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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade China expanded its renewable energy sector with unprecedented speed. This success story presents a challenge to Western modes of environmental governance, where stakeholder participation is often deemed a necessary pre-condition for effective policy outcomes. Drawing on new research (including previously unpublished interview data), the article first discusses established modes of environmental governance before examining the growth of China’s renewables sector through the theoretical lens of the ‘developmental state’. The article then analyses renewable energy policy design and implementation in China, illustrating how top-down command and control strategies have successfully diffused renewable energy technology from a standing start. We argue that (1) China’s distinct approach to the sector differs from Western modes of environmental governance and (2) this has revealed a new path towards renewable energy diffusion that authoritarian states in particular might regard as an attractive alternative to participatory models.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Geoffrey Chun-fung Chen is Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. He was educated at the National Chengchi University (Political Science), the London School of Oriental and African Studies (International Law) and the University of Sheffield (Politics). He received his PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Bath. Chen's current work focuses on Chinese politics, environmental politics, and comparative political economy.
Charles Lees is Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics, Languages, and International Studies at the University Bath. He is an expert in comparative party systems, coalition government, environmental politics and policy, and has contributed to debates on the methodology of single-country studies. He has provided research and advice for the Centre for American Progress, Australian Labor Party, Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, the House of Lords and the Scottish Executive, amongst others. He holds or has held visiting fellowships at the University of California San Diego, the Australian National University, the University of Sydney, Cardiff University, the University of Birmingham and the University of Sussex.
Notes
1. Our analysis is based on data from semi-structured interviews with 32 renewable energy-related policy-makers, think tanks, academic researchers, business practitioners and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) conducted during the field trip from 9 February to 25 August 2013. The majority of the interviewees are leaders or senior executives in professional associations, research societies, academic institutions, corporations, government apparatus and non-profit organisations. Apart from interview data, our analysis is based on collected written materials, including policy and legislature documents, statistical data, newspaper articles and limited availability of internal documents.
2. Evidence drawn from Germany and Denmark’s experience seems to show that the sharing of decentralised ownership rights reduces local objections to the deployment of renewable energy (Jacobsson and Lauber Citation2006, Mitchell et al. Citation2006, Szarka and Blühdorn Citation2006, Elliott Citation2011: 219–48) and outcomes tend to be better if residents have an economic interest in local projects (Mabee et al. Citation2012). Moreover, ceteris paribus large-scale developments seem to be less acceptable to public opinion than a proliferation of small, privately administered projects (Devine-Wright Citation2014).
3. Other examples are Sinovel and Dongfang. These two domestic companies remain in the top three. They acquire technology licences from Fuhrländer and RE Power, both of which are German turbine companies (Lewis Citation2011: 294).
4. As a successor to the State Planning Commission that maintained control of the country’s planned economy, NDRC is a restructured governmental organisation under the State Council, which maintains obligation to formulate macroeconomic policies and social development. With respect to energy governance, one of the agency’s functions is to determine the general framework of the country’s energy policies and to permit major development projects. Even more so, NDRC is also responsible for the planning and drafting of climate policies; its subsidiary apparatus, the Department of Climate Change, is responsible for ‘front end’ climate actions such as carbon emissions trading, controlling the greenhouse gases emitted by the heavy industry and project approval. Its power seems stronger than the newly emerging Ministry of Environment, which was only nominally upgraded in 2008. Most of the work involves the end-of-pipe solution such as environmental policy monitoring, inspection, supervision and verification.
5. Anonymous interview at the Energy Bureau, Jiangsu Provincial Development and Reform Commission (JS/09/2013) and interview with Jingcheng Jin, Director of Power and New Energy Department, Zhejiang Provincial Development and Reform Commission (ZJ/02/2013)
6. Interview with Andy Chong (JS/11/2013).
7. Interview with Hongfei Huang (ZJ/12/2013).
8. Interview with Yangang Jia (JS/10/2013).
9. Anonymous interview in Jiangsu (JS/05/2103).
10. Interview with Jinwei Zhu (JS/04/2013)
11. Interview with Jingcheng Jin (ZJ/02/2013).
12. Interview with Professor Pei-hong Wang, board member of China Energy Research Society (JS/02/2013).
13. Anonymous interview (JS/15/2013)
14. Anonymous interview (JS/15/2013).
15. This policy document has revised and re-introduced in 2015, and certain purposes for the development fund have been removed, such as encouraging the research and ‘local content’ equipment production.
16. China’s wind resources are mainly concentrated in the Northern regions and coastal areas; these areas accounted for 77 per cent of the above-mentioned land-based wind energy resources (Liu Citation2013). As Lewis (Citation2011) observes, we have seldom seen wind resources on such a scale developed elsewhere in the world.
17. Anonymous interview (JS/15/2013).
18. Interview with Ruilin Xu (JS/03/2013).
19. According to the policy, the subsidy is a standard tariff on 17 Yuan/W for the building project. For the combined-mounted photovoltaic building-integration projects on the roof and walls, the subsidy standard tariff is 13 Yuan/W. Regarding photovoltaic tariffs, an anonymous policy-maker at Jiangsu Energy Bureau indicated,
Now at Jiangsu Province, the price of 1 kilowatt of electricity is 1 Yuan. The cost is actually 4.355 Yuan, and the rest is supported by the state’s subsidies. State funds supports enterprises, this is why our renewable electricity price is lower than the prices in European countries. (Anonymous 09/JS/2013)
20. Interview with Yangang Jia (JS/10/2013).
21. Interview with Pei-hong Wang (JS/02/2013).
22. For example, the development of nuclear power in China began early in the 1950s, and the industry was dominated by three state-owned enterprises: China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group Co., Ltd., China National Nuclear Corporation and China Power Investment Corporation. As with the renewables sector, the state was reluctant to open up the sector to foreign actors, and the principle of endogenous technology development was stressed as well as the attempt to facilitate technology transfer from American and French producers (OECD Citation2012: 116). However, unlike the renewables sector, there was no centralised government apparatus developing coherent policies for the sector (Xu Citation2010: 68) and no set of unified standards for nuclear safety and industrial technology and the local industry still remains relatively backward (Liu Citation2013: 106). In addition, within the field of climate technology, there is a recognition that the process of catch up is facing difficulties. As the Ministry of Technology’s Twelve Five-Year Special Guidelines of Electric Vehicle Technology Development, published in Citation2012, put it:
At present, China’s electric vehicle development has entered a critical period. We are facing major development opportunities, and we are also facing serious challenges. There are still many problems to be solved in the development of electric vehicles; for example, our core technology is not competitive, corporation is reluctant to invest, and the potential of government coordinative and planning capacity has not been fully released. (Ministry of Science and Technology Citation2012)