Abstract
Non-democratic regional powers are increasingly blamed for authoritarian backlashes in formerly democratising countries, or for the persistence of entrenched autocratic regimes in their neighbourhood. Yet there is a striking scarcity of theoretical deliberations as to why powerful autocracies should prefer autocratic neighbours over democratic ones. Employing a rational-choice model that links foreign policy behaviour to the logic of domestic politics, this article develops a theoretical argument why, and under which circumstances, autocratic regional powers should be expected to attempt to impact upon governance structures in their regional environment. Combining a political economy perspective with findings from transition literature, the authors conclude that, all else equal, autocratic regional powers have strong incentives to favour similar political systems in nearby states, but that this interest must be weighted against an overarching interest in political stability. The article discusses these theoretical findings against the backdrop of country cases in the regional environments of Russia and China.
Acknowledgment
Research to this paper was conducted within the DIE project ‘The Impact of Russia, India and China on Governance Structures in their Regional Environment (RICGOV)’, enabled by funding from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The paper has benefited from comments by Jörg Faust, Oliver Schlumberger, Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and two anonymous referees. Earlier versions were also discussed at the ECPR 2009 Convention in Potsdam and the 2009 Millennium Annual Conference in London. All responsibility, of course, remains solely with the authors.
Notes
It is symptomatic that Linz's (Citation1975 reissued as Linz Citation2000) classic study on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes is still unrivalled in its treatment of the subject and was reissued almost unaltered (with only a new introduction) in 2000.
As Ray (Citation2003, p. 229) notes, some incarnations of realism have taken domestic factors into account.
Statistical analyses have also rebutted the realist objection that the democratic peace was an exceptional historical phenomenon of the post-Cold War period – driven by political alliances rather than regime-type characteristics – by controlling for common interests. See Gelpi and Griesdorf Citation2001.
In fact, it is almost by definition that changes in regime type do not take place in stable polities except for truly extraordinary circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances might exist when a ‘benevolent autocrat’ relinquishes his unrestricted powers and opens up the way for democracy without immediate pressure having been put on him. Bhutan may have seen such a rare scenario.
See also Nicole Jackson Citation(2010).