Beyond Asymmetry: Substantive Beliefs in Preference Formation and Efficiency of Asymmetrical Negotiations

Abstract

Contrary to extant propositions on the primacy of trade dependency in compelling faster agreement by subordinate states in asymmetrical economic negotiations, in the European Union–Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (EU–ACP) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, it is the states that were least materially vulnerable that were quickest to accept an EPA. Why so? I argue that the speed and propensity of ACP states to accept and ratify their EPAs were principally hinged on variances in preference formation based on what Ikenberry and Kupchan [(1990), ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, International Organization, 44 (3), pp. 283–315: 283] call ‘substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs’. The quickest states to ratify an EPA were those which most intensely shared the EU's neoliberal belief in an automatic correlation between trade liberalisation and economic growth, rather than those that were most materially vulnerable. Therefore, by taking the normative sources of preference formation by subordinate states seriously, we can not only derive a parsimonious explanation of EPA negotiating efficiency but also form a foundational conceptual model of predicting efficiency in asymmetrical negotiations that unifies the role of both normative and material considerations.

Keywords:

• ACP–EU relations
• rhetorical framing
• substantive beliefs
• internalisation
• negotiations

Acknowledgements

For comments that have informed the development of this paper, the author would like to express his gratitude to Timothy Shaw, Soren Dosenrode, Tony Heron, Diana Tussie, Ole Elgström and Wolfgang Zank. The author is also thankful to Remco Vahl of the European Commission, Morgan Githinji from the Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and Junior Lodge of the Caricom and other ACP technocrats for facilitating his interviews. He extends gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers whose suggestions have significantly enriched the manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Elijah N. Munyi holds Ph.D. in International Relations. He is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Comparative Intergration Studies and teaches in the Masters Program in Development and International Relations at Aalborg University, Denmark.

Notes

1. By initialling, a state confirms the authenticity of the agreed texts of the treaty. By signing, the state confirms consent to be bound by the contents of the treaty. Ratification signals the due authorisation by all concerned agencies (executive and parliament) for the application of the treaty.

2. Although South Africa did not initial an EPA (already having made the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement FTA with the EU) it is critically involved in South African Customs Union–EU negotiations.

3. While the tariff jump is perhaps the best quantifiable indicator of the financial costs of not accepting an EPA, for a few countries – Nigeria, Botswana, Antigua and Berbuda and Marshall Islands – their exports to the EU are so concentrated on one commodity that the scope of commodities under change may not reflect the real vulnerability. Both Nigeria and the Marshall Islands are not included in the 37 initialling states; so in the article only Botswana and Antigua and Barbuda are affected by this limitation on the use of tariff jumps.

4. The Economic Community of West African States and Southern Africa accepted to ratify their EPAs in late July 2014, two months before the expiry of the deadline, while Kenya and the rest of the EAC states accepted an EPA in October 2014.

5. Temporary movement of natural persons: when independent service providers or employees of a multinational firm temporarily move to another country.

6. ‘Neoliberal’ is used here strictly in reference to trade policy in the economic theory Ricardian sense of open trade as being necessarily propitious to overall national welfare.

7. The SVI questionnaires issued to ACP negotiators had a total of 20 questions evaluating several aspects of the negotiation process and outcomes. This included the levels of satisfaction with the EPA outcomes, the degree of institutional entrapment and the degree of relational influence of ‘special relations’ on states’ preference formation.

8. Cariforum Regional Negotiating Machinery.