 excited spectators showed up at the stadium to watch the match, which was conducted in a clear anti-Israeli and warlike atmosphere. The Israeli side had a police and military escort throughout the tournament, which was even heavier on its way to the final match. A helicopter flew over the bus that brought them to the stadium, and then hovered above it throughout the game. ‘Inside the stadium there was an Iranian soldier every meter and hundreds of military personnel were stationed there … They [the Iranian fans] waved signs with swastikas. We could feel the immense hatred’, recalled Feigenbaum.⁷⁴

Among the songs the Iranian fans sang during the match, one with a dirge-like rhythm typical of the Ashura festival stood out: ‘We should saw off Moshe Dayan’s head and shoot Golda Meir’. The rain of chicken heads on the players was repeated, accompanied by curses. ‘It was clear to us that against more than 100,000 excited spectators – if Israel won the players would not leave alive’, said Yair Stern, who broadcast the game for Israel Television, along with former star Mordechai Spiegler. ‘The feeling in the press box was real panic. We were afraid that if we scored first goal the rabid crowd would take their revenge against us’. In the end, Iran won by a score of 1:0, thanks to an own goal by Yitzhak Shum. Shum claimed in his defence that it hadn’t been deliberate, but added that both sides were happy about what he had done. Rosen added, ‘Many people hugged him after that … “you saved us”, they told Shum’. The person who best summarised the atmosphere around the game was the coach, David Schweitzer: ‘We lost the match – but we saved our lives.’⁷⁵

Surprisingly, despite the Israeli players’ recollections about their experiences at the tournament and the hostile atmosphere towards those who competed in other sports, the correspondence between the Israeli mission in Tehran and Jerusalem reveals the substantial efforts to exploit the games to preserve and even improve the official ties between the two states. For the same reason there were also attempts to downplay the manifestations of hatred by the Iranian public, including the local crowd, against the Israeli delegation in general and the football team in particular, and to keep quiet about them. This is why Ambassador Lubrani recommended that steps be taken to ensure that ‘the reaction in the Israeli press be positive, expressing the authorities’ good attitude and appropriate treatment of the Israeli delegation to the Asian Games.’⁷⁶

At Lubrani’s suggestion, Foreign Minister Allon sent a letter to his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Ali Khalatbari, thanking him for the warm welcome given the Israeli delegation and especially the efforts to protect the athletes. Allon congratulated the Iranians for what they had done to preserve the principle of ‘fairness in sports’ and their efforts to make sure that ‘no element of politics be permitted to intrude’. Yosef Inbar, chairman of the Israeli Olympic Committee, and Chaim Glovinsky, its secretary, sent a similar letter to the Shah. They thanked him for the cordial hospitality, expressed appreciation of the exemplary organisation of the games, and praised the organisers’ investment ‘to make all of us feel at home and secure in Tehran’.⁷⁷

An attempt to paper over the atmosphere of fear in which the Israelis lived, which, as the players testified, extended to the pitch, appears in a special report written by the Israeli mission in Tehran. Under the heading ‘The Asian Games’, it stated that despite several antisemitic manifestations and insults directed at Dayan (who symbolised Israel) and Judaism, the Iranian crowd had been more restrained than the Israelis had anticipated. The Iranian broadcaster had noted the referee’s lack of objectivity more than once. What is more, with regard to the outcome of the match the report observed that ‘there were very few people in the general public … who believed that the Iranian footballers won thanks to their play. Most people, Muslims as well as Jews, believe that Israel lost because it wanted to make a gesture to Iran’.⁷⁸

The hosts’ attitude, too, was discussed in the mission’s report. The Iranians were praised for the organisation of the games, including the major investment to protect the Israeli delegation. ‘The host’s willingness, openness, fairness, and meticulousness were exemplary’. Emphasis was placed on the local media’s fair treatment of Israel. This was evident both in newspapers’ unequivocal condemnation of the boycott of Israeli athletes as well as in the coverage of the delegation in the various media – which ‘stood out against the background of the generally hostile attitude towards Israel’. From Israel’s perspective, the Asian Games were ‘an impressive and satisfactory event’ that also contributed to its public image. The Games were ‘much more successful than any mass information campaign we could have conducted’, the mission reported to Jerusalem.⁷⁹

However, despite the lavish praise in the report, the embassy knew how to read the messages below the surface and endeavoured to moderate the political conclusions about the relations between Tehran and Jerusalem. On both the official and practical levels, no change could be expected, because the feeling was that the Iranians preferred to keep their ties with Israel out of the limelight. Two events backed this view: first, the hosts’ attempt to hide Israel’s participation at the international exhibition held in Tehran shortly after the Asian Games could not be missed. In addition, at the last moment the Iranians cancelled the reception at the Israeli Pavilion, because the invitation stated that ‘it was intended to display the Israeli manufacturers [emphasis in the embassy report]’.⁸⁰

The second event, which was directly linked to the sports boycott of Israel, represented a new and worrisome development in the bilateral relationship. Israel was supposed to host the Asian Weightlifting Championships, beginning on 2 November 1975. The competition was cancelled because the vast majority of those invited announced they would not send representatives and only four states confirmed their participation. Israel cancelled the event right after Iran announced that it too would stay away. The Iranian decision was an example of the extent of the identification and solidarity they were displaying with the Asian nations, especially the Arabs, with regard to the boycott of Israel. This was a real turning point in the relations between Jerusalem and Tehran, which switched from fighting the boycott to joining it, at a time when, on the surface, there were still warm and friendly relations between the two states.⁸¹

The Jews of Iran, too, sensed the wind of change blowing in their country. The first conspicuous warning had been in May 1968, after the Iranian footballers defeated Israel in the finals of the Asian Nations cup, held in Iran. The victory was followed by severe violence and attacks on Jews by their Muslim neighbours. These traumatic events sparked a wave of Jewish emigration to Israel.⁸² Six years later, in 1974, the Jews of Iran realised that an abyss now yawned not only between them and the local Muslims, but also between them and the regime. Solidarity with the Arabs was no longer the sole province of the masses and the general hostility was ascending from the street to the government. The animosity was directed against senior Jewish bureaucrats and even penetrated the royal house: the Shah himself began to make antisemitic statements in public. In an interview for 60 Minutes, Mike Wallace asked him about the relations between the US administration and the Jewish lobby and about the Jews’ influence on decision-makers in Washington, including the president. The Shah’s answer could have been taken straight from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion:

Sometimes they are disserving the interests of Israel … Because they’re pushing around too many people … They have many means at their disposal. They are putting on pressure on many, many people. And at the end, I don’t think that it will even help Israel … They [the Jewish lobby] are strong … They are controlling many things … Newspapers … medias … Banks … finances and I’m going to stop there.⁸³

From then on, as the years passed and the Shah’s regime teetered, while Islamists grew stronger, the wave of emigration by Iranian Jews increased. In 1974–79, there were 80,000 Jews in Iran; by 1980, a year after the Islamic Revolution, only 32,000 had been left. Many members of the community felt that the lack of trust between Muslims and Jews was now too great to be bridged and that the Jews were no longer viewed as legitimate residents of the country by the leadership or their fellow citizens. Thus the closing whistle of the football match in Aryamehr Stadium was also the closing whistle for Israel in Asia and a wake-up call for the Jews of Iran.⁸⁴

Conclusion

Like many others throughout history, the Pahlavi regime exploited sports to attain political goals. Football was no exception; as years passed and the sport became increasingly popular in Iran, the monarchy saw it as a tool to achieve national objectives – building a healthy nation, unifying the citizens, and bolstering the country’s international standing. Hosting the ‘Asian Olympics’ in 1974 was the acme of the politicisation of sports and realisation of the national goals, as defined by the regime. By means of the Games, the Shah sought to brand Iran under his leadership as a modern and progressive Western country and to utilise the Asian Games as a stepping stone to holding the Olympics in Tehran.

The Asian Games did not serve the Shah’s political goals only. Politics had penetrated deep into Asian sports and resulted in the boycott of Israel. Arab athletes and their East Asian colleagues refused to compete against Israelis; those who had already done so refused to stand with them on the winners’ podium when medals were awarded. What is more, the Israeli member of the Games executive committee was not re-elected, and in the end the country itself was expelled from the Asian Football Confederation and had to find its place in Europe.

The Israelis were subjected to hate and hostility not only by other athletes, but also by the Iranian spectators – at all of the competitions. Because football had attained the status of the national sport in Iran, the Iranians could not accept any result other than first place – and all the more so because Israel was their opponent in the final. Despite the heavy security and the Israeli delegation’s sense of safety throughout the games, an Israeli victory in the final of the Asian Games football tournament was impossible – for the players and even more so for the Jewish community of Iran.

After the most recent rounds of war between Israel and the Arabs, in 1967 and 1973, the football pitch had become another battleground. The Iranians wanted to continue proving the superiority of the Muslim camp, with which they identified after the Arabs’ success in the October War, to Israel and the Jews. Against their will, members of the Jewish minority in Iran who identified with and felt they belonged both to their country, Iran, and to Israel, the nation-state of the Jews, found themselves on this ‘contested terrain’, in Bourdieu’s terms. In September 1974 they understood that, just as after the May 1968 final, now too a match between Iran and Israel – a direct confrontation between the two teams – revealed the chasm between their ideas and sentiments. The Jews had to choose one side or the other – support for Israel or for Iran. In truth, the choice had already been made for them, because many Iranians no longer saw Jews as part of the Iranian nation. In the 1970s, especially as the 1979 revolution loomed larger, tens of thousands of Jews left Iran. Most of them made their way to the US, while others went to Israel.

It was the Israelis who failed to read the map correctly. They looked for every possible way to mollify the Iranians and maintain correct relations with them. During the games, Ambassador Lubrani and the Tehran embassy staff sent instructions to the foreign ministry in Jerusalem and to the heads of the Israeli delegation to avoid insulting or wounding the organisers, including with regard to the boycott of the Israeli athletes. When the Games were over, Israeli officials sent letters of thanks to the Iranians and released statements praising the organisation of the sporting event. No one in Jerusalem tried to draw serious conclusions about the state of relations with Tehran. No sincere and true attempt was made to examine the vast gulf between the outlook of the Iranian people and the regime, which itself increasingly played down the country’s relations with Israel. In practice, the closing ceremony of the Asian Games in 1974 was a sign of the future, when, only a few years later, Iran slammed shut its gates both to Israel and to the West.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Or Hareuveny

Or Hareuveny is a doctoral student at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Bar-Ilan University Israel.

Yehuda U. Blanga

Yehuda U. Blanga is a senior lecturer at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Bar-Ilan University.

Notes

1. Zinshtein, “Forever Pure.”

2. Israel State Archives (hereafter ISA), MFA-8391/9, “Asian Games,” September 24, 1970.

3. Sorek, Arab Soccer in a Jewish State, 14–5.

4. Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 356; Chehabi, “A Political History,” 375–6; and Juricic, “Political History of Football.”

5. Chehabi, “A Political History,” 376; Chehabi, “The Politics of Football,” 235–6; and Martin and Mason, “The Development of Leisure,” 246.

6. Chehabi, “The Politics of Football,” 237; Chehabi, “A Political History,” 375–6; Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 356; and Dousti et al., “Sport Policy in Iran,” 153; Chehabi, “A Short History of The Iranian Soccer”; and Juricic, “Political History of Football in Iran.”

7. Chehabi, “The Politics of Football,” 237; Dousti et al., “Sport Policy in Iran,” 153; Chehabi, “A Short History”; Chehabi, “The Juggernaut of Globalization,” 279; Chehabi, “A Political History,” 377; and Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 357.

8. Juricic, “Political History of Football in Iran.”

9. Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 357–8; and Chehabi, “A Political History,” 379.

10. Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 358; Chehabi, “A Political History,” 380; and Chehabi, “The Politics of Football,” 238.

11. “Majaleh-ye Futbal-e Iran,” Hamshahri Online (October 19, 2015), www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/60565/مجله-فوتبال-ایران; Chehabi, “A Political History of Football,” 380–3; Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 359; and Chehabi, “The Politics of Football,” 238.

12. Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 359.

13. Reza Shah abdicated following the August 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion, allegedly because of trade and economic ties with Nazi Germany.

14. Chehabi, “A Political History of Football,” 383.

15. Ibid., 383–4.

16. Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 360, 362.

17. “Iran – International Matches,” Rec. Sport Soccer Statistics Foundation, July 12, 2017, http://www.rsssf.com/tablesi/iran-intres.html; Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 362; and Chehabi, “A Political History of Football,” 384.

18. Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 360–1; and Chehabi, “A Political History of Football,” 384.

19. Ibid., 384–5; and Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 361.

20. Chehabi, “A Political History of Football,” 384–5; and Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 361.

21. Chehabi, “A Political History of Football,” 385.

22. ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 75, April 16, 1968; ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, April 5, 1968.

23. ISA, MFA-8416/14, “Iran 1970, Israel-Iran Relations,” Baruch Gilad (n.d.); ISA, MFA-8416/14, Iran 1970, “On your talks in Teheran,” December 10, 1970.

24. ISA, MFA-8416/14, “Iran 1970, Israel-Iran Relations,” Baruch Gilad (n.d.); ISA, MFA-8416/14, Iran 1970, “On your talks in Teheran,” December 10, 1970; On Iran’s positions after the October 1973 war, see ISA, MFA-8391/9, Iran, No. 11, December 2, 1974. For the speech of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Ali Khalatbari at the UN General Assembly on October 10, 1974, during which he attacked Israel and stressed the need for recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, see: ISA, MFA-8391/9, Iran, No. 392, October 10, 1974.

25. ISA, MFA-8416/14, “Iran 1970, Topics for the talks between the foreign minister and the Shah,” November 25, 1970; ISA, MFA-8416/14, Iran, 1970, “Recommendations for the foreign minister’s talks in Tehran,” December 7, 1970.

26. ISA, MFA-8416/14, “Iran 1970, Israel-Iran relations,” Baruch Gilad (n.d.); authors interview with Zvi Rosen, Tel Aviv, June 15, 2021 (Hebrew).

27. ISA, MFA-8416/14, “Iran 1970, Israel-Iran relations,” Baruch Gilad (n.d.).

28. ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 75, April 16, 1968; ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, April 5, 1968; and “The Jewish Community of Teheran,” The Museum of the Jewish People at Beit Hatfutsot, https://dbs.anumuseum.org.il/skn/en/c6/e123710/Place/Teheran.

29. Habib Elghanian was a businessman, philanthropist, and chairman of the Jewish Community Council in Tehran. He was arrested after the Islamic Revolution. Because of his commercial ties with the US and Israel, he was charged with espionage and was the first Jew executed after the revolution. For the allegation about the ticket purchases, see ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 726, May 28, 1968.

30. Maariv, May 19, 1968; Chehabi, “Yahūdiyān-i Īrān dar ʿArṣehhā-ye Varzeshi”; and Chehabi, “A Political History of Football,” 385.

31. Rahimian, “Ba-gehinnom shel Tehran”; Sheinberg, “Paras zakhta”; and authors interview with Yittzhak Vissoker, Tel Aviv, May 20, 2021 [Hebrew].

32. Authors interview with Vissoker; Porat, “Shipput oyen”; and Goldberg, “Ha-shuq ha-Parsi.”

33. ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 135, May 27, 1968; ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 40, June 11, 1968.

34. ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 726, May 28, 1968.

35. Chehabi, “A Political History,” 386.

36. Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 364, 366; and Bromberger, “Le football en Iran.”

37. “Ashnaei ba bashgah-e mashin sazi Tabriz” [Introduction to Mashin Sazi Tabriz club], Hamshahri Online, May 20, 2016, www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/334574/آشنایی-با-باشگاه-ماشین-سازی-تبریز; Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 364, 366; and Chehabi, “A Political History,” 394.

38. Chehabi, “A Political History,” 386; Etelaʿat, “Iran dar makan-e dovom-e asia: radehbandi-ye keshvarha az nazar-e medal dar payan-e haftomin doreh-ye baziha-ye asiaei” [Iran in second place in Asia: Ranking of countries in terms of medals at the end of the seventh Asian Games], September 16, 1974.

39. “Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class,” 364.

40. The 1973 oil crisis saw a quadrupling of price, from $3 to $12 a barrel.

41. Chehabi, “Yahūdiyān-i Īrān dar ʿArṣehhā-ye Varzeshi”; Sagi, “Zikkaron ẓillumi”; and Macalister, “Background.”

42. Authors interview with Oded Machnes, Mishmar Hasharon, April 27, 2021 [Hebrew]; authors interview with Vissoker; Elro’i, “Post Mispar 596.”

43. Elro’i, “Post Mispar 596,”; and Sagi, “Zikkaron ẓillumi.”

44. Authors interview with Machnes.

45. The delegation consisted of more than 60 athletes, escorts, and coaches.

46. Lehrer, “Ha-Asiada”; and Sheinberg, “Ḥishuq bittaḥon”.

47. ISA, MFA-8391/9, “Asian Games,” September 24, 1970; Chehabi, “Yahūdiyān-i Īrān dar ʿArṣehhā-ye Varzeshi”; interview with Machnes.

48. Porat and Lehrer, “Ha-haḥrama ha-goveret.”

49. ISA, MFA, 8391/9, Iran, No. 26, September 5, 1974; Dror Feldman, “Yarqu ve-zarqu tarnegolim” [They spat and threw chickens], https://www.sport5.co.il/articles.aspx?FolderID=2795&docID=106624 (Accessed May 18, 2020); and “Tehran 1974,” Olympic Council of Asia, https://www.ocasia.org/games/101–tehran-1974.html (Accessed June 20, 2021).

50. ISA, MFA-8391/9, “Iran, Asian Games,” No. 54, September 11, 1970.

51. See note 48 above.

52. Lehrer, “Tla’otav shel Fistiner”; and Sheinberg, “Ha-shlishit shel Ester.”

53. ISA, MFA-8391/9, No. 70, September 16, 1970.

54. Porat, “Ha-shtikqa.”

55. On Sept. 8 Zaarar Ali, the head of the Pakistani delegation and secretary of his country’s Olympic Committee, contacted Inbar and apologised that the Pakistani footballers had not shown up for their match against Israel. Maariv, September 9, 1974.

56. Etelaʿat, “Siyasat be basketbal niz rah yaft: Pakistan dar moqabel-e esrail hazer nashod!” [Politics found its way to basketball: Pakistan didn’t show up against Israel] September 8, 1974; Sheinberg, “Ha-neqama ha-metuqa; Lass, “Proyekt sporta’im”; and Arutz hasport, “Tehran, 1974,” September 18, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KiYAXle-MtY.

57. Maariv, September 1–2, 1974; September 2, 1974.

58. Maariv, September 15, 1974; Parchizadeh, “When the Islamists are Gone”; Etelaʿat, “Esrail az sherkat dar mosabeghat-e ayandeh-ye futbal-e asia mahroum shod” [Israel banned from participating in future Asian football matches], September 15, 1974; and Lehrer, “Ha-tovim be-yoter.”

59. Parchizadeh, “When the Islamists Are Gone”; Etelaʿat, “Esrail az sherkat dar mosabeghat-e ayandeh-ye futbal-e asia mahroum shod,” September 15, 1974.

60. Porat and Lehrer, “Ha-kaduregel ha-Israeli sullaq”; and ISA, MFA-8391/9, No. 65, September 16, 1970.

61. Maariv, September 10, 1974; and Porat, “Shoftim Irani’im.”

62. Maariv, September 8, 1974.

63. Horesh, “Tehran, 1974.”

64. Bourdieu, “Program for the Sociology of Sport”; and interview with Rosen.

65. Sorek, Arab Soccer in a Jewish State, 6–7.

66. Interview with Rosen; Horesh, “Teheran 1974”; and Porat, “Im ḥaẓi-treisar.”

67. “Yehudei Teheran ba’u el nivḥeret Yisra’el u-viqshu: ‘ana, hafsidu!’” [Tehran Jews came to Israeli teams and begged: “please lose”], Ha’olam ha-zeh, October 9, 1974.

68. Interview with Rosen; telephone interview with Yehoshua (Shaye) Feigenbaum, May 27, 2021; and Horesh, “Teheran 1974.”

69. Tabak, “Be-vaqasha.”

70. ISA, MFA-8391/9, “Asian Games,” September 24, 1970; interview with Vissoker.

71. Etelaʿat, “Futbal-e Iran, khatmaneh final miresad” [Iranian football will definitely reach the final], September 2, 1974; Etelaʿat, “Esrail 8 – Malezi 3,” [Israel 8 – Malaysia 3] September 4, 1974; Etelaʿat, “Esrail hala faqat kore-ye shemali ra pish ru darad” [Israel now faces only North Korea], September 11, 1974.

72. Interview with Machnes; Maariv, September 8, 1974.

73. Etelaʿat, “Mosabegheh-ye final-e futbal az televizion bakhsh mishavad” [The football final will be broadcast on television], September 14, 1974; Etelaʿat, “Shahrestanha dar hijan-e bazi emshab: shartbandiha-ye kalan barsar-e peyruzi-ye futbal-e Iran!” [Cities in the excitement of tonight’s game: Huge bets on Iranian football win], September 15, 1974; Etelaʿat, “O’Farrell dar kalisa” [O’Farrell at church], September 15, 1974; Etelaʿat, “Iran, hijan … Gol!” [Iran, excitement … Goal!], September 16, 1974.

74. Feldman, “Yarqu ve-zarqu tarnegolim”; and telephone interview with Feigenbaum.

75. Interview with Rosen; Feldman, “Yaraqu ve-zarqu tarnegolim.” Stern added that, “’to our good fortune,’ we lost only 1:0 and escaped safely.” For Stern’s account, see Gal, “Sippur ha-ẓalaḥat ha-parsit”; Mesdaghi, “Negahi be Futbal-e Iran dar 35 Sal-e Gozashte.”

76. ISA, MFA-8391/9, No. 72, September 17, 1970.

77. ISA, MFA-8391/9, Misḥeqei Asiya, mikhtav todah le-Khalatbari [Asian Games, thank-you letter to Khalatbari], September 22, 1970.

78. ISA, MFA-8391/9, “Asian Games,” September 24, 1970.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Davar, October 29, 1975.

82. ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 726, May 28, 1968. In 1968, when there were about 80,000 Jews in Iran, 1,299 came on aliya to Israel; in 1969, about 2,000 did so. See Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran, 48; Shapiro, “World Jewish Population 1968,” 546.

83. ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 135, May 27, 1968; ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 70, August 25, 1969; ISA, MFA-4174/19, “Iran-Jewry,” AR/351.1, No. 2022, October 22, 1969. Wallace asked the Shah: “Well, now, just a second. You really do believe that the Jewish community in the United States is that powerful? They make the media reflect their view of foreign policy?” Shah: “Yes.” See “The Shah on Israel, Corruption Torture and …,” New York Times, October 22, 1976, https://www.nytimes.com/1976/10/22/archives/the-shah-on-israel-corruption-torture-and.html

84. Schmelz and DellaPergola. “World Jewish Population”; and Shapiro, “World Jewish Population 1980.”