Producing Airpower: The Rise and Fall of Neo-Liberalism’s Defence Agenda

ABSTRACT

Few policy issues are more challenging than complex weaponry’s procurement and employment. Technology drives weapon costs upwards faster than economies are growing and militaries struggle to maintain increasingly sophisticated arms. Certain governments have adopted a reform agenda rooted in neo-liberal economic theory to address these challenges. Two broad policies – enhancing inter-firm competition for contracts and outsourcing activities to the private sector – emerged as central to this reform agenda. Although rarely presented as such, these reforms present a significant intellectual challenge to the hitherto predominant statist model for military power’s provision. Surprisingly, in light of neo-liberal policies’ adoption by militarily active states, no study has systematically examined these reforms’ content and impact. My article fills this lacuna by examining the state – the United Kingdom – that most consistently enacted neo-liberal defence reforms. To preview the conclusion, neo-liberal reforms initially generated small initial efficiencies, but then produced significant adverse consequences when pursued beyond a certain minimal level. Britain’s competition policy, for example, ultimately incentivized firms to consolidate into monopolies, which narrowed the scope for future competition and prevented the state from upholding fixed price contracts. Outsourcing, likewise, proved detrimental once policymakers sought to extend its scope beyond a limited range of simple services.

KEYWORDS:

• Neo-liberalism
• defense
• armaments
• air power
• Britain
• Margaret Thatcher
• defense procurement
• outsourcing
• competition policy

Acknowledgements

Many individuals provided advice and support in course of conducting research on neo-liberalism’s impact on defence. The Institute for Humane Studies’ undergraduate research fellowships and my opportunity to dine with Milton Friedman at Claremont McKenna initially sparked my interest in this subject years ago, while Suzanne Berger’s encouragement to examine the impact of distinct varieties of capitalism on defence procurement laid the intellectual foundations of this article. I would like to thank Jong-kun Choi, Chung-in Moon, Moritz Weiss and Sang-ho Lee for their comments when I first presented the paper. New Political Economy’s anonymous reviewers then provided invaluable feedback that greatly improved the final product. Finally, I would like to thank Audrey DeVore for her editorial help.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Marc R. DeVore is a Lecturer at the University of St. Andrews' School of International Relations. Dr DeVore also served as National Security Advisor to the President of the Central African Republic and an advisor to the President of Guniea-Bissau. He has published in the Review of International Political Economy, Security Studies, New Political Economy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Defence and Peace Economics, War in History, Comparative Strategy and Terrorism and Political Violence. He has conducted field research in the Balkans, Libya, Iraq, Lebanon and the Central African Republic.

Notes

1 TNA T 496/39 Discussion with Mr. Bourn-AUS(P), 23 October 1981.

2 TNA T 496/39 J. Macauslan to M. Hansford, 30 October 1981.

3 TNA T 499/349 Capital Contract: Cost Analysis and Forecasting, 30 January 1987.

4 HC Deb (1986) 107 col. 1351–9.

5 PREM 19/2935 Tom King, EFA Radar, 22 January 1990.

6 Defence Committee Second Report Session 1999–2000, HC 158, Ministry of Defence Annual Reporting Cycle, Evidence Q 509.

7 HC Public Accounts Committee, Oral Evidence (23 February 2004), ev.3.

8 HL (1984) 457 col. 1454.

9 TNA T 499/349 M.L. Taylor to D.J. Seammen, 27 January 1987.

10 HC Deb (2000) 355 col. 411–12.