Paternalist populism and illiberal elitism in Central Europe

Abstract

Through the analysis of the ideology of two Hungarian parties typically considered as populist, this paper investigates how elitism can be integrated into an overall populist appeal. The two parties, Fidesz and Jobbik, exhibit features of paternalist populism and illiberal elitism while offering different responses to the challenges typically confronted by authoritarian populist movements. With regard to Jobbik, the paper uncovers the existence of three distinct ideologies: right-wing populist; ultra-nationalist; and traditionalist and ‘meta-nationalist.’ The paper directs attention to the layered nature of partisan ideological discourses and assesses the relevance of the analysed model for Eastern and Central Europe.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Daniel Hamilton for his suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by the Austrian Marshall Fund and by OTKA [grant number K-105445].

Notes

1. I. Krastev, ‘The strange death of the liberal consensus’, Journal of Democracy, 18(4) (2007), pp. 56–63.

2. Ibid., p. 62.

3. E.g. P.C. Schmitter, ‘A balance sheet of the vices and virtues of ‘populisms’’, Romanian Journal of Political Sciences, 2 (2007), pp. 5–11; E. Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005).

4. S. Gherghina, S. Mişcoiu, and S. Soare (Eds) Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013); A. Bozóki, ‘Consolidation or second revolution? The emergence of the new right in Hungary’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 24(2) (2008), pp. 191–231; A. Bozóki, ‘Illusion of inclusion: configurations of populism in Hungary’, EUI Working Papers, SPS, 2012/06; M. Shafir, ‘Neo-populism in the post-communist zodiac’, in Gherghina et al. (Eds) op. cit., pp. 316–355.

5. M. Bánkuti, G. Halmai, and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Disabling the constitution’, Journal of Democracy, 23(3) (2012), pp. 138–146.

6. One frequently cited feature, the assertion that the people are homogeneous, is left out of the definition. The frequency of statements implying homogeneity indicates well the presence of populist sentiments and discourse, but political actors cannot avoid differentiating along specific values and interests. Therefore, expecting a genuinely homogeneous, undifferentiated idea of the people is not realistic.

7. M. Canovan, ‘Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy’, Political Studies, 47(1) (1999), pp. 2–16; H. Kriesi and T. Pappas, ‘Populism in Europe during crisis: an introduction’, in H. Kriesi and T. Pappas (Eds) Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession (ECPR Press, 2015), pp. 1–19; C. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); K. Deegan-Krause and T. Haughton, ‘Toward a more useful conceptualization of populism: types and degrees of populist appeals in the case of Slovakia’, Politics and Policy, 37(4) (2009), pp. 821–841; K. Hawkins, ‘Is Chavez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective’, Comparative Political Studies, 42 (2009), pp. 1040–1067; B. Stanley, ‘The thin ideology of populism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 13(1) (2008), pp. 95–110.

8. Most typically, the term ‘people’ either refers to the entire community or to the underdog, cf. Laclau, op. cit, Ref. 3.

9. E. Laclau, ‘Populism: what’s in a name?’ in G. Panizza (Ed) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 32–49; Canovan, op. cit., Ref. 7; C. Mudde and C. Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: comparing the contemporary Europe and Latin America’, Government & Opposition, 48(2) (2013), p. 151.

10. Z. Enyedi, ‘Plebeians, citoyens and aristocrats or where is the bottom of bottom-up? The case of Hungary’, in H. Kriesi and T. Pappas, op. cit, Ref. 7, pp. 229–244.

11. V. Orbán, To Preserve the Hungarian Quality of Existence [Megőrizni a létezés magyar minőségét], (2009), available at http://tdyweb.wbteam.com/Orban_Megorizni.htm.

12. V. Orbán, All Issues Need to be Approached Without Taboos (2015), available at http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/egyetlen_kerdest_sem_szabad_tabukent_kezelnunk.

13. The opposition was excluded even from such symbolic events at the conference celebrating the 25th anniversary of the post-Communist Hungarian Parliament.

14. G. Tellér, ‘Is the system of the regime-change a system?’ [Rendszer-e a rendszerváltás rendszere?], Nagyvilág, 54(11) (2009), pp. 979–992; G. Tellér, ‘Was an Orbán-Regime born between 2010 and 2014?’ [Született-e Orbán-rendszer 2010–2014 között], Nagyvilág, 59(3) (2013), pp. 346–367.

15. G. Tellér, ‘Was an Orbán-Regime’, ibid.

16. Available at http://index.hu/belfold/2014/12/04/megint_uj_egyhazi_torvenyt_tervez_a_kormany/ for the context see: Z. Enyedi, ‘The contested politics of positive neutrality in Hungary’, in J. Madeley and Z. Enyedi (Eds) Church and State in Contemporary Europe. The Chimera of Neutrality (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 157–176.

17. G. Tellér, ‘Is the system’, op. cit., Ref. 14.

18. Jobbik’s 2010 manifesto clearly stated these claims. Orbán’s famous ‘illiberal state’ speech is also a good example of this orientation, cf., available at http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/10592.

19. G. Vona, Born on 20 August [Született augusztus 20-án] (Budapest: Magyar Hírek, 2012), p. 131.

20. Ibid., p. 94.

21. In terms of the transparency of governmental policy-making, Hungary fell to 132nd position by 2013–2014, according to the World Economic Forum.

22. Available at http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/national-consultation-on-immigration-to-begin.

23. A. Körösényi, ‘Political representation in leader democracy’, Government and Opposition, 40(3) (2014), pp. 358–378.

24. Radical Change. Party program of Jobbik for the 2010 election, available at http://www.jobbik.hu/sites/jobbik.hu/down/Jobbik-program2010OGY.pdf.

25. J. Debreczeni, Image [Arcmás] (Budapest: Noran Libro, 2009).

26. G. Vona, ‘The typology of modern man’ [A modernkori ember politikai tipológiája], Magyar Hüperión, 1(1) (2013), pp. 18–29.

27. Available at http://index.hu/belfold/2011/03/08/tiszta_udvar_rendes_haz_utan_jar_csak_segely/.

28. The Constitutional Court rejected the latter provision.

29. Eventually both initiatives failed.

30. Not considering such slips of the tongue as minister János Lázár’s infamous ‘those people who have nothing are worth just that.’

31. Of course, the emphasis on spiritualism has strong roots in the tradition of Christian Democrats, which rejected both communism and liberalism as forms of materialism.

32. G. Tellér, ‘Is the system’, op. cit., Ref. 14.

33. Consider the American prohibitionists and the Russian narodniks, cf. P. Wiles, ‘A syndrome, not a doctrine’, in G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (Eds) Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp.180–196.

34. Available at http://observatorio-lisboa.eapn.pt/ficheiro/Eurostat_Nov.-2014.pdf.

35. A. Bozóki, ‘Illusion of inclusion’, op.cit., Ref. 4, p. 16.

36. G. Tellér, ’Was an Orbán-Regime’, op.cit., Ref. 14, pp. 356–357.

37. Ibid.

38. M. Billig, Fascists: A Social Psychological View of the National Front (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978).

39. Z. Enyedi and D. Róna, ‘Governmental and oppositional populism: competition and division of labor’, in S.B. Wolinetz and A. Zaslove (Eds) Absorbing the Blow (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016).

40. Interestingly, Jobbik appeared on the Hungarian scene originally as an explicitly Christian party. Its very first campaign was about erecting large-scale crosses across Budapest in various public spaces. While this image has never been repudiated, as time went by the party became more explicit in its criticism of the Christian churches, particularly the Catholic Church, demanding more conservative and nationalist policies.

41. M. Sedgwick, Against the Modern World. Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

42. C.W. Ernst, ‘Traditionalism, the perennial philosophy, and Islamic studies’, Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 28(2) (1994), pp. 176–181.

43. G. Vona, ‘The typology of modern man’, op. cit., Ref. 26.

44. G. Vona, ‘Introductory thoughts about the foundation of a spiritual Euroasianism’ [Néhány bevezető gondolat a szellemi eurázsianizmus megteremtéséhez], Magyar Hüperión, 1(3) (2013), pp. 291–296.

45. G. Vona, ‘Revisiting emotional nationalism’ [Az érzelmi nacionalizmus felülvizsgálata], Magyar Hüperión, 1(2) (2013), pp. 136–152.

46. Vona’s advisor, Baranyi, reminds the reader that the ancient kings lived in symbiosis with nations, but they did not belong to any particular nation. Accordingly, not even the Árpád-house, the first kings of Hungary, can be considered Hungarians, cf. T. Baranyi, ‘Monarchy and royalty’ [Királyság és királyiság], Magyar Hüperión, 1(3) (2013), pp. 280–297.

47. D.V. Shlapentokh, ‘Eurasianism: past and present’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30(2) (1997), pp. 129–151.

48. G. Vona, ‘Introductory thoughts’, op. cit., Ref. 44.

49. The would-be editor of Magyar Hüperión put it in no uncertain terms: ‘From a right wing perspective being an active component of an Empire is incomparably superior to democratic independence.’ R. Horváth, ‘Lectures to nationalists’ [Tanítás nacionalistáknak], Pannon Front, 5(21) (1999), pp. 34–40.

50. R. Horváth, ‘Why do we respect Haynau’ [Miért tiszteljük Haynaut], Pannon Front, 7(35) (2001), p. 2.

51. Z. Taraszevics, ‘The caudillo: about Francisco Franco’ [A Caudillo – Francisco Francóról], Magyar Hüperión, 1(1) (2013), pp. 30–44.

52. G. Vona, ‘The typology of modern man’, op. cit., Ref. 26.

53. T. Baranyi, ‘Populism’ [Populizmus], Magyar Hüperión, 1(3) (2013), pp. 129–133.

54. G. Vona, ‘The typology of modern man’, op. cit., Ref. 26.

55. Z. Pető, ‘A jobboldali és a konzervatív kifejezések használatáról’, Magyar Hüperión, 1(5) (2013), pp. 179–188.

56. R. Horváth, ‘Lectures to nationalists’ [Tanítás nacionalistáknak], Pannon Front, 21 (1999), pp. 34–40.

57. T. Baranyi, ‘Populism’, op. cit., Ref. 53.

58. G. Vona, ‘The typology of modern man’, op. cit., Ref. 26.

59. T. Baranyi, ‘Populism’, op. cit., Ref. 53.

60. Available at http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20150426_hegedus_lorant_a_jobbik_neppartosodasarol.

61. Slovakia 2012: 59.2% (SMER-SD, OďaNO, SNS, 99%), Austria 2013: 29.77% (FPO, BZÖ, Stronach List), Czech Republic 2013: 25.53% (ANO 2011, Dawn of Direct Democracy), Poland 2011: 29.89% (PiS) and Hungary 2014: 65% (Fidesz, Jobbik).

62. K. Deegan-Krause and T. Haughton, ‘Toward a more useful conceptualization’, op. cit., Ref. 7; P. Učeň ‘Parties, populism, and anti-establishment politics in East Central Europe’, SAIS Review, 27(1) (2007), pp. 49–62.

63. In Eastern Europe, Russia has a similar historical and intellectual background.

64. Some of the politicians of the past, like Meciar and Slota in Slovakia, Milosevic and Seselj in Serbia, Iliescu and Vadim Tudor in Romania, may have been more authoritarian in their fundamental values. But they have not attempted to influence Western political discourse through speeches and articles (cf. Orbán’s article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 September 2015).

65. M. Walzer, ‘Citizenship’, in T. Ball, J. Farr, and R.L. Hanson (Eds) Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 211–219.

66. T. Skocpol and V. Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of American Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).