China's Post-Listian Rise: Beyond Radical Globalisation Theory and the Political Economy of Neoliberal Hegemony

Abstract

While China's rise has been much discussed, its meaning continues to be contested. This is true in radical international political economy, where, for example, it was the subject of (often polarised) debates between Giovanni Arrighi and David Harvey prior to Arrighi's death in 2009. This reflected a broader debate in IPE between development theory and radical globalisation analysis. The key point of contention is whether China's rise represents a challenge to or further consolidation of neoliberal hegemony on a global scale. This article critically scrutinises some of the key assumptions of the radical globalisation approach, specifically, that China represents another form of the ‘competition state’ whose development aspirations have been radically constrained by global ‘new constitutionalism’ and American monetary power so as to conform to neoliberalism. Deploying a structurationist approach to global governance and an eclectic/regulatory analysis of the Chinese state, I argue that China has challenged neoliberalism by projecting its growing power through constitutionalised global governance. In the face of (declining) American power, global constitutionalism has provided an opportunity structure that may help China consolidate its long-term strategy of consensual development. Far from anchoring ‘neoliberal hegemony’, global economic governance is increasingly central to its unravelling.

Keywords:

• globalisation
• governance
• development
• regulatory state
• structuration
• monetary power

Notes

In the long negotiating process leading up to WTO membership, one of the key demands of the Chinese authorities was that China's status as a developing country should be acknowledged.

A key characteristic of global actorness, ‘presence’ has been defined as ‘the ability to exert influence externally; to shape the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others. [It] does not denote purposive external action, rather it is a consequence of being’ (see Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 27–9).

‘BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China’, regarded by many as the leading economies of the developing world.

For example, Olivier Blanchard has called for the overthrow of inflation targeting as the central goal of economic management and argued that government spending should play a more active macroeconomic role. As one economics correspondent noted, the IMF's recommendations ‘up-end 15 years of economic orthodoxy’ (Uren 2010). The IMF has also recently voiced support for controversial forms of taxation on capital, such as resource taxes on global mining companies.

By 2009 the IMF had already secured a considerable, if temporary, augmentation of its loan-granting capacity, which was increased from $250 to $750 billion in the wake of the GFC. The increase was partly underwritten by loan guarantees from developing countries with large reserves, notably China.

Not surprisingly, such policy shifts have been noticed in the US and have served to reinforce criticisms of the IMF coming from cross-party congressional trade lobbies demanding action against China on trade. The same lobby believes the Obama government's preference for negotiating on the yuan via the IMF has led to recalcitrance and inaction (see Palmer 2010; Rabinovitch 2009).