Abstract
Coup leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have announced their intention to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States, a process that will unfold over the coming year. The putative withdrawal threatens to further weaken economic development in these three Sahelian states – already among the poorest in the world – and could see them pivot further towards the Russian sphere of influence.
On 28 January 2024, the military leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced that their states intended to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional economic bloc. The decision will take around a year to ratify formally, but the split is likely to proceed. The putative withdrawal threatens to further weaken economic development in these three Sahelian states – already among the poorest in the world – and could see them pivot further towards the Russian sphere of influence. It will also likely undermine efforts to counter Islamist violence across the region, given the withdrawal of Western soldiers, and could see violence spread further to littoral West African states. The withdrawal of three of ECOWAS’s 15 member states underscores the bloc’s failure to counter unconstitutional changes of power in recent years. It also presents remaining member states with a dilemma: whether to seek to enhance economic convergence – such as through the adoption of the proposed ‘eco’ currency – or whether to allow ECOWAS to wither and instead focus on pan-African measures such as the African Continental Free Trade Area and the African Union.
Constrained economic development
The January statement marked the culmination of a series of confrontations between the three military-led states and fellow ECOWAS members. Such confrontations were sparked by a series of military coups in the Sahelian states – with two in Mali (2020 and 2021), two in Burkina Faso (both in 2022) and one in Niger (July 2023).
Having failed to reverse the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso through the imposition of sanctions, ECOWAS sought to promote a particularly hard line against the putschists in Niger, stating that it would consider ‘all measures necessary [including] the use of force’ if the elected president were not reinstated. In August, it activated its standby force, comprising an estimated 20,000–30,000 soldiers from member states including Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Senegal. Largely in response, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formed the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) in September 2023, a mutual-defence pact under which signatories pledged to provide military support should any of them come under attack and to cooperate to end or prevent armed uprisings.
The AES’s withdrawal from ECOWAS has both economic and political dimensions. Economically, the schism is disrupting trade between the AES members – all of which are landlocked – and the littoral West African states on which they have traditionally relied. ECOWAS states accounted for more than 51.0% of Malian imports in 2022 (the most recent data available) and more than 21.0% and 13.0% of imports from Burkina Faso and Niger, respectively. AES states have pledged to increase trade with each other – in April, for example, Niger agreed to deliver 150 million litres of diesel to Mali at around half the market rate – and will likely conduct some trade via neighbouring Guinea (currently suspended from ECOWAS following its own military coup in 2021). Nonetheless, prices are likely to rise in all three markets due to supply disruptions. Inflation in Niger, for example, increased to 11.0% in April 2024 from a recent low of 0.3% in May 2023. This is adding to socio-economic pressures in countries that are already notably poor – in 2023, real per-capita GDP in Niger was US$597 using 2010 prices, US$824 in Burkina Faso, and US$1,057 in Mali, compared with the global average of US$17,004. It will also likely fuel recruitment by insurgent groups.
Politically, the AES states’ withdrawal will lead to longer transitions back to civilian rule; Mali and Burkina Faso agreed to initial road maps under pressure from ECOWAS, which are now likely to be set aside. This is already apparent in Mali, where elections returning the country to civilian rule were due to be held by 26 March 2024. Authorities failed to organise that vote, ordered the suspension of all political activities on public-order grounds in early April and stated that national elections would not be held until the security situation had ‘stabilised’.
There are also likely to be broader and more serious political consequences. Firstly, AES states are likely to pivot further towards Russia’s sphere of influence, furthering the risk that the Sahel belt becomes a de facto Russian satellite region. Secondly, the AES withdrawal will present further headwinds to combatting Islamist insurgent activity in West Africa.
Pivot towards Russia
The two coups in Mali were driven in part by the army’s rejection of a French-oriented counter-insurgency approach, amid growing anti-French sentiment in the subregion. France subsequently withdrew its forces from Burkina Faso and Mali, and in December 2023 French operations in West Africa ended when their final tranche of soldiers left Niger. Domestic militaries in all three AES states are poorly equipped and trained and are not well-placed to tackle jihadists. These governments have requested assistance from the Russian state and private military companies. A 100-strong contingent from Russia’s Africa Corps (effectively the successor to the Wagner Group) landed in Burkina Faso in January 2024, while Russia deployed ‘military instructors’ and an air-defence system to Niger in April.
Links with Russia are deepest in Mali, however. This follows the withdrawal of French soldiers and the cessation, at the Malian government’s request, of peacekeeping operations by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stablization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on 1 January 2024. Mali is now highly dependent on Russian private military companies for its internal security, with an estimated 1,000 soldiers deployed there. But these groups cannot match the scale of air and land power, logistical support and satellite intelligence at the disposal of the French soldiers (who numbered 5,500 at their peak), and Russian soldiers have not made substantial territorial gains. Moreover, Russian forces have an uneven record in Mali and have posed a threat to civilians. For example, Malian and foreign soldiers executed at least 500 people in Moura, according to a UN report, with Human Rights Watch identifying the foreign soldiers as Russian mercenaries. Such human-rights abuses could further alienate Tuareg and Fulani pastoralist communities. Violence between the Malian armed forces and Tuareg separatist groups has increased since MINUSMA’s withdrawal, with both groups fighting to control the vacated MINUSMA bases in the north of the country.
Elevated spillover risks
There is little to suggest that Russian soldiers will be more effective in Burkina Faso or Niger, underscoring concerns that the Islamist insurgency will worsen in the Sahel and potentially spread to other areas. AES states have already announced their withdrawal from the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), founded in 2014 as a regional, intergovernmental organisation to promote development and security within member countries (the other two being Chad and Mauritania). They also announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel’s Joint Task Force, formed in 2017 to collect and share security information.
Having asked French and UN soldiers to leave, AES leaders have turned their attention to US forces in the region. In April, the US Department of State reportedly agreed to withdraw approximately 1,000 soldiers from Niger. This calls into question the future of the US air base in Agadez, which cost US$100m to build, has been used for inhabited and uninhabited surveillance flights and other operations, and has provided intelligence on fighters affiliated with Islamic State (ISIS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, an al-Qaeda affiliate. In the same month, Chad – still a member of the G5 Sahel – requested that US soldiers vacate a base in the capital, N’Djamena, and reportedly threatened to cancel the agreement governing US military operations in the country.
These decisions will constrain the gathering of intelligence on Islamist insurgents and further hamper cooperation between the AES and other regional states on counter-insurgency operations. Informal reports suggest that jihadist activity has increased in the Sahel and – given porous borders – also in countries including Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. Militants are known to operate in forests along Burkina Faso’s southern borders with Benin, Ghana, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire and they have attacked army posts and border villages in the north of Benin and Togo. In March 2023, the US announced US$100m in security assistance to Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Togo ‘to help address the threats of violent extremism and instability’. Also, all five states are members of the Accra Initiative, which aims to prevent spillover violence from the Sahel to the coast and to ‘address transnational organised crime and violent extremism in member countries’ border areas’. Littoral governments are investing in public services in their northern territories as part of efforts to reduce the economic attractiveness of joining insurgent groups. Nonetheless, corruption, poor economic conditions and, in most cases, a reasonably sparse state presence in northern areas (most economic activity and large population centres are in the south of littoral countries) means that conditions remain ripe for an increase in insurgent activity.
The withdrawal of the AES states from ECOWAS poses a challenge to the bloc because it calls into question both its professed commitment to democracy and good governance, and its broad aim of promoting economic integration and shared development. ECOWAS has had notable successes in terms of the former, such as in the first Liberian civil war (1989–97) and in The Gambia, where the bloc deployed some 7,000 soldiers in 2017 after the incumbent president, Yahya Jammeh, refused to step down after losing the presidential election to Adama Barrow in 2016. It has struggled, however, to tackle insurgencies in the Sahel and has clearly failed to roll back military takeovers in four of its member states. ECOWAS notably failed to deliver on threats in August 2023 to intervene militarily to restore Niger’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum – largely because Nigeria, which has the strongest military force within the bloc, is struggling to tackle widespread insecurity within its own borders. Indeed, in February 2024, ECOWAS lifted most of its sanctions on Niger despite the military remaining in power, a move perceived as an attempt to de-escalate tensions with AES states and persuade them to remain within the bloc. Should there be further military takeovers in member states, it is unclear whether the threat of ECOWAS intervention will have a substantive impact.
In economic terms, the AES states’ departure will add to the growing debate around the CFA franc, the currency used by all three AES markets, as well as five other ECOWAS members (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo). While use of the CFA franc, which is pegged to the euro, has helped contain inflation, it has proved unpopular in many West African states, with opponents arguing that it is neo-colonialist and deprives African governments of control of their own monetary policies. In this context, the 25 November 2023 declaration by AES finance ministers that they intend to establish a stabilisation fund, create an investment bank and move towards ‘a true economic and monetary union’ heavily implies a move away from the CFA franc.
Such impulses are also present outside of the AES states. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, who in March 2024 won presidential elections in Senegal by defeating the incumbent’s nominee, ran on a platform of ‘rupture’ – championing greater domestic sovereignty – which included abandoning the CFA franc. While Faye has subsequently softened his stance on the issue, suggesting that he will seek regional reform of the CFA franc regime before moving to a new national currency, this casts further doubt on ECOWAS’s planned adoption of a shared currency – the eco – from 2027. Given that the eco would be backed by and pegged to the euro if adopted, critics argue that the change in currency regime would be minimal. It is unclear whether Nigeria and Ghana – the two largest economies in ECOWAS – would be prepared to abandon their national currencies and join the eco. It is also questionable how many member states will be able to meet the stated convergence criteria of single-digit yearly inflation, a fiscal deficit of 4.0% of GDP or less, central-bank deficit-financing of no more than 10.0% of the previous year’s tax revenues, and gross external reserves equivalent to at least three months of import cover.
The departure of the AES states raises fundamental questions about the purpose of ECOWAS in light of the emerging African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Thus far, all three AES states and 11 of the 12 ECOWAS members have deposited instruments of AfCFTA ratification. Given that AfCFTA will potentially create one of the world’s largest free-trade areas, comprising 53 of 54 countries in continental Africa, West Africa signatories may well decide to raise their sights and prioritise this grouping. This would seriously undercut ECOWAS given the difficulties it has faced addressing both regional economic integration – its raison d’être – and serious political issues at the national level.