Vacant land in London: a planning tool to create land for growth

ABSTRACT

Vacant land is a widespread urban phenomenon that has been problematised as a waste of a scarce resource, which needs to be brought back to use. The consensus around this belief has been almost unanimous, despite the contradiction between the idea of scarcity and that of vacancy. This paper explores the assumptions underpinning this contradiction to point to new ways of addressing the ‘vacant land problem’. Drawing on the work of Lefebvre and Massey, the paper suggests a dialectical framing of vacant land to understand how its socially constructed nature shapes its transformation. The paper reveals a static understanding of urban change behind the conceptualisation of Battersea Power Station and Silvertown Quays as ‘bad places’, which in turn legitimises and shapes their transformation. The paper argues for a re-problematisation of ‘vacant land’, whereby its function as a planning tool for growth can be challenged.

KEYWORDS:

• Vacant land
• land scarcity
• Lefebvre
• Massey
• London

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Brownfield land is the common term currently used to refer to vacant land in England.

2. Hegel elaborates a new method of thinking to be able to grasp the Absolute Truth, or Concrete Universals, of the world around us. This new method, called dialectical thinking, differs from the Aristotelian logic in that the negation of the thesis (i.e. anti-thesis) does not reinstate the original thesis. For instance, ‘A is not non-A’ provides an example of Aristotelian reasoning. But in Hegel, the anti-thesis would actually allow a move towards a new rational unity: the synthesis. In other words, ‘A is not non-A’ would render the Concept that reflects both A and non-A. The synthesis (Concept) overcomes and preserves the elements of thesis (A) and anti-thesis (non-A). According to Hegel, this way of thinking would allow us to achieve the Absolute Truth, because it would help us to grasp the whole without losing sight of its constitutive parts (Cordón and Martínez 1992).

3. Lefebvre argues that there are three ‘material expressions’ of Social Space: Spatial Practices, Representation of Spaces, and Representational Spaces (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 38–41).