Rooted in Violence: Civil War, International Trade and the Expansion of Palm Oil in Colombia

Abstract

Internal armed conflict severely inhibits economic growth according to a prominent set of civil war literature. Similarly, emerging scholarship finds that civil war inhibits processes of economic globalisation which are argued to produce economic growth. A case in point is international trade, which is reportedly stymied by intra-state war. In contrast, this article employs a critical theoretical framework which acknowledges the often violent tendencies of globalised capitalism. By analysing Colombia's palm oil industry, this article argues that civil war violence can facilitate international trade. In the case study which is presented, violence perpetrated by Colombia's public armed forces and right-wing paramilitaries has enabled the palm oil sector to enter and compete in the globalised economy. This includes processes of forced displacement, which have acquired land for palm oil cultivation, and violence directed at civil groups deemed inimical to the interests of the palm oil sector. By employing a micro-level approach, this article attempts to isolate violent trends related to palm oil cultivation in Meta, the largest African palm-growing region in Colombia. An attempt is therefore made to give an empirically informed account of how violence in Colombia's civil war is facilitating palm oil exports.

Keywords:

• civil war
• Colombia
• disaggregation
• economic development
• international trade
• palm oil
• political economy of conflict

Acknowledgements

For feedback on earlier drafts, the author would like to thank the following: Ruth Blakeley, Doug Stokes, Christopher Cramer, Claudia Cruz Alvarez, Philip Cunliffe, Hugh Miles and Jonathan Joseph. The author would also like to thank the anonymous referees for their feedback and suggestions.

Notes on contributor

David Maher is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Salford, UK. His research investigates the links between neoliberalism, globalisation and political violence. David has also published work on US foreign policy, the political economy of conflict, critical terrorism studies and the US-Colombian free trade agreement.

Notes

1 There is no consensus on how to define civil wars (for an overview, see Sambanis 2004). Nevertheless, pertinent to the analysis in this article, Colombia's conflict is consistently coded as a civil war or an internal armed conflict in the relevant data sets typically used for civil war analysis. (For data sets, see Sarkees 2000, Gleditsch et al. 2002, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Lacina and Gleditsch 2005, Themnér and Wallensteen 2012, UCDP 2013). The analysis that follows uses a broad definition of civil war violence which, as this article proceeds to discuss, encompasses forced displacement and violence against civilians perpetrated by belligerent armed groups of a particular conflict. In the case of Colombia, this refers to the public armed forces, the paramilitaries and guerrilla groups. Moreover, the terms ‘civil war’, ‘intra-state conflict’ and ‘internal armed conflict’ are used interchangeably throughout this article.

2 On the whole, these studies argue that trade is likely to produce economic growth (especially when mixed with other factors such as foreign direct investment (FDI)), which, in turn, reduces the likelihood of internal conflict (for a good summary, see Magee and Massoud 2011; for studies, see Hegre et al. 2003, Barbieri and Reuveny 2005, Bussmann and Schneider 2007, Elbadawi and Hegre 2008).

3 For instance, critics have argued that economic development can provoke civil war if economic growth is unfairly distributed and horizontal inequalities are exacerbated (for example, Stewart 2002, Pugh 2006).

4 Which Kennedy analyses as the period between 1815 and 1885.

5 These economic estimations are also difficult to measure, with ‘extensive debate over the accuracy of the different cost estimates’ (Moser 2000: 25).

6 In fact, Cramer (2006) argues that this twin process constitutes primitive accumulation, Karl Marx's argument that the original accumulation of capital was inherently violent (Marx 1990: 875). While a discussion does not fit the scope of this paper, the suitability of applying primitive accumulation to contemporary debates can be contested. For Glassman (2006), a debate exists between Marxists (who argue that primitive accumulation is a distinct historical process which has now passed) and neo-Marxists (who see primitive accumulation as an ongoing process). Nevertheless, Marxists from both sides of the debate largely accept that capitalist accumulation was violent in its incipiency and, in many parts of the world, continues to be violent in the extreme. It is this broad framework regarding the violent characteristics of globalised capitalist development which is applied throughout this article.

7 With hindsight, Williamson (2004) notes that ascertaining the degree of consensus with regard to attaining competitive exchange rates is problematic. In this light, as some critics argue (for example, Birch and Mykhnenko 2010), it is important to recognise diversity in the application of neo-liberalism across many countries.

8 For example, the GOC has ratified a number of free trade agreements, including with the USA (entering into force in 2012), the EU (2013), Canada (2012), South Korea (2012), Chile (2009), the ‘Northern Triangle countries’ (Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador; 2009–10), the European Free Trade Association countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; 2009) and Mexico (1995) (see OECD 2012: 9–10, 99).

9 A discussion of the efficacy of neo-liberal policies in producing economic growth does not fit the scope of this paper. However, while Colombia has often produced robust economic growth, levels of poverty and inequality remain acute. Moreover, since neo-liberal restructuring began in 1991, wealth distribution has worsened. For example, in 1991, the richest 10 per cent of Colombia's population held a 39.5 per cent share of the country's total income; in 2010, the figure was 44.4 per cent (World Bank n.d.).

10 Estimations vary as to when Colombia's civil war began. It is also worth noting that the GOC and Colombia's largest guerrilla group entered into peace talks in October 2012. This process has not concluded and is not discussed in this article.

11 By 2011, the GOC recorded a total of 3,875,987 IDPs (Acción Social 2011). Moreover, IDP figures are cumulative and do not consider IDPs who have relocated and resettled.

12 Figures are taken from six Fedepalma reports. Where possible, the most recent report is used for annual figures as these figures are likely to be the most up-to-date.

13 Notwithstanding these costs, the number of small-scale growers has expanded during the 1990s and 2000s, aided by government financing schemes. Nevertheless, small-scale producers often accrue sizeable debts and ultimately enter into production agreements with large palm oil companies (Mingorance 2006: 13, Leech 2009: 2).

14 There are also well-documented links between many of Colombia's politicians and paramilitary groups (for example, see IHRLC 2010). While important, a discussion does not fit the scope of this paper, which instead focuses on the links between Colombia's public forces and paramilitaries.

15 Fidel Mingorance (2006) provides an in-depth discussion of Colombia's palm oil industry. This includes an overview of the violations of Colombian and international law in palm-growing regions. This overview is based on the accounts of the affected communities, social organisations, human rights groups and reports from Colombian government agencies. However, Mingorance's data are not quantified and have no reference to chronology. Instead, Mingorance provides a list of violations committed in these palm-growing regions, which are then outlined on a map of Colombia.

16 Other criticisms of CTAs are, inter alia, greater job precariousness, degradation of already unfair labour conditions in employer–employee relationships, the evasion of quasi-fiscal contributions, violations of labour laws, the loss of association and striking rights, the lack of trade union representation and a lack of worker autonomy vis-à-vis companies (see Seeboldt and Yamile 2010: 50, footnote 17; see also Otis 2012).

17 This trend is also consistent with longer term patterns in Colombia's conflict, whereby levels of violence vary across different periods (see data from UCDP 2013). Therefore, broader levels of HRPV in Meta (Figure 3) could rise again.

18 The following data have also been further coded (namely, HRPV data from CINEP), as well as collated and compiled (that is, forced displacement data), by this author.