Feminist Institutionalism and Neoliberalism

Abstract

Neoliberalism is an ideology that requires the public/private split in human affairs to exist and to be perceived as normal and natural. This paper begins by looking at the feminist critique of dualisms, as developed by the feminist institutional economist Ann Jennings and feminist economists Paula England and Julie Nelson and then applies their critique of the public/private dualisms to neoliberal conceptions of agency and care. The paper argues that once dualism is exposed as an incorrect representation of existential reality, it becomes impossible to use for justifying the characterization of behavior, invidious distinctions, and the social valuations of human behavior it supports, thereby making neoliberal assumptions about normal behavior that support its policy prescriptions untenable. Finally, it explores the consequences of this critique of neoliberalism on the conceptualization of agency and the economics of care.

HIGHLIGHTS

• Feminist economists and original institutionalists share aspects of their inquiry.

• Both approaches understand economics as the study of social provisioning.

• The public/private dualism is necessary to sustain neoliberal ideology.

• Discrediting the public/private dualism leads to rejecting neoliberal agency.

• Caring is inconsistent with neoliberal ideology.

KEYWORDS:

• Agency
• feminist methodology
• caregiving

JEL Codes:

• B52
• B54

Notes

1 Original Institutionalism considers human behavior as culturally constructed within a society’s institutional structures. The so-called New Institutionalism combines J. R. Commons’ concept of transactions with a notion of institutions as social habits and social structures into the methodological individualist framework of mainstream economics with various degrees of sophistication and results. See Malcolm Rutherford (1994) for an explication.

2 For a discussion of Veblen’s feminist economics, see Jennings (1998). Joseph Dorfman (1934) notes that Gilman knew and commented on Veblen’s work.

3 Veblen first referred to the economy as a process of provisioning in 1901 (Veblen [1919] 1990). It has been used by OI as the definition of economics ever since. Julie Nelson introduced the term into feminist economics in 1993.

4 Going back to Wesley Clair Mitchell’s (Veblen’s student) founding of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).

5 We explore this with care ethics and OI value theory later in this article.

6 Along with Jennings, Deborah Figart, Ellen Mutari, Marilyn Powers, Irene van Staveren, Paulette Olson, Barbara Hopkins, Ann Mari May, Janice Peterson, Ulla Grapard, Eiman Zein-Elabdin, Edythe Miller, and others fall into this category (see Mayhew 1999). See Rutherford (2011) for a discussion of OI economists of the interwar period (1918–47), some of whom were noted feminists such as Hazel Kyrk and Margaret Reid.

7 The numbers are large. We emphasize the work of Nancy Folbre, Julie Nelson, and Paula England, which is particularly close to OI in ways relevant to our arguments.

8 Waller argues the cultural significance of reified dualisms is they serve as social valuational schemes. He argues that dualisms should be restructured into a continuum (Waller 1989). Nelson made similar criticisms of dualisms and proposed similar ways of addressing those criticisms (1993, 1996, 2003a, 2003b). Nelson places Cartesian dualisms on a continuum, distinguishes between the positive/negative aspects of each component, and locates actual behavior along that continuum thereby embracing both categories’ positive and negative aspects. This approach breaks from conventional use where one side of the dualism is prioritized over the other and problematizes the use of the dualism as a valuational criterion. Significantly, England (1993, 2003) makes an OI expansion of her refined critique of the separative-self/connected-self dichotomy when she revisits the topic. England reformulates the separative-self/connected-self dualism as a dichotomy between the separative-self and the soluble-self where actual human behavior takes place on a continuum between these two extremes (2003: 34–35). Conventionally, OI uses “dualism” to mean two categories that are completely separable but taken together represent a complete conception of reality. OI uses “dichotomy” to refer to the extreme ends of a continuum of behavior where actual behavior occurs somewhere on that continuum. England often uses dichotomy in the way that OI uses dualism.

9 This protected and legitimized the exclusion of any role or responsibility for social reproduction functions from the emergent, public economic sphere.

10 Recent shifts in public perceptions regarding the acceptance of non-binary conceptualizations of gender suggest the dualistic conceptualization of gender divisions might be lessening. If this proceeds so that the dominant understanding of gender is non-binary larger social conceptualizations might be challenged and could foreshadow changes in the way we understand the overall dualistic relationships that dominate social constructions in the Western intellectual tradition. While the masculine/feminine dualistic construction may become less relevant, it could be replaced by a masculine/non-masculine formation and simply fit into the rest of the related dualistic constructions. With respect to overall neoliberal ideology, the breakdown of one dualistic construction among many may not have much significance. Historically, neoliberalism adapts to fluid social constructions rather easily. But at its core the market/non-market distinction as manifest in the public/private dualism seems to be much more central to the maintenance of neoliberalism. As both Nicholson and Jennings note, the public/private dualism has been flexible in defining what is “not the economy.” And this characteristic has made it central and crucial to the maintenance of neoliberal ideology and thus the most important of the many dualisms to reject.

11 For more on mental models see Mary V. Wrenn (2007).

12 Feminist Economics alone has published fifty-four articles concerning care between 1995–2018, including nineteen on caring labor, eighteen on childcare, two on eldercare, one on healthcare, three on care theory, and eleven of a general character.

13 And implicitly rejecting an efficiency/equity dualism.

14 Admittedly, explicit analysis of care has been limited in OIE. There is an extensive literature on social valuation, however.

15 Clearly, Original Institutional economists reject the legitimacy of the positive/normative and fact/value dualisms as well.

16 Arguably, Nancy Folbre (2008) contains a version of the institutionalist critique of mainstream value theory and an application of instrumental valuation to questions of the social valuation of children.

17 The dependency of the care receiver is coupled with taking on the responsibility by the caregiver as described by Tronto (1993).

18 The valorization of autonomy is a cultural choice. Other cultures can and do reject autonomous individualism as a social value.

19 For feminist institutionalist intersectional analysis see Kanchana N. Ruwanpura (2008). Also, see William M. Dugger (1996).

20 Possibly now operating as a masculine/non-masculine dualism.

21 Of interest is the evolution of the categories of economy/state, masculine/feminine, and public/private in ways that reflect historical change but maintains the overarching tendency to envision the world in dualistic terms. This limits the possibility of any particular changes in the categories to undermine the stability of social systems sustained by understanding the world in dualistic ways. Thus, allowing neoliberal ideology to be sustained despite underlying evolution in the society as long as that evolution does not impinge directly and obviously on the core precepts of neoliberalism.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

William Waller

William Waller was Helen Cam Visiting Fellow at Girton College, Cambridge University, and is currently William R. Kenan Jr Professor of Economics at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. He writes extensively on original institutional economics including issues of methodology and its relationship to feminist economics. His work has been published in the Journal of Economic Issues, History of Political Economy, Review of Social Economy, Rethinking Marxism, among others.

Mary V. Wrenn

Mary V. Wrenn is Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of the West of England. Previously (2011–16) she was the Joan Robinson Research Fellow in Heterodox Economics at Girton College, University of Cambridge. Her research interests center on studies of neoliberalism, including locating ontological concepts such as agency, identity, and emotions therein. Her recent work has been published in the Journal of Economic Issues, the Cambridge Journal of Economics, and the Review of Radical Political Economy, among others.