The truth, but not yet: avoiding naïve skepticism via explicit communication of metadisciplinary aims

ABSTRACT

Introductory students regularly endorse naïve skepticism – unsupported or uncritical doubt about the existence and universality of truth – for a variety of reasons. Though some of the reasons for students’ skepticism can be traced back to the student – for example, a desire to avoid engaging with controversial material or a desire to avoid offense – naïve skepticism is also the result of how introductory courses are taught, deemphasizing truth to promote students’ abilities to develop basic disciplinary skills. While this strategy has a number of pedagogical benefits, it prevents students in early stages of intellectual development from understanding truth as a threshold concept. I argue that we can make progress against naïve skepticism by clearly discussing how metadisciplinary aims differ at the disciplinary and course levels in a way that is meaningful, reinforced, and accessible.

KEYWORDS:

• Introductory pedagogy
• naïve skepticism
• student relativism
• threshold concepts

Acknowledgements

This paper could not have been written without discussion and comments from a number of my fellow faculty at the University of Minnesota Rochester, especially Shanna Altrichter, Molly Dingel, James Ford, Aaron Kostko, Brian Mondy, and Jennifer Wacek. This paper also benefitted significantly from suggestions provided by Kris Gorman of the University of Minnesota Center for Educational Innovation and two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID

Jake Wright http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1299-6725

Notes

1 See, e.g., discussions by Besong (2016), Burkard (2017), Cashmore (2015), Momeyer (1995), Stokes (2012), Tait et al. (2012), and Turner (2013).

2 Naïve skepticism has several names in the existing literature, most often ‘student skepticism’ after Satris’ (1986) original treatment, but also ‘reflective relativism’ (Momeyer 1995). I use naïve skepticism primarily because it is the naïveté that is problematic, rather than the fact that it is often employed by students or, as a result of the naïveté, employed reflexively.

3 See, e.g., (Ayer 1952) and (Mackie 1977).

4 See, e.g., (Schellenberg 2007).

5 See, e.g., (Cartwright 1983) and (van Fraassen 1980).

6 See, e.g., Leiserowitz et al.’s (2013) discussion of the effects of Climategate.

7 See, e.g., (S. Meyer 2009).

8 See, e.g., (Foster 1997).

9 See, e.g., (Caplan 2013).

10 See, e.g., Hume's aesthetic skepticism (see [Gracyk 2016] for a review).

11 See Descartes’ Meditations (1998) or (Pollock 1986) for a more intuitive version of the argument.

12 I’m grateful to Molly Dingel for her discussion on this point, which helped me conceptualize much of the discussion in this section.

13 Despite the professional consensus that the American Civil War was caused by slavery, nearly half of Americans believe that the main cause was states’ rights (Kohut et al. 2011).

14 Differing interpretations on the causes of the genocide exist from both the Hutu and Tutsi perspectives (Caplan 2013).

15 See, e.g., (Foster 1997).

16 As McFarland notes, the ‘continuing attractiveness’ of Updike's story lies in its ‘ambiguity’ (1983, 96).

17 See, e.g., the debate in (György 1999).

18 E.g., (Davis and Moore 1945).

19 E.g., (Collins 1971).

20 One of the best-known elements of the song – the guitar hook at the beginning – is a string-skipping guitar exercise (Slash and Bozza 2007).