(National) pride and (conceptual) prejudice: critical remarks on the distinction between patriotism and nationalism

ABSTRACT

Patriotism and nationalism are typically conceptualized as two distinct if not conflicting forms of national attachment. Carrying a substantial normative dimension, the former is often linked to an enlightened sense of community that takes pride in the commitment to democratic values, whereas the latter is understood as an exclusionary and uncritical attachment to the nation. It is this dichotomy and the categorical assumptions at its core which this article subjects to critical appraisal largely missing from the debate. We first (a) address the confusion that comes from constructing national attachment as fixed and dualistic. Then, we (b) highlight the lack of contextual awareness in empirical research that employs scales and items regardless of geographical or temporal peculiarities. Finally, we (c) cast light on the implications entailed, in particular, the legitimacy provided to the civic ideal of a good and reasonable patriotism.

Introduction

Patriotism and nationalism are strange terms. On the one hand, we are steadily confronted with them – be it that we are told about our patriotic duty to stay at home and avoid infecting others with COVID-19, or that we read about a ‘rise of nationalism’¹ that appears to sweep the planet. On the other hand, they often remain elusive. Just like the protagonist in Robert A. Heinlein’s classic Stranger in a Strange Land, they do not suffer from a lack of attention or interest but from a lack of clarity concerning their true nature. Not even the umbrella term under which to subsume them is clear: While some have proposed national pride,² others prefer national attitude,³ national attachment⁴ or national identity.⁵ Others again describe the situation as even more diffuse, with ‘[n]ationalism, national pride, and patriotism [being used as] synonyms for national identity’.⁶ A rather odd assessment, because, surely, there must be a difference between an identity and an emotion such as pride.⁷ And surely there is more to both.

Yet, zooming in on both concepts adds to our confusion rather than resolving it. We soon find that there is not only a wide range of possibilities to subsume but also to subdivide patriotism and nationalism iterum atque iterum. Regarding the former, researchers have contraposed, inter alia, military to civic patriotism;⁸ genuine to pseudo-patriotism;⁹ constructive to blind patriotism¹⁰ and extreme patriotism to moderate patriotism, robust patriotism, deflated patriotism or ethical patriotism.¹¹ With regard to the latter, the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism¹² has been highly influential for several decades; not to mention Tamir’s liberal nationalism¹³ or the hegemonic, particularistic and marginal nationalisms that Wirth once observed gaining traction in prewar Europe.¹⁴ Already back then, he complained about a truly ‘enormous literature’ on the issue that ‘has such wide ramifications and comprises such a variety and complexity of phenomena that its scientific study has appeared forbidding’.¹⁵

Nevertheless, in this article, we take no interest in the differences between the various notions of patriotism and nationalism. It suffices to say that there are (too) many of them. Instead, we want to devote our attention to the demarcation line between the concepts as such. In common parlance, in political rhetoric from Madrid to Muscat, but also in empirical scholarship,¹⁶ this line is almost always constituted by a dichotomic presupposition that approves of patriotism but not of nationalism. Patriotism is often conceived in a Habermasian sense,¹⁷ that is, as neither idealizing one’s nation nor condoning its past transgressions but ‘[evaluating it] from the basis of a critical conscience’.¹⁸ Good patriots, so the argument goes, support their country in a rational and reflective way, thoroughly rejecting all anti-democratic or anti-humanist inclinations. Nationalism, by contrast, is regarded as an ignorant and aggressive ideology that rests on notions of superiority and competition. We argue that both this dichotomy and its empirical manifestations engender numerous essential shortcomings.¹⁹ To map them, we present a threefold critique: first of the arbitrariness and coarseness of the concepts, then of the lack of context in empirical studies operationalizing them, and lastly of the normative consequences and logical inconsistencies entailed. Of course, due to the constraints of a journal article, this critique is far from exhaustive. We nonetheless hope that our plea for more rigorous and conscious scholarship can be of value for the future analysis of nationalism.

A threefold critique

(1) Blurred concepts

Among the many problems regarding patriotism and nationalism, the most obvious stems from what we have already hinted at – namely, which in (mostly empirical) research, both concepts are often conceptualized in a dichotomic way that leaves very little room for nuance and subtlety. This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, because distinguishing between the supposedly innocent attachment to one’s own nation (patriotism) and aggressive feelings of superiority towards other nations (nationalism) is not as obvious as it might appear.²⁰ In fact, a growing strand of literature suggests a considerable correlation between both²¹ and contests the doctrine of a binary opposition. Second, because conducting such operationalizations²² has ‘spawned a variety of scales and concepts’ that is both hard to assess and inherently ‘characterized by conflicting and contradictory terminology and measurement’.²³ Instead of a reliable gold standard, there is only a confusing mélange of approaches that give rise to numerous imprecisions and misunderstandings.

For instance, both patriotism and nationalism are often conflated with related but fundamentally distinct concepts. Patriotism can be difficult to distinguish from support for democracy,²⁴ most notably in the case of items such as the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) ‘How proud are you of the way democracy works?’²⁵ At times, it may even seem as though it is only a proxy for pro-democratic attitudes within a largely unspecified national context. Nationalism, in turn, is frequently equated with nativism, protectionism, authoritarianism, and, most prominently, (right-wing) populism.²⁶ For both are ‘intersecting and mutually implicated though not fully overlapping’²⁷ phenomena that have ‘elective affinities and often – but not always – coincide’,²⁸ there is an inherent risk to be led astray and consider nationalist politicians as populists or populist politicians as nationalists, although neither is a given.²⁹ The same also applies to chauvinism, an ideology that is sometimes defined as congruent with nationalism, sometimes as different but sharing certain features, and sometimes as completely detached. There are cases in which chauvinism (but not nationalism) has been associated with feelings of superiority, and others in which the same survey item has been utilized to prove either. To give but one example, both better world and better country items³⁰ indicate chauvinism for Feinstein and Bonikowski, Mader, and Raijman et al. but nationalism for Ariely and Davidov.³¹

While these inconsistencies are important, there is yet another layer of confusion that originates in the incongruity between the terminology used in scholarly discourse and the self-description of those this discourse is about. In fact, most political parties and individuals described as nationalist would probably reject the label because of its negative connotations and insist on being called patriots instead.³² This is certainly true for most supporters of Europe’s far right but also for many of the protesters who stormed the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 after having been told to ‘peacefully and patriotically make [their] voices heard’.³³ And while these ‘nationalists’ regard themselves as patriots, many ‘patriots’ may consider themselves nothing but good democrats who remain unfazed by the more irrational and essentialist undercurrents of their nation. It may appear like a semantic question first and foremost – but in conjunction with all the vague boundaries outlined earlier, this manifest gap between self-image and public image corroborates that the distinction between patriotism and nationalism is blurred rather than sharp.

(2) Missing contexts

On an empirical level, these conceptual difficulties are complemented by a widespread lack of acknowledging the context in which research on patriotism and nationalism is conducted. As context, we define in this article matters of geography and time; both are of supreme importance to the validity of any research design. We argue that although most empirical studies may have been carried out in consciousness of their contextual embeddedness, there always remains the risk of methodological decontextualization. Put differently, what has proved helpful in measuring concepts in one spatiotemporal context can be deficient or even counterproductive in another.

The limits of geography are perhaps more obvious, for it is often more intuitive that notions of attachment differ quantitatively and qualitatively across specific national contexts.³⁴ In Japan, they may be linked to religio-cultural traditions, in the US to civil liberties and in Germany to the challenges of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (working-off-the-past).³⁵ Some cases are even more complex since they lack clarity about the object of attachment. Take Austria, for instance, where some ‘nationalists’ reject the concept of Austrian uniqueness because they regard themselves as Germans and their country as part of an indivisible German nation. This once popular sentiment receded after the Second World War but regained some popularity by the mid-1950s; not even half of the respondents (49%) to a 1956 Fessel institute poll agreed that Austria is a real nation, with almost as many expressing deutschnationalist views instead.³⁶ Although these views may again be marginalized today,³⁷ they still hint at a crucial contextual element that too often goes unnoticed in comparative scholarship. Of course, there are also examples of particularities that have found more consideration. One is the distinction between emic and etic forms of attachment introduced in Karasawa’s study of patriotism and nationalism in Japan.³⁸ Items such as ‘It is a desirable attitude for a Japanese citizen to worship at shrines and temples’³⁹ are clearly context-related and set themselves apart from the earlier work of Sakano⁴⁰ (who merely translated the scales of Kosterman and Feshbach⁴¹ into Japanese).

They nonetheless are the exception rather than the rule, and, at times, even the most thoughtful appraisal of the national context may be insufficient in light of deeper subnational divisions.⁴² In Germany, not only the country’s National Socialist past must be considered but also its East–West divide and the divergent notions of nation and state that have historically emanated from it.⁴³ In Belgium (Flanders) and Spain (Catalonia), there are powerful independence movements that may likewise affect how people position themselves with regard to their nation. Even more illustrative is the case of the United Kingdom, where the most dominant country, England, has appropriated the common signifier of Britishness in such a way that significant segments of the population consider it tantamount to Englishness. Yet most Scots would never equate them and see a marked difference between this imposed kind of Britishness and their own quasi-authentic Scottishness.⁴⁴ Last but not least, research from Israel, a state engaged in battles of identity and belonging since its foundation, shows that only little more than half of the Palestinian citizenry (53%) label themselves Israelis; a number that suggests a major disconnect between citizenship and national attachment.⁴⁵

Besides geography, time is another major constraint to be aware of – manifestations of national attachment not only differ from country to country but are also subject to the eternal flow and tide of history. What is a source of collective pride today may be ridiculed or ignored tomorrow, and what symbolizes national unity in the present may have aroused little interest in the past. This makes it difficult to assess patriotism and nationalism in their current form by employing items, scales, and categories from previous decades, at least if done without any systematic re-evaluation. To give an illustrative example, one of the most interesting nationalism items (Nat*-3) of Blank and Schmidt is about sports: ‘German success in sports makes me feel … (1, not proud; 5, very proud)’.⁴⁶ It obviously rests on the assumption that pride in the nation’s athletic achievements is not only crucial for the creation of a common identity but also linked to ‘feelings of superiority theoretically associated with nationalism’.⁴⁷ In the specific case of Germany, one would probably think about soccer when answering this item.⁴⁸ This is, after all, a country where the likes of Franz Beckenbauer and Fritz Walter are held in as high esteem as Hermann Hesse and Heinrich Böll; a country where König Fußball (‘King Soccer’) is known to reign supreme and was integral to the development of a positive German postwar identity. Consider only the so-called Miracle of Berne⁴⁹ which was not only a major media event of the 1950s but also provided a powerful founding myth for the young republic.⁵⁰ By identifying the national soccer team with ‘German virtues’ such as ‘discipline, competitive strength and a never-slackening will’,⁵¹ the connection between sports and the nation was reinforced and the Germanness of those wearing the Adler auf der Brust (‘Eagle on the chest’) underscored. Culturally Christian and homogeneous, they embodied a norm any German nationalist could easily relate to.

But times have changed and so has the public image of the Mannschaft. No longer does it stand for the imagined homogeneity of the past but rather for a vibrant, multicultural society in which immigrants from everywhere have found a new home.⁵² From Poland-born Lukas Podolski and Miroslav Klose who spearheaded this shift with their electrifying performances during the 2006 FIFA World Cup (known in Germany as Sommermärchen)⁵³ to present star players like Antonio Rüdiger (Sierra Leonese mother) and Leroy Sané (Senegalese father): all recent successes of the team were built on an immigrant foundation, which once provoked the then-chairman of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland, Alexander Gauland, to explicitly exclude soccer from the sphere of the national. ‘It is no question of national identity any longer […] The German or the English national teams have ceased being German or English in a traditional sense some time ago’,⁵⁴ he declared in a 2016 interview with Spiegel. Many diehard nationalists think along very similar lines. They see the growing ‘de-ethnicization of the nation’⁵⁵ in professional sports as threatening traditional modes of belonging and misrepresenting the real identity of their nation. Taking pride in such a blatantly non-national national team? Certainly not. Nativist outlets like PI-News⁵⁶ have consequently responded with scorn to what they see as just another instrument of Umvolkungspropaganda,⁵⁷ praising the ‘authentic character’ of teams like Hungary or Russia instead. In other words, there is no reason to believe that expressing pride in Germany’s multicultural national team should be seen as a serious indicator of nationalist sentiment today. The German squad that won the 1990 FIFA World Cup may have been favoured by nationalists and the general population alike; the multicultural, multiethnic, BLM-supporting,⁵⁸ and highly diverse squad of 2022 is not.⁵⁹

One could further extend the scope of this argument because its wording (‘German success … ’) does not necessarily confine ‘success’ to the national team alone. Instead, it may be understood as including club soccer as well, which is an area where the gap between national entrenchment and squad composition is particularly pronounced. Responding to the demands of internationalization and catering to a global audience,⁶⁰ Europe’s soccer clubs have long started to compete for talent from around the world,⁶¹ weakening the traditional nexus between player nationality and team identity. When Bayern Munich beat Paris Saint-Germain in the final of the 2020 UEFA Champions League, the winning goal was scored by a Frenchman of Caribbean descent: Kingsley Coman. It remains an open question whether the French, the Germans, or simply all Bayern Munich supporters should be proud of his magnificent header. Casting sports aside, the temporal context is also relevant for numerous other items, including, in the case of Blank and Schmidt, Nat-5 (‘Due to Germany’s economic superiority … ’) and Pat-2 (‘Germany’s social security system makes me … ’).⁶² The former because claims of economic superiority are inevitably dependent on momentary perception, and the latter because fierce criticism of Germany’s social security system has been rather common in recent years. Particularly, in view of Gerhard Schröder’s controversial Hartz IV reforms,⁶³ open expressions of ‘welfare pride’ may not seem patriotic but strange and cynical to many Germans (not that those calling themselves patriots are likely to care about such issues in the first place).

(3) Problematic consequences

These conceptual and contextual shortcomings also entail various consequences that go beyond the boundaries of empirical research and can only be addressed in a cursory manner here. First, there are obvious problems that stem directly from the normatively charged distinction between constructive patriotism and regressive nationalism. By praising patriotism as enlightened and promoting ‘civic virtue’⁶⁴ while condemning nationalism as a dangerous and irrational deviation, many scholars make no pretence of which they view as morally superior. Some even argue that embracing a healthy patriotism fulfils a crucial preventive function since it protects society against the perils of violence and social erosion.⁶⁵ Although this patriotism-cohesion nexus has been called into question by more critical approaches,⁶⁶ it still affects the public perception of patriotism and nationalism greatly.⁶⁷ Presidents and senior politicians of different ideological leanings, from Germany’s Frank-Walter Steinmeier to South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, do not grow tired of praising the unifying powers of patriotism incessantly, whereas an open commitment to nationalism is even rejected by those usually identified as nationalists.⁶⁸

Of course, not all researchers subscribe to clear-cut distinctions and are blind to the normativity produced by casting patriotism and nationalism as moral opposites. Nor do they all sing endless paeans to the virtue of the former; to insinuate such would be as fallacious as denying normative imbalances altogether. Keller, for instance, posits that ‘patriotism is absolutely unique in being connected, by its nature, to a disposition toward bad faith’⁶⁹ – and that this verdict is not limited to the ‘unthinking, jingoistic forms of patriotism that are so easy to belittle’ but likewise applies to ‘patriotic dissidents, and to those whose patriotism is not really political in nature’.⁷⁰ However, the influence of these approaches is limited and rarely stretches beyond the boundaries of political philosophy. In empirical (i.e. most comparative and socio-psychological) scholarship, the ‘good patriotism/bad nationalism’ dichotomy remains widely accepted, as if it were a higher truth in need of perpetual confirmation. Hanson and O’Dwyer even speak of a ‘liberal academic bias’⁷¹ that prompts many researchers to link nationalism to suprematism,⁷² irrespective of the fact that patriots may believe in the superiority of their communities as well: ‘emotional’ patriots by attaching a greater subjective value to them (Keller’s ‘rolling green fields and friendly farmers’)⁷³ and Habermasian patriots because of their democratic nature. One may even ponder whether they are but idealizers of another type. While nationalists are accused of idealizing the nation and lacking the critical consciousness that reason prescribes, these patriots may be considered cast in the same mould – only that they idealize liberal democracy and its central features. As they depart from the conviction that there is no higher patriotic calling than defending humanist and democratic values,⁷⁴ they absolutize these values just like nationalists absolutize the greatness and glory of their nation. Understood in this way, the patriotic position would be neither value-free nor particularly enlightened. Engaging with the various flaws of one’s nation against the backdrop of a specific script is hardly proof of admirable consciousness if the script itself goes unquestioned.

Apart from this tendency to approach patriotism and nationalism in a normatively biased way, one may also point at logical inconsistencies that arise from the operationalization of the ‘good patriotism/bad nationalism’ dichotomy. For instance, if we (a) define patriotism as based on the ‘loyalty to the universal principles and procedures of liberal democracy’⁷⁵ and (b) deduce that all those disloyal to these principles and procedures cannot be considered patriots, then we will be unable to find patriots in autocracies or countries governed by military juntas.⁷⁶ Neither will we find them among people who do not believe in the innate superiority of democracy or live their lives in ignorance of it; they may be nationalists, but patriotism remains, by definition, out of reach for them. While this may appear like a thought experiment, it has a foundation in empirical research: As mentioned before, many cross-national studies such as those of Ariely and Davidov use items such as ‘How proud are you of the way democracy works?’⁷⁷ – implying that their respondents view the political system they live in as democratic and regard democracy as something to be proud of. Both assumptions seem premature and ignorant of those who may consider it an impractical or otherwise deficient form of government instead.⁷⁸ And, nota bene, a form of government that does not impede their patriotic commitment in the slightest.

Similar criticism may be raised against supposedly ‘patriotic’ items that aim at secondary democratic elements such as public welfare. We have already remarked that Blank and Schmidt ask for pride in the social security system,⁷⁹ which, again, necessitates both the existence of such a system and a pro-welfare consensus in society (i.e. a general agreement that it is positive and hence something to be proud of).⁸⁰ As a result, only those who live in countries in which these conditions are fulfiled can answer this question in the affirmative and score points on the patriotism scale. In contrast, citizens of countries without a welfare state are structurally incapable of proving their patriotism as this would require them to express pride in a redistributive mechanism they do not have or want. This leads to the slightly paradoxical situation that, if we take the definition of patriotism as critical support of the nation based on humanist and democratic values at face value, most of the world’s population would encounter severe difficulties in their pursuit of being recognized as patriots. Instead, they would be conceptually sidelined by those who only regard democracies as legitimate and only democrats as patriotic.⁸¹

In line with this argument, one may also question the link between civic commitment and patriotism that is abundant in the literature.⁸² The idea here is that patriots feel a strong obligation to ‘move their country in a positive direction’,⁸³ whereas nationalists prefer to simply revel in their resentment. Again, this is unconvincing since there is no good a priori reason to consider nationalists less engaged in moving their country forward. They may be at odds with ‘patriots’, academics, and the general population about the direction and the right means to move towards it – but this alone does not mean much. Approaching the subject with our preconceived idea of the social good may here blind us to the fact that nationalism has its own notion of commitment. We may not approve of this notion and even repudiate it, but the attempt to resurrect the imagined glory of the past is not necessarily less positive than the further advancement of democratic standards. It is ultimately just a matter of perspective and preference.

Concluding remarks

There is no doubt that having a grasp of both patriotism and nationalism is essential to approach the complex relationship between the phantasmal behemoth that is the nation and all those who draw their identity from it. Both concepts have been exhaustively examined in theoretical treatises and operationalized in empirical studies, yet their supposed dichotomy continues to raise more questions than it answers. In this contribution, we have presented three elements of critique that we consider particularly relevant, namely, the conceptual fuzziness of patriotism and nationalism, the neglect of time and space as contextual factors, and the consequences that arise from adopting a normatively charged perspective. Table 1 illustrates the concerns that emanate from this critique as well as some of the questions they bring forth.

Table 1. Elements of our critique.

	General (issue-related)	Specific (case-related)
Concepts	Demarcative I: Can PAT and NAT be distinguished in a meaningful and coherent way? Do they help us to understand national attachment?*
	Traversal: Do problems arise from the difference between self-identification and ascription?	Demarcative II: Do existing survey items measure the right concept?
Contexts		Spatial: Are the selected items relevant for this country? Temporal: Are the selected items already outdated?
Consequences	Normative: How to avoid ‘good PAT – bad NAT’?	Logical: How to deal with PAT in non-democratic societies?

*Or, as remarked in the introduction, national attitude, national identity, national pride, etc.

Given these elements, we want to close with three remarks aimed at improving future research. First, given the ‘conceptual stretching, i.e. the vague, amorphous conceptualizations’⁸⁴ of patriotism and nationalism, we plea for more clarity in utilizing both terms. This applies in particular to empirical scholarship where it is often unclear if (and why) an item indicates patriotism, nationalism, or both. Criteria like concept differentiation and field utility could be valuable aids in this regard and deserve renewed attention.⁸⁵ Second, it must be brought to mind that even the most clearly defined concepts are only of limited use if they fall prey to contextual confusion. There is no doubt that the development of new measurement instruments is an important task and that cross-country research can greatly enrich our knowledge by allowing us to compare its different manifestations of national attachment. But if we want to obtain valid findings, it is also indispensable to increase our awareness of the context of each case and the limitations of cross-national surveys whose ‘[fundamental utility] derives from [their] generality’⁸⁶ rather than their attention to detail. Ignoring contextual nuances may be less problematic in empirical studies that only compare a small number of countries from the same world region; but in case of transcontinental or even global comparisons, turning a blind eye to them means disregarding reality in order to accommodate methodology. Third and last, since patriotism and nationalism are tainted by normative biases, the role of research in conferring doubtful legitimacy on patriotism while marginalizing critical views needs to be more thoroughly analysed and reflected.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Gianni D’Amato, Jelena Dzankic, Philipp Lutz, Nikolas Roberts, and our two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and remarks.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. For a detailed discussion on this, see F. Bieber, ‘Is Nationalism on the Rise? Assessing Global Trends’, Ethnopolitics, 17 (2018), pp. 519–540.

2. E.g. R. J. P. De Figueiredo and Z. Elkins, ‘Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride’, American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003), pp. 171–188; S. Ha and S. I. Jang, ‘National Identity, National Pride, and Happiness: The Case of South Korea’, Social Indicators Research, 121 (2015), pp. 471–482; G. Ariely, ‘The nexus between globalization and ethnic identity: A view from below’, Ethnicities, 19 (2019), pp. 763–783.

3. E.g. H. Dekker, D. Malová and S. Hoogendoorn, ‘Nationalism and Its Explanations’, Political Psychology, 24 (2003), pp. 345–376; S. Nathanson, ‘Moderate Patriotism’, in M. Sardoč (Ed) Handbook of Patriotism (Cham: Springer, 2020), pp. 141–161.

4. E.g. N. Satherley, K. Yogeeswaran, D. Osborne and C. Sibley, ‘Differentiating between pure patriots and nationalistic patriots: A model of national attachment profiles and their socio-political attitudes’, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 72 (2019), pp. 13–24; L. Huddy, A. del Ponte and C. Davies, ‘Nationalism, Patriotism, and Support for the European Union’, Political Psychology, 42 (2021), pp. 995–1017.

5. E.g. T. Blank and P. Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Representative Data’, Political Psychology, 24 (2003), pp. 289–312; K. Hanson and E. O’Dwyer, ‘Patriotism and Nationalism, Left and Right: A Q-Methodology Study of American National Identity’, Political Psychology, 40 (2019), pp. 777–795; U. Wagner, J. Becker, O. Christ, T. Pettigrew and P. Schmidt, ‘A Longitudinal Test of the Relation between German Nationalism, Patriotism, and Outgroup Derogation’, European Sociological Review, 28 (2012), pp. 319–332. A comprehensive critique of Blank and Schmidt’s use of national identity can be found in M. Mäs, Regionalismus, Nationalismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2005).

6. N. Kersting, ‘Sport and National Identity: A Comparison of the 2006 and 2010 FIFA World Cups’, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 34 (2007), pp. 277–293 (p. 279).

7. A general critique of using ‘national pride’ as a proxy for national identity has been made in K. Meitinger, ‘What does the general national pride item measure? Insights from web probing’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 59 (2018), pp. 428–450; M. Mußotter, ‘We do not measure what we aim to measure: Testing three measurement models for nationalism and patriotism’, Quality & Quantity, online first (2021), pp. 1–21. One may also note that pride has an inherently competitive component: even from a pro-dichotomy position, using pride items to measure patriotism appears thus deficient. See for details H.-A. Heinrich, ‘Emotions toward the nation’, in S. Salzborn, E. Davidov and J. Reinecke (Eds) Methods, Theories, and Empirical Applications in the Social Sciences: Festschrift for Peter Schmidt (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012), pp. 227–234.

8. M. Curti, The Roots of American Loyalty (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946).

9. T. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson and N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).

10. R. Schatz and E. Staub, ‘Manifestations of blind and constructive patriotism. Personality correlates and individual-group relations’, in D. Bar-Tal and E. Staub (Eds) Patriotism: In The Lives of Individuals and Nations (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1997), pp. 229–245; R. Schatz, E. Staub and H. Lavine, ‘On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism’, Political Psychology, 20 (1999), pp. 151–174.

11. I. Primoratz, ‘Patriotism’, in E. Zalta (Ed) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/patriotism/. For the first two types, see also S. Nathanson, ‘Moderate Patriotism’, op. cit., Ref. 3.

12. E.g. M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (London: BBC Books, 1993).

13. Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); see also Y. Tamir, Why Nationalism? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019); G. Gustavsson and D. Miller, Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics: Normative and Empirical Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

14. L. Wirth, ‘Types of Nationalism’, American Journal of Sociology, 41 (1936), pp. 723–737.

15. Wirth, ibid., p. 723.

16. E.g. T. Blank and P. Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany’, op. cit., Ref. 5; E. Davidov, ‘Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP: 34 Countries in a Comparative Perspective’, Political Analysis, 17 (2009), pp. 64–82; H.-A. Heinrich, ‘Causal Relationship or Not? Nationalism, Patriotism, and Anti-Immigration Attitudes in Germany’, Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 6 (2020), pp. 76–91.

17. J. Habermas, ‘Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität’, in J. Habermas (Ed) Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), pp. 632–659; see also C. Cronin, ‘Democracy and Collective Identity: In Defence of Constituional Patriotism’, European Journal of Philosophy, 11 (2003), pp. 1–28; A. Ingram, ‘Constitutional patriotism’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 22 (1996), pp. 1–18; J.-W. Müller, Verfassungspatriotismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010).

18. Blank and Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany’, op. cit., Ref. 5, p. 292.

19. An earlier critique of the distinction between good and bad nationalisms in different forms (e.g. liberal/illiberal; ethnic/civic) can be found in P. Spencer and H. Wollman, ‘Good and bad nationalisms: A critique of dualism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 3 (1998), pp. 255–274.

20. E.g. B. Bonikowski, ‘Nationalism in Settled Times’, Annual Review of Sociology, 42 (2016), pp. 427–449; M. Canovan also highlights the blurred lines between both concepts, reminding us that the ‘French republican version of nationalism has a good deal in common with [German] constitutional patriotism’. Canovan, ‘Patriotism is Not Enough’, British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), pp. 413–432 (p. 421).

21. E.g. R. Latcheva, ‘Nationalism versus Patriotism, or the Floating Border? National Identification and Ethnic Exclusion in Post-communist Bulgaria’, Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, 29 (2010), pp. 187–215; Satherley, Yogeeswaran, Osborne and Sibley, ‘Differentiating between pure patriots and nationalistic patriots’, op. cit., Ref. 4; Huddy, del Ponte and Davies, ‘Nationalism, Patriotism, and Support for the European Union’, op. cit., Ref. 4.

22. E.g. G. Ariely, ‘Constitutional patriotism, liberal nationalism and membership in the nation: An empirical assessment’, Acta Politica 43 (2011), pp. 294–319; G. Ariely, ‘Globalisation and the decline of national identity? An exploration across sixty-three countries’, Nations and Nationalism, 18 (2012), pp. 461–482; Davidov, ‘Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP’, op. cit., Ref. 16; R. Kosterman and S. Feshbach, ‘Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes’, Political Psychology, 10 (1989), pp. 257–274; Q. Li and M. B. Brewer, ‘What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American Identity After 9/11’, Political Psychology, 25 (2004), pp. 727–739.

23. L. Huddy, ‘Unifying national identity research: Interdisciplinary perspectives’, in J. Grimm, L. Huddy, P. Schmidt and J. Seethaler (Eds) Dynamics of National Identity: Media and societal factors of what we are (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 9–24 (p. 18).

24. E.g. L. Huddy and N. Khatib, ‘American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement’, American Journal of Political Science, 51 (2007), pp. 63–77.

25. E.g. Ariely, ‘Constitutional patriotism, liberal nationalism and membership in the nation’, op. cit., Ref. 22; Davidov, ‘Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP’, op. cit., Ref. 16; R. Raijman, E. Davidov, P. Schmidt and O. Hochman, ‘What Does a Nation Owe Non-Citizens? National Attachment, Perception of Threat and Attitudes towards Granting Citizenship Rights in a Comparative Perspective’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 49 (2008), pp. 195–220.

26. For the difference, see e.g. B. Bonikowski, D. Halikiopoulou, E. Kaufmann and M. Rooduijn, ‘Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange’, Nations and Nationalism, 25 (2019), pp. 58–91; R. Brubaker, ‘Populism and nationalism’, Nations and Nationalism, 26 (2020), pp. 44–66; B. De Cleen, ‘Populism and nationalism’, in C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ostiguy and P. Ochoa Espejo (Eds) Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 342–362.

27. Brubaker, ‘Populism and nationalism’, op. cit., Ref. 26, p. 45.

28. Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann and Rooduijn, ‘Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective’, op. cit., Ref. 26, p. 60.

29. Interestingly, hardly anything has been written about the relationship between populism and patriotism, although the latter is the concept most populists seem to refer to. Famous examples include the PEGIDA (Patriotic European against the Islamization of the Occident) movement as well as Florian Philippot’s right-wing party Les Patriotes. One notable exception (dealing with the post-9/11 context in the US) is R. Curren, ‘Patriotism, Populism, and Reactionary Politics since 9.11’, in M. Sardoč (Ed) Handbook of Patriotism (Cham: Springer, 2020), pp. 741–761.

30. Items such as ‘The world would be a better place, if people from other countries were more like [my country]’ and ‘Generally, [my country] is better than most other countries’.

31. E.g. Ariely, ‘Globalisation and the decline of national identity?’, op. cit., Ref. 22; Davidov, ‘Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP’, op. cit., Ref. 16; Y. Feinstein and B. Bonikowski, ‘Nationalist narratives and anti-Immigrant attitudes: exceptionalism and collective victimhood in contemporary Israel’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 47 (2021), pp. 741–761; M. Mader, ‘Stabilität und Wandel der nationalen Identität in der deutschen Bevölkerung’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 68 (2016), pp. 435–456; Raijman, Davidov, Schmidt and Hochman, ‘What Does a Nation Owe Non-Citizens?’, op. cit., Ref. 25.

32. Studying exposure to the US flag, Kemmelmeier and Winter showed that even this symbol of civic patriotism is closely linked to nationalist sentiment. See M. Kemmelmeier and D. G. Winter, ‘Sowing Patriotism, But Reaping Nationalism? Consequences of Exposure to the American Flag’, Political Psychology, 29 (2008), pp. 859–879.

33. D. Trump, as cited in Associated Press, ‘Transcript of Trump’s speech at rally before US Capitol riot’, 14 January 2021, https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

34. H. Bergsieker, ‘National Pride and Prejudice: The Case of Germany’, in I. Karolewski and A. Suszycki (Eds) Multiplicity of Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 151–173.

35. A term related to ‘coming to terms’ with the historical experience of National Socialist rule and state crimes. The translation as working-off-the-past is taken from S. Neiman, Learning from the Germans (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019).

36. E. Bruckmüller, ‘Die Entwicklung des Österreichbewusstseins’, in R. Kriechbaumer (Ed) Österreichische Nationalgeschichte nach 1945. Die Spiegel der Erinnerung: Die Sicht von innen. Österreichische Nationalgeschichte, Band 1 (Wien: Böhlau, 1998), pp. 369–396.

37. The far-right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) and its predecessor, the Verband der Unabhängigen (VdU) have traditionally advocated this position, with the VdU’s Ausseer Programm describing Austria as a ‘German state. Its politics shall serve the entire German people and must not be aimed against other German states’. This has gradually changed since the mid-1990s, even though influential FPÖ politicians such as Andreas Mölzer continued to beat the drum for their notion of German unity. See e.g. S. Frölich-Steffen, ‘Die Identitätspolitik der FPÖ: Vom Deutschnationalismus zum Österreich-Patriotismus’, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaften, 33 (2004), pp. 281–295; D. Morrow, ‘Jörg Haider and the new FPÖ: beyond the democratic pale?’, in P. Hainsworth (Ed) The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the Margins to the Mainstream (London and New York: Pinter, 2000), pp. 33–63.

38. M. Karasawa, ‘Patriotism, Nationalism, and Internationalism Among Japanese Citizens: An Emic-Etic Approach’, Political Psychology, 23 (2002), pp. 645–666

39. Karasawa, ibid., p. 654.

40. N. Sakano, ‘A comparative study of the “patriotism-nationalism” scale between Japan and the United States’, in S. Shibano (Ed) Report to the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research #01450044, 1992).

41. Kosterman and Feshbach, ‘Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes’, op. cit., Ref. 22.

42. Bengt Muthén reminds us that we often use large-N samples without realizing that populations may consist of several subgroups with quite different characteristics. Muthén, ‘Latent Variable Modeling in Heterogeneous Populations’, Psychometrika, 54 (1989), pp. 557–585.

43. E.g. O. Gabriel (Ed), Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2001); for conceptions of national identity in the GDR, see J. Palmowski, ‘Citizenship, Identity, and Community in the German Democratic Republic’, in G. Eley and J. Palmowski (Eds) Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 73–94.

44. See D. McCrone and F. Bechhofer, Understanding National Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

45. S. Smooha, Arabs and Jews in Israel. Volume 1: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989). We are, of course, well aware that this source may be considered outdated as well.

46. Blank and Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany’, op. cit., Ref. 5, p. 297.

47. Blank and Schmidt, ibid., p. 297. In general, such items are not uncommon, see e.g. R. Latcheva, ‘Nationalism versus Patriotism, or the Floating Border?’, op. cit., Ref. 21; R. Latcheva, ‘Cognitive interviewing and factor-analytic techniques: a mixed method approach to validity of survey items measuring national identity’, Quality & Quantity, 45 (2011); pp. 1175–1199; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew and Schmidt, ‘A Longitudinal Test of the Relation between German Nationalism, Patriotism, and Outgroup Derogation’, op. cit., Ref. 5.

48. Among the many items used by Bergsieker, one even explicitly mentions soccer: ‘I do not care how successful German athletes are (e.g. the soccer team)’. Bergsieker, ‘National Pride and Prejudice: The Case of Germany’, op. cit., Ref. 34, p. 152. Of course, the fact that one does not care about something is hardly indicative of anything but a lack of interest. There may be plenty of zealous nationalists who are wholly uninterested in and ‘do not care’ about how their nation performs in dance or archery competitions.

49. By beating a seemingly invincible Hungarian side (known as the Mighty Magyars) 3–2 after being 0–2 down, the German team sent shockwaves through world football, with the game soon gaining mythical status. While this sentiment was short-lived, interest in the ‘miracle’ grew again after its 50th anniversary in 2004. See D. Blecking, ‘Das “Wunder von Bern” 1954 – Zur politischen Instrumentalisierung eines Mythos’, Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, 40 (2015), pp. 197–208.

50. W. Pyta, ‘German football: a cultural history’, in A. Tomlinson and C. Young (Eds) German Football: History, Culture, Society (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–23.

51. Pyta, ibid., p. 18.

52. E.g. J. Gehring, ‘Race, ethnicity, and German identity: a media analysis of the 2010 world cup men’s national soccer team’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39 (2016), pp. 1962–1980; M. Stehle and B. Weber, ‘German Soccer, the 2010 World Cup, and Multicultural Belonging’, German Studies Review, 36 (2013), pp. 103–124; U. Merkel, ‘German football culture in the new millennium: ethnic diversity, flair and youth on and off the pitch’, Soccer & Society, 15 (2014), pp. 241–255.

53. Authors such as Kersting view the 2006 FIFA World Cup more critically, referring to it simultaneously as an ‘expression of patriotism’ and a ‘spontaneous expression of nationalism’. Kersting, ‘Sport and National Identity’, op. cit., Ref. 6, p. 278.

54. A. Gauland, as cited in Spiegel, ‘Warum sich AfD-Vize Gauland nicht für einen Rassisten hält’, 27 June 2016, https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/alexander-gauland-partei-vize-der-afd-im-interview-a-1098612.html

55. R. Poli, ‘The Denationalization of Sport: De-ethnicization of the Nation and Identity Deterritorialization’, Sport in Society, 10 (2007), pp. 646–661 (p. 654).

56. PI-News, ‘Der DFB als Werbeträger für die Umvolkung’, 16 May 2018, http://www.pi-news.net/2018/05/der-dfb-als-werbetraeger-fuer-die-umvolkung/.

57. The term Umvolkung (ethnicity inversion) denotes the concept of an alleged population replacement of ethnic Germans by (non-European and therefore non-assimilable) migrants. It is closely related to the Great Replacement conspiracy theory and refers to the same deterministic ‘demography is destiny’ narrative.

58. Black Lives Matter. Before their UEFA Euro 2020 match against England, the Mannschaft even ‘took the knee’ to protest police violence against Black people.

59. The same applies to other national teams as well. The success of the French side that won the 2018 FIFA World Cup, ‘overwhelmingly African, emphatically Black, and unapologetically Muslim’, was outwardly celebrated; yet beneath the orchestrated ‘cries of a restored national unity lurk[ed] a palpable fear of France’s rapidly growing non-white population […]’. As a result, far-right commenters have lamented that this team is not really French, does not feel French, and represents nothing to be proud of. K. Beydoun, ‘Les Bleus and Black: A Football Elegy to French Colorblindness’, Minnesota Law Review Headnotes, 103 (2018), pp. 21–29 (p. 27).

60. H. Alberts, C. Kazimierz and J. Zaniewski, The Internationalization of European Sports Teams and the Issue of National Citizenship: Can Sports Transcend Political Borders? (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011).

61. Already in 2005, Premier League club Arsenal FC made history by fielding an entirely foreign matchday squad (consisting of players from e.g. Germany, Cameroon or Spain). By 2021–22, the share of non-English players in the Premier Leagues has increased to a record 65.3%. A similar trend can be observed in other European leagues.

62. Blank and Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism?’, op. cit., Ref. 5, pp. 297–298. Both are ISSP items that also appear in other empirical studies, see e.g. Latcheva, ‘Nationalism versus Patriotism, or the Floating Border?’, op. cit., Ref. 21.

63. T. Fleckenstein, ‘The Politics of Labour Market Reforms and Social Citizenship in Germany’, West European Politics, 35 (2012), pp. 847–868.

64. G. Ariely, ‘Why does patriotism prevail? Contextual explanations of patriotism across countries’, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 24 (2017), pp. 351–377 (p. 351); see also A. MacIntyre, ‘Is patriotism a virtue?’, in D. Matravers and J. Pike (Eds) Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 286–300; for an assessment of patriotism’s role in civic education, see e.g. S. Ben-Porath, ‘Civic virtue out of necessity: Patriotism and democratic education’, Theory and Research in Education, 5 (2007), pp. 41–59; M. Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); for a general overview, see M. Costa, ‘Patriotism and Civic Virtue’, in M. Sardoč (Ed) Handbook of Patriotism (Cham: Springer, 2020), pp. 213–226.

65. E.g. F. Fukuyama, Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).

66. E.g. R. Arneson, ‘Against Patriotism and National Partiality’, in M. Sardoč (Ed) Handbook of Patriotism (Cham: Springer, 2020), pp. 429–450; D. McCabe, ‘Patriotic Gore, Again’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 35 (1997), pp. 203–223; S. Keller, ‘Patriotism as Bad Faith’, Ethics, 115 (2005), pp. 563–592. One may also reference the late George Kateb who once called patriotism ‘a mistake twice over: it is typically a grave moral error and its source is typically a state of mental confusion’. G. Kateb, ‘Is Patriotism a Mistake?’, Social Research, 67 (2000), pp. 901–924 (p. 901).

67. Mounk even likens nationalism to a half-wild animal one has to domesticate (or be torn to pieces by it). While this seems a colourful metaphor, it is not exceptional in political debates on the subject. See Y. Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

68. F. Steinmeier, ‘Speech of the German Federal President on 8 May 2020’, 8 May 2020, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede-von-bundespraesident-dr-frank-walter-steinmeier-1752232; C. Ramaphosa, ‘Address to the Nation’, 16 September 2020, http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-progress-national-effort-contain-covid-19-pandemic%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane-2.

69. Keller, ‘Patriotism as Bad Faith’, op. cit., Ref. 66, p. 590.

70. S. Keller, The Limits of Loyalty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 79

71. Hanson and O’Dwyer, ‘Patriotism and Nationalism, Left and Right’, op. cit., Ref. 5, p. 792.

72. E.g. Huddy and Khatib, ‘American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement’, op. cit., Ref. 24; Satherley, Yogeeswaran, Osborne and Sibley, ‘Differentiating between pure patriots and nationalistic patriots’, op. cit., Ref. 4; Heinrich, ‘Causal Relationship or Not? Nationalism, Patriotism, and Anti-Immigration Attitudes in Germany’, op. cit., Ref. 16.

73. Keller, The Limits of Loyalty, op. cit., Ref. 70, p. 73.

74. Müller, Verfassungspatriotismus, op. cit., Ref. 17, p. 17.

75. Müller, Verfassungspatriotismus, op. cit., Ref. 17, p. 10. One might stress that these allegedly universal principles are not universal at all. They are derived from one particular tradition and, despite posing as universal, have always been in its service. Other perspectives can be tolerated in the Habermas-inspired understanding of patriotism, but this is ‘contingent upon a compulsory deference to a political constitution […] established by the dominant [Western culture]’. Neither this constitution nor its values are supposed to be challenged or changed by e.g. immigrants who are nonetheless subject to their provisions. For De Genova, it follows that constitutional patriotism ‘retains an unseemly residue of civic nationalism deeply committed to […] the political prerogatives of “natives”’. N. De Genova, ‘Migration and Race in Europe: The Trans-Atlantic Metastases of a Post-Colonial Cancer’, European Journal of Social Theory, 13 (2010), pp. 415–419 (p. 411).

76. It could be argued that there are convinced democrats even in the most oppressive non-democracies, and this is certainly correct. But to be loyal to e.g. democratic institutions and procedures, more than an inner commitment is needed – namely, the existence of such institutions and procedures. If there is no democratic procedure at all, there is also no procedure one could be loyal to; it would be the same as being loyal to Napoleon III. or the House of Gryffindor. One may of course say that one is loyal to the idea of the procedure in an abstract sense, but this is not the same as being loyal to the procedure in the sense of a material reality.

77. Ariely, ‘Constitutional patriotism, liberal nationalism and membership in the nation’, op. cit., Ref. 22; Davidov, ‘Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP’, op. cit., Ref. 16.

78. Ariely and Davidov work primarily with democratic OECD countries, although the latter’s sample includes borderline cases such as Russia or Venezuela. However, the relevant question is not if non-democracies have been covered in practice but if they could be covered in theory.

79. Blank and Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany’, op. cit., Ref. 5, p. 298.

80. Others use this item as well. For instance, Huddy and Khatib ask their respondents if they are ‘proud of their country’s social system?’ Huddy and Khatib, ‘American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement’, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 68. So do, inter alia, Ariely ‘Constitutional patriotism, liberal nationalism and membership in the nation’, op. cit., Ref. 22; Davidov, ‘Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP’, op. cit., Ref. 16; Latcheva, ‘Nationalism versus Patriotism, or the Floating Border?’, op. cit., Ref. 21.

81. Billig pointedly remarked that ‘liberal Western academics find it easier to recognize nationalism in others than in themselves’. M. Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), p. 15. The formula our patriotism – their nationalism is indeed often employed to distinguish between the benevolent patriotism of ‘advanced’ nations and the dull and primitive nationalism those ‘less advanced’ espouse. Eventually, patriotism and nationalism become civilizationist categories that indicate different degrees of social development.

82. E.g. Hanson and O’Dwyer, ‘Patriotism and Nationalism, Left and Right’, op. cit., Ref. 5; Kosterman and Feshbach, ‘Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes’, op. cit., Ref. 22; Satherley, Yogeeswaran, Osborne and Sibley, ‘Differentiating between pure patriots and nationalistic patriots’, op. cit., Ref. 4.

83. Huddy and Khatib, ‘American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement’, op. cit., Ref. 24.

84. G. Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), pp. 1033–1053 (p. 1034).

85. J. Gerring, ‘What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences’, Polity, 31 (1999), pp. 357–393.

86. Ariely, ‘The nexus between globalization and ethnic identity’, op. cit., Ref. 2, p. 770.