THe politics of nuance: Irish official discourse on northern ireland

Abstract

To be effective, the institutional and constitutional reforms implemented on the island of Ireland after the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998 needed to be accompanied by conceptual adjustment at all levels of society. It is in this conceptual alteration that official discourse comes into play. This article examines the discourse of the Irish governmental elite regarding three key themes in Irish official nationalism: unity, distinctiveness, self‐determination. Reinterpretation of the meaning of these concepts enabled major adjustments in Irish policy towards Northern Ireland to be presented by the Irish government as the fulfilment, as opposed to the betrayal, of core principles of Irish nationalism.

Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges use of the resources of the Dublin European Institute and the Institute for the Study of Social Change, University College Dublin, when conducting the research on which this article is based. She also wishes to acknowledge the value of comments made on earlier drafts of this article when presented to the ‘Rhetoric and Politics’ conference, University of Essex (May 2003) and to the Department of Politics, Brock University, Ontario (October 2003).

Notes

This article's approach is drawn from a social constructivist framework; for more on discourse analysis and social constructivism see Potter (1996).

Liam Cosgrave was a government minister (1954–1957), leader of Fine Gael (1965–1977) and Taoiseach (1973–1977). Key events in Northern Ireland whilst Cosgrave was in office include the Sunningdale Declaration and Assembly (1973–1974) and the Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention (1975–1976).

Hajer (1995: 44) defines discourse as ‘an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations … that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’.

The original text of Article 2 of the Irish Constitution reads: ‘The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas.’ The non‐recognition of Northern Ireland in the definition of the Irish nation embodies the centrality of the unity of territory, state and nation in Irish nationalism.

The distinctive nature of the Irish nation is supported by Article 1 of the constitution, which affirms the nation's right ‘to develop its life, political, economic and cultural, in accordance with its own genius and traditions’.

Although the definition of self‐determination is contentious (see Mayall, 1990), a clear example is seen in Article 1's affirmation of the Irish nation's ‘inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign right to choose its own form of Government’. Notably, the territory of the Irish nation is defined in terms of the island (Articles 2 and 3).

For expansion and application of this three dimensional model of nationalism, see Hayward (2002). See also Newman's (1998) elaboration of the concept of a sovereign ‘nation state’ in terms of the social construction of national identities within a particular territorial space.

These three terms have been selected from a range of concepts also associated with nationalism, such as ‘sovereignty’, ‘identity’, ‘community’ and ‘tradition’, because they are more specifically relevant to Irish official nationalism. Moreover, these concepts cover the three dimensions of nationalism (territory, nation, state) in relation to Northern Ireland.

Jack Lynch was a government minister (1957–1966); leader of Fianna Fáil (1966–1979) and Taoiseach (1966–1973, 1977–1979). Key events in Northern Ireland during Lynch's period in office include the introduction of British troops into Northern Ireland (1969), Bloody Sunday (1972) and the introduction of Direct Rule (1972).

This explicit rejection of military force to achieve reunification by a Fianna Fáil leader contrasts strongly with de Valera's (1926, emphasis added) claim: ‘We shall at all times be morally free to use any means that God gives us to reunite the country.’

The categories ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ in relation to the discourse do not imply that the two are exclusive or confined to separate time periods; in fact, it is notable that there is often a significant overlap between the use of traditional and new discourse.

Crucial contextual changes in the Republic of Ireland connected to change in the government's approach to Northern Ireland include economic development (see Bradley, 2002), socio‐cultural adjustment (see Coakley, 2002; Hardiman and Whelan, 1998), and European integration (see Goodman, 2000; Hayward, 2002).

Contributions that have examined the discourse of nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland include Cunningham's (1997) critique of the language of John Hume and Ivory's (1999) comparison of the discourse of political parties north and south in Ireland.

Garret FitzGerald was a government minister (1973–1977); leader Fine Gael (1977–1987) and Taoiseach (1981–1982, 1982–1987). Key events in relation to Irish policy on Northern Ireland whilst FitzGerald was in office include the New Ireland Forum (1983), the Anglo‐Irish Agreement (1985) and the Northern Ireland Assembly (established 1982 and dissolved in 1986).

Charles Haughey was a government minister (1961–1970, 1977–1979); leader of Fianna Fáil (1979–1992) and Taoiseach (1979–1981, 1982, 1987–1992). Key events in Northern Ireland whilst Haughey was in office include the Constitutional Conference (1979–1980), the Northern Ireland Act and Assembly (1982), and the agreement for formal talks between the two governments and the political parties (1991).

John Bruton was a government minister (1981–1982, 1982–1987); leader of Fine Gael (1990–2001) and Taoiseach (1994–1997). Key developments in the Northern Ireland peace process that occurred whilst Bruton was Taoiseach include the Framework Documents (1995), the Twin Track Initiative (1995) and Multi‐Party Talks (1996–1998).

Albert Reynolds was a government minister (1979–1981; 1982; 1987–1992); leader of Fianna Fáil (1992–1994) and Taoiseach (1992–1994). Whilst Reynolds was in office, the following key events in relation to Northern Ireland took place: the Joint (Downing Street) Declaration (1993), first Hume–Adams–Reynolds statement (1994), first IRA and Loyalist ceasefires (1994) and the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation (1994).

The fact that FitzGerald (1977) can make reference to ‘traditional North/South tensions’ highlights the association of the geographical areas with different histories, ideologies and cultures.

Bertie Ahern was a government minister (1987–1994); leader of Fianna Fáil (1994–) and Taoiseach (1997–). As Taoiseach, Ahern has overseen the renewed IRA ceasefire (1997), the Good Friday Agreement and Referendum (1998), and devolution in Northern Ireland (1999).

Affirming the ‘equal but distinct’ discourse, Prime Minister Blair noted in his speech to the Oireachtas (1998) that cooperation between the Irish and British states does not ‘threaten our separate identities’ or ‘mean losing our distinctiveness’.

One difference between Irish official discourse and that of other Irish nationalists is epitomised in the way that Gerry Adams (1998) explicitly rejects this interpretation of self‐determination – ‘the referendums do not constitute the exercise of national self‐determination’ – and argues that the criteria for the achievement of self‐determination are not yet observed in Ireland.