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ABSTRACT
This article asks, ‘What’s left of the Italian left?’ arguing that an answer to the question presupposes having the answer to four more specific questions, namely, what does the term ‘left’ mean? What parties belong to this category thus defined? What accounts for the parties’ electoral decline since the end of the cold war? What, if anything, can be done to revive their fortunes? I argue that the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ describe a spatial metaphor having to do with attitudes to equality. The electoral difficulties of the parties belonging to this category over the past thirty years can be explained by reference to three interlinked processes of long-term economic, social and political change that help account for the electoral decline of mainstream parties of the left in Western democracies in general in recent decades. In the context of globalization, a revival of the fortunes of the left in Italy appears to lie in the direction of an embrace of a social democratic ideology combined with a renewed emphasis on the principal of internationalism.
RIASSUNTO
Questo articolo si chiede: “Cosa resta della sinistra italiana?” sostenendo che una risposta a questa domanda presuppone di avere la risposta a quattro domande più specifiche, ovvero: cosa significa il termine “sinistra”? Quali partiti appartengono a questa categoria così definita? Cosa spiega il declino elettorale di questi partiti dalla fine della Guerra Fredda? Cosa si può fare, se si può fare, per risollevarne le sorti? Sostengo che i termini “sinistra” e “destra” descrivono una metafora spaziale che ha a che fare con gli atteggiamenti rispetto all’uguaglianza. Le difficoltà elettorali dei partiti appartenenti a questa categoria negli ultimi trent’anni possono essere spiegate facendo riferimento a tre processi interconnessi di cambiamento economico, sociale e politico di lungo periodo che contribuiscono a spiegare il declino elettorale dei partiti mainstream di sinistra nelle democrazie occidentali in generale negli ultimi decenni. Nel contesto della globalizzazione, la rinascita della sinistra in Italia sembra andare nella direzione di un’ideologia socialdemocratica combinata con una rinnovata enfasi sul principio dell’internazionalismo.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. See, for example, the edition of l’Espresso of 2 October 2022, entitled ‘Vuoto a sinistra’.
2. This party assumed a left-wing profile despite itself; for in order to compete effectively it had both to defend its flagship reddito di cittadinanza (‘citizenship income’) which was under attack from the right, and to attack the PD from the left – not least because its rightward-leaning voters had already deserted it and because the centre ground, between the PD and the right, was already occupied by the fourth formation at the election: the alliance between Carlo Calenda’s Azione and Matteo Renzi’s Italia Viva (IV).
3. E.g. the difficulties encountered by Marxian revolutionary discourses in the face of declining numbers of blue-collar workers.
4. This is fundamentally the strategy of Azione-IV and is eloquent about their refusal to form a stable electoral coalition with the PD at the 2022 general election.
5. Anti-establishment narratives lost their appeal as voters looked to the mainstream parties for protection; and ‘it became more difficult to offload blame onto the EU, which came across as an institution concerned to protect the well-being of citizens in a cohesive, timely and attentive manner, rather than as a surly auditor’ (Genovese and Vassallo Citation2023, 133). Meanwhile, the failure of Brexit in the UK, and the defeat of Donald Trump in the US presidential elections (with their controversial aftermath) also helped to undermine the appeal of populist narratives.
6. Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) database, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout
8. ‘Verso le elezioni europee: la posizione di Potere al Popolo’, 13 January 2019, https://poterealpopolo.org/elezioni-europee-posizione-potere-al-popolo/
9. ‘[Contropiano] France Insoumise, Podemos, Bloco de Ezquerda guardano alla sfida europea del prossimo anno’, 27 November 2018, https://poterealpopolo.org/contropiano-france-insoumise-podemos-bloco-de-ezquerda-guardano-alla-sfida-europea-del-prossimo-anno/
10. All quotations taken from Stefano Fassina’s ‘Presentazione’, http://patriaecostituzione.it/manifesto/
11. It is of course true that protectionism, the emergence of regional trade agreements, the reassessment of global value chains, the emergence of populist and nationalist movements and other phenomena suggestive of ‘de-globalization’ have acquired increasing significance in recent years. Nevertheless, globalization remains a deeply entrenched phenomenon with global economic integration, interconnectedness and the flow of information continuing to play significant roles in many areas, including finance, technology and communications.
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James L. Newell
James L. Newell is former Professor of Politics at the University of Salford, UK, and Adjunct Professor at the University of Urbino Carlo Bo. His research interests lie in the fields of Italian politics; political corruption, and the European Union and the politics of Brexit. His recent books include Silvio Berlusconi: A Study in Failure (Manchester University Press, 2019), Italy’s Contemporary Politics (Routledge, 2021), European Integration and the Crisis of Social Democracy (Palgrave, 2022). He is chair and treasurer of the UK Political Studies Association’s Italian Politics Specialist Group and founding co-editor, with Maurizio Carbone, of the journal, Contemporary Italian Politics.